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ABSTRACT 
 
The Tonle Sap is rich in fisheries, biodiversity and natural resources, which makes it a 
very important space for livelihood and environmental security for Cambodians. This 
research utilizes core political geography concepts, such as space, place, territoriality, 
territory and scale to examine the complex political and human landscape of the Lake, and 
also to explore why the politics of space is inherently significant to resource governance 
issues. In addition to researching the multi-layered political geographies of this freshwater 
lake, the thesis also considers non-territorial social and power relations within patron-client, 
money-lending and trading “moy” system relations. 
 
The thesis examines the Tonle Sap as a ‘global’, ‘regional’ and ‘national’ space, 
particularly through the study of official and abstract representations of the Lake-space by 
different international, state and non-state agencies. At the meso-level, the thesis explores the 
territorialization of the Tonle Sap, primarily through three key forms of territoriality – 
commercial fishing, conservation of environment and biodiversity, and forms of ‘public 
fishing’.  
 
To examine the differing boundaries, territories and contestations over space in the 
Lake, the research focused on four different fishing villages – Kampong La. Kampong Loung, 
Kampong Phluk and Peam Bang. Due to the annual ‘flood pulse’, and great transformations 
in the wetlands, floodplain, and extent of the lake waters between dry and wet seasons, social 
– ecological relations also affect the spatiality of fishing and territoriality of different 
communities. This thesis focuses on key differences between ‘floating villages’ (permanently 
on the water), ‘stand-stilt villages’ (static but half year dry and half year surrounded by 
water), and farming-fishing communities (rice paddy areas with fishing to supplement 
incomes).    
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Thus the key contributions of the thesis are in the detailed examination of social-
ecological, political geographic and political economic relations within the resource realm of 
the Tonle Sap. Hitherto, there are no serious studies of the politics of space and territoriality 
in relation to resources, livelihoods and ‘nature’ within the Tonle Sap. Ultimately, this thesis 
wishes to explore how and why current governance practices and spatial politics are failing to 
protect fisheries, to ensure livelihood security to the majority of people living on and around 
the Lake, or to secure environmental sustainability.  
 
  iv 
Acknowledgements 
 
I grew up in the so-called ‘killing fields’ of the Khmer Rouge era, where I lost my 
father. After this era, I had a strong belief that I had no opportunity to go to school and further 
my studies. However, I have experienced many life transforming events, meeting and 
knowing many people who have been influential in altering my life chances; and part of my 
acknowledgements is to thank all those people, including family members, work colleagues, 
friends and mentors who have helped me to take up the challenge of life-long study and self-
improvement. Eventually, I became an activist working for the Fisheries Action Coalition 
Team (FACT) of Cambodia, where I have become passionately involved in resource politics 
and livelihood security issues. Further encouraged to understand more about the dynamics of 
the Lake and also in an effort to improve my position within Cambodia, I sought to undertake 
higher level academic research. As a result, my dream for better education finally came true 
through the opportunity to study a PhD at the National University of Singapore (NUS). I am 
very grateful to all those at NUS who have made this possible. 
 
The part of my life I have spent working towards my PhD at NUS has been another 
episode of such a life drama, but with one difference; it has been a privileged time, and a most 
profound one. Not only for me, but also my wife and my four children (three daughters and 
one son) join me in undertaking my PhD. Without my wife, it would be impossible for me to 
research and write this thesis, and thus, she deserves this Degree as much as I do. It has been 
four years of vibrant intellectual stimulation, hard work, and challenging effort within an 
extremely supportive community of friends, colleagues, and mentors. I take this opportunity 
to express my deepest gratitude to those who have inspired and supported me in the pursuit of 
my passion.  
 
First of all, no one deserves more credit for inspiring me in my intellectual quest than 
my Supervisor, Dr. Carl Grundy-Warr. His strong support, political geographic knowledge, 
  v 
and enthusiasm provided me with the great self-confidence and additional motivation needed 
to finish my thesis. His patience, support, guidance, wide-ranging scholarship, and personal 
research experience within Southeast Asia have helped to navigate me through the perplexing 
and unfamiliar intellectual rapids of undertaking a thesis. 
  
My special thanks and appreciation are also extended to A/P Victor Savage, for his 
guidance and advice throughout my study at the NUS. Furthermore, I would like to express 
my sincerest thank and gratitude to A/P Lu Xixi for his comments, support, friendly advice 
and faith in me.  I have special thanks for the former Head of the Geography department, A/P 
Shirlena Huang, who has always been encouraging, and the current Acting Head, Professor 
Henry Yeung, who has wished me due diligence in my final submission phase. Everybody at 
my ‘academic home’, the Department of Geography at the NUS have given me support and 
inspired me to complete this task. Thanks are also warmly extended to the non-academic 
staff, especially Ms. Lee Poi Leng  (Pauline) for  kind support, administrative reminders, and 
able assistance in the whole bureaucratic and technical dimension of the PhD process. 
 
Thanks to friends, colleagues and staff of the Fisheries Action Coalition Team 
(FACT) for their priceless contributions to my research, and facilitation of my fieldwork in 
the Tonle Sap; particularly Mr. Ronald Jones, Technical Advisor of FACT, for his editing 
advice on a couple of chapters; and Dr. Carl Middleton, former staff of FACT (now a lecturer 
at Chulalongkorn University in Thailand and researcher for the International Rivers Network) 
for his comments and partial editing of Chapter 4.  
 
I deeply thank villagers in Kampong Phluk, Kampong Loung, Kampong La and Peam 
Bang, for their information, accommodation, warm hospitality, and food provided to me 
during my field research. Their honesty, friendliness, and generosity can never be adequately 
compensated.  
 
  vi 
This study has received great support and encouragement from my mother, my 
mother in law, my step-father, my brothers and sister, and my brothers and sisters in law. A 
true Cambodian family effort! They tirelessly and constantly supported me in this research 
and they have helped my nuclear family during my absence.  
 
Finally, I dedicate this work to my family (nuclear and extended), especially to my 
wife—Pen Rasmey; my daughters—Socheata, Solinda and Pich Pissey; and my son—
Sopanha. I also dedicate this work to ‘the soul’ of my dear departed father (Keo Phorn), who 
cruelly died in the Khmer Rouge era. I would like to think that this thesis is in part a memory 
and a part of him. 
 
I have been fortunate to have family and relatives, mentors, friends and colleagues in 
Cambodia and Singapore who have nurtured my courage to undertake this endeavor and I 
dedicate this achievement to all of them.  
 
MAK SITHIRITH – November, 2010 
 
 
  vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................... II 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................................................IV 
TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................................... VII 
FIGURES ..............................................................................................................................................XI 
TABLES ................................................................................................................................................XI 
MAPS .................................................................................................................................................. XII 
ACRONYMS AND CAMBODIAN TERMS ..................................................................................XIII 
CHAPTER ONE..................................................................................................................................... 1 
THE TONLE SAP: POWER, SPACE AND RESOURCES,.............................................................. 1 
1.1 THE CONTESTED SPACE IN THE TONLE SAP LAKE .......................................................................... 1 
1.2 MAIN THEMES OF THESIS ............................................................................................................... 7 
1.3 KEY AIMS..................................................................................................................................... 10 
1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS..................................................................................................... 10 
CHAPTER 2 ......................................................................................................................................... 14 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEMES: POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, POWER, SPACE AND 
RESOURCES ....................................................................................................................................... 14 
2.1 WHY POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY? .................................................................................................... 14 
2.2 POWER, POLITICS AND POLICY ..................................................................................................... 17 
2.3 POLITICS OF SPACE: KEY CONCEPTS – PLACE, SPACE AND TERRITORY ....................................... 20 
2.3.1 Politics of ‘Place’ ................................................................................................................ 20 
2.3.2 ‘Abstract’ versus ‘Lived Space’ ........................................................................................... 22 
2.3.3 ‘Politics of Scale’, ‘Terrains of Resistance’, ‘Spaces of Dependence’ and ‘Spaces of 
Engagement’ ................................................................................................................................. 24 
2.3.4 ‘Territory’ and Territorial Politics ...................................................................................... 28 
2.3.5 Property, Law and Geography............................................................................................. 32 
2.3.6 State Territorialization and Human Territoriality ............................................................... 35 
2.4 POLITICAL GEOGRAPHIES OF THE MEKONG BASIN ....................................................................... 39 
2.5 POWER AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY IN CAMBODIA..................................................................... 43 
2.6 POLITICAL GEOGRAPHIES OF FISHERIES IN A FRESHWATER LAKE................................................ 45 
2.6.1 Governance Spaces, Privatization, and Resource Exploitation........................................... 48 
2.6.2 Threats to Livelihood Security ............................................................................................. 49 
2.6.3 The Politics of Knowledge ................................................................................................... 51 
2.6.4 Human-Ecology Relations and Territoriality in a Freshwater Lake ................................... 53 
CHAPTER 3 ......................................................................................................................................... 56 
METHODOLOGY............................................................................................................................... 56 
3.1 ENGAGEMENT AS ACTIVIST AND ACADEMIC ................................................................................ 56 
3.2 APPROACH AND METHODS ........................................................................................................... 58 
3.2.1 Micro-level Fieldwork ......................................................................................................... 59 
3.2.2 Ethnographic fieldwork and human geography................................................................... 60 
3.2.3 Ethnographies of ‘lived space’ and notions of ‘the Field’................................................... 61 
3.2.4 Relating abstract concepts to ‘everyday life’....................................................................... 64 
3.2.5 Relating the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro’ ..................................................................................... 65 
3.3 REFLEXIVITY AND POSITIONALITY ............................................................................................... 66 
3.4 POLITICS OF RESEARCH................................................................................................................. 68 
3.5 OTHER RESEARCH METHODS ....................................................................................................... 70 
3.5.1 Semi-structured Individual and Group Interviews............................................................... 70 
3.5.2 Archival and Published Document Research....................................................................... 72 
3.6 SITE SELECTION ........................................................................................................................... 72 
3.6.1 Household Selection ............................................................................................................ 79 
3.7 EXECUTING THE FIELD WORK ...................................................................................................... 80 
  viii 
3.7.1 Research Problems .............................................................................................................. 85 
3.7.2 Research and Data Collection before Beginning My Thesis ............................................... 88 
3.7.3 Reliability and Limitation .................................................................................................... 90 
3.8 RESEARCH RATIONALE................................................................................................................. 91 
CHAPTER 4 ......................................................................................................................................... 94 
SPATIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE IN THE TONLE SAP
................................................................................................................................................................ 94 
4.1 PRODUCING SPACE IN THE TONLE SAP ......................................................................................... 94 
4.2 POWER AND REPRESENTATIONS OF SPACE ................................................................................... 99 
4.3 THE ‘GLOBAL SPACE’ OF THE TONLE SAP .................................................................................. 101 
4.3.1 The Global significance of biodiversity in the Tonle Sap .................................................. 102 
4.3.2 Specialization and Rationalization of the Tonle Sap as a Conservation Space ................. 104 
4.4 THE ‘REGIONAL SPACE’ OF THE TONLE SAP............................................................................... 105 
4.4.1 The ‘pulsing ecosystem’ and ‘heartbeat’ of the Mekong ................................................... 106 
4.4.2 The Tonle Sap as an integral part of the Lower Mekong fisheries .................................... 108 
4.4.3 Regional impacts and external ecological threats on the Tonle Sap ................................. 110 
4.4.4 Regional institutions and the Tonle Sap ............................................................................ 113 
4.4.4.1 The Mekong River Commission (MRC) ....................................................................................113 
4.4.4.2 Cambodia’s National Mekong Committee .................................................................................115 
4.4.4.3 Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS): Rationalizing 
Space in the Tonle Sap ...........................................................................................................................116 
4.5 TONLE SAP AS A ‘NATIONAL’ RESOURCE AND SOVEREIGN SPACE ............................................. 121 
4.5.1 Safety Net, Communal Bank and ‘Space of Dependence’.................................................. 121 
4.5.2 State control and commercialization of the Tonle Sap ...................................................... 125 
4.5.3 ‘Public Fishing Space’ in the Tonle Sap............................................................................ 127 
4.6 THE MANAGEMENT OF THE TONLE SAP ..................................................................................... 128 
4.6.1 Fisheries Administration.................................................................................................... 128 
4.6.2 The Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve Secretariat—Induced by Global Actor such as UNDP 129 
4.7 THE TONLE SAP BASIN MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................. 131 
4.7.1 The Tonle Sap Basin Authority .......................................................................................... 134 
4.8 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 136 
CHAPTER 5 ....................................................................................................................................... 138 
HUMAN-NATURE INTERACTIONS, EVERYDAY SPACES OF DEPENDENCE, AND 
COMMUNITY-LEVEL TERRITORIALITIES OF THE TONLE SAP...................................... 138 
5.1 CONNECTIONS BETWEEN ‘LANDSCAPE’, ‘BELONGING’ AND ‘PLACE’ WITHIN THE WATER WORLD
......................................................................................................................................................... 140 
5.2 SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF TERRITORIALITY AND TERRITORIES..................................... 143 
5.3 HUMAN-NATURE INTERACTIONS AND THE ‘PULSING ECOSYSTEM’............................................ 146 
5.4 FISHING COMMUNITIES IN THE TONLE SAP................................................................................. 147 
5.5 THE ‘FLOOD PULSE’ AND TERRITORIALITIES OF FISHING VILLAGES IN THE TONLE SAP ............ 150 
5.6 MAPS, POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY AND COMMUNITY SPACES ........................................................ 156 
5.7 FLOATING TERRITORIALITY ....................................................................................................... 159 
5.7.1 Mobile Territoriality .......................................................................................................... 159 
5.7.1.1 ‘Floating territory’ of a floating community...............................................................................160 
5.7.1.2 Restricted boundaries of a floating community ..........................................................................162 
5.7.2 Vertical territoriality of a floating community................................................................... 164 
5.7.2.1 Mobile Vertical Territoriality .....................................................................................................164 
5.7.2.2 Vertical territoriality: Floating up and down without changing location....................................168 
5.8 “PULSING TERRITORIALITY” ...................................................................................................... 177 
5.8.1 Human terrestrial territoriality in Kampong Phluk........................................................... 178 
5.8.2 Terrestrial territoriality ..................................................................................................... 180 
5.8.3 Aquatic territoriality of Kampong Phluk ........................................................................... 186 
5.9 FARMING-FISHING TERRITORIALITY IN THE TONLE SAP LAKE.................................................... 187 
5.10 EVERYDAY FORMS OF CONFLICT AND RESISTANCE OF FISHING COMMUNITIES IN THE TONLE SAP
......................................................................................................................................................... 193 
5.10.1 The ‘closing water gate’ across the fishing lot area........................................................ 194 
5.10.2 The ‘extension of fishing lot boundaries’......................................................................... 195 
5.10.3 The sale of open access fishing areas .............................................................................. 196 
  ix 
5.10.4 Conflicts between agriculture and fishing ....................................................................... 197 
5.11 ‘EVERYDAY SPACE’ AND ‘EVERYDAY PRACTICES’ ................................................................... 198 
5.11.1 Everyday practices for fishers in the fishing lots ............................................................. 199 
5.12 THE FRESHWATER LAKE AS AN ECOLOGICAL-POLITICAL-TERRITORIAL ‘MATRIX’ .................... 200 
CHAPTER 6 ....................................................................................................................................... 201 
TERRITORIALITIES AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHIES OF A FRESHWATER LAKE.... 201 
6.1 POLITICAL TERRITORIALITY, ACCESS AND RESOURCE POLITICS ................................................ 202 
6.2 TERRITORIES, POWER AND BIO-POWER...................................................................................... 204 
6.3 STATE TERRITORIALIZATION AND RESOURCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA .......................................... 207 
6.4 TERRITORIALIZATION AND MAPPING IN CAMBODIA................................................................... 210 
6.5 FRESHWATER LAKE TERRITORIALITY AND THE TONLE SAP ....................................................... 212 
6.6 THE COMMERCIAL FISHING TERRITORIALITY............................................................................. 214 
6.6.1 The Commercial Fishing Lot Territory in the Tonle Sap................................................... 214 
6.6.2 The Power of the Fishing Lot Owners ............................................................................... 216 
6.6.3 The Management of the Fishing Lots in the Tonle Sap...................................................... 220 
6.6.3.1 The Fishing lot Territoriality in the Tonle Sap ...........................................................................220 
6.6.3.2 The Controls of the Fishing Lots................................................................................................223 
6.6.4 Boundary of Fishing Lots in the Tonle Sap........................................................................ 226 
6.6.4.1 The Floated Boundary of a Commercial Fishing Lot .................................................................227 
6.6.4.2 The Fixed Boundary of the Fishing Lot .....................................................................................228 
6.6.4.3 Fishing Lot Tenure System ........................................................................................................230 
6.7 THE CONSERVATION TERRITORIALITY ....................................................................................... 232 
6.7.1 The Fish Sanctuary ............................................................................................................ 232 
6.7.2 The Biosphere Reserve Territoriality................................................................................. 234 
6.7.2.1 The Transition Zone ...................................................................................................................235 
6.7.2.2 The Buffer Zone .........................................................................................................................236 
6.7.2.3 The Core Zone............................................................................................................................238 
6.8 THE SUBSISTENCE TERRITORIALITY IN THE TONLE SAP ............................................................. 240 
6.8.1 The Subsistence Territoriality ............................................................................................ 241 
6.8.1.1 Boundary of Public Fishing Area ...............................................................................................242 
6.8.1.2 The Control of the Public Fishing Area......................................................................................243 
6.8.2 Re-territorialization of the Public Fishing Area ................................................................ 244 
6.8.2.1 Boundary and Map of Community Fishery ................................................................................246 
6.8.2.2 Fish Sanctuary as Control Strategy ............................................................................................247 
6.9. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 252 
CHAPTER 7 ....................................................................................................................................... 254 
POLITICS OF FISHERY SCALES IN THE TONLE SAP........................................................... 254 
7.1 THE POLITICS OF SCALE IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY .................................................................. 255 
7.2 THE SCALE OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN THE TONLE SAP ..................................................... 259 
7.2.1 The Geographical Scale of Fisheries Management in the Tonle Sap Lake........................ 260 
7.2.2 Fishing Scales and Fishery Management .......................................................................... 263 
7.2.3 Temporal Scale of Fisheries Management......................................................................... 267 
7.3 POLITICS OF SCALE IN THE TONLE SAP....................................................................................... 268 
7.3.1 Politics of Commercial Fishing in the Tonle Sap .............................................................. 268 
7.3.1.1 Politics, Patronage and Power in Commercial Fisheries ............................................................268 
7.3.1.2 Fishing Lots and Sub-Lots..........................................................................................................271 
7.3.2 Politics of Small-Scale Fishing .......................................................................................... 272 
7.3.2.1 The Settlement Scale and Community Types in the Tonle Sap..................................................273 
7.3.2.2 Fishing Household Scales...........................................................................................................282 
7.3.2.3 The Survival Scale for Fishing Communities in the Tonle Sap..................................................287 
7.4 CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................... 289 
CHAPTER 8 ....................................................................................................................................... 290 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISHING IN THE TONLE SAP: COMMERCIALIZED 
SPACES, PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONS, AND THE MOY SYSTEM................................... 290 
8.1 RESOURCE ECONOMY TRANSFORMED ........................................................................................ 290 
8.2 CAMBODIA’S “HYBRID” DEMOCRACY, “TRANSITIONAL” POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PATRON-
CLIENT RELATIONS .......................................................................................................................... 292 
  x 
8.3 RICE–FISH ECONOMY OF FISHING COMMUNITY IN THE TONLE SAP ........................................... 297 
8.3.1 Traditional Forms of Patron-Client Relations in the Rice–Fish Economy........................ 297 
8.3.2 Territorialization of the Tonle Sap and the neakleu – neak tonle relations ....................... 302 
8.4 MARKET ECONOMY OF FISHING COMMUNITY IN THE TONLE SAP .............................................. 304 
8.5 CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF PATRON-CLIENT SYSTEM IN FISHING COMMUNITY IN THE TONLE SAP
......................................................................................................................................................... 309 
8.6 MOY AS A PATRON-CLIENT SYSTEM OF FISHING COMMUNITY IN THE TONLE SAP..................... 313 
8.6.1 Fishing and Fish Selling in the Tonle Sap ......................................................................... 314 
8.6.2 The Moy System of Fish Trading in the Tonle Sap ............................................................ 318 
8.6.3 Money lending as Vital Part in the “Moy System”............................................................ 322 
8.6 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 325 
CHAPTER 9 ....................................................................................................................................... 327 
CONCLUSION: SPACE, RESOURCES AND PEOPLE............................................................... 327 
9.1 CURRENT CRISIS IN FISHERIES GOVERNANCE ............................................................................ 327 
9.2 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS....................................................................................................... 329 
9.3 COMPETING REPRESENTATIONS OF SPACE ................................................................................. 330 
9.4 CONTESTED BOUNDARIES AND EVERYDAY TERRITORIALITIES .................................................. 336 
9.5 SCALES OF FISHING .................................................................................................................... 340 
9.6 NON-TERRITORIAL AND TERRITORIAL “POWER WEBS” ............................................................. 342 
9.7 STRESSING ‘LOCALIZED’ FORMS OF MANAGEMENT................................................................... 350 
9.8 POLICY IMPLICATIONS ................................................................................................................ 352 
9.8.1 Implication of Spatial Arrangements ................................................................................. 352 
9.8.2 Fisheries Law..................................................................................................................... 354 
9.8.3 Social-ecological Relations and Livelihood Security......................................................... 355 
9.8.4 Community Organizing and Sustaining Resource Stewardship......................................... 356 
9.9 FUTURE RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS.............................................................................................. 360 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................................. 362 
APPENDIX ......................................................................................................................................... 385 
APPENDIX ONE: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INTERVIEWING THE OFFICIALS ............................................. 385 
APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INTERVIEWING VILLAGER ......................................................... 388 
APPENDIX 3: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION ......................................................................................... 396 
APPENDIX 4: FISHING LOT NUMBERS AND AREA ............................................................................. 397 
APPENDIX 5: FISHING OCCUPATION ................................................................................................. 398 
APPENDIX 6: PICTURE OF FISHING VILLAGES................................................................................... 400 
 
  xi 
List of Figures, Tables and Maps 
Figures 
FIGURE 1. 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY AND ECOLOGY OF THE TONLE SAP 11 
FIGURE 2. 1: ADAPTED FROM JONES ET AL., (2004) ................................................................................. 18 
FIGURE 4. 1: THE CONTESTED AND ABSTRACT SPACES OF THE TONLE SAP .......................................... 136 
FIGURE 5. 1: WATER LEVEL IN THE TONLE SAP MEASURED IN KAMPONG LOUNG (MRC, 2005) .......... 154 
FIGURE 5.2: TERRITORIAL SYSTEM OF STAND-STILT COMMUNITIES STUDIED IN KAMPONG PHLUK ...... 155 
FIGURE 5.3: MOBILE TERRITORIALITY OF FLOATING COMMUNITY ........................................................ 163 
FIGURE 5.4: MOBILE VERTICAL TERRITORIALITY OF FLOATING COMMUNITY........................................ 165 
FIGURE 5.5: TERRITORIAL SYSTEM OF FARMING-CUM-FISHING COMMUNITY IN THE TONLE SAP .......... 191 
FIGURE 6. 1: GENERAL STRUCTURE AND ARRANGEMENT OF FISHING LOT (ADOPTED FROM VUTHY ET AL., 
2000). .......................................................................................................................................... 221 
FIGURE 6. 2: TERRITORIALITY OF FRESHWATER LAKE........................................................................... 252 
FIGURE 8. 1: THE RECIPROCAL FISH – RICE ECONOMY OF THE TONLE SAP .......................................... 302 
FIGURE 8. 2: MARKET RELATIONS IN THE TONLE SAP .......................................................................... 305 
FIGURE 8. 3: DUAL ECONOMY OF FISHING COMMUNITIES IN THE TONLE SAP ........................................ 307 
FIGURE 8. 4: THE MOY SYSTEM OF FISH TRADING IN THE TONLE SAP ................................................... 314 
FIGURE 9. 1: FISHERS TRAPPED IN THE ‘POWER WEB’ OF CORRUPTED OFFICIALS .................................. 344 
FIGURE 9. 2: FISHERS IN THE ‘POWER WEB’ IN THE FISHING LOT SYSTEM .............................................. 345 
FIGURE 9. 3: THE ‘MOY’ SYSTEM IN THE TONLE SAP............................................................................. 347 
FIGURE 9. 4: FISHERS TRAPPED IN THE ‘POWER WEBS’ OF FISH TRADERS IN THE TONLE SAP ................ 348 




TABLE 1. 1: ADMINISTRATIVE SPACE IN THE TONLE SAP AND POPULATION BY PROVINCE ........................ 3 
TABLE 3. 1: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDIED COMMUNITIES IN THE TONLE SAP ................................ 73 
TABLE 3. 2: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HOUSEHOLDS INTERVIEWED IN THE STUDY AREAS
...................................................................................................................................................... 80 
TABLE 4. 1: MAJOR HYDROPOWER DAMS IN THE MEKONG RIVER BASIN............................................. 110 
TABLE 4. 2: MAJOR WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN THE MEKONG BASIN..................... 111 
TABLE 4. 3: FISHING POPULATION IN THE TONLE SAP AND NATIONAL POPULATION ............................. 122 
TABLE 4. 4: THE CATCH OF SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES BY PROVINCE IN THE TONLE SAP ........................ 123 
TABLE 5. 1: TYPOLOGY OF FISHING VILLAGES BY PROVINCE IN THE TONLE SAP................................... 150 
TABLE 5. 2: THE SIZE OF THE FLOATING HOUSE BY HOUSEHOLD CATEGORIES....................................... 161 
TABLE 5. 3: THE HOUSE SPACE BY HOUSE CATEGORY ........................................................................... 171 
TABLE 5. 4: THE VILLAGE SPACE BY VILLAGE ....................................................................................... 171 
TABLE 6. 1: THE FISHING LOT GUARDS AND WEAPONS BY SELECTED PROVINCE IN THE TONLE SAP ..... 231 
TABLE 6. 2: THE FISH SANCTUARY IN THE TONLE SAP LAKE ................................................................ 234 
TABLE 6. 3: THE CORE ZONES IN THE TONLE SAP LAKE ....................................................................... 238 
TABLE 6. 4: THE CATEGORIZATION OF THE TONLE SAP BY A FUNCTIONAL AREA .................................. 241 
TABLE 6. 5: THE COMMUNITY FISHERIES AROUND THE TONLE SAP....................................................... 245 
TABLE 6. 6: COMMUNITY FISHERY IN THE TONLE SAP BY PROVINCE .................................................... 246 
TABLE 6. 7: COMMUNITY FISHERIES BY PROVINCE AROUND THE TONLE SAP LAKE .............................. 250 
TABLE 7. 1: FISHING SCALE OF THE FRESHWATER CAPTURE FISHERIES IN THE TONLE SAP ................. 260 
TABLE 7. 2: FISHING GEARS COMMONLY USED VARIOUS SCALES OF FISHERIES..................................... 264 
TABLE 7. 3: GEOGRAPHICAL LANDSCAPE OF STUDIED COMMUNITIES .................................................. 274 
TABLE 7. 4: LIVELIHOOD ACTIVITIES BY FISHING COMMUNITIES IN THE TONLE SAP ............................. 275 
TABLE 7. 5: THE CATEGORIZATION OF FISHING GEAR............................................................................ 277 
TABLE 7. 6: THE SCALE IN HOUSEHOLD FISHING BY DIFFERENT FISHING COMMUNITY .......................... 283 
TABLE 7. 7: OWNERSHIP OF FISHING GEAR BY COMMUNITY TYPES AND HOUSEHOLD STATUS............... 284 
TABLE 7. 8: SCALE OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN THE TONLE SAP .................................................... 288 
TABLE 8. 1: THE COMMUNITY FISHERIES AROUND THE TONLE SAP....................................................... 303 
TABLE 8. 2: FISHING AREAS FOR FISHERMEN BY SEASON ...................................................................... 315 
TABLE 8. 3: DAILY FISH CATCH OF FISHING HOUSEHOLD LEVEL IN DIFFERENT FISHING VILLAGE IN PEAM 
BANG........................................................................................................................................... 316 
TABLE 8. 4: THE FISH SALE BY FISHERS IN PEAM BANG ........................................................................ 317 
  xii 
TABLE 8. 5: FISH TRADER BY FISHING COMMUNITIES ............................................................................ 319 
TABLE 8. 6: THE MOBILE FISH BUYER AND THEIR TARGET FISHING VILLAGE......................................... 322 




MAP 1. 1: MAP OF THE TONLE SAP LAKE (ADOPTED FROM KUMMU ET AL., 2006) .................................... 8 
MAP 3. 1: MAP OF THE STUDY AREAS IN THE TONLE SAP LAKE .............................................................. 75 
MAP 4. 1: MAP OF THE TONLE SAP LAKE IN THE MEKONG REGION (ADOPTED FROM CNMC, 2004) ... 118 
MAP 4. 2: MAP SHOWING THE COMPLEX SPACE OF THE TONLE SAP (MOE, 2005)................................. 124 
MAP 5. 1: THE OVERLAPPED SPACE OF FISHING LOTS AND THE BIOSPHERE RESERVE ........................... 172 
MAP 5. 2: THE ZONING OF KAMPONG PHLUK (ADOPTED FROM AFN, 2004)......................................... 183 
MAP 6. 1: MAP OF THE FISHING LOTS IN THE TONLE SAP LAKE............................................................ 218 
MAP 6. 2: MAP OF THE BIOSPHERE RESERVES AREAS IN THE TONLE SAP LAKE................................... 237 
MAP 6. 3: MAP OF COMMUNITY FISHERIES IN THE TONLE SAP LAKE .................................................... 249 
  xiii
  ACRONYMS AND CAMBODIAN TERMS 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
ASL Above Sea Level 
CB Collective Fish Buyer 
CDRI Cambodia Development Resource Institute 
CF Community Fishery 
CFDS Cambodia Family Development Service 
CMDG Cambodia Millennium Development Goal 
CNMC Cambodia National Mekong Committee 
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency 
DoF Fisheries Administration 
EIA Environment Impact Assessment  
EJF Environmental Justice Foundation 
FA Forest Administration 
FACT Fisheries Action Coalition Team 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization 
FiA Fisheries Administration 
GEF Global Environment Facility  
GIS Geographical Information System 
GMS Great Mekong Sub-region  
GPS Global Positioning System 
GTZ German Technical Cooperation 
MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
MFB Mobile Fish Buyer 
MIME Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy 
MoE Ministry of Environment 
MoP Ministry of Planning 
Moy regular clients 
MoWRAM Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology 
MRC Mekong River Commission 
NAPA National Adaptation Programme of Action to Climate Change 
Neakleu High Lander 
Neak tonle  River People 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization  
PRA Participatory Rapid Appraisal 
RGC Royal Government of Cambodia 
Seila foundation  
Sreleu higher ricefield 
Srekrom lower rice field 
TSBA Tonle Sap Basin Authority 
TSBO The Tonle Sap Basin Organization 
TSBR The Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
UNEP United Nations Environment Program  
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
WB World Bank 
WUP Water Utilization Program 
  xiv 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Tonle Sap: Power, Space and Resources, 
 
1.1 The Contested Space in the Tonle Sap Lake  
 
Cambodia proverb says: “mean teuk, mean trey,”—where there is water, 
there is fish; But what if the fish deplete due to bad governance? 
 
CAMBODIA covers an area of 181,035 km2. It borders Vietnam in the east, 
Laos in the northeast, and Thailand in the north and west. The gulf of Thailand 
borders Cambodia in the south (World Bank 2004). It is agrarian country where large 
space of the country is used for rice cultivation. Agriculture is the main industry of 
the country and it was an engine to build the Angkor Empire before 12th centuries 
when three or four rice harvest was possible during Angkor period because of rich 
alluvial soil and the water storage system. Another factor contributing to the building 
of the Angkor Empire and the state was the particularly helpful conduct of the Tonle 
Sap as illustrated by various scholars: 
 
“In this country, it rains half of the year; in the other half, it hardly rains at 
all. From the fourth to the ninth month, it rains every afternoon, and the 
water level of the Great Lake can reach seven or eight fathoms 
[approximately 50 feet]. The big trees are drowned; only their tops can be 
seen. People who lived on the shores all go away to the mountains. Later, 
from the tenth month to the third [of the following year’, not a drop of rain 
falls, and the Great Lake can be navigated only by small boats…] The 
people come back down at this point and plant their rice” (The account of 
Chou Ta-Kuant to Angkor between 1296-1297 quoted in Chandler, 
1992:74). 
 
“The miracle of the Tonle Sap amazed many travelers to Angkor. As long 
as the region supported a large population, the deposit left by receding 
water provided useful  nutrients for the soil. Even after Angkor was 
abandoned, the lake remained the most densely populated by natural 
fishbowl in the world, providing generation of Cambodians with much of 
the protein for diet” (Chandler, 1992:74).  
 
“Jayavarman centered the [Khmer] kingdom on the region of the [Tonle 
Sap] Great Lake. Rich in fish and fertile of rice on the lake’s alluvial plain, 
the area was capable of sustaining a great population, the basis of the rise 
of the dynasty that he founded.” (Kamm, 1998:17).  
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These accounts illustrate that the Tonle Sap Lake has been a rich source of fish and 
rice for people living near its shores for many centuries. Rice and fish were essential elements 
underlying the ‘power’ of the Khmer as stated in the old Khmer Proverb “tveu sre neung teuk, 
tveu seuk neung bay” which means “cultivating rice requires water, doing war requires rice”. 
Furthermore, the Khmer built the empire and Angkor Wat before the 12th century. The 
location to build the Angkor Wat was strategically chosen by King Jayavarman II and he 
installed his successive capitals in the Tonle Sap Lake region, utilizing the seemingly 
inexhaustible fishing pond known as Tonle Sap Lake (Thierry, 1997).  
 
For the Khmer dynasty, control of the Tonle Sap area and mastery of water supplies 
were the keys to power. The indigenous irrigation systems became one of the achievements of 
the Angkor civilization and a source of its strength (Kamm, 1998:18). In essence, the 
intensive use of irrigation systems and reservoirs gave the Khmers a technical edge: “By 
freeing cultivators from dependence on unreliable seasonal monsoons, they made possible an 
early ‘green revolution’ that provided the country with large surplus of rice” (Seekings, 
1990:10). The rich alluvial soil and the water storage system, the Angkorian people could 
cultivate three or four rice a year (Chanlder, 1992). The power of the King largely derived 
from the development of an irrigation system that could produce 3 to 4 times of rice harvest a 
year, feeding a relatively large population. Fish from the Tonle Sap undoubtedly enabled an 
extension of the Kingdom across parts of mainland Southeast Asia. Thus, connections 
between water resources, fisheries and political power have ancient roots.  
 
In contemporary times, the Tonle Sap is a social and livelihood “safety net” for 
millions of people. Formed 5500-6,000 years ago, the Tonle Sap Lake is a largest freshwater 
lake in Southeast Asia, and it is 7th largest lake in the world in terms of the lake area in the 
wet season (ILEC, 2005; Penny, 2002; Penny et al., 2005; Tsukawaki et al., 1997). 
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Cambodian people say that “where there is water, there is fish” and “where there is a fish, 
there is food”. As a largest freshwater lake in Southeast Asia, it supports one of the most 
productive freshwater fisheries in the world, with annual yields of 230,000 tons, equivalent to 
about half of the country’s total production (Van Zalinge et al., 2000; UNDP/GEF, 2004). 
Thus, the The Tonle Sap is envisaged as a huge ‘space of dependence’ (Cox, 1998), or rather 
multiple ‘spaces of dependence’ for fishing communities around the Lake and people from all 
over the country who use fish as an important source of protein and livelihood incomes. 
Different fishing communities have settled around the Lake over time, such as the ‘floating’, 
‘stand-stilt’ and ‘farming-cum-fishing’ communities. Thus, the Lake is home to 
approximately 4 million people. Of the total population, about 1.4 million people (See Table 
1.1) live in the Tonle Sap floodplain between the National Road No.5 and No.6 in 1158 
villages within 160 communes (Keskinen, 2003; NIS, 2008).  
 
Table 1. 1: Administrative space in the Tonle Sap and population by province 






Banteay Meanchey 6679 678,033 577,772 1.57 
Battambang 11702 1,024,663 793,129 2.28 
Kampong Chhnang 5521 471,616 417,693 1.21 
Kampong Thom 13814 630,803 569,060 1.03 
Pursat  12692 397,107 360,445 0.7 
Siem Reap 10299 896,309 696,164 2.53 
Tonle Sap Provinces total 60707 4,098,531 3,414,263   
Tonle Sap area (Between National Road 5 & 6) 14876 1,388,555a)  1,186,192 n/a 
Cambodia 181,035 13,388,910 11,437,656 1.54 
Source: Keskinen, 2003 and 2008; NIS, 2008; a) This is based on estimation 
 
 
People living around the Lake have adapted to the natural ecosystem, hydrology, and 
developed their own human systems to use resources, improving their skills in fishing and 
processing of fish. Their cultural and social lives are uniquely and tightly reliant on fishing 
and on other resources the Lake provides.  The Tonle Sap is a unique Water World, with 
pronounced rhythms, seasonal patterns, a pulsing ecosystem, and people have adapted to 
these ecological cycles over many generations. The techniques, fishing skills, and cultural 
rituals are all aspects of the indigenous ecological knowledge (IEK, Berkes, 1999) passed on 
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from generations to generations. Fishing is the main source of income and livelihood security 
for most communities around the Tonle Sap (Navy et al., 2006). In a sense, this thesis is 
partly an attempt to come to terms with the spatiality of peoples’ lives and livelihoods relating 
to human – nature relations in this wetland. Space takes on deep material, political, cultural, 
economic and ecological meanings.  
 
Freshwater fish forms the main part of the Cambodian diet, particularly as many fish 
are made into “prohok”, a fermented fish, which is a favorite food for many Cambodians as 
indicated below: 
In the countryside, prahok is often eaten simply with rice. But a typical 
Cambodian meal will often include prahok as an ingredient in samlor, or soup, or 
as a dipping sauce, such as teuk kroeung, which is eaten as an accompaniment to 
grilled freshwater fish wrapped in lettuce or spinach leaves (Ly Vanna and Moul 
Jetr, 2003, Leisure Cambodia).1 
 
Fish and “prohok” are eaten with rice.   
 
…."Prahok is the taste of Cambodia. If there is no prahok, we are not 
Cambodians. Prahok is the Khmer identity," says Nao Thouk, Director General, 
Fisheries Administration.  "It is like butter or cheese for Westerners," he adds, 
explaining that some 70,000 to 80,000 tonnes of prahok are produced each year 
between December and March. 
 Farmers from outlying provinces will travel vast distances to trade rice for the 
fish paste, which is one of the most important sources of protein for Cambodians 
in the countryside, where simple meals of prahok and rice are common…  
(ThingAsian, Experience Asia Through the Eyes of Travellers, 2007).2 
 
These accounts suggest that the Tonle Sap is important for Cambodian people for two 
reasons; first, it provides common pool resources in which people from all over the country 
could access and use these resources to provide food and to supplement their living; second, 
the Lake provides a critical role in terms of providing natural and cultural capital for 
numerous communities living around the Lake.  Hitherto, there have always been relatively 
plentiful supplies of fish which provide a “safety net” against famine. Thus, many 
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Cambodians rely on the Lake’s resources for their living and they consider the Lake as a 
“social safety net.” 
 
The notion of the Lake as being a space providing common pool resources and 
livelihood security is important but misleading in the sense that the Lake has also been 
steadily commercialized over time. Firstly, the French colonized Cambodia in 1863 and the 
colonial authorities used the Tonle Sap as a ‘power base’ through exploiting fisheries 
resources: 
The fisheries laws and regulations were formalized and written down for the 
first time by the colonial administration of the French Protectorate and 
published in several complementary Royal ordinances in 1908… The purpose 
was to extract revenue for financing the colonial administration…The 
ordinances of 1908 succeeded in allowing the colonial treasury to increase its 
tax income from fisheries by 17 percent in the first year. In 1910, the taxes 
from fisheries covered one-ninth of the administration budget of the French 
Protectorate, compared to one-eighth that was provided by taxes from rice 
paddies. In the following decades, no major changes have been introduced in 
the system of auctioning the fishing lots…(Degen and Thouk, 2000:53-54).  
 
The French Protectorate Regime classified the Tonle Sap into the commercial fishing 
areas, public fishing areas, and conservation areas. The French Protectorate Administration 
further divided the commercial fishing areas into the commercial fishing lots and auctioned 
these areas for private control, reducing areas of public access (Degen and Thouk, 2000). The 
colonial administration effectively reduced commons spaces and excluded ordinary fishers 
from access to fishing areas within the designated lots. The post-colonial state authorities 
have continued to apply these practices and use the fishing lot system to exploit fisheries for 
state revenue generation, leading to fishing conflicts between fishing communities and 
commercial fishing lots (FACT and EJF, 2001). Indeed, numerous conflicts between villagers 
and fishing lot owners, followed by public forums on these conflicts in 2000 were influential 
in raising this researcher’s interest in the politics of space and resource management in the 
Lake long before I decided to write this thesis.  
 
  6 
In addition to providing natural, social and economic capital for Cambodians, the 
Tonle Sap Lake provides vital roles within the broad Mekong Basin. Anders Poulsen 
describes the Tonle Sap as “the pulsating heart” of the Mekong:  
“…floods around the Tonle Sap show a seasonal swelling and shrinking of the 
Great Lake. The rhythms resemble heartbeats, adding substance to the 
expression that the lake is "the heart of the Mekong", in which case the 
tributaries must be arteries” (Poulsen, 2003:08).  
 
Based on this view, Jussi Nikula (2005) argues that “the importance of the flood pulse 
to the Tonle Sap Lake has been compared to that of heartbeat. The flood pulse is what 
keeps the heart beating. If the heart stops, the system dies” (Nikula, 2005:13). Indeed, 
the entire ecosystem would be transformed adversely; the fisheries would collapse, 
indigenous knowledge would be subverted, the poor would go hungry, livelihoods 
would be disrupted, the communities would become dispossessed of basic means of 
survival, and the national economy would be severely affected. Thus, if we consider 
the trans-border hydrological and biophysical linkages of the Lake with the Mekong 
Region we obtain a strongly regional dimension concerning the Lake’s future 
ecological and environmental security (Nikula, 2005; Kammu et al., 2008)3: 
 
The Tonle Sap Lake and associated ecosystem services are vital for the great 
majority of the people living in the area. But the importance of the lake is not 
limited to its floodplains. Its influences are felt widely in the whole Cambodia 
as well as regionally in the Southeast Asia and even internationally. For 
example Kummu et al. (2005c) recognize the lake's value as, among others, 
regionally important feeding, breeding and rearing ground for fishes, as natural 
reservoir that protects the Mekong delta from excessive flooding and supplies it 
with water during the dry season, and as home of internationally significant 
biodiversity and water bird sanctuary” (Nikula, 2005:14-15).  
 
These comments suggest that the Tonle Sap is both at the heart of the Mekong Region 
and it has become one of the globally significant freshwater biodiversity hotspots. Protecting 
the Tonle Sap is essential not only with regard to the Mekong Region, but also as part of 
efforts to preserve tropical wetland biodiversity. As this thesis aims to show, protecting 
                                               
3
 Jussi Nikula, The Lake and its People. MSc Thesis, Helsinki University of Technology, 2005.  
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biodiversity through designating the Tonle Sap as the Biosphere Reserve Areas and the 
classification of the Biosphere Reserve Areas into three different conservations—the 
‘transitional zone’, the ‘buffer zone’ and the ‘core zone’—has added to the political 
geographic complexity of the Lake. Commercial, public and conservation uses often overlap 
and clash, but environmental degradation due to various human uses continue to threaten the 
Lake’s future viability as a social “safety net”. These are further reasons why this thesis has 
materialized. Unless an effort is made to study the multi-scale and multi-level political 
geographic complexity of the Lake, then many significant conflicts and problems of resource 
governance will not be properly understood.  
 
1.2 Main Themes of Thesis  
 
There are plenty of studies about resources and fisheries management in the Tonle 
Sap Lake, focusing on the technical aspects of fisheries, environmental management, 
biodiversity conservation, and various aspects of Lake governance (Degen et al., 2000; Van 
Zalinge et al., 2000; Baran, 2005; Keskinen, 2003, 2006; Ratner, 2006; Kummu et al., 2006, 
2008). These studies highlight two essential issues relating to resource management in the 
Tonle Sap Lake; on the one hand, they highlight weak governance in resources management 
in the Tonle Sap, leading to over-exploitation in resources, and its negative implications for 
livelihoods of fishing communities in the Tonle Sap Lake, and on the other hand, they call for 
improvements of the governance, such as establishing proper institutional arrangements and 
policy framework.  
 
This thesis draws on these resource management studies, but it also seeks to provide 
alternative explanations for some of the problems of resource governance. My approach 
emphasizes the political geographies of lake resources management. This study focuses on the 
geographical classifications in the Lake and examines the implications of human territoriality 
in resource politics. 
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Map 1. 1: Map of the Tonle Sap Lake (adopted from Kummu et al., 2006) 
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First, I argue that the state constructs spaces in the Tonle Sap Lake as a means of 
controlling people, things and resources within those spaces and as a way of exploiting 
resources more effectively. The official geographical classifications in the Tonle Sap have 
created commercial spaces, public fishing spaces and conservation spaces. This research sets 
out to explore the politics of space, for no space is politically neutral (Lefebvre, 1991; 
Massey, 2005). Space generates a whole host of complex territorial claims (Peluso, 2005a); 
actors4 claim space to utilize and exploit resources, to earn value from those resources, and 
thus, space becomes territorialized and politicized (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; Cox, 1998; 
Paasi, 2003; Delaney, 2005; Peluso, 2005a). Core political geography concepts such as place, 
scale, territory, boundary, and politics of space form the heart of many of my discussions 
concerning the Tonle Sap. Given the different territories, territorialities and territorialized 
spaces in the Tonle Sap, the research examines the implication of ‘political geographical 
classification’ on resource management. The research demonstrates that official 
representations, classifications, and territories have generated many contested claims, 
overlapping functions, boundary disputes, and conflicts involving many local communities 
that inevitably lead to further resource degradation as people seek to compensate by 
exploiting more from what limited space and resources are available to them. Furthermore, 
we can not fully appreciate the problems of political geography in relation to fisheries, unless 
we also appreciate some of the complex political economic and ‘social’ dimensions of power 
involved, such as the ‘power webs’ (see chapters 8 and 9), networks, social hierarchies, 
patron-client relations at play.  
 
Figure 1.1 is an effort to synthesize key dimensions of this thesis, and to illustrate the 
central significance of political geography and territorialized politics in the Tonle Sap Lake. 
Each Chapter of the thesis will focus on specific issues in the diagram. The rest of this 
Chapter will highlight key aims and outline the thesis components.  
                                               
4
 In the Tonle Sap Lake there are many actors including fishers, fishing lot owners, fisheries officials, 
environmental officials and Commune Councils; each claiming its own space. 
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1.3 Key Aims 
 
Following Robert Sack’s (1986) notion of human territoriality as a “strategy 
employed to control people and things by controlling areas”, the following specific objectives 
are central to my research:  
1. To highlight the significance of political space in relation to natural resources and 
fisheries governance; 
2. To explore different and competing territorialities affecting the management and 
governance of resources;  
3. To explore the different forms and effects of ‘power’ in the politics of space and 
resources in the Tonle Sap; and  
4. To appreciate that there are non-human hydrological, biological and ecological 
influences that affect human behaviors, actions, and interactions and also complicate 
the politics of space in the Tonle Sap.  
 
To explore each of these objectives, empirical research was carried out in four rural 
fishing communities between 2006 and 2010 (See Chapter 3).   
 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
 
This thesis consists of nine Chapters. The brief introduction, followed by Chapter 2, 
which provides a literature survey in relation to political geography and resource politics. It 
raises concepts of relevance for the following chapters. In particular, concepts drawn from 
political geography, such space, place and territory on the one hand, and power, policy and 
politics on the other, are reviewed in relation to the empirical focus on the Tonle Sap. Chapter 
3 outlines the methods and strategies utilized in the process of undertake research to produce 
this thesis.  





















Politics of Scale 
 


























Political Geography and Politics of  
Resource Management in   








State   
Control 
Fishery Scale   in the Tonle Sap 
Constructing Everyday Sace and Community-Level Territorialities 
 12 
 
Chapter 4 highlights there are distinct official representations of space and these 
official designations have greatly complicated the political geography. I highlight that the 
Lake is simultaneously considered as a global space, a regional space, and a national space. 
These relate to the contestations of space at different scales.  
 
Given the huge significance of human-nature relations in the Tonle Sap, Chapter 5 
sets out to examine how local communities have adjusted their livelihoods to annual, 
seasonal, and periodic hydrological and bio-physical environments of the Lake, as well as 
their ‘everyday struggles’ to maintain livelihoods and living space in spite of the various 
different official representations of space. Chapter 5 also explores social-ecology interactions 
and the community-level territorialities in the Lake-space. Political geographies associated 
with commercial fishing lots and the ability of patrons to influence who has access to so-
called ‘public fishing spaces’ means that fishers often have to collude with different patrons 
in order to maintain their fish catches or gain access to better fishing areas. To survive under 
this system, fishing communities construct their spaces through a politics of patron-client 
system. This is one of the many ‘hidden geographies’ of fishing communities in the Lake.  
 
Chapter 6 analyzes the overtly political aspects of territoriality and the political 
geography of fishing in the Lake. In this Chapter, I use the political dimensions of the concept 
of human territoriality to analyze strategies in the control of fish and fishing in the Tonle Sap 
Lake. I introduce three different types of territoriality—commercial territoriality,  
conservation territoriality and public-communal territoriality—each of which has implications 
on resource management.  
 
Chapter 7 presents a ‘politics of scales of fisheries management’ in the Tonle Sap. 
From the outset, these discussions relate to specific concepts of fishery scale by policy-
makers designing fishery law, rather than to discus
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‘politics of scale’. In this Chapter, I present three ‘scales’ used explicitly in fishing in the 
Tonle Sap Lake— ‘small-scale’, ‘medium-scale’, and ‘large-scale’ fishing, highlighting 
fishing scale as a strategy to control fishing by grouping people into assigned fishing 
categories according to Fishery Law and the competent State agencies. The large-scale fishing 
is designated for commercial fishing areas, while the medium and small-scale fishing is 
designated to a public fishing areas. The thesis highlights that the official designation of 
small-scale fishing is problematic given the fact the definition does not take into account the 
actual fishery practices that exist between and within fishing communities.  
 
Chapter 8 discusses the ‘political economy of fishing’ in the Tonle Sap by introducing 
the ‘moy system’ in fish trading, which is extremely important in the context of the Lake. To 
catch fishes and to sell fish, fishers rely on fish traders and many fishers borrow money from 
fish traders, but they also have to sell their fish catches cheaper than market prices. Thus, 
many fishers are trapped in what I term the web of ‘moy system’.  
 
The final Chapter presents the gist of my research findings, including original 
contributions, and discusses these findings in relation to other research in political geography, 
resource politics, political ecology and anthropology. In particular, I wish to highlight the 
academic significance of this research in the field of political geography, and the practical 
elements of the research in relation to the future resource governance of the Tonle Sap and 







Literature Review and Themes: Political Geography, Power, Space and Resources 
 
This chapter focuses on key literature that has influenced this study, including a 
review of certain conceptual ideas and themes relevant to the thesis. As this manuscript is 
grounded in political geography and resources governance, the most relevant concepts are 
summarized as power, politics, and policy on one hand, and space, place, and territory on the 
other hand (Jones et al., 2004). This thesis tackles core concepts of political geography. The 
second most relevant concepts are associated with the complex multi-disciplinary fields of 
‘resources management’, which is a more multi-disciplinary field. As this review will also 
show, some of the direct relevance literature on territory, territoriality and resource politics in 
Southeast Asia is not written by geographers, but comes from related disciplinary fields, such 
as anthropology, political science, and sociology. The context of my study is the Mekong 
Basin, and so literature pertaining to this, particularly that which relates to the politics of 
space and resources shall be reviewed briefly. As my study focuses on the Tonle Sap, there is 
a section on the politics of fisheries, livelihood security, and the political geography of a 
freshwater space. However, the approach adopted by this researcher is not simply to have a 
stand-alone literature review then to forget pertinent literatures in the more empirical 
chapters. In fact, each chapter does contain sections that relate some of the arguments 
advanced to relevant literature. Thus, this chapter introduces key themes and concepts that are 
discussed in more detail in each of the following chapters. 
   
2.1 Why Political Geography?  
 
First of all, this researcher is perhaps the only person in Cambodia who regularly 
reads political geography journals! As far as the researcher is aware, there is no formal 
political geography taught at any level of education in Cambodia, and whenever the 
researcher mentions that he is studying political geography there are usually polite silences or 
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bemused glances to suggest that nobody really knows what this sub-discipline means. For 
these reasons alone, it is probably useful to consider political geography within the context of 
a country that has definitely had more than its share of major geopolitical upheavals with dire 
political geographic consequences over time. Whilst, there has been little indigenous 
engagement with academic political geography, the same is not true of lived historical 
experience. Cambodians should know more about the ‘lived’ meanings of geopolitics and 
political geography in their lives than most people, particularly having experienced literally 
decades of war followed by a period of peace that has entailed further huge political economic 
transformations. In addition, political geography scholarship is highly relevant to studies of 
the politics of space and resources in contemporary Cambodia (see for example, Le Billon, 
2002; Sneddon, 2007; Springer, 2009a, 2009b; Marston, 2000; Tyner, 2008; Wyatt and 
Hirsch, 2004). The major gap in the existing literature is that there are no studies of political 
geographies in the Great Lake of Cambodia at all. And there exists relatively little empirical 
research examining how freshwater systems are partitioned between users. For scholarly and 
practical reasons, this study of the political geographies of the Tonle Sap is a necessary 
addition to our understanding. 
 
 More specifically, as the thesis concerns resource governance, the relevance of 
political geography to understanding the Lake became much more apparent after a visit by my 
then soon-to-be thesis advisor, Dr Carl Grundy-Warr, to the Tonle Sap Lake about seven 
years ago. It was when we visited several ‘floating villages’ together and discussed the ways 
in which the everyday ‘lived spaces’ of these communities has been so affected by various 
boundaries, such as fishing lots and conservation areas, that the researcher began to see a 
different way of seeing the space of the Lake. Indeed, it seemed to me that one of the most 
neglected aspects of Tonle Sap governance is the political geography of resource control, 
access, utilization and management. Thus, the foundations for this thesis started to take shape. 
The rest is history so to speak. However, it has taken the researcher a long journey to 
appreciate the significance and potential applications of political geography ideas to a 
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resource context that is more familiar to the researcher as a space of real life politics, 
conflicts, fishing and livelihood struggles. Combining the researcher’s practical experience as 
an NGO officer and as a PhD researcher has been a huge and time-consuming task.  
 
This section presents a general review of the main aspects of political geography and 
related fields the researcher has drawn upon to help frame ideas for this thesis. In particular, 
this review covers certain ideas contained in political geography, resource politics, and 
resource management literature. To begin the survey let us consider some basic definitions of 
political geography. 
 
Some geographers define political geography as a study of political territorial units, 
borders and administrative subdivisions. For other geographers, political geography has been 
about the study of political processes, related but different from political science only in the 
emphasis given to geographical influences and outcomes and in the application of spatial 
analysis techniques. However, an important element of political geographic analysis has been 
the study of the functions and politics of State territorial sovereignty and territorial practices 
as ‘containers’ of events, relations and representations, as well as critical examinations as to 
how we need to ‘go beyond containers’ when analyzing socio-economic and political 
spatiality within the world system of states (Elden, 2006; 2010a; Taylor, 1994; 1995). This 
thesis necessitates consideration of some classic political geographic concepts, such as 
‘territory’ (Elden, 2010; Paasi, 2003; Delaney, 2005; Storey, 2001), ‘boundaries’ (Newman, 
2004), ‘scale’ (Howitt, 2003), and relate these concepts to notions of ‘power’ (Allen, 2003a; 
2003b) as they affect both the spatial politics and non-spatial socio-political relations 
involved in Tonle Sap resource governance matters.  
 
As a quick working definition of political geography, I follow Agnew’s introduction 
(2002: 1) that political geography incorporates how ‘politics is informed by geography’ and 
‘how geography is informed by politics.’ Following Jones et al., (2004), political geography 
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is about the study of the interactions of ‘politics’ and ‘geography’. The study of ‘politics’ and 
‘geography’ necessitates understandings of the workings of ‘power,’ ‘politics’ and ‘policy’ in 
resource uses and  how these influence and play upon and through geography, particularly 
‘space,’ ‘place’ and ‘territory’ (Jones et al., 2004; Agnew et al., 2003). In this thesis there are 
many ways in which the actions of agencies and individuals, using ‘power,’ ‘politics’ and 
‘policies’ exploit natural resources within, through and affecting the meanings of and 
organization of ‘space,’ ‘place’ and ‘territory’ (Jones et al., 2004). Power, politics and policy; 
and space, place and territory are key elements in political geography and these six elements 
are intrinsically related to an appreciation of resource politics and governance in the Tonle 
Sap.  
 
2.2 Power, Politics and Policy 
 
Central to numerous discussions about political geography in this thesis are ideas 
about power. Jones, Jones and Woods (2004: 3) argue that “power is the commodity that 
sustains politics and policy’, and ‘politics’ is the whole set of processes that are involved in 
achieving, exercising and resisting power’ while policy relates to the ‘intended outcome’—
the things that power allows one to achieve and that politics is about being in a position to 
do.” The interaction of these three dimensions is a major concern of political geography (see 
Figure 2.1). As a process, ‘politics’ operate in and through space and place. Places “are never 
neutral entities with undisputed objective meanings. Rather, they are socially constructed by 
individuals and groups who draw on their experiences, beliefs and prejudices to imbue places 
with particular characteristics, meanings and symbolisms” (Jones et al., 2004: 115). 
‘Territories’ are effectively created out of political processes, and this researcher uses Sack’s 
(1983; 1986) definition, that territories must always involve a precise delimitation of  a 
geographic area, communication to others of that area, and attempts by some authority, 
agency or person to control that area. Two interrelated concepts, as far as this researcher’s 
understanding is concerned, are ‘territory’ and ‘human territoriality’ (Sack, 1986; Storey, 
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2001; Delaney, 2005), and the way in which different agencies, institutions, communities and 
individuals create, shape, invent, influence and establish ‘territories’ and they are affected by 
the territorialization of the Tonle Sap space. In summary, this thesis covers key concepts of 
political geography as outlined diagrammatically in Figure 1.1., which are discussed in more 
detail in chapters 4 – 8.  
 
Figure 2. 1: Adapted from Jones et al., (2004) 
 
This simple disgram does not capture the full implications, spatial and non-territorial, of 
notions of ‘power’. But it does help to show that politics, power and policy are related to 
spatial organization, which forms a large part of this study. On the one hand, this thesis is 
about the myriad ways in which power may be made more explicit, communicated, and 
reified through the creation of boundaries and the formation of different kinds of territories 
(Sack, 1986; Passi, 1996; Delaney, 2005). On the other hand, our discussion of ‘power’ 
necessitates examinations beyond mere spatial effects. ‘Power’ means much more than 
authorities or individuals being able to ‘exercise power over others’ (Allen, 2003b: 96), or 
sovereign bodies exerting ‘disciplinary power’ which shapes and normalizes subjects to 
speak, think and act in particular manners (Foucault, 1994), whereby “each individual action 
is referred to a whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation and the 
principle of a rule to be followed” (Foucault, 1991: 26). The formation of particular territories 
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frequently require rules, regulations, disciplinary codes, attempts to enforce control, and so 
on, and certain groups may indeed draw great political and economic advantage from such 
forms of territorialization. However, the power ‘effects’, implications, and ways power is 
mediated through multiple stakeholders, institutions, agencies and individual actors may 
result in unintended outcomes, generate new conflicts, and produce forms of resistance. This 
necessitates a perspective on power in relation to political geography and social relations that 
go beyond an analysis purely of human territoriality (a core focus and concept in this thesis).  
 
In chapters 8 and 9 in particular, the thesis focuses on issues of non-territorial dimensions 
of power, particularly in relation to the political economy of resources and political patronage 
issues in Cambodia, applying these ideas to the Tonle Sap. Indeed, one of the major concerns 
is how territorial and non-territorial power influence politics and relationships within the field 
of resource governance. Non-territorial political economic concerns (although there are some 
overlapping issues of political geography) focus on the deeply embedded nature of patron-
client relations, which I call the ‘power webs’ of the Tonle Sap.  
 
 Allen (1997) conceptualizes power in three main ways: power as an inscribed 
capacity; power as a resource; and power as strategies, practices and techniques. Whilst the 
dominant focus of this research is in relation to the spatial dimensions of power as exercised 
through the creation of boundaries and territories within the Tonle Sap, there are also various 
other forms of power that influence spatial practices and the politics of resources in the Lake 
space. As Jones, Jones and Woods (2004) have argued, when individuals and groups form 
interactions, collectives and networks, combining resources, then new forms of politics and 
power can be exercised. As Allen (2003b: 98-9) observes, “power on this account is 
understood as a rather fluid medium which can expand in line with resources available to 
collective ventures, or it can diminish once collective, short-term goals have been achieved.” 
Such a ‘fluid’ notion of power as ‘something intrinsic to all forms of social interaction’ helps 
us to appreciate the multiple possible ‘effects’ (spatial and otherwise) that may arise, as well 
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as to appreciate that political geography necessarily involves an understanding of dynamic 
politics and political relations that operate within, through and across political space. And 
it is precisely that this thesis wishes to address in relation to the politics of resources, 
fisheries, and livelihoods of ordinary people, places and communities within the Tonle Sap.  
 
2.3 Politics of Space: Key Concepts – Place, Space and Territory  
 
Place and space are hugely important concepts in geography, and they have wider 
application in geography, political science and sociology; often being used inter-changeably 
and often with too little attempt at precise definition (Agnew, 1987). However, in geography, 
scholars try to distinguish the ‘place’ from ‘space’.  Place is a ‘particular point in space’ that 
is always in a process of being defined, being given meaning and of becoming by the 
emotions and meaning that people apply to specific attachments (Jones et al., 2004). Space is 
organized into ‘places’ often thought as bounded settings in which social relations and 
identity are constituted (Johnston et al., 2000). Nonetheless, ‘place’ is grounded and 
particular while ‘space’ is abstract, non-bounded and not necessarily related to particularized 
and localized attachments (Staeheli, 2003). 
 
2.3.1 Politics of ‘Place’ 
 
 However, different persons treat the same locality in different ways—a city is 
viewed as a ‘place’ by its inhabitants, but may be regarded more as an abstract ‘space’ to 
plan, to rearrange, and to develop by urban planners (Cresswell, 2004). Jan Penrose (2002) 
makes a clear distinction between space, place and territory. He argues that:  
“place and territory are quite different from space…, but space only becomes a place 
when it acquires a ‘perceptual unity’, and only  become territory when it is delimited 
in some ways. In other words, both place and territory refer to space that has been 
defined in some ways and, though a territory is also a place, not all places are 
territories. The creation of territory creates a place…” (Penrose, 2002:279).  
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The concept of ‘place’ is highly significant in cultural geography and is particularly 
related to ideas of attachment and ‘belonging’ (Cresswell, 2004). Angew (1987) defined place 
in terms of three different meaning: locale, location and how different residents, groups and 
communities come to develop a ‘sense of place’. ‘Locale’ is the structured micro-sociological 
content of place, the setting for everyday, routine social interaction provided in place. In 
Johnston word (2000: 583), ‘locale’ is the setting in which social relation are constituted. 
‘Location’ is the representation in local social interaction of ideas and practice derived from 
the relationship between places. It is the geographical area encompassing the setting for social 
interaction and defined by social economic process operating at wider scale. The development 
of a ‘sense of place’ is actually subject to considerable pressures in many societies due to 
globalizing influences, human mobilities, geographical fragmentation and socio-economic 
ruptures of ‘local communities’ (Cresswell, 2004: 63-4).  According to Jones, Jones et al., 
(2004): “places have meanings and values attached to them by people; places often have 
socio-psychological meanings…” (Jones et al., 2004:115). However, the extent to which 
people identify with places will vary greatly across time and space. The use of place is 
manifold, to memorize the past, to influence people’s behaviors, to control people and areas, 
and to construct the ‘politics of place’ (Jones et al., 2004; Penrose, 2002). In this researcher’s 
view, the Tonle Sap is full of ‘places’ of meaning largely due to the strong local attachments 
people have to environmental resources, and due to the relative lack of social mobility (except 
for those seeking work elsewhere). Furthermore, the Tonle Sap has a distinct ‘politics’ 
relating to the way in which particular places (such as ‘floating villages’) are viewed, 
perceived, have strong attachments, and relate to different ecological resources of the Lake. 
Indeed, this thesis discusses places in terms of their social-ecological relationships to Lake-
space and resources, and the way in which political geography affects those relations and 
people’s livelihood security.  
 
Undoubtedly, the concepts discussed above are closely related to those developed in 
several papers by Arturo Escobar (1998, 2001, 2006, 2008) revolving around ‘defense of 
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place’ and what he calls ‘territories of difference’. Escobar’s ideas seem to be particularly 
valid in relation to the whole space of the Tonle Sap and myriad place-based struggles 
existing within the larger space. According to Escobar (2008: 67): “The politics of place can 
be seen as an emergent form of politics, a novel political imaginary in that it asserts a logic of 
difference  and possibility that builds on the multiplicity of actions at the level of everyday 
life. Places are the site of dynamic cultures, economies, and environments rather than just 
nodes in a global capitalist system (…) Politics of place is a discourse of desire and 
possibility that builds on subaltern practices of difference for the construction of alternative 
socio-natural worlds” (my emphases added). In this thesis the discussion concerns mostly the 
ways in which people’s ‘lived space’ (see below) and ‘everyday life’ has been fundamentally 
altered by official representations, territorializations and governance practices. However, it is 
necessary to consider why and how local people, communities, and concerned NGOs, can 
organize, associate and network to resist and challenge dominant discourses and hegemonic 
geographies. Political geography, ecology and anthropology seem to offer exciting ideas that 
help to examine, interpret and critique real space and place-based resource politics. This 
thesis is a modest attempt to contribute a better political geographic understanding of a 
significant case study and also to analyze academic ideas that may influence politics and 
practice. 
 
2.3.2 ‘Abstract’ versus ‘Lived Space’ 
 
Space is a key central concept of geography, and it should be distinguishable from 
place. Jan Penrose (2002) put it more specifically about space: 
 “First, [space] comprises the substance that is fundamental to human life on 
this planet. Through its constitution of land, water and atmosphere, space 
encompasses the basic prerequisites of human survival: the food that we eat, 
the water that we drink, the air that we breathe and the resources for 
protecting ourselves... Second... when the substantive qualities of space are 
filtered through human experiences of time and process, they have the 
capacity to invoke or release an emotional response. For example … space is 




Clearly, the connections that people have to land, water and natural resources are highly 
differentiated across space, and they are very different for people who live and work in a city 
like Phnom Penh to people who live on the shores of a freshwater lake. The ‘space’ of the 
Tonle Sap has all of the qualities highlighted by Penrose. There are also numerous ‘places’ 
and ‘territories’ which give meaning, functions, representation, order, (dis)order, conflicts and 
contestation over space and resources. There is also a critical distinction to be made between 
‘abstract’ space and ‘lived’ space. The distinction is largely based upon Henri Lefebvre’s 
(1991) notions of ‘representations of space’ as ‘conceptualized spaces’ of planners, scientists, 
architects, policy-makers, technocrats, cartographers and social engineers who routinely 
utilize space in abstract and functional ways. As Robert Sack (1986) stressed, space is 
malleable and can be made and remade over and over again. And of course, it is through 
representations of abstract space that new functions, properties and territories may be created. 
But the abstract space of planners is not equivalent to the everyday, experienced and ‘lived 
space’ of the majority of people, even though the plans and representations may affect and 
influence what goes on in that space. The latter relates to Lefebvre’s (1991: 39) idea of 
‘representational spaces’ or “space as directly lived through its associated images and 
symbols communities which are vitally connected to the broader physical environment 
through numerous social practices as well as human-ecological relationships.”  
 
 All such representations require both ‘simplifications’ of space (Scott, 1998) and the 
obliteration or ‘silencing’ of certain ‘lived’ aspects of space (Harley, 1989). As Lefebvre 
(1991: 162) notes: “It is this ability to smother difference, to suggest who should be seen and 
heard and who should not, that can give particular social spaces the impression of sameness 
rather than displacement and diversity.” ‘Abstract space’, according to Lefebvre (1991: 370-
1), “is a lethal one which destroys … historical conditions … in order to impose abstract 
homogeneity.” This contrasts sharply with ‘representational space’, which ‘is alive; it speaks’ 
(my emphasis). These are the spaces of different Tonle Sap commun
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fish, trade, make a living, and forge better lives for their children. A large part of this thesis is 
devoted to the contradictions of space produced through formal representations and political 
geographies superimposed upon a vibrant, differentiated and contingent ‘lived space’, and 
human-nature space with its rhythms, seasons and annual flood pulse (See Chapters 5 - 7). 
 
2.3.3 ‘Politics of Scale’, ‘Terrains of Resistance’, ‘Spaces of Dependence’ and ‘Spaces of 
Engagement’ 
 
Another way we may envision space in a political sense is through the politics of 
subaltern people trying to protect access to resources or means of livelihoods. Political 
geographers have examined how and why the politics of scale is socially constructed and how 
this may enable relatively localized cultural, social and environmental political struggles to 
become amplified and mediated within bigger national and international arenas by ‘jumping 
scales’ (Cox and Mair, 1991; Delaney and Leitner, 1997; Howitt, 2003; Jones, 1998). As 
Howitt (2003: 151) puts it: “Like another quintessentially geographical term ‘place’, ‘scale’ is 
rendered most meaningful in its development as an empirical generalization – a concept made 
real by building up an understanding of complex and dynamic relationships and processes in 
context.” 
 
In trying to decipher what forms  of indigenous ‘politics’ may help to challenge 
dominant political geographies and hegemonic power in the Tonle Sap, the researcher has 
found that Paul Routledge’s notion of ‘terrains of resistance’ and Kevin Cox’s (1998) ideas of 
the ‘space of dependence’ and the ‘space of engagement’, particularly useful. These are terms 
that take on particularly interesting meanings in applications to rural livelihood, sustainability, 
and resource politics.  
 
Routledge’s (1996) ‘terrains of resistance’ seems to be useful political concept in 
analyzing the resource politics of the Tonle Sap. These ‘terrains’ are free from fixed scales 
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and maintain the possibility of social movements with layers and contours within place and 
across space. Such terrains also allow for “contested webs of power / knowledge relations” 
(Routledge, 1996: 510). This thesis calls for challenges to certain dominant representations of 
space, and for poorer fishers to defend livelihoods there is a need for greater solidarity and 
networking within and between community-based groups and NGOs and other activist 
organizations. The idea of the Tonle Sap consisting of its own political economic ‘terrains’ of 
domination and resistance is very appropriate, although the contours and amalgams of power 
cannot simply be reduced purely to discourses of dominance and resistance. As Routledge 
(1996: 511) puts it: “forces coalesce power at particular sites, and these sites provide locations 
where hegemonies are contested.” Hegemony is “a dynamic process whereby the groups 
involved, including dominant and resistant elements, are always shifting, as is the terrain 
upon which they struggle. Hegemony can thus be viewed as an active site upon which the 
contestation between forces of resistance and domination are enacted.” And within the Tonle 
Sap there are many such ‘active sites’ incorporating agents, actors, human-nature relations, 
and power relations. Routledge is particularly interested in the politics of social movements, 
and whilst I am reluctant to invoke the term ‘social movement’ to apply to myriad community 
struggles, and livelihood politics in the Tonle Sap, the political basis of such ‘movements’ as 
forms of resistance are very appropriate in the context of smaller scale fishing communities of 
the Lake. According to Routledge (1996: 514) “movement struggles are frequently over the 
practices and meanings of everyday life, and movement politics are symbolically manifested, 
as expressions of vernacular politics.” Such terrains encompass ‘macro-politics’ of larger 
connections, alliances, and networks, and ‘micro-politics’ based upon particular geographical 
imaginations and ‘knowledges of everyday life.’ These ideas overlap with Cox’s ‘spaces of 
engagement’ and Escobar’s ‘territories of difference.’ Finally, Routledge (1996: 517) argues 
that: “A terrain of resistance is thus both metaphoric and literal. It constitutes the geographical 
ground upon which conflict takes place, and is a representational space with which to 
understand and interpret collective actions.”   
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 Similar to ‘terrains of resistance’, Cox (1998) developed concepts of spatial politics 
that are inherently scale flexible and may involve multi-scalar linkages, alliances and 
practices. According to Cox it is helpful to distinguish between what people are most 
concerned to defend, to resist in fervor of, or to struggle for, and how they can then go about 
their particular battles. He does this be discussing two distinct but related ‘spaces’ for the 
interplay of politics. As Cox (1998: 2) puts it: “Spaces of dependence are defined by those 
more-or-less localized social relations upon which we depend for the realization of essential 
interests and for which there are no substitutes elsewhere; they define place-specific 
conditions for our material well-being and our sense of significance.” This is particularly 
appropriate in a context like the Tonle Sap, where many people, and even whole 
communities, are deeply embedded in social-ecological relations associated with particular 
natural cycles and seasonal biophysical processes, producing fisheries, inundated forests, and 
various environmental resources upon which people rely for livelihoods, incomes, identity 
and survival. As this thesis shall illustrate, there are distinct village relations with localized 
aquatic resources, and it is not too difficult to envisage that many people and communities do 
have strong place-based connections and overlapping ‘spaces of dependence.’ 
 
For Cox (1998), such spaces of dependence are not confined to village-level sites, but 
may apply to “people, firms, state agencies” who organize “to secure conditions for the 
continued existence of their spaces of dependence”, and so, we could extend this notion also 
to conservation agencies, provincial and district level authorities, even private fishing lots. 
However, this thesis is primarily concerned with the majority of people who primarily rely on 
the Tonle Sap for their living and sustenance, and people who have relatively few alternative 
sources of livelihood available, unless they are able to migrate to cities or industrial estates or 
agro-business operations for work. In other words, there are particular relations (human-
ecological, capital-labour, cultural-social) developed over time, which means that it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, for local people to develop alternative spaces of dependence. Also 
for many people their skills and associations with the Lake are simply not easily transferrable 
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or portable. Thus, the terminology ‘space of dependence’ seems particularly appropriate to a 
resource politics application in the Tonle Sap.  
 
Spaces of dependence exist within “broader sets of relations”, usually but not 
necessarily at larger scales, “and these constantly threaten to undermine or dissolve them” 
(Cox, 1998: 2). Similarly, the places, people, communities and localized resource dependence 
that characterize struggles in the Tonle Sap are subject to commercialization, privatization, 
territorialization, and other forces, that weaken, undermine or pressure more localized 
resource dependence. Thus, we need to consider how relatively ‘local’ struggles may be 
elevated to different levels or scales. Conceptually, this is done through relational and 
associational forms of politics which allow for jumping and moving between spatial scales of 
action by the concerned agents and actors engaging “with other centers of social power.” “In 
so doing they construct a different form of space which I call here a space of engagement: the 
space in which the politics of securing a space of dependence unfolds” (Cox, 1998: 2). As 
such, the ‘space of engagement’ is constructed through specific political relationships, 
engagements, networks, and acts ‘through’ space, territories and scales (Allen, 2003b). In 
reality, the defense of place, of livelihoods, of access to indigenous livelihood resources, all 
require forms of politics that involve trans-local connections with other agencies, re-scaling 
the purely ‘local’ into multi-level action. Indeed, the Mekong Basin has become a dynamic 
region for examining the politics of scale at sub-national, trans-boundary, international and 
regional scales (Lebel, Garden and Imamura, 2005; Wyatt and Hirsch, 2004).  
  
Whilst the thesis does not focus specifically upon the politics of developing ‘spaces 
of engagement’, it is a relevant political (and economic) geography concept that helps us to 
consider possibilities beyond the status quo.  In Chapter 9 it is argued that successful ‘scales 
of engagement’ for ordinary fishers and community groups in the Tonle Sap can only come 
about through intra- and inter-communal institutional networking, collective action of fishers 
associations in and between different sites, and cohesive CBO-NGO interaction and 
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affirmative action. Thus, the politics of ‘scale’ are highly malleable and dependent on the 
institutions, actor-networks involved, and the forms that spaces of engagement take “is 
entirely contingent” (Cox, 1998: 20). In the Tonle Sap, there are many ways in which multi- 
and cross-scale politics are being manifested due to the complex array of agents and actors 
that use, influence or participate in resource politics. One of the underlying concerns of this 
research is to examine the political geographies of resource and fishery conflicts. In the 
process, this leads to an exploration of possible ways in which ordinary villagers and fishers 
may create their own ‘spaces of engagement’, offering “a myriad of transformational 
opportunities” (Howitt, 2003: 151) to improve environmental and social justice, and resource 
governance. 
 
2.3.4 ‘Territory’ and Territorial Politics   
 
‘Territory’ is a key and essential concept of political geography (Dahlman, 2009; 
Delaney, 2005; Elden, 2010a; Gottman, 1973; Paasi, 1996; 2003; Sassen, 2006; Storey, 
2001), of understanding ‘nationhood’ (Winichakul, 1994), and a critical idea that relates to 
resource politics (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; Peluso, 2005a; 2005b; Vandergeest, 1996). 
In all of these applications, territory and processes of creating territories are essential concepts 
in relation to understanding the politics of space and resources in the Tonle Sap.  
 
According to Penrose (2002: 279) the creation of territory usually relates to the 
making of a place, which also requires specific geographical space, but ‘space’ only becomes 
a ‘place’ when it acquires a ‘perceptual unity’, and is a ‘territory’ when it is delimited [by 
boundaries]. ‘Territory’ often becomes a particular ‘geographical space’ occupied by 
individuals, social, groups or institutions for particular purposes (Paasi, 2003; Jone et al., 
2004; Storey, 2001; Penrose, 2002). Stuart Elden (2010b: 757) asks: “What do we mean when 
we talk of territory? There seem to be two dominant definitions in the literature. One sees 
territory as a bounded space, a container, under the control of a group of people, nowadays 
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usually a state. The other sees a territory as an outcome of territoriality, a human behavior or 
strategy. These two definitions are, of course, not mutually exclusive.” This researcher tends 
to see both definitions as important, and the territoriality dimension as something that is 
highly dynamic, flexible, and contingent in contemporary contexts. Elden’s arguments more 
forcefully apply at the level of national territory, whereas the focus in this thesis is at the sub-
national level where human territoriality in relation to specific resources is highly relevant.  
Many scholars have tended to focus almost exclusively on territory in relation to ‘territorial 
States’, in relation to notions of ‘territorial integrity’, and the creation of the world political 
map made of inter-locking territorial States (Dahlman, 2009; Elden, 2006; 2010a; 2010b; 
Sassen, 2006; Taylor, 1988; 1994; 1995). Whilst these ideas about territory are relevant to this 
thesis (see below), this research is much more focused on territorializing processes ‘within’ 
the boundaries of the sovereign state of Cambodia, particularly in the context of a freshwater 
lake space. It is in this micro context of territorial application that territorial behavior 
(territoriality) is very lively and relates to many issues of resource access, utilization and 
control. Furthermore, various grandiose representations of space in the Tonle sap have helped 
to create new and sometimes overlapping boundaries and territories.  
 
In an often cited work within the sub-discipline, Jean Gottman’s The Significance of 
Territory (1973) identifies two critical reasons for territory; firstly, it confers security – 
‘territory’ can be converted into defensible ‘space’, and second; it can provide opportunities 
for prosperity by producing territories that enable the economic organization of ‘space’. In 
fact, ‘territory’ signifies a distinction and a separation from adjacent territories that are under 
the different jurisdiction (Storey, 2001; Gottman, 1973), and territory may help to bolster 
different forms of ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’ for different purposes, usually defined by states 
(Delaney, 2005). However, ‘attachments to territory’ may be very complex due to unclear or 
permeable boundaries, movements across boundaries, allegiances that transcend territory, and 
contested identities within and across political territories (Delaney, 2005; Storey, 2001, 
Penrose, 2002). This researcher argues that such argument apply at the scale of the Tonle Sap 
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where there are a great many territorialized forms of inclusion and exclusion, boundary 
conflicts, and many territorial claims of local fishers and communities claiming fishing space 
rights or traditional access to inundated forests.  
 
The ‘enclosure’ functions that territory provides are historically significant in relation to 
other important political economic and legal concepts, particularly that of ‘property’ (Elden, 
2010a; Blomley, 1994; 1998; 2003; Peluso, 1996; 2005a). Whilst much of Elden’s work on 
territory has been in trying to produce “a historical conceptual examination” of territory that 
is far broader theoretical project in time and space than the specific concerns of this thesis, 
there are several definitional and conceptual points about ‘territory’ in Elden’s work that do 
apply to this largely empirical thesis. For instance, in an article entitled ‘Land, terrain, 
territory’ Elden (2010a) cites Edward Soja (1971: 7) who proposed “a tripartite analysis of 
resource, power and social organization,” specifically involving three key tendencies: (1) 
“control over the distribution, allocation, and ownership of scarce resources”; (2) “the 
maintenance of order and the enforcement of authority”; and (3) “the legitimization of 
authority through societal integration.” Elden (2010a: 6) then proceeds to link Soja’s work to 
a discussion of three “conceptually distinguished” yet “practically intertwined” definitions: 
• “Land is a relation to property, a finite resource that is distributed, allocated and 
owned, a political-economic question. Land is a resource over which there is 
competition.” 
• “Terrain is a relation of power, with a heritage in geology and the military, the 
control of which allows the establishment and maintenance of order. As a ‘field’, a 
site of work or battle, it is a political-strategic question.” 
• “Territory is something that is both of these, and more than these. Territory must be 
approached in itself rather than territoriality, and in relation to land and terrain.” 
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There are many aspects raised here that do apply to the notion of ‘territory’ adopted in this 
study. Territories on water can contain many of the same rationales and purposes of territories 
on terra firma, la terre or land, and on terrain. Perhaps aqua firma would be more apt to 
discuss the same issues in freshwater lakes because water space, like land space, is linked to 
notions of property.  There is no question that fisheries space and territories are linked to 
different ideas property regime or ownership, including forms of state-ownership, 
privatization, and ideas about ‘public space’ and ‘community fishery spaces.’ The materiality 
of space is often linked to economic ‘power’ and these may be reified by ‘territories’ 
signifying ‘property’ ownership of one kind of another in the landscape (Blomley, 1998; 
Sikor and Lund, 2009).  
 
Elden (2010a) is correct to point out certain territorial dimensions of power based on 
notions of property. “Possession of land is the determinant of power, and conflict over land is 
a key indicator of power struggles” (Elden, 2010a: 8), and of course, the same may be said of 
conflicts over fisheries. Control and struggles over propertied ‘water’ spaces are just as 
critical to examine as those concerning ‘land’. As the title of a recent volume concerning 
power and politics over water resources in the Mekong region imaginatively conjures up, the 
thesis is dealing with Contested Waterscapes (Molle, Foran and Käkönen, 2009).  And much 
of the contestation concerns issues of property dispute, territorial conflict and differential 
access to fishing grounds. And there is also a ‘strategic-defensive’ ‘terrain’ dimension to 
some of these conflicts, with armed guards and bamboo-fences regularly employed by 
fishing-lot owners to keep people out, and questions of enforcement, corruption, and illegal 
encroachment never far from the discussion of fishing territories (FACT & EJF, 2001; 
Sithirith and Vikrom, 2008).  Indeed, discussion of these issues entails that we consider how 
territorialization and the portioning out of property rights is often related to issues of social 
ordering, class and social struggles (Blomley, 2003: 122), as well as different geographies of 
‘violence.’ There is no doubt that even at the scale of the Tonle Sap “territory is a vibrant [and 
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contested] entity” (Elden, 2010a: 12; author’s insertion) deserving close investigation and 
analysis. 
 
Whilst Elden (2010a) has definitely helped elaborate some of the ‘political-
economic’, ‘political-strategic’ and ‘political-legal’ functional elements of ‘land, terrain, 
territory’, there are still other dimensions of ‘territory’ that are relevant, including the cultural  
and symbolic dimensions. Several aspects of everyday social life and social power come 
together in territory (Paasi, 2003; Storey, 2001). Paasi (1996; 2003) defines territories as 
‘social constructs’ and discusses how territories generate forms of spatial socialization 
relating to the boundaries of nation-states, but at lesser scales, this could equally be applied to 
the many ways in which people become socialized into accepting various boundaries, 
territories, properties, and zones in that affect their daily life. Research experience and 
observations of life in the Tonle Sap has shown that fishers come to ‘accept’, grudgingly or 
willingly, many of the spatial constraints that fundamentally affect their livelihood security 
and fishing practices. There is no escaping the fact, that even in the middle of a freshwater 
lake, people are affected in so many ways by its political and territorial organization.  
 
2.3.5 Property, Law and Geography 
 
Property rights encompass the ‘rights’ of the person or group to hold land, forest, 
areas of water (such as fishing lots, conservation areas, or community fisheries) as ‘property’. 
Property rights effectively relate to very distinct forms of regime, control or ownership 
ranging from ‘open access’ (free-for-all), to rights or things or resources held as ‘common 
property’ (formally or informally regulated access for members of a ‘community’ or ‘group’), 
to different forms of state property (such as national parks), and privatized property (held 
exclusively by individuals, agencies or companies). According to Bromley (1991), a right is 
“a capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind one's claim to a benefit stream. Rights 
only have effect when there is some authority system that agrees to defend a right holder's 
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interest in a particular outcome. Rights can only exist when there is a social mechanism that 
gives duties and binds individuals to these duties.” Bromley further argues that: “when one 
has a right one has the expectation both in law and in practice that one's claim will be 
respected by those with duty and it is the essential function of state to stand ready to refrain 
those from duty. If the state is unwilling, or unable, to ensure that compliance to duty, then 
rights become meaningless” (Bromley, 1991: 15).  
 
Property is the result of a secure claim to a resource. Resources may exist where 
there are no secure claims and therefore, cannot be considered as property (Grima and Berkes, 
1989).  However, individuals, groups and the state claim resources, and so there are very few 
‘resources’ that would be left unclaimed.  These groups eventually translate these claims into 
‘property’ and determine access conditions, and this relationship strongly affects the resource-
use pattern (Gibbs and Bromley, 1989). The resources accessed, harvested and managed by 
the individuals are referred to as a ‘private property’, by the group is referred to as ‘communal 
property’ and by the ‘collective choice’ refers to as a ‘state property’. These are referred to as 
a ‘property rights regimes’ or ‘property resource regimes’. ‘Property rights regime’ is the only 
way in which to limit the access to resources (Bromley, 1991; Charles, 2001; Ostrom, 1990; 
Berkes, 1989). Further, it should be clear that such regimes may function more effectively 
through the reification of classification, control, and attempts to enforce rules via territoriality 
(Sack, 1986). 
 
Central concerns of this thesis are territory, access to resources, and property 
(Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; Vandergeest, 1996; Delaney, 2005; Phuc, 2008; Sikor and 
Lund, 2009). As Blomley observes, ‘local landscapes of property are … in a complex state of 
‘becoming’ (Blomley, Delaney and Ford, 2001: 127) meaning that ‘property’ is often part of 
legal, political and economic processes of claiming, legitimizing and controlling space and 
resources. Local landscapes contain many competing properties, territories and claims. 
Similarly, the freshwater space contains complex legal geographies that relate to the system 
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of territorialized resource governance. Just like many of the terrestrial and coastal spaces of 
Southeast Asia, the Tonle Sap has been subject to increasing ‘commoditization’ (after 
Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; Nevins and Peluso, 2008) involving in the process various 
state agencies, private actors, international organizations and non-governmental bodies, each 
with their own competing geographical imaginaries and representations of space.  
 
‘Property’ implies access in relation to natural resources, whether legalized or not. 
According to Thomas Sikor and Christian Lund (2009: 1) “not all forms of access to 
resources or their benefits are guaranteed by a politico-legal institution, they may still 
contribute an important element in people’s livelihoods.” This thesis has explored various 
‘grey areas’ between what people actually have rights to and what they merely have access to, 
and contradictions in relation to so-called ‘public fishing spaces’, as well as the problems of 
access that many ‘floating communities’ are confronted with due to their ambiguous status, 
lack of landed resources, and occasional mobility. The problem is that the politics of the 
commons is highly territorial nowadays (Peluso, 2005a). Issues of property, access and rights 
are tied inevitably to territorialized practices and forms of control. Struggles over property 
are also struggles over territory. Certain kinds of territorialization have literally squeezed 
village access rights, areas of commons, and produced conflicts between claimants. It is not a 
level playing-field for there is differential access to legal and political resources in 
Cambodia’s highly hierarchical society with its myriad patron-client relationships. As Sikor 
and Lund (2009: 3) succinctly describe, “property is about relationships among social actors 
with regard to objects of value.”  
 
At one level, this thesis has viewed political territoriality as being linked to strategies 
to authorize property rights and efforts to have claims to space legitimized by relevant state 
and governing institutions. Thus, some forms of human territoriality hold ‘legitimacy’ in the 
eyes of those governing agents and others do not. However, if we adopt a more multi-
dimensional perspective, numerous indigenous human territorialities linked to local 
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conceptions of space, social-ecological adaptations, and various customary practices are not 
necessarily legitimized or considered valuable to the governing agents. This thesis calls for 
recognition of certain types of indigenous territorial practice, including mobile and vertical 
territorialities closely linked to everyday social life and to the ‘pulsing ecosystem.’  
 
“The control of spatial ordering and the control of people in space combines different 
techniques and policies of classification, registration and mapping” (Sikor and Lund, 2009: 
13; Harley, 1989; Walker and Peters, 2001; Delaney, 2005). There are also legal processes 
and social relations of power that produce not only ‘representations of space’ but forms of 
social-spatial ‘ordering’ according to the relevant governing bodies. Territoriality “is often a 
key element in the exercise of authority” (Lund, 2006: 93; Sikor and Lund, 2009: 14).  
 
2.3.6 State Territorialization and Human Territoriality  
 
As human territoriality is discussed in more detail in the relevant chapters 
(particularly Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) the discussion here represents only a brief outline of 
some key issues. One of the key texts that influenced the direction of this researcher is Robert 
Sack’s (1986) classic text Human Territoriality. Undoubtedly, Sack’s notion of human 
territoriality has influenced my thinking about the ‘social constructions of territory’ and the 
relevance of territorial strategies to matters of contemporary resource politics. However, this 
thesis has sought to examine how and why territoriality relates to resource management and 
resource politics in a contemporary Cambodian setting, and as such it is necessary to place 
these discussions within regional natural resource political economy context.  
 
 According to J.B. Harley (1989: Harley, 2000, in Laxton and Andrews) “In modern 
times the greater the administrative complexity of the state the more pervasive its territorial 
and social ambitions – then the greater its appetite for maps (my emphasis).” In ‘modern’ 
Southeast Asia the internal territorial impulses of states has more than matched their external 
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“cartographic anxieties” involving relations with neighbouring states (Krishna, 1994), 
particularly as far as mapping, claiming and controlling natural resources is concerned 
(Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; Peluso, 1996; 2005a; 2005b; Phuc, 2008; McElwee, 1999; 
2004; Laungaramsri, 2002; Fadzillah-Cooke, 2003; Sowerwine, 2004; Vandergeest, 1996; 
2003). Most of the states in Southeast Asia have employed territorial administration to 
organize surveillance, gather information on ‘units’ of population, sedentarize mobile or 
nomadic groups, relocate people from sensitive areas of national security or important forest 
reserves, as well as to collect taxes, tolls, and revenues. In other words, political territoriality 
is readily employed in the service of the state for a range of political, economic, social, 
administrative, governance, state security, resource expropriation, rents, and other reasons. 
 
Processes of territorialization within national ‘geo-bodies’ are as important to 
examine as the role of modern political geography in the creation of ‘nation’ (Winichakul, 
1994). Yet the ‘territorial trap’ of reifying State territories is mostly focused on the issues of   
inter-locking states, international boundaries, formal political sovereignty, and the 
significance of ‘national space’ (Agnew, 1994; Elden, 2010a; 2010b; Taylor, 1994). Whilst 
Elden (2010a) sees the significance of ‘territory’ and its links to ‘earth and land’ the processes 
of territorializing land, earth, resources, water, and so on, are little discussed in his 
examination of ‘territory.’ It is in the field of resource politics and governance, and in the 
disciplines of anthropology, political science, and to a lesser extent, geography, that we can 
see some of the most relevant examinations of how the creation of territories, through 
territoriality, are explicitly used of as a means to exercise and reify state sovereignty and 
control over so-called ‘national’ environmental resources.  
 
The researcher begins the territorial analysis of fishing lots in the early 20th century 
Tonle Sap with French colonial measures to extract rents from the Lake. Similarly processes 
of utilizing territorial and non-territorial controls were seen in the forests of Burma. As 
Raymond Bryant (1997: 15) puts it: “To begin with, the British sought to define political 
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control in terms of ‘inside/outside” – that is, it sought to define state control clearly and 
permanently in terms of what was both within and without its legal jurisdiction. (…) Fixed 
borders permitted the state to conduct resource management with greater confidence in ‘its’ 
territory than was hirtherto the case.” The process was far from neat and tidy, as this was 
often contested by various ‘non-state’ groups, and sometimes “territorialization was even 
reversed” (Bryant, 1997: 16). However, there are powerful logics to territorial control over 
resources, as Bryant (1997:16) explains: “the colonial state sought to develop a national 
profile of the people and resources under its formal jurisdiction as part of an attempt to 
enhance political control and commercial activity.” For colonial authorities, it seems that 
superior military force, couple with advanced mapping and surveying techniues, enabled 
forests and other land to take on more precise ‘legal and spatial’ definitions. 
 
  The forms of resource territorialization that became so important in extracting value, 
rents, profits for distant imperial and metropolitan powers, were to be extended in post-
colonial ‘territorializations of national space’, often within the boundaries inherited from 
colonial times. Since the end of colonial rule, the region has witnessed intensive forms of 
terrtiorialization associated with the extension of state administrative bureaucracies into every 
district, every periphery, every remaining ‘resource frontier’ of their so-called national geo-
bodies. No matter whether we are talking about centralized socialist states, such as Lao PDR 
or Vietnam, or relatively free-market democracies, such as Thailand, or military regime states 
such as Myanmar / Burma, territorialization or resource sectors has been an on-going and 
emphatic process in spite of ongoing processes of transnationalized production and 
globalization creating numerous cross-border flows, investments and relations.   
 
State territoriality often generates and relates to different forms of politics. 
Vandergeest and Peluso (1995; 2001) have examined the history of ‘forest politics’ in relation 
to state territorialization strategies, and revealed how applications of territoriality may lead to 
different forms of social, ethnic and racial exclusion. They have also shown how territorial 
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processes of civil administration, land-use zoning, and differing jurisdictions over forests help 
to “constitute and consolidate state power” (1995: 6). Peter Vandergeest (2003) discusses the 
relationship between spatial strategies of resource control and racialization of forests in 
relation to particular categories of ‘non-Thai’ upland groups and so-called ‘hill tribes’ in 
northern Thailand, whereby “spatio-ethnic distributions have also been produced and 
reinforced through administrative mapping” (Vandergeest, 2003: 24). Various other 
researchers have explored the intersections between boundaries, racial / ethnic identities, 
community-based natural resource management, and access to resources (Li, 2001; Tsing, 
1999; Lohmann, 1999; 2000). Nancy Peluso has explored the roots of ‘territorialized 
violence’ involving state and non-state territorialities in West Kalimantan between the Dayaks 
and Madurese (Peluso and Hawell, 2001; Peluso, 2008). To Xuan Phuc (2008) reveals that 
many Southeast Asian states have tended to promote notions of ‘people-less forest 
conservation’ which has put them into direct conflict with numerous local communities over 
access to, exploitation rights within, and control of much forest land. “In contrast to the view 
that forests must be strictly protected, villager forest-dwellers or those living nearby forests 
see the forest as their source of livelihood and are intimately linked to cultural ties and 
community management … State law defines and determines the boundaries of criminality, 
without recognizing the complexity of existing local and / or traditional institutions, and 
criminalizing all activities considered as not suitable for the state’s purpose” (Phuc, 2008: 10 
– 11). There are equally numerous studies advocating various forms of counter-territoriality 
and ‘counter-mapping’ strategies in community and group responses to dominant state 
representations and territorializations of space (Laungaramsri, 2002; Fadzillah-Cooke, 2003; 
Peluso, 2005a; 2005b, Try Thoun & Tek Vannara, 2005).  
 
In Cambodia’s fairly authoritarian hybrid democracy environmental resource 
revenues have been central to the ways in which the State has both maintained and extended 
networks of political patronage and forged partnerships with investors and companies 
working within particular resource sectors (Le Billon, 2000; 2001; 2002; Global Witness, 
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2009; Kheang, 2005).  In the Tonle Sap, renewed interest in the commercial value of annual 
fisheries production revitalized the fishing lot system, leading to intensified territorializations 
of the Lake, and new fishery conflicts during the 1990s to the current time (Degen, et.al., 
2000; FACT & EJF, 2001). As Peluso (2005b: 2) observes elsewhere, “territories are not 
exclusive zones of influence and they are clashing all over the place.” Thus, in the Tonle Sap 
numerous ‘territories’ were created and there have been subsequent contestations over 
claimant rights and responsibilities. Indeed, there are potential ‘claimants’ everywhere one 
looks in the freshwater lake, particularly now that so-called ‘community fishery 
organizations’ (CFOs) are also making claims for legalized spaces through formal mapping of 
boundaries and registration submissions to the provincial and national authorities (Bonheur, 
2007). As this thesis sets out to demonstrate, however, the Tonle Sap is a very ‘unruly space’ 
with many boundary disputes, fishery conflicts, and overlapping claims.  
 
2.4 Political Geographies of the Mekong Basin 
 
Political geographic studies have tended to examine broader issues of resource 
governance within the Mekong region, focusing more on trans-boundary, upstream – 
downstream dynamics, politics of scale, hydro-politics, social movements and networks, as 
well as connections between law and trans-boundary resources management (for example, 
Bakker, 1999; Hirsch, 2006; Hirsch, 2010; Johns, Saul, Hirsch, Stephens, and Boer, 2010; 
Lebel, Garden and Imamura, 2005; Sneddon and Fox, 2006; Hirsch & Wyatt, 2004). These 
studies should also be viewed in the context of a much bigger literature that examines the 
politics of trans-border resource governance, particularly the issues of hydropower and hydro-
politics, inter-state relations, the role of the Mekong River Commission, and increasing geo-
economic significance of China in the resource politics of the Mekong Basin (Hirsch, 2010; 
Lebel, Dore, Daniel, and Koma, 2007; Molle, Foran and Käkönen, 2009; Osborne, 2000).  
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In the last decade, the most pressing area of debate has probably been the shifting 
nature of hydropower development in the Mekong Basin, with numerous new dams having 
been planned, built or proposed in many tributaries and even along the mainstream of the 
Lower Mekong River. Australian historian Milton Osborne, in writing about hydropower 
development, is of the opinion that “where once it was appropriate to write of risks, when 
assessing the Mekong’s future it is now time to write of fundamental threats to the river’s 
current and vital role” (The Cambodian Daily, 20 January 2010). These threats are truly 
connected to the future of the Tonle Sap, for hydropower development directly impacts upon 
the fish migrations of numerous species found in the daily catches and diets of literally 
millions of people, and the risks relate to the Mekong which is ‘one of the most productive 
fisheries in the world (Coates et al., 2003).  
 
As a quick illustration of the entangled politics of the Mekong Basin in contemporary 
times, it is worthwhile pointing to the many different parties, organizations, and individuals 
who have jointly and individually raised their voices against the plans to build the Don 
Sahong Dam in southern Laos. If constructed this would be the first mainstream dam on the 
Lower Mekong River, with very adverse consequences on fish migrations (TERRA, 2007; 
Baran and Ratner, 2007). The project developer, Malaysian company Mega First Corporation 
Berhad (MFCB) signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Laos in 
March 2006 and a Project Development Agreement in February 2008, confirming “the 
feasibility and social/environmental studies of the proposed Don Sahong project to be 
technically and financially feasible” (MCFB, 2008, cited in Khamin and Middleton, 2008). 
Don Sahong is planned for a site just one kilometer north of the Laos-Cambodia border, in the 
Khone Falls area of Khong District, Champasak Province (Baird, 2009: 4). The Khone Falls 
function as a ‘bio-geographical’ zone of great significance, due to the migratory paths along 
specific channels only of large numbers of fish. The area supports at least 201 fish species, 
out of which 87% are migratory species (Baran and Ratner, 2007), with many of these 
believed to come from the Tonle Sap (Baird, 2009). The Don Sahong site would apparently 
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block the Hou Sahong Channel, “the only channel that migratory fish can effectively use in 
the lower-water season to get past the Khone Falls” (Baran and Ratner, 2007: 2).  
 
The Don Sahong case illustrates perfectly well how the dominant discourse of 
hydropower is transforming resource governance issues at a regional and trans-border scale 
within the Mekong Basin. The concern about hydropower is about the process and politics 
behind it, as well as about the complex roles of international financial institutions such as the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank, of the lower Mekong inter-governmental 
mechanism, the Mekong River Commission (MRC), public-private ventures and companies, 
individual state agencies, non-governmental organizations, and various civil society groups 
play. In an article that reviews some of the major developments in hydropower politics since 
the World Commission on Dams (WCD) report in 2000, Hirsch (2010) has examined China’s 
growing influence as a hydropower exporter and China’s emphasis on forming friendly 
bilateral ties within the region, which include hydropower technical expertise, coupled with 
the growing impatience of certain lower Mekong states, particularly Laos, Myanmar and 
Cambodia, with long processes of deliberation, public stakeholder consultation, and other 
procedures that may curtail key ‘developmental projects’ considered of national interest. 
Indeed, many of the state agencies supporting hydropower are increasingly drawn into geo-
economic intra-regional ties due to the development of the Mekong Power Grid enabling 
easier energy transfers within and between countries (International Rivers Network, 2006; 
Cronin, 2008).  
 
Philip Hirsch (2010: 321) in examining the geo-economic and geopolitical trends, 
rather gloomily forecasts that “it truly appears that the status of the Mekong River and its 
tributaries as relatively free-flowing may be coming to an end.” If this is ‘truly’ the case, then 
the future vitality of the Tonle Sap as a major socio-ecological source of resources, nutrition, 




Thus, we can see that there is intense debate and broad interest in the politics of 
resources in the Mekong Basin as a whole. Indeed, this researcher has also actively 
contributed to some of the academic discussion (Sithirith, 2007), as well as personal 
involvement in the Fisheries Action Coalition Team (FACT), and through regional civil 
society networks, such as that created by the group Towards Ecological Regional Recovery 
and Regional Alliance (TERRA) based in Thailand but with linkages across lower Mekong 
borders (see Watershed, various publications from 1995 to present). All of this background is 
useful in informing and helping to shape this thesis (see Chapter 3).  
 
Undoubtedly, all the Mekong studies are highly relevant in the sense that they discuss 
important resource governance processes and form of politics that directly relate to the 
Cambodian context and to fisheries management in the Tonle Sap. Even so, this thesis is not 
attempting to examine in any detail the Tonle Sap’s numerous socio-ecological and resource 
politics connections across borders with other parts of the Lower Mekong, even though these 
are of critical importance to the future of the Lake. Rather the thesis focuses primarily upon 
how resource politics and processes have transformed the internal space of a freshwater lake. 
This thesis is much more focused on how and why the Tonle Sap has become partitioned, 
territorialized, zoned, and transformed into a political geographic maze that is still little 
researched in relation to resource governance. This is not purely an exercise in political 
geography, for there are many policy-oriented (see Chapter 9), socio-economic, and 
environmental concerns underpinning the thesis.  
 
After working for several years in the context of undertaking NGO work with small-
scale fishers, I became intensely aware that many fishers faced problems relating to the ways 
in which the space of the Tonle Sap has been divided into different functional zones and that 
there are in fact a great many boundaries within the Lake system that have so far been little 
studied. Many studies have tended to focus on policy frameworks in the fisheries sector, as 
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well as upon the legal-political notions of community management, fishery reforms and 
derived policy implications (Ratner, 2006). Whilst there has been a very big interest in the 
politics of fisheries and resources of the Tonle Sap, there has been virtually no real discussion 
of the political geographies of resources or of resource management (or conflicts over 
resources) in the Lake.   
 
One political geography based study focusing purely on the Tonle Sap examines the 
critical aspects of nature’s materiality, paths of accumulation in transforming aspects of the 
Lake’s political economy and political ecology, and some of the resultant dispossessions of 
small-scale fishers (Sneddon, 2007). By focusing on human-nature relations and how these 
affect processes of accumulation in relation to wild capture fisheries, Sneddon’s study is 
perhaps the closest that political geographer’s have come to the research focus of this 
particular thesis. Although the research focus here is on the formalized political geographies 
of the Lake’s numerous zones, territories and boundaries. The thesis sets out to consider how 
and why the politics of space, including non-territorial politics, are central to understanding 
critical matters of resource access, utilization, ownership, control, and livelihood security 
relating to the majority of mostly smaller-scale fishers of the Tonle Sap.  
 
2.5 Power and Political Geography in Cambodia 
 
 In the context of Cambodia, I would like to briefly mention further studies that have 
at least drawn my attention to considerations of power, its effects, politics, authority and 
issues of resource control. From an anthropolitical-sociological perspective, Mona Lilja 
(2008) has done much to unpack the concept of power in relation to ideas about discourse and 
resistance of women politicians and activists in Cambodian society. Lilja (2008: 3) argues 
that “looking at resistance means looking at resistance against power-loaded discourses.” She 
examines gender “stereotyping and hierarchization and how these are played out,” as well as 
the way in which women leaders have managed to develop forms of ‘discursive resistance’ 
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(using performativity, identity politics, irony, hidden transcripts, and so on). What is 
particularly valuable here for a study of small-scale fishers in the Tonle Sap, is that (after 
Foucault, 1991: 170-194) “each individual is both the subject and the object of power – the 
subject is exposed to ranking and stereotyping at the same time as s/he promotes the 
repressive ‘truths’ – thus being both an agent exercising power and a ‘subaltern’ who has 
been subjected and reduced to order by disciplining strategies.” One of the key themes of this 
thesis is the way in which state-centered and other controlling agencies have rationalized the 
space of the Lake, but at the same time, the territorial (and non-territorial) means of doing so 
also tend towards stereotyping ‘community spaces’ and their subaltern subjects. However, in 
the Tonle Sap, just as in gender politics, there are many subalterns who actively refuse to 
internalize or comply with dominant discourses and official representations of space (see 
concluding chapter). Further, indigenous conceptions of space and social-ecological 
connections may also generate alternative outcomes and possibilities that contradict with 
dominant notions (chapters on scale and human territoriality).  
  
From a political geographic perspective, two further studies have been particularly 
relevant in showing how Cambodia has faced different forms of power, authority and 
violence, which are related to transformations in the human landscape. Tyner’s (2008) focus 
on geography, genocide, and the unmaking of space during the Khmer Rouge period in 
Cambodia’s history discussed how ideology and particular geopolitical imaginaries can lead 
to extremely coercive transformations of space, place and identity. Drawing on theoretical 
insights by Henri Lefebvre (1991), and citing Mona Domosh (1998: 210), Tyner (2008: 109) 
reminds us that space is “purposefully representational of certain social ideas, and therefore 
the holders of these ideals attempt to control its use.” As Tyner continues, “we are socialized, 
for example, into an understanding of these representations of space, of whom is permitted 
access, and what behaviours are acceptable.” Tyner (2008: 110) discusses how the Khmer 
Rouge constructed their own communist spaces, and in doing so “they deliberately set out to 
deconstruct, or unmake, previous spaces.”  Of course, the violent removal of whole 
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populations for cities and creation of large rural collectives led to very distinct 
transformations in political, cultural, social and economic geographies. What this illustrates is 
that Cambodia (including the Tonle Sap basin) have been subjected to very dramatic and 
sudden politico-spatial transformations in recent history.  
 
Different forms of socio-spatial violence have continued in various forms until the 
current day. As Simon Springer (2009a and 2009b) has illustrated, urban centres, particularly 
those places and localities occupied by the urban poor, have become particularly subject to 
coercive measures attempting to relocate, remove and silence their residents, who are often 
viewed by the authorities as a public nuisance in the way of neoliberal-inspired 
developmental projects within city spaces. Springer also draws on some of Lefebvre’s ideas, 
by discussing ‘public space’ (or representational spaces), as potential sites “where the 
voiceless can make their demands seen and heard, as a medium for the contestation of power, 
and as the space in which identity is constructed, reified, and contested” (Springer, 2009 a: 3). 
Whilst I can not do justice to these geographical studies in this short introduction to this 
thesis, there are important connections to my thesis in that all these studies view space as 
being coninually a project in process, whereby the politics of space is extremely dynamic, full 
of different attempts to mould or transform the human and non-human landscape and create 
new territorialities, as well as ‘alternative’ politics that challenge official discourses, 
representations, and attempts to create order and hierarchy.  
 
2.6 Political Geographies of Fisheries in a Freshwater Lake  
 
The Tonle Sap supports one of the most productive freshwater fisheries in the world, 
with annual yields of 230,000 tons, equivalent to about half of the country’s total production 
(Van Zalinge et al., 2000; UNDP/GEF, 2004), and inland fish production plays a vital role in 
national economy. Given the rich in fisheries and its high commercial values of fish, the 
colonial and post-colonial state divides the Tonle Sap into the many ‘fishing lots,’ marked it 
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with boundaries, and auctioned for private control. At the same time, the state sets aside 
fishing areas in the Tonle Sap Lake as a ‘public fishing area’ for community uses for 
subsistence fishing (FACT & EJF, 2001; Van Acker, 2005; Keskenen, 2003). Furthermore, 
the state classifies the Lake into three main geographical functions for conservation 
purposes—transitional zone, buffer zone and core zone for a conservation purpose (Bonheou 
and Lane, 2001; 2002; TSBR, 2007). 
 
Not surprisingly, functionally different territories produce conflicts of the interest 
(Bonheur and Lane, 2001; 2002; TSBR, 2007). On the one hand, the commercial fishing lot 
and the conservation systems were established by the state ignoring ecological functions and 
human system of the Tonle Sap.  On the other hand, the conservation area overlaps the 
commercial fishing lots and the nature of the commercial exploitation of fisheries in the 
fishing lots conflict the conservation efforts in the conservation area (Bonheur and Lane, 
2001; 2002; Sithirith & Grundy-Warr, forthcoming).  
 
The ‘state spaces’ exclude the ‘community spaces’, for instance, the spaces of 
‘floating villages’, the spaces of ‘stand-stilt villages’ and the spaces of ‘farming-cum-fishing 
villages’. Therefore, fishing communities around the Tonle Sap Lake are struggling to 
construct their own spaces within and in the grey areas left by officially constructed spaces. 
Thus, in the Tonle Sap, space is constructed and reconstructed and it is constructed by agents 
and actors operating at national, regional and global levels, and some spaces overlapped such 
as commercial spaces and conservation spaces, leading to institutional, policy and 
management conflicts. Thus, different forms of spaces in the Tonle Sap can be analyzed 
across scales, and the management of the Tonle Sap is significantly influenced by spatial 
arrangements. Territoriality is a highly flexible concept, for it can relate to planning for the 
whole lake system, but this system contains so many boundaries, so many representations of 
space, and many examples of overlap and spatial conflicts. 
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Central to examination of resources governance is the consideration of the how the 
different constructed ‘territories’ of the Lake affect the livelihoods of people living dependent 
on aquatic resources. The political spaces constructed by the state exclude the ‘community 
spaces’, for instance, the spaces of ‘floating villages’, the spaces of ‘stand-stilt villages’ and 
the spaces of ‘farming-cum-fishing villages’. Therefore, fishing communities around the 
Tonle Sap Lake are struggling to construct their own spaces within and in the grey areas left 
by officially constructed spaces.  
 
With the creation of commercial fishing lots in French colonial period of rule and the 
resurrection of the fishing lot system in the ‘transitional period’ of Cambodia’s political 
economic transformation in the early 1990s, and the conservation areas, there were many new 
boundaries created within the Lake space. The demarcation of boundaries cut across many 
community areas considered to be ‘traditional fishing grounds’, and they did not take into 
account the ecological processes and hydrological regime. Thus, territorialization of the Tonle 
Sap has tended to ignore complex socio-ecological processes, in a similar way to how the 
whole Lower Mekong Basin involved ‘simplifications’ by reducing complex ecosystems and 
hydrology to ‘watercourses’ management in order to facilitate inter-state cooperation in the 
1995 Lower Mekong Agreement (Sneddon and Fox, 2006).  
 
Boundary conflicts are critical given the fact that boundaries are unclearly marked as 
a result of naturally fluctuating water-levels between the dry and wet seasons, and these 
implicate resources management and affect the livelihoods of fishing communities. Hitherto, 
the complexity of the political space of the Tonle Sap has been little explored, and remains a 
gap in knowledge of resource disputes, conflicts or governance issues (Sneddon, 2007; 




2.6.1 Governance Spaces, Privatization, and Resource Exploitation 
 
We can examine governance in the Tonle Sap Lake in relation to the management of 
commercial fishing areas, public fishing areas, and conservation areas, which are the key 
spatial resource ‘spaces’ of the Tonle Sap Lake. Commercialization of fisheries for state 
revenue generation lies at the heart of governance. The system is operated through a 
centralized management hierarchy, which means a high degree of state control of fisheries 
and resources (FACT & EJF, 2001; Van Acker, 2005; Degen et al., 2000).  
 
Furthermore, the management of fisheries in the Tonle Sap is dominated by the 
commercial fishing lots, which the researcher views as ‘privatized space’ because these areas 
are auctioned for private ownership every 2-4 years. The reality is, however, that fishing lot 
owners usually end up in control of these areas for more than 10 years, due to their close ties 
with high level government officials in charge of fishing business, and their bribes in 
exchange for the continued fishery control. Furthermore, the system works by sub-dividing 
fishing lots into sub-lots and leasing of these valuable fishing grounds to sub-lease holders 
who then use high-tech, up-scale equipment, sometimes ‘illegal’ means, to maximize their 
fish catches critical to make returns on their capital investments. In this manner, the way the 
Lake-space is governed, the territorialization of the Lake-space, and its commercialization, 
are directly contributing to over-exploitation and resource degradation. 
  
Fluctuating water-levels are a concern to the private fishing lots. On the one hand, 
fishing lot owners are often preoccupied with how to maximize fishing returns within existing 
lot boundaries, on the other hand, the fluctuating water-levels are conducive for fishing lot 
owners to silently expand their lots laterally beyond agreed limits. In many cases, the 
commercial fishing lot owners extend lot boundaries into the public fishing areas, leading to 
the fishing conflicts with local fishing communities (FACT & EJF, 2001; Van Acker, 2005; 
Keskenen, 2003).  
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2.6.2 Threats to Livelihood Security 
 
We may perceive the whole of the Tonle Sap as a ‘space of dependence’ for fishing 
communities around the Lake as well as being an important source of protein and livelihood 
incomes. Different fishing communities have settled around the Lake over time, such as the 
floating, stand-stilt and farming-cum-fishing communities, and they use the resources around 
the lake to sustain their livings (Sithirith and Grundy-Warr, forthcoming). At the same time, 
they have adapted to the lake’s ecosystem and developed their system, skills and practices to 
use resources in the lake, and processing the fish. Their cultural and social lives are based on 
fishing.  Fishing is the main source of income and livelihood security for most communities 
around the Tonle Sap (Navy et al., 2006).  
 
The commercial fishing lot system and the conservation efforts often conflicts with 
customary fishing practices of communities living around the Tonle Sap Lake. To access to a 
good fishing ground, fisher has to collude the powerful and corrupted officials, but many of 
them struggle to access to fisheries as they do not have enough resources to bribe them. Thus, 
they tend to encroach into conservation areas or commercial fishing lots, resulting in arrest 
which is subject to heavy fine, otherwise they are courted. This is one of causes of poverty in 
the Lake (FACT & EJF, 2001; Van Acker, 2005; Degen et al., 2000).  
 
Moreover, the commercialization of fisheries has led to the over-exploitation and 
degradation of resources in the Lake. At the same time, lack of alternative livelihood system 
and the limited access to fisheries for small and poor fishers are the causes of the fisheries 
destruction in the Lake. Fishers would maximize resources when they have opportunity in 
order to satisfy their needs. Due to a high population, the competition for resources is 
increased between fishers and between fishers and commercial fishing lots. Thus, the existing 
governance system has failed to ensure the sustainability and the well-being of the people 
(FACT & EJF, 2001). Simultaneously, increased development pressures around the Tonle 
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Sap, such harbor construction, irrigation and agriculture, and potential oil and gas 
development, aiming at seeking short-term economic gains at the expenses of long-term 
(social, economic and environmental) sustainability goals. Furthermore, since the political 
economic opening up of Cambodia to inward investment from the early 1990s, there has been 
much state – private sector exploitation of the country’s natural resources, including forestry, 
minerals, and fishery resources (ADB, 2005a; Hughes, 2003; Le Billon, 2000; Sneddon, 
2007). This is the national context for intensified commercialization of the Tonle Sap, 
affecting the livelihoods of millions of Cambodians as well as the national economy (FACT 
& EJF, 2001; Gum, 2000; Le Billon, 2000).  
 
Despite the abundance of resources, the Tonle Sap sap is considered as of the poorest 
regions in the country. This is confirmed by the World Bank (2006) indicating that about 35 
percent of people living in poverty in Cambodia, but in the Tonle Sap, the poverty headcount 
is still high accounting for 45 percent of the total population in 2004 (World Bank, 2006). The 
ADB report (2005) reiterates that the Tonle Sap Lake has a high rate of poverty. Deeper 
analysis in the incidence of poverty under the Tonle Sap Initiative stated that half of the 
villages in Tonle Sap estimated to have 40-60 percent of people living below the poverty line 
and in some areas even 80 percent of people living under the poverty line (ADB, 2005a; 
UNDP/GEF, 2004). Women constitute about 51% of the population in the Tonle Sap region. 
Significantly, they also head about 15-30% of households (UNDP/GEF, 2004). The fish catch 
per unit of effort has been decreasing, making livelihood dependence on fisheries a tough 
battle, particularly those living in the floating and stand-stilt communities whose livelihoods 
are entirely dependent on fishing. The situation is more critical for floating and stand-stilt 
communities given the fact that they do not own agricultural land and declining fish catches 
makes them more vulnerable. This is a major reason why this research focuses much more 
closely on these unique communities of the Tonle Sap. 
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2.6.3 The Politics of Knowledge  
 
 In Fikret Berke’s (1999) Sacred Ecology he raises several important reasons as to 
why we need to encourage “pluralistic approaches” to resource governance matters. At least a 
part of this project may be to build upon existing forms of ‘indigenous ecological knowledge’ 
(IEK) however we define it. As Berkes (1999: 180) puts it: “pluralism can include non-
Western knowledge about specific ecosystems as well as non-Western perspectives in 
interpreting that knowledge.” Furthermore, Berkes (1999: 181) suggests that: “Traditional 
systems inspire a new resource management science open to the participation of resource 
users in management, one that uses locally grounded alternatives to top-down centralized 
resource management. The point is important not only for humanizing resource management, 
but also for making sure that local needs are addressed and that relevant local knowledge, 
practice, and values are part of the decision making.” These viewpoints are highly relevant for 
fisheries management, whether on the oceans and in coastal zones (McGoodwin, 1990; Gupta 
and Sharma, 2008), or in a freshwater lake (Tola and Middleton, 2008). The idea is not to 
suggest that IEK is best, and there may often be much cross-over between forms of 
knowledge (Agrawal, 1996). Indeed, in the Tonle Sap, the researcher has noted that some of 
the now very exploitative commercial technologies used in the fishing lots are actually up-
scaled forms of indigenous technology at much smaller scales. Thus, any form of knowledge 
may lead to bad outcomes.  
 
 In the Mekong Basin as a whole, it has been argued that the applications of scientific 
knowledge have tended to depoliticize important socio-economic and environmental issues 
relating to major water projects, particularly dams, and that such knowledge production feeds 
into the “anti-politics’ machine of development” (Käkönen and Hirsch, 2009: 350). In other 
words, certain kinds of scientific knowledge may help to deflect attention away from the 
pressing issues at the scale of the local and the everyday, or provide a highly sophisticated 
technocratic smokescreen that makes it hard to challenge without counter-scientific evidence 
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and research. Nevertheless, scientific evidence can often cut in different directions. For 
instance, there exists massive biological, ecological and fishery science evidence that stresses 
the importance of wild capture fisheries in the Lower Mekong Basin (Friend, Arthur and 
Kestinen, 2009). The problem is that more dominant narratives exist that stress ‘trade-offs’ 
between hydropower and fisheries, emphasize aquaculture, and treat wild capture fisheries as 
being “inevitably in decline” due to more important water utilization projects.   
 
 Counter-narratives in support of wild capture fisheries have been developed based on 
combinations of knowledge, using science backed up by considerable investigation at various 
localized scales, and by incorporating the ecological understandings or ‘local wisdom’ of 
fishers. The Lower Mekong and Tonle Sap have deeply entrenched ‘wetlands livelihoods’ 
(Friend, 2007) based upon a very wide variety of fishing practices. Ian Baird has worked 
extensively with local communities in Laos and has documented how LEK is deeply 
ingrained in the lives of fishing communities “based on accumulated experiences regarding 
ecological and social processes that affect natural resources” (Baird, 2000:4). In addition, 
LEK has also been examined in order to examine and monitor the adverse downstream 
impacts of building dams along trans-border river systems (Baird and Mean Meach, 2005). 
These are positive examples of the sorts of ‘knowledge partnerships’ (Zanetell and Knuth, 
2002) that potentially provide more informed appraisals and analyses for policy to be based 
upon.  
 
What is particularly important in the call for more pluralistic approaches is the 
genuine need to build upon sustainable local practices and localized forms of knowledge 
wherever these are likely to help protect fisheries from over-exploitation or enable more 
broad based commitment to resource management efforts and goals. In a review of 
community organizations for managing water resources around the Tonle Sap, Carl 
Middleton and Prom Tola (2008: 150) pointed out that “there are numerous examples 
throughout Cambodia where artificial community organization arrangements have been 
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unsuccessfully imposed under the guise of community participation without first examining 
the potential for adapting or building upon existing local arrangements.” This is why it is 
necessary to thoroughly examine what already exists before trying to impose new structures 
that may be a misfit or malfunction due to a lack of compliance and genuine cooperation. 
Whilst we do indeed need to be wary of idealizing ‘the local’, IEK, and ‘the community’ 
(Agrawal and Gibson, 1999), it is still necessary to search for ways we can optimally use the 
forms of knowledge available, building upon local institutions, and developing partnerships 
needed for preserving livelihood and environmental security. 
 
2.6.4 Human-Ecology Relations and Territoriality in a Freshwater Lake 
 
The politics of territoriality are central concerns of this thesis. However, it is 
necessary to note that non-territorial forms of politics are always present, and territoriality as 
a political (and social) strategy may be turned on and off. Even so, I am interested in how and 
why territories are made and their significance in terms of what these territories have to say 
about power relationships. As David Delaney (2005: 16-17) puts it: “The point is that when 
we look through territory what we will always see are constellations of social relational 
power. Territory may facilitate or impede the workings of power, control, self-determination, 
or solidarity. Territorializations are the expressions of power, and how power is manifested in 
the material world. This fundamental relationship to social power is one of the features that 
distinguishes territory from other forms of social space (…) What makes an enclosed space a 
territory is, first, that it signifies, and second, that the meanings it carries or conveys refer to 
or implicate social power.” Further, the thesis examines both the ‘territorial’ and ‘extra-
territorial’ combinations of power that affect resource governance in the Tonle Sap Lake. For 
as Alatout (2006) observes, human territoriality reflects particular spatialities associated with 
complex mediated relations of power implicated by resource governance systems.  
 
Viewing human territoriality as being ‘always socially constructed’ (Sack, 1986) 
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tends to obscure some fundementally socio-ecological connextions and human-nature 
relations that characterize a freshwater lake with pronounced ‘pulsing ecosystem’ dynamics 
and seasonal fluctuations in water-levels. The rising and falling water-levels cause the areas 
around the Lake to be flooded during the water ‘rising’ period and to dry out during the water 
‘falling’ period (Lamberts, 2001; Kummu and Sarkkular, 2008; Nikula, 2005). Those areas 
that oscillate between a terrestrial and an aquatic status are defined as the ‘Aquatic-Terrestrial 
Transition Zone’ (ATTZ) (Junk, 1997). Ecosystems that experience fluctuations between 
terrestrial and aquatic conditions are called ‘pulsing ecosystems’, and are characterized by the 
‘flood pulse concept’ (Junk, 1997; Lamberts, 2001; Nikula, 2005). This thesis utilizes both 
the scientific understanding of the ‘pulsing ecosystem’ and ethnographic observations of 
spatial behavior (human territoriality) in relation to it. 
 
 Social scientists and human geographers have tended to ignore “ecosystem scales and 
ecosystem territories” (O’ Lear, 2005: 300; Natter & Ziehofer, 2002). Whilst political 
geographers interested in resource governance matters would do well to learn from political 
ecology approaches in order to produce more “conceptually sophisticated accounts of 
complex human-environmental relations” (Sneddon and Fox, 2006: 183; Robbins, 2003). In 
this thesis there is much consideration of how the biophysical processes influence indigenous 
territorialities. For instance, with regard to the ‘floating communities’ it seems that socially 
constructed adaptations and mobilities are as much related to the ‘flood pulse’, water-levels, 
and seasonal environmental changes, as they are to political economic influences and political 
boundaries (see Chapters 5 and 6). One of the unique contributions of this thesis is that it 
highlights how spatial practices and human territoriality relates to rising and falling waters, 
seasonal changes in the biophysical properties of the Lake, the annual flood pulse, and to 
other ‘natural’ phenomena such as fish migrations. The fact is that political and social 
organization, particularly ‘from above’, often complicates social-ecological relations that 
have developed over time in adaptation to water-level changes. Thus, territorial issues have 
vertical, horizontal and temporal dimensions that are not influenced by but not fully 
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controlled by humans. This has produced some peculiar indigenous spatial adaptations and 
territorialities within the Tonle Sap that are significant dimensions of the social-ecological 
‘lived space’ (such as ‘vertical’, ‘mobile’ and ‘pulsing’ territorialities, see Chapter 5) and 
complicate our understanding of the effects of formal political territories (Chapter 6).  
 
This thesis focuses on the political geographies of a freshwater lake, which unlike 
maritime space (see Grundy-Warr and Schofield, 2010) and most terrestrial resources, has 
received relatively little academic attention from political geographers. It is not surprising that 
Elden (2010a) makes a strong connection between ‘territory’ and ‘land’, and most of the 
focus on resource mapping, territories and territoriality in the region has focused on landed 
resources (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; Laungaramsri, 2002; Fadzillah-Cooke, 2003; 
Peluso, 2005a; 2005b). Nevertheless, the huge importance of the wetlands, rivers, ponds, 
reservoirs and lakes of the Mekong system deserve greater attention from political 
geographers interested in the politics of space and how spatial political organization affects 
resource access, utilization and control. Thus, this research extends the discussion of human 
territoriality and political territorialization to include the Great freshwater Lake of Cambodia.  
 
As this thesis argues, some communities are side-lined or ignored or subordinated by 
dominant representations and territorializations. This is where discussions concerning 
indigenous territoriality within the Tonle Sap link to a wider and important literature on 
property, access and territory on the one hand, and discussions of ‘public space’ in urban 
contexts (Blomley, Delaney and Ford, 2001; Sikor and Lund, 2009; Springer, 2009a) and 
territorial ‘commons’, community forests and ‘counter mapping’ (Laungaramsri, 2002; 
Peluso, 1992; 2005a; 2009). How are alternative geographies and ‘orders’ based on ‘the 
defense of place’ (Escobar, 2008) and ‘everyday’ practices (Rigg, 2007) to be created? How 







3.1 Engagement as Activist and Academic 
 
This research is founded upon a long-term engagement with the Tonle Sap in a 
professional capacity, previously (until October 2010) as Director of the Fisheries Action 
Coalition Team (FACT), and also over the past five years as a research scholar. The thesis is 
partially influenced by my previous experience as a director of non-governmental 
organization working with ordinary fishing communities, as well as by this academic 
research. Thus, there are insights that the thesis contains issues relating to differing personal 
critical engagements in the politics of resource governance. This long-term involvement, 
spanning over a decade, is responsible for my interest in central themes explored here. For 
instance, the existence of spatial politics over resources in the Tonle Sap is nothing new or 
exceptional (it has existed as long as human-beings have fished there and intensified recently 
with commercialization), but there is a definite gap in tackling spatial politics in the literature, 
both at practical policy levels (see Conclusion) and within the academic literature about the 
Tonle Sap (as discussed in Chapter Two). Thus, the researcher became directly interested in 
political geography, first in recognizing this gap whilst being fully engaged as an NGO office-
holder, then latterly as a research scholar becoming involved in this important sub-discipline 
as the thesis has evolved. 
 
 As a dedicated University researcher it is possible to devote the necessary time to 
developing an in-depth critical understanding of the Tonle Sap’s social-ecological system, the 
politics of resources and political geographies. Being the former director of FACT has 
provided this research with additional information, and helped to frame relevant questions to 
the most pressing livelihood problems and resource conflicts faced by communities living 
around and within the Tonle Sap.  From an early stage in the thesis plan there was a clear 
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need for micro-level locality and place-based research that relates to broader resource 
governance issues. As Tania Murray Li (2007: 3-4), an experienced anthropologist and 
occasional development consultant in Indonesia, states, regarding her dual role as academic 
and advocate: “I believe my predicament is diagnostic. It enables me to ask what ways of 
thinking, what practices and assumptions are required to translate messy conjunctures, with 
all the processes that run through them, into linear narratives of problems, interventions, and 
beneficial results.” The Tonle Sap is also full of ‘messy conjunctures’ and understanding 
more about these necessitates additional research into the complex political economy and 
geographies of resources within the Lake.  
 
Straddling the academic and activist spheres enables what geographer Paul Routledge 
(1996) calls “critical engagement” in the analysis of “terrains of resistance” in the field of 
resource politics, for the researcher has direct experience of being involved in livelihood and 
governance questions in an advocacy, and not purely in an academic context. As Routledge 
(1996: 510) aptly points out there are frequently many “struggles within and between 
academia and activism, particularly the contradictions that arise between an intellectual grasp 
of those directly involved in those events.”  Experience of being involved as a research 
scholar studying the Tonle Sap has revealed that there are often potential gaps in the reading 
of events, processes and issues from the relatively isolated archives and materials of the 
University and multiple “localized understandings.”  
 
As an NGO activist concerned with small-scale fishers, it became apparent that there 
are other sorts of intellectual contradictions and gaps between those making key policy 
decisions at national, provincial and agency levels and the “messy” “life worlds” and “lived 
space” of ordinary people. As such, it is imperative to attempt to provide deeper research 
insights concerning the human landscape, localities, people and places that are under the 
resource governance spotlight. Many official agency reports at government or international 
institutional levels provide superficial or only passing reference to the heterogeneity and 
 58 
complex “lived space” (after Lefebvre, 1991) and multiple differentiated communities of the 
Tonle Sap. This research seeks to fill certain gaps in our understanding of complex social-
ecological and political situations confronting small-scale fishers, communities, stakeholders 
and agents enmeshed in the politics of environmental resources. For instance, certain types of 
knowledge and rationalizations of the Lake-space are privileged and other knowledge(s) and 
meanings are relatively silenced in the processes of resource governance.  
 
This thesis has a simple objective of trying to make more visible the various localized 
politics and practices that relate to what are termed ‘fishery conflicts’ in the Tonle Sap and 
relate these to broader political economic changes affecting Cambodia. In so doing, the thesis 
also relates to what Escobar (2001; 2008) calls “the defense of place” which entails 
uncovering various alternative subaltern strategies that relate to the politics of resources and 
struggles to maintain livelihoods, the cultural politics of resources, and social adaptations to 
overarching transformations of human-nature relations induced by broader political economic 
forces.    
 
3.2 Approach and Methods  
 
This thesis is explorative in the sense that very little research, and practically zero 
academic research, has focused on the politics of space in the Tonle Sap (See Chapter Two). 
Due to previous engagement with FACT, as an academic researcher I was advantaged by 
knowing where to look for macro-level data almost as a routine task. The researcher already 
had detailed pre-thesis knowledge of reports undertaken by various other agencies and 
institutions involved in different aspects of Tonle Sap affairs. At every stage, prior consent 
was sought from all the people involved in this research, and in every case the researcher 
informed people about the key purposes of this research. In addition, whilst researching this 
thesis, it was possible for the researcher to undertake detailed micro-level empirical research 
in places that were already familiar, which was critical to the initial formulation and 
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subsequent implementation of feasible methodological practices. The following sub-sections 
will explore research methods (including ethnographic and other qualitative and quantitative 
methods); ethical concerns; field site and household selection; and the politics of research. 
 
3.2.1 Micro-level Fieldwork  
 
Too many agency reports and academic arguments about the Tonle Sap are based on 
local-level assumptions rather than detailed primary research or actual detailed knowledge of 
peoples’ lives on the Lake. The bulk of this thesis is based on first-hand macro- and micro-
level research, practical experience of working on Tonle Sap issues for one decade, and the 
author’s deep concerns about the livelihoods, resources and environmental future of the Lake. 
A great deal of time and effort has been made to collect data from primary sources and 
numerous field-based observations. Most of the materials presented are original. The research 
process involved considerable adjustment from city-life (the researcher’s office and home are 
in Phnom Penh), and it is very demanding for any city-dweller to undertake primary 
fieldwork in the Tonle Sap for any reasonable length of time because many villages lack 
proper sanitation and public services, and access to them can also be very challenging. 
However, long stays in study sites and participant observation are the only ways to develop an 
understanding of ‘floating village’ life, of appreciating what aquatic resources really mean for 
peoples’ livelihood security, and why seasonal variations affect those ways of life. This thesis 
is mostly based upon important fieldwork in four different fishing villages in the Tonle Sap 
Lake—Kampong La, Kampong Phluk, Kampong Loung and Peam Bang (See Table 3.1 
below). 
 
In gathering primary data, three qualitative approaches were employed: (a) 
ethnographic-type fieldwork, in particular, participant observations in the selected study sites; 
(b) semi-structured interviews and group interview with those who work and live in these 
areas; and (c) archival research into documents, maps, and other relevant historical and 
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contemporary materials. In addition, the researcher had access to the quantitative data 
collected by numerous competent agencies, including Fisheries Administration (FiA), the 
Mekong River Commission (MRC), the World Fish Center, FAO, Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), independent scientific studies, and an organization most familiar to the researcher, the 
Fisheries Action Coalition Team (FACT).  
 
3.2.2 Ethnographic fieldwork and human geography 
 
Steve Hebert (2000: 550) observed that in top geographical journals (notably, 
ANNALS of the Association of American Geographers and Society and Space) there has been 
only a small fraction of papers deploying ethnographic methodologies, and Nick Megoran 
(2006: 623) has argued that such methods have been largely “neglected by political 
geographers.” This seems at odds with those human (mostly cultural and social geographers) 
who have elaborated the merits of ethnography within geography most eloquently, or who 
have utilized these methods effectively in their own research (Ley, 1974, 1988; Western, 
1981, 1999; Rowells, 1978; Gregory, 1981; Cook and Crang, 1995; Crang, 1994; Katz, 2004; 
Valdivia, 2005; for a useful discussion of ethnography within geography, see Cloke et al., 
2004). As Hebert (2004: 551) asked: “How better to determine how place and agency 
intertwine and recreate each other than by closely examining how different social groups 
meaningfully define, inhabit, manipulate and dominate space?” This also relates strongly to 
political geographic research. Megoran (2006: 627) utilized ethnographic methods in his 
research on the porous borderlands of the Uzbekistan – Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley, and 
argues that “used alongside textual and (in the context of boundaries) technico-legal studies, 
ethnographic participant observation could be a helpful tool to build up a fuller understanding 
of geopolitics and international relations.” Donnan and Wilson (1998) have also illustrated the 
relevance of cultural, social, and political anthropology research in the field of international 
boundary and borderlands studies. This researcher believes such methods are helpful in the 
study of the “everyday”, sometimes unusual, mostly banal implications of internal 
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boundaries, zones and territories, and in the examination of how certain dominant 
representations of space are played out, experienced, and influence the “everyday spaces” of 
ordinary people in the Tonle Sap area. 
 
3.2.3 Ethnographies of ‘lived space’ and notions of ‘the Field’ 
 
 Many official studies of the Tonle Sap make policy statements, scientific 
observations or rational judgments about all manner of issues concerning fisheries, 
biodiversity, sustainability, governance, and so on, but usually these are statements are made 
from a rarified level that does not seem contaminated by “the messiness” of human life on 
and around the Lake. Yet, as many human geographers realize we must grapple with “the 
inescapable entanglements of people and place” and examine the “intimate attachments” that 
all sorts of people have to the places that encircle them (Cloke et al., 2004: 172). The lived 
space of the Tonle Sap incorporates numerous different kinds of villages, each linked to the 
Lake and its resources in peculiar ways associated with unique amalgams of non-human 
biophysical forms and processes, human demographic and settlement patterns.  
 
Employing ethnographic participant observation allows for a fuller appreciation of 
human behavior in relation to localized space and local practices, much of which, in the 
author’s view, remain too little understood in relevant policy-making circles. In particular, in 
chapters 4 – 8, the thesis is concerned mostly with micro-level political geographies, human 
territoriality, conflicts over space, fishery scales, and patron-client relations at district and 
village levels. Whilst the researcher does not claim to fully comprehend all “the inner 
workings” of the communities researched, the plain matter is that without the effort to spend 
time with people in these places and to make lots of observations, the thesis would be 
empirically much poorer, and this would also handicap efforts to link grounded realities to 
broader conceptual concerns and issues of resource governance (see Chapter Nine).  
 
 62 
 This research thesis follows previous research in the Mekong Basin which has taken 
indigenous ecological knowledge, local understandings and meanings of place, and 
ethnographic research as a serious engagement to appreciate fundamental questions, problems 
and resource management issues more thoroughly. For example, Baird and Shoemaker (2008) 
provide a wonderfully rich ethnographic study of people, livelihoods, and development in the 
Xekong River Basin, Lao PDR. Their study was founded on Ian Baird’s research on and off 
over 15 years along the Xekong River, in Attepeu and Champasak provinces, as well as upon 
utilizing insights from a group of Lao videographers, and from colleagues in the Global 
Association for People and the Environment (GAPE). Such duration, detail, contacts and 
engagement enable researchers to uncover intimate place-based localized knowledge as well 
as highly nuanced meanings of place. The level of engagement with the people and places in 
this research is at a similar level of intensity, primarily due to the researcher’s dual role as 
both researcher-scholar and activist-NGO worker. It is also aided by the fact that the author is 
a Cambodian researching within Cambodia. This meant that the very real research barriers of 
being “lost in translation” and “culture shock” were significantly reduced.  
 
 Within anthropology and geography there is a need to interrogate what is meant by 
‘the field’. Below there are listed specific communities and sites that have become significant 
places that relate to the research process. However, as Gupta and Ferguson (1997: 15) have 
argued, choice of fieldwork sites can enable some forms of “situated knowledge” but “block 
off others”. By choosing certain sites over others is inevitably highly selective and skews 
empirical research to specific places that may or may not necessarily be comparative or 
reflect broader theoretical or governance issues. Furthermore, researchers need to be sensitive 
to “less localized relations”, “trans-local” processes, and multi-scale processes (Howitt, 
2003). Thus, in any piece of ethnographic research it is useful to adopt other methods that 
enable broader social and power relations, interconnections and flows between places to be 
analyzed in relation to the specific sites under the microscope. Gupta and Ferguson sought to 
re-think meanings of ‘the field’ in the discipline of anthropology, but their idea of a malleable 
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and flexible ‘field’ incorporating “shifting locations rather than bounded fields” (1997: 38) is 
applicable to much human geographic work too. Socio-cultural units are not spatially and 
temporally isolated from broader political economic, social and ecological processes. 
Furthermore, deeper ‘local’ understandings of specific sites, places, localities and territories 
also require knowledge of the ‘power webs’ of interconnections, processes and relations that 
are at once local, trans-local and multi-scalar (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997; Howitt, 2003).  
 
 The notion of ‘the field’ adopted in this study is very broad. Definitely it does include 
the different chosen village sites (discussed below), but the fieldwork in these sites is only a 
part of a temporally larger enterprise, which actually began years before the author decided to 
undertake PhD research and became instead an NGO activist examining fishery issues in 
Cambodia. ‘The field’ is further stretched out to include many insights, secondary reports, 
unpublished documents, statistics and other materials that ‘my position’ made me familiar 
with. Thus, networking and working in offices in Phnom Penh does sometimes allow access 
to privileged information unavailable at the actual fieldwork village-sites. In a sense 
‘fieldwork’ has also included numerous conferences, meetings and workshops on the Mekong 
Basin, on fisheries management, on all manner of economic and social issues relating to the 
Tonle Sap, in which I have participated over the years. Thus, the ‘boundaries’ of ‘the field’ 
are flexible, and involve more than simply participant observations at village level (which are 
still very necessary).  
 
 ‘The field’ is flexible, relating both to the experience, positions, networks, and 
contacts of the researcher, as much as to the deep ethnographic engagement in the actual 
places one is studying. However, this researcher believes that without understanding these 
various sources it is hard to develop a deep understanding of the Tonle Sap. A vital part of 
this process has been becoming concerned about what Jonathan Rigg (2007) and others have 
termed ‘the geographies of everyday life.’ 
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3.2.4 Relating abstract concepts to ‘everyday life’ 
 
 Cloke et al., (2004: 186) argue that “the ‘nitty-gritty’ of everyday life [could not] be 
represented as raw, unmediated data – the empiricist fallacy, data speaking for itself – nor 
[could] it be presented through abstract theoretical categories – the theoreticist and idealist 
trap, the lack of interest in empirical findings … [What’s] best for the relation – data / theory 
– is the ‘surprise’ … That each can bring to the other [through a] continuous process of 
shifting back and forth … between ‘induction’ and ‘deduction’” (also see Willis and 
Trondman, 2000). Ethnographers often argue that theory needs to be derived from the ground 
up, thus allowing social phenomena to be revealed through intensive fieldwork, which is more 
important to them than testing particular hypotheses or applying abstract theory (Eyles, 1988; 
Atkinson and Hammersley, 1994). As Heibert (2000: 551) puts it: “Ethnography explores the 
tissues of everyday life to reveal the processes and meanings which undergird social action, 
and which enable order to be reproduced and sometimes challenged.” However, ethnography 
is not “purely inductive” (Heibert, 2000: 552). In this thesis, the researcher has drawn upon 
conceptual apparatus mostly from the sub-disciplinary field of political geography, which 
provides a range of important concepts and theoretical notions that have enable sharper 
analysis of the politics of space, and simultaneously these ideas have ‘come alive’ through  
detailed micro-level ethnographies, interviews and surveys that are integral to this thesis. For 
instance, human territoriality (Sack, 1986; Delaney, 2005) is a social geographic theory 
relating to human social interactions, and as such, detailed empirical work can help to 
highlight critical aspects of territorial behaviour and strategy in relation to superimposed 
structures, forms of governance and political boundaries. This is largely why in the field of 
resource politics, anthropological and sociological approaches have added much to our 
understandings of state territoriality, contestations over land use and common property 
resources in Southeast Asia (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; Peluso, 1992; 2005a; 2005b; 
Vandergeest, 1996; Li, 2007). Sad to say, there is very little attention from hardcore 
geographers, let alone political geographers (Sithirith and Grundy-Warr, forthcoming). To 
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cite Heibert (2004: 553) again: “A theoretically informed, structurally sensitive, ethnography, 
however, can uncover how structures are made real in the contexts and commotions of daily 
life.”   
 
3.2.5 Relating the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro’ 
 
 One of the key empirical aims of this research is to highlight the complex politics of 
space in the Tonle Sap through a series of detailed studies of localized problems concerning 
fishery access, boundary disputes, clashes in conceptions of space, and so on. Key thesis 
objectives are to highlight the significance of political space in relation to natural resources 
and fisheries governance; to explore competing territorialities affecting the management and 
governance of resources; and to explore different forms and effects of ‘power’ in the politics 
of space and resources in the Tonle Sap (see Chapters 1 and 2). All of these are ‘macro-level’ 
objectives that relate to broader politics concerning the current and future governance of 
natural resources. The trick is to be able to relate the ‘micro’ empirical findings to the ‘macro’ 
conceptual and political issues? Once again, ethnographic approaches are helpful. 
“Ethnography can elucidate the linkages between the macrological and the micrological, 
between enduring and structured aspects of social life and the particulars of the everyday” 
(Heibert, 2000: 554).  
 
 This thesis examines the socio-economic, political and spatial implications of 
expanded commercialization and commercial fishing lots on the fisheries of the Lake. In 
order to ‘get at’ numerous ‘micro’ dimensions it is necessary to engage in grounded (or 
literally, on the water) fieldwork to appreciate the various different ways in which 
commercialization has affected ordinary fishers’ access to fishing grounds, fishery practices, 
and fishery scales. Each chapter in this thesis represents a conscious research effort to 
examine moments when broader processes, constraints and structures impinge upon the lived 
spaces and daily life-worlds of ordinary fishers, thus connecting micro with macro and macro 
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with micro events, incidents, and changes. Ethnographic approaches and local-level empirical 
research are undoubtedly relevant to the geographer’s engagement with how landscapes are 
continually being made and remade through broader political economic transformations, as 
well as how these contested landscapes are actually being lived and experienced by ordinary 
people.  
  
3.3 Reflexivity and Positionality 
 
As Del Casino (2001: 462) put it: “ethnography is always a partial and contested 
narrative informed by the decisions we make before we begin, after we have started, and once 
we have completed our research.” This is an interested statement, and one that is certainly 
applicable in the case of this thesis, which has undergone numerous twists and turns, changes 
in direction, and title changes, as the researcher has tried to come to grips with the project, 
purposes and process of undertaking the lengthy and often arduous PhD thesis research. 
Indeed, the process has often led to considerable self-questioning at different stages of the 
thesis, partly because the topic and subject matter are issues I am personally very passionate 
about.  
 
Cloke et al. (2004: 192) raised numerous questions that seem pertinent to many 
human geography research projects. For example, “how can you justify using methods 
designed to develop sufficient trust for participants to yield sensitive information and then 
risk betraying this by publicly writing what may upset (or perhaps even disadvantage) them?” 
This statement addresses real ethical dilemmas, for instance, does the research in any way 
disadvantage or hurt the key human subjects of the research? Sensitive handling of 
ethnographic data, avoiding as far as possible attributions to particular individuals of families, 
and being honest about key research purposes with all respondents has been central to the 
approach adopted for this thesis. However, the thesis process is not without dilemmas and 
contradictions. This researcher is a relatively middle-class urbanite with a decent social status 
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as a previous director of an NGO examining fisheries issues. That is somewhat at odds with 
the socio-economic realities, social status and class of people living in the Tonle Sap area. 
Many of my respondents are relatively poor fishers, sometimes living off meager resources 
with little to supplement their fishery incomes. Whilst the researcher is from the same 
country, the Tonle Sap could often be on a different world from the busy hustle and bustle of 
life in Phnom Penh. Indeed, it is not too difficult to come across people who live and work in 
the city who have never visited the Tonle Sap. To help bridge social gaps the researcher 
should remember to treat “people as knowledgeable, situated agents from whom researchers 
can learn a great deal about how the world is seen, lived and works in and through real places, 
communities and people” (Cloke et al., 2004: 193). Using ethnographic-type research 
methods helps the researcher to better understand ways in which embodiments, emotions and 
feelings are bound up with places and identities. Understanding the constraints and enabling 
aspects of one’s position, as researcher and in terms of other identifiers, is a vital part of 
asking oneself important questions about the biases, assumptions and contradictions often 
inherent in any research process. 
 
To overcome the social barrier between the life-worlds of researcher and subjects 
takes a conscious effort to de-emphasize ‘position’ and to focus clearly on the research goals. 
Ethnographic methods recognize that the researcher is not a neutral, objective, recorder of 
events, an ‘observer’ in the field (Cloke et al., 2004). No longer seen as the ‘expert’ who is 
qualified to ‘uncover’ information, the researcher is now seen as having an impact on the 
research process and the ‘selecting’, ‘ordering’, ‘filtering’ and ‘prioritizing’ of information 
collected (Gibson-Graham, 1994; Cloke et al., 2004). The researcher is ‘positioned’ as part of 
the research process and her/his ‘positionality’ in part determines the outcome of the research. 
Gibson-Graham (1994: 220) described a shift from the metaphor of ‘mining’ for data in 
which the researcher must simply discover information, to metaphors of ‘conversation’ and 
‘performance’, in which research is seen as a way to produce new ways of seeing, new 
configurations of theory and new subject positions.
 68 
continually reflect upon her/his role and approach to so-called human ‘subjects’ in the 
research process.  
 
Undertaking this research has involved various ethical concerns, and at all times the 
researcher has tried to be reflexive about strategies whilst remaining sensitive to the places 
and people being studied. Through some of the empirical insights uncovered about the 
political geographies, ecologies and human life of the Tonle Sap, the researcher seeks not just 
scholarly fulfillment, but also a thesis that can in some way help towards a better 
understanding of, engagement with, and empowerment of those ordinary people whose daily 
lives are so intimately bound to the Lake’s biophysical space and natural resources. Self-
reflexivity is important when undertaking detailed fieldwork, for it leads to a more sensitive 
handling of methods and data, furthermore it can help to connect what is happening to in the 
research process to broader contexts affecting the research ‘field’. Finally, it “can help 
researchers to explain – to themselves and to others – what they did and why under the 
circumstances’’ (Cloke et al., 2004: 194-95, original emphasis).  
 
3.4 Politics of research  
 
The above discussion also relates to the ‘politics’ of undertaking research. ‘Political purpose’ 
relates to this simple statement by Derek Gregory (1981: 5) that human geographic research 
should “restore human beings to their worlds in such a way that they can take part in the 
collective transformation of their human geographies.” This fits with Rigg’s (2007: 9) 
privileging of “the local and the everyday geographies” as a way of forcing “a consideration 
of human agency.” As suggested above, many ordinary people who live in the Tonle Sap 
often get only passing mention within official documents, or when they are mentioned, they 
are either marginalized populations living in poverty, ‘victims’ of environmental damage, or 
they are ‘culprits’ contributing to diminishing resources, environmental degradation, and the 
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need to protect fisheries from over-fishing (without specifying the complex social and 
political relations involved).  
 
As a researcher with strong interests in political geography, it should be recognized 
that the researcher’s role and purpose do sometimes have significant ‘political’ dimensions, 
whether by accident or design. Paul Routledge (2001: 114-15) described his research in 
connection to the Free Namada Movement as “standing within the river.” “First, it is a 
representational struggle over the meaning of processes such as democracy and development, 
a discursive conflict over different imagined geographies. The abstract space of the state 
stands against the lived space of tribal and peasant communities. Second, it is a material 
struggle over land and water resources, with the people of the valley struggling to protect 
cash crops, subsistence livelihoods, and cultures.” This is very like Escobar’s concerns with 
‘defense of place’ struggles briefly mentioned earlier. Routledge goes onto explain and justify 
why he as an academic became activated to do more advocacy work in addition to his 
scholarly outputs “on one side of the struggle”, in other words, consciously taking sides in a 
political struggle. He talks about the need for critical “collaborative methodologies” 
combining sound academic research with activist aims, and working alongside groups and 
organizations that are bound up in processes of struggle. As he puts is: “Resisting is about 
being within the river, within the flow of action, rather than watching it from the banks. It is 
about making politics the subject, rather than the object, of research so that life will not be 
drenched in tears!” (Routledge, 2001: 119).  
 
Whilst this researcher does not exactly “stand in the river” as part of a social 
movement (or rather “stand in the lake”) in a collaborative struggle with the people and places 
that are central to this thesis, but the research does have underlying political goals that 
strongly relate to some of Routledge’s arguments about the need to identify “politics as the 
subject” and to consider seriously the concerns of those groups and communities that are 
often engaged in “defense of place” type struggles. Gupta and Ferguson (1997: 39) have also 
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stressed that research and fieldwork practices should not be merely aloof academic exercises, 
even if “the most politically engaged “experts” may still conceive of themselves as occupying 
an external and epistemologically privileged position.” They go on to say, that rather than 
anthropologists simply “sharing” their work with “ordinary people” they should also forge 
links “between different knowledges” in order to be able to transform “the field(s)” of 
research into “a site for strategic intervention.” These words are full of meaning in the context 
of the Tonle Sap and the researcher’s engagements with it, pre-, during and post-research for 
this thesis, and as a scholar-researcher and NGO-activist. The Tonle Sap represents both a 
field arena writ large containing numerous potential field sites within, and represents “a site 
for strategic intervention” containing many possible “situated interventions” between 
different forms of knowledge, different social locations, in order to develop “a political 
purpose with allies who stand elsewhere” (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997: 39). Indeed, this is very 
much like what various civil society groups, social movements, and concerned academics are 
already engaged in within the politics of resources, livelihoods and water in the Mekong 
region (see Hirsch, 2006). These are also related strongly to some of the political perspectives 
that underpin some of the key conclusions of this thesis (Chapter 9). 
 
3.5 Other Research Methods 
 
3.5.1 Semi-structured Individual and Group Interviews 
 
While there are many helpful reports and documents available to the researcher, many 
of these have not been based on detailed qualitative social research. Thus, a lot of valuable 
insights may be gained from in-depth and semi-structured interviews directly with fishers and 
household members because their voices, concerns, experiences and otherwise would 
otherwise be mostly unheard. The semi-structured interview is useful as the researcher is able 
to guide the discussion while the same time allowing interviewees to speak more broadly 
about their experiences. Such interviews enable understanding numerous contemporary issues 
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in relation to resource management, which are often differing perspectives from those gained 
by reading official reports and agency research documents (See Appendices).  
 
It is important to record that the researcher has only interviewed adults, over 18 years 
of age, after receiving their prior-permission, and with their anonymity respected unless they 
agree to have real names (usually shortened) recorded. Furthermore, before any interviews 
were conducted the interviewees were informed about my research focus and purpose of 
study. As the author is a relatively well-known figure in the villages concerned, it is necessary 
to maintain honest and open relations with all the villagers. And like other researchers, there 
exists a strong sense of ‘commitment’ towards the people and places with whom this author 
has come into contact. This researcher’s role and engagement with the Tonle Sap is a long-
term one, and it goes well beyond writing this thesis. Thus, the author agrees with Stan 
Stevens (2001: 72) perspective on such fieldwork that “returning to a place often, and over 
many years, and for long periods of time, changes accountability … the obligation is one you 
take on as someone who wants to be welcomed and valued in a community.” The engagement 
this researcher has goes well beyond the writing of this thesis. 
 
The researcher has conducted group discussions with community members in the four 
study sites. These discussions focus on the history of the villages, livelihoods, and the 
fisheries situation confronting their communities. These discussions allow community 
members to express their opinions about the resource management regime, the impacts of 
policy and institutions on them and resources on the lake and to identify possible ways 
forward. The group discussions are valuable background to enable the researcher to undertake 
more detailed interview later. From these interviews, the researcher is able to piece together 
how politics help shape the ‘local’ resource uses, management and distribution and how each 
community in my four chosen sites exercise their politics in response to the national politics 
in efforts to protect their livelihoods.  
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3.5.2 Archival and Published Document Research 
 
Archival materials are a valuable source from which we may trace the historical 
geographical classifications and policy shifts in the resources sector. Archives can be thought 
of as an integral part of the apparatus of modern government and a key to understanding state 
functions and the process of knowledge construction (Anderson, 1983; Latour, 1987). More 
than just a record of the state’s activity, archives are part of the state’s construction and use of 
power (Blunt et al., 2003). Archives can reveal who benefit most from policies; how official 
ideology becomes normalized; how assumptions underlying key discourses permeate 
decision-making; and how images are selected through which ideas and events are recorded 
and disseminated for public consumption.  
 
By critically observing the content of archives, this researcher has been able to gain 
insights into state actions. Just like maps, archives can also reveal important inclusion and 
exclusion strategies in policy making (Harley, 1989; Anderson, 1983).  Reading archival 
material is an interpretive strategy based on the assumption that there is a hierarchy of 
discourses affecting policy-making (O’Tuathail, 1996). It should be clear that archival 
research about documented and published materials is relevant to discourse analysis. This is 
particularly important when many reports about the Tonle Sap are found in international and 
national agency publications from organizations as diverse as the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), Mekong River Commission (MRC), Fisheries and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
Oxfam, the World Fish Center, and the Fisheries Department of the Government.  
 
3.6 Site Selection 
 
In order to accomplish research objectives, choice of field-sites is extremely careful. 
The Tonle Sap is simply too big a space for a single thesis on the politics of space and 
resources, consisting of six provinces, of which 1158 villages are located in the floodplain 
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areas, of these villages, about 170 villages are floating villages (Keskinen, 2003; 2006). To 
study the politics of resources management, the researcher has selected four different sites in 
the Tonle Sap for in-depth study based upon prior research, knowledge of their problems, 
accessibility to the researcher, and their differing characteristics in relation to the flood-pulse: 
(i) Kampong La—a farming-cum-fishing village in Pursat Province; (ii) Kampong Loung—a 
floating community in Pursat Province; (iii) Peam Bang—a floating community in Kampong 
Thom Province, and (iv) Kampong Phluk—a stand-stilt community located in Siem Reap 
Province (see Table 3.1).  
Table 3. 1: The characteristics of studied communities in the Tonle Sap 






Kampong La • 189 
households in 
Kampong La, 




Kampong La as 
farming-cum-
fishing, and 
Anlong Raing as a 
“floating village” 
Farming and Fishing 
for Kampong La, 
and more than 90% 
of households in 
Anlong Raing are 


















spaces of floating 
community in 
Kampong Loung 
in the Tonle Sap.  
Peam Bang 619 households 




More than 90 
percent of 
households in Peam 













More than 94% of 
households are 
engaged in fishing 
as a primary source 
of living.  
The stand-stilt 
community stays 
in water for six 
months and on 
land for six 
months.  
 
The following discussion relates to the descriptive distinctions of the villages in terms 
of location, size, population, and their respective characteristics in relation to the annual rising 
and falling water-levels of the Tonle Sap. This is critical to the aims of the thesis seeking to 
reveal how and why there are human-ecological aspects to territoriality as well as purely 




Peam Bang is a floating commune, located in Stung District, Kampong Thom 
Province, consisting of five floating villages, all of them geographically surrounded largely 
by the ‘water body’. Peam Bang’s 5 villages are home to 619 families in 2005 with a total of 
2929 people of which women constitute 51% of the total population, and the rest are male 
(See Table 3.1). On average, each family has roughly 5 members. Some Vietnamese 
households settle in Peam Bang for fishing, but the record is not available in public 
documents. Peam Bang is located near to ‘commercial space’ or ‘fishing lots’. The 
‘commercial space’ refers to fishing areas of ‘fishing lots’. There are three fishing lots in 
Peam Bang, namely fishing lot no.4, fishing lot no.5 and fishing lot no.6, covering 55,203ha 
as a “commercial space”. Fishing lot no. 4 covers 19,390ha and the fishing no.5 covers an 
area of 9,908ha. The fishing lot no.6 is the most important fishing lot in Peam Bang, covering 
a huge area, estimating about 25,905ha (DoF, 2001). However, a large area around Peam 
Bang is also categorized as a conservation area, designating as a ‘Biosphere Reserve’ located 
in Boeung Chhmar (Kosal and Vanna, 2001).  
The ‘Biosphere Reserve’ in Boeung Chmar is one of the three Biosphere Reserve 
areas in the Tonle Sap Lake, covering an area of 28,000 ha (ADB, 2006a). Boeung Chhmar 
Lake which is a permanent water body in the Tonle Sap Lake is located in the center of a 
‘core area’ of Boeung Chmar Biosphere Reserve, covering an area of 14,560 hectares, 
consisting of ‘open water’ and ‘flooded scrub’ in dry season (Vathana, 2001). Boeung 
Chhmar Lake and its associated creek system had been designated as a ‘Ramsar Site’ in 1996 
together with other sites in the country and gained its formal recognition by the Ramsar 
Convention in late 1999 in which Cambodia is a signatory. Thus, there are several political, 
geographic and ecological issues that relate directly to Peam Bang. It has been complex 
territorial system, especially the overlapping spaces between fishing lot areas, the Biosphere 
Reserve Areas, and the so-called ‘community areas’ overlap with the fishing lots and 
Biosphere Reserve Areas. It is precisely this real and grounded politics of the space that 
underlies my thesis research motives.  
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Kampong Loung is also a floating community located in the western shore of the 
Tonle Sap Lake in Pursat Province. This community is a largest floating community in the 
Tonle Sap Lake inhabited by 1029 households. Many researchers consider Kampong Loung 
as a ‘floating town’ of the Tonle Sap, and there are more Vietnamese households living as 
either fisherman or fish traders. Access to this community is mainly by boat and it is very 
remote from District and Provincial Towns (about 7 km from the Krakor district center). 
Kampong Loung is fascinating as an ethnically mixed space with its own unique human 
territoriality associated with rising and falling water-levels (See Table 3.1).  
 
As a ‘floating town’, people settle their houses on water. In the dry season, the water 
level in the Tonle Sap is very low, making the space for community more restricted and 
lower, while in the wet season, the rising waters in the Tonle Sap push the location of the 
community upward in a deeper lake. The water level affects the location and space throughout 
the year which makes the political geography of this ‘floating town’ only understandable 
through careful imphirical research. One of the contributions of this study is to reveal the 
human-recological dimensions of mobile and floating territoriality and the complex politics 




Kampong La is a farming-cum-fishing community, but it is divided into two parts. 
The first part is called a Kampong La which is a typical farming-cum-fishing village whereby 
most households are engaged in both farming and fishing in the Tonle Sap, and the second 
part names as an Anlong Raing which is a ‘floating village’ whereby people living in Anlong 
Raing are primarily engaged in fishing as a way of life. Kampong La and Anlong Raing is 
officially one village, but physically there are two different villages, located 12 km away from 
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each other, making the political control of this village difficult. The peculiar classification of 
distinct settlement types as one village is a motivation for me to study politics of space in this 
area. For the purpose of this study, I focus on the different politics of space faced by 
Kampong La, and also Anlong Raing.  
 
Kampong La is home to about 189 households (See Table 3.1). Farming is a ‘primary 
occupation’ while fishing is ‘secondary occupation’ for most households. Kampong La is 
surrounded by rice field paddies in which land access is critical. In the wet season, the 
floodplain is inundated. The land covers an area of 874 ha, classified into five functional 
geographical spaces—land for housing, land for rice-farming, the forest lands and 
uncultivated lands (CFDS, 2002).  
 
Anlong Raing is a floating community. It is located in the west Shore of the Tonle 
Sap Lake. It is estimated that this floating settlement is existed there for more than 100 years. 
It is surrounded by the fishing lot areas, a fish sanctuary and the protected inundated forest. 
An access to the forest resources is limited. Fisheries and forest resources are over-exploited 
by commercial and non-commercial exploitation, legal and illegal. At present, Anglong Raing 
is home to 93 families with a total population of about 431 people ( 202 males and 229 
females) of which Vietnamese consist of 36 families and with total people of 186 ( 100 males 
and 86 females). Villagers in Anglong Raing own no farm land, and they are primarily 
dependent on fishing as the main occupation. They catch and sell fish for income. Incomes 
from fish sales are used for different purposes; buying rice, clothes, medicine, kitchen items, 
ceremony contribution, school fee for their children. The struggle of these villagers to 








Kompong Phluk is a small commune in Prasat Bakong district, Siem Reap Province, 
located about 12km south of the district headquarters and about 16km southeast of Siem Reap 
Town. Kampong Phluk is home to about 513 families in 2005, most of them are fishing as 
their main occupation (See Table 3.1). While fishing occupies 90% of the population, 
Kampong Phluk residents are also engaged in farming and other trade activities to supplement 
their incomes. Kampong Phluk is neither a floating nor land-based village in the Tonle Sap, 
but it is a ‘stand-stilt’ community within which houses are built on long stilts about 5-7m 
above the ground and the village itself is located six months within water and six months on 
land.  
 
As a fishing community, Kampong Phluk is located on the edge of the lake proper, 
covering by an area of 14, 249 hectares. This area is divided into flooded forest (water forest) 
covering 7328 ha, cultivated areas covering 1409 ha, open water in the lake covering 5378 ha, 
swamp land covering 118 ha and housing areas covering 14 ha (Commune data, 2006; 
Marschke and Berkes, 2005b).  
 
The everyday geography of the stand-stilt village is affected by the daily water level 
fluctuations in the Tonle Sap. The change in water level everyday in the Tonle Sap shapes the 
‘everyday geography’ of the stand-stilt village, the ‘everyday space’ of fishing, and the 
‘everyday life’ of villagers. Seasonally, the space and life of stand-stilt community is affected 
by being six months within water and six months on land (AFN, 2004; Marschke, 2005; 
Marschke and Berkes, 2005a).  This happens due to the ‘flood pulse’ when the whole 
floodplain is inundated by rising water level, and in the dry season, the flood recedes in the 
lake and so some areas become free of flood waters (Kummu et al., 2008). “Ecosystems that 
experience fluctuations between terrestrial and aquatic conditions are called pulsing 
ecosystems, and fall within the domain of the flood pulse concept” (Junk, 1997quoted in 
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Kummu et al., 2006:503). Kampong Phluk is one of many communities in the Tonle Sap 
experienced a ‘pulsing environment’ in which the whole community stays six months on land 
and six months within water.  
 
The reason for selecting this community is due to its characteristic as a stand-stilt 
village. It thus provides yet another settlement type different in character from my other two 
study sites. Secondly, people are engaged in fishing, but supplement incomes by some faming 
activities. This makes for helpful comparative analysis with Kampong La.  Thirdly, a hotly 
contested fisheries space exists because the community has conflicts with Fisheries 
Administration (FiA) over access to the community conservation areas. It is precisely the 
differing relations to space and resources that help to generate political geography problems.  
 
3.6.1 Household Selection 
 
The total number of households in four different sites of the study area is estimated at 
about 1100 households with a total population of 8,810 people. Given a larger geographical 
coverage of the study areas, it is not possible to reach out to all households. Thus, the 
researcher had to select specific households to work with. To ensure a diversity of 
households, the selection criteria for households in each community included: female-headed 
and male-headed households; a range of ages for the key contact persons in each household; 
economically diverse households; full-time fishers and part-time fishers. A key aspect the 
researcher sought to uncover were socio-economic differentiation at village level. 
 
Among many households, only 259 households were included for interviews, of 
which 45 households in Kampong La, 29 households in Kampong Loung, 49 households in 
Kampong Phluk and 136 households in Peam Bang (Field study, 2007-2009). The main 
contact person for each household was generally the household head. The household as a unit 
of analysis enables particular insights into the livelihood dependency on resources; access to 
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resources for everyday life; the dynamics of how households interact with state and non-state 
actors to ensure their access to resources (see Table 3.2). 
 
Table 3. 2: Demographic characteristics of the households interviewed in the study areas 






No. of interviewed 
households 
Village name: Kampong La 
Commune: Kampong Pou 
District: Krakor 
Province: Pursat 
189 857 5 45 
Kampong Loung—Phum 3 
Commune: Kampong Luong 
District: Krakor 
Province: Pursat 
114 575 5 29 
Peam Bang Commune 
District—Stung  
Province—Kampong Thom 
619 2929 5 136 
Kampong Phluk Commune 
Village name: Thnoat Kambot 
District –Prasat Bakong 
Siem Reap Province 
178 1035 6 49 
Total 1100 8810 5 259 
 
 
Stratified random sampling was employed in the selection of households for the 
household level interviews, although some prior selection was possible based on earlier visits 
and my existing contacts. With stratified random sampling, the population was first divided 
into a number of parts or 'strata' according to some characteristic, chosen to be related to the 
major variables being studied. For this survey, wealth categories were used as main strata and 
livelihood activities and female headed households as sub-strata. Table 3.2 gives some 
demographic features of the sample households in the four study sites. A copy of the 
questionnaire is provided in Appendix 1-3.  
 
3.7 Executing the Field Work 
 
To put into practice my selected methods, there are some steps I needed to take in 
terms of selecting specific community representatives to interview. This section provides a 
preliminary explanation of the sites and interviewees. This research was conducted in three 
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phases. The first phase was carried out as a baseline data collection in the study sites to gain 
some background knowledge of the information of the village such as: wealth ranking, 
household list and characteristics, social map, and the second phase, the field notes through 
meetings and household interviews. The third phase involved verification or validation of the 
survey results. The bulk of the research was undertaken in 2007-2008, and it was undertaken 
with frequent discussions with my thesis supervisor. Subsequent fieldwork was carried out at 
different times during 2009, and much of my writing-up phase has been during 2009 until 
mid-2010. Due to requested adjustments required prior to thesis submission, there have been 
some further re-writes in the latter part of 2010. 
 
a) Data Collection 
 
Two types of data were collected—secondary and primary data. The study relies on 
documents, books and research papers for secondary data, but this researcher believes that 
primary data is absolutely critical in this study. For this research, the author needed to 
generate a lot of primary data due to the extremely limited research previously done on these 
field sites, with virtually no studies available on political geography in the Tonle Sap. 
Relevant secondary data included socio-economic, demographic, geographical, hydrological, 
and natural conditions of Tonle Sap Basin core areas were used to analyze current planning, 
management policy, and project implementation of concerned government agencies and civil 
society. But the author found that there is very little reliable public data pertaining to his field 
sites. This has meant that longer periods of research were undertaken than were originally 
planned for. The thesis has been an exhausting personal journey and a time-consuming effort. 








The data and information concerning the Tonle Sap is available at national level, but 
it is limited at the village and commune levels. Thus, the secondary data is gathered largely at 
the national level and provincial level prior to the field investigation. National level data on 
the Tonle Sap available includes the population census, the Seila data on population in all 
provinces in the Tonle Sap, the statistics of fish catch from the ‘commercial fishing lot’. If 
most policy makers, policy analysts and academics rely mostly on such statistical data, I 
believe they will make some misguided assumptions, particularly at micro levels. Thus, 
detailed empirical research is necessary to help fill in critical gaps. As noted above, the 




The word ‘primary data’ denotes a rather strict academic relationship and like many 
other pre-planned notions, it does not always fit the field work where in most cases, the 
researcher establishes more than academically defined strict subject-object relationships. 
Doubtless, the fishermen living in the Tonle Sap have been the ‘primary sources’ of 
information, knowledge and insight in much of my research. However,  referring to the 
fishermen as ‘sources’ after lengthy period of time, effort, patience and help that may have 
unsparingly been given to the researcher, calling these people a ‘source’ definitely sounds 
inadequate. A ‘source’ also unpleasantly implies unequal power relations and/or disparity 
between the researcher and people whom she/he studies.  
 
The ‘primary data’ could be generated from interviewing people who become 
‘respondents’ or people providing information for the researcher. In the Tonle Sap, to get an 
interview with local fisher-folk, the most important issue is ‘building trust’ and with trust, the 
researcher may access to information. Apart from ‘building trust’, the researcher has to use a 
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range of interview styles and other techniques to obtain reliable data. Therefore, it is 
important to identify the research methods applicable to the areas, respondents and situational 
context.  
 
b) Household Interviews 
 
About 259 households from four different sites were randomly selected for 
households interview (See Table 3.2). Structured interviews were undertaken between 
January and October, 2007 to understand the complexity of spaces in the Tonle Sap Lake; 
how community constructs their spaces; and their access to resources for daily living; and 
how resources are used and managed at the community level. More importantly, the 
household interviews examined how the complex spaces and territoriality affects the everyday 
life of rural households and how these households cope with increased resources scarcity and 
competition. The interview also focuses on how community practice and customary rights are 
institutionalized. Further, interviews were conducted with the government officials and staff 
of non-governmental organizations, focusing on the institutional arrangements and policy 
frameworks for resource management, and also the future resource management in the Lake.  
 
All households gave prior permission to the researcher to take part in the interviews. 
However, some households were unable to be contacted for interview, so thus, were replaced 
by the next households. Households were visited, and these questions were asked verbally in 
Khmer. Each interview took an average 30 minutes. The data was entered into ‘excel sheet’ 
and then to SPSS for analysis and creation of frequency tables (See Appendix 1 & 2 for the 
questionnaires).  
 
Between February and May 2008, I paid numerous visits to Kampong Phluk, in 
March to Kampong Loung and Kampong La, and in May to Peam Bang. I did follow up visits 
to each site and met with key informants that I also arranged focus group discussions (FGDs). 
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During these visits, I collected additional information and tried to verify early data with key 
informants.  
 
c) Focus Group Discussions 
 
The focus group discussion (FGD) is a semi-structured primary data gathering 
method in which in-depth conversation is conducted with a purposively selected set of 
participants to discuss issues based on key questions identified by the researcher. For this 
study, the guide questions were on topics dealing with general livelihoods, poverty and water-
related problems, the history of the village, fisheries, situation, fishing areas, fishing catch, 
fishing trade with fish trader, and fishing relation with the fishing lots. These discussions 
allowed community members to express their opinion about the resource management regime, 
the impacts of policy and institutions on them and resources in the lake and identify the way 
forward. Larry Lohman (1995) observed the oral traditions of many rural communities, and 
the fishers of the Tonle Sap often discuss issues in small group, and prefer face-face 
encounters. Thus, focus groups are more structural to local people than rigid interviews, and 
these worrying than formal questionnaires.  
 
A copy of the guide questions is provided in Appendix 3. In each research site, one 
focus group discussion was organized. In total, four separate focus group discussions were 
organized in the research sites. About 7 to 9 participants were involved in each focus group 
discussion including key informants, men and women identified based on their wealth status, 
the key fishers, and Village Chief. These discussions enabled the researcher to gain insights 
about the resources management taking place in their communities. Participatory methods 
were used during the FGDs including “what makes a good quality of life”, ranking and 
scoring, historical analysis, and brainstorming. The method on “what makes a good quality of 
life” aims to identify and prioritize the components of a good quality of life and what 
influences people’s capacity to manage their lives successfully. In this context, it exposes 
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people’s challenges in relation to their livelihoods and their dependence and relation to water 
resources.  
 
3.7.1 Research Problems 
 
The particular problems encountered are restricted information, or many things being 
non-documented. The author has occasionally encountered reluctance to be interviewed, or 
even resistance from civil servants and representatives of civil society, some of whom are 
unwilling to discuss sensitive political topics. There are numerous cases of unrealistic 
(sometimes unbelievable) statistics. The difficulties listed above all need to be dealt with 
through the research methods applied. The lack of existing information is dealt with through a 
cautious treatment of secondary literature and the use of primary sources. The reluctance to 
share information has been addressed in two different ways: the first is through diplomatic 
probing, the second is triangulating information (through different ways of asking the same 
question). The former has been carried out through extended and repeated interviews, where 
the core issue has been approached from different angles. Patience, politeness, and honestly 
have helped me to probe deeper into delicate issues. Statistics are sparingly used and 
statistical analysis has added more information where available. But qualitative methods are 
the main tools of this empirically and ethnographically informed thesis. Thus, the thesis 
utilizes a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, and it employs both interview 
techniques, primary and secondary sources.  It rests to a high degree on primary research.  
 
Relatively little (in fact almost zero) academic research has been carried out in the 
spheres of political geography in the Tonle Sap, rendering a knowledge deficit. I have been 
encouraged by my supervisor’s knowledge of political geography in Southeast Asia, and by a 
select few geographers who are specializing in the Mekong Basin, such as Philip Hirsh, Chris 
Sneddon and Ian Baird. However, there is very little geographical research of contested space 
in the Tonle Sap. In the Tonle Sap, most research carried out is in the field of fisheries 
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management, but less on the overall resource management in the Tonle Sap. For more generic 
analyses, sources such as the Mekong River Commission, the ADB, World Fish Center and 
studies by NGOs help to provide some background data, and materials for analysis.  
 
A structural problem is of course that most actors engaged in information gathering in 
the Tonle Sap have ‘a stake’ in the selected proposed developments. Hard data, seemingly 
presented as fact must be critically assessed, and there are at least two aspects that need to be 
considered. First, the reliability issue, is it correct? Given the difficulties of measuring and the 
little baseline information to draw upon, I must constantly question information presented as 
fact. For instance, the fish catch data seems to be generally underestimated for a variety of 
reasons in relation to vested interests, and since there is little research on which to contrast 
this information it is temping to take these data for fact. Second, the validity issue: is it the 
relevant information? Who is setting the development agenda? One piece of information 
might be correct, but one must ask if it is that particular piece of information I am interested 
in obtaining? These questions are obviously necessary to ask when researching political 
matters, but they should also be asked in cases where the informant regards his/her 
information as facts. This situation is endemic in the crossroad between politics and natural 
resource management. Each institution has a budget, an agenda and a target audience. So we 
must ask who does that data serve? 
 
Concretely, on the empirical side, a number of publications have documented the 
zoning in the Tonle Sap, the human settlements in each in the Tonle Sap zone, the livelihoods 
of people living in each zone as a fulltime and part time fishing and resource management. 
For instance, the CNMC and NEDECO report (1998) discussed the development strategy for 
resource management in the Tonle Sap in which it highlighted the zoning in the Tonle Sap. 
The latter and Keskinen (2003; 2006) further discussed the zoning in the Tonle Sap in relation 
to the socio-economy of the Tonle Sap. Apart from zoning study in the Tonle Sap, many 
documents were prepared by the fisheries scientists including the report produced by Ahmed 
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et al., (1998), Degen and Thouk (2000), Van Zalinge et al., (2000), among many others listed 
in my bibliography.  
 
The extensive work and documentation done by the Fisheries Administration in 
various forms, the WUP-FIN/MRC Program, the Tonle Sap Technical Coordination Unit 
under the Ministry of Environment and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) are of 
course of great value for my study, focusing on the politics of resource management in the 
Tonle Sap. However, in spite of a huge amount of data, there are surprisingly few studies of 
relevance for political geography. There is also a systematic self-promoting bias in their 
materials. Other sources, such as contemporary consultancy studies, the UN reports, the 
World Fish Center reports on fisheries in the Tonle Sap and brief research reports, have also 
been consulted, but needs to be carefully valued in relation to their reliability. Sometimes, it is 
easy to take-for-granted authoritative statistical tables, scientific foundations of an 
international or national agency, and convincing recommendation, without raising possible 
alternatives, new questions or highlighting probable gaps in such studies.  
 
The value of different sources of information needs to be cautiously weighed. For 
example, an interviewed decision-maker may discuss his or her field of activity in one part of 
the interview, but in another part the interviewee uses general knowledge slightly outside his 
or her special area of competence. The source may discuss the ministry’s own researched 
figures, but also draw on reports or studies from somewhere else. Likewise, a government 
report on the planned development may come directly from the Ministry of Planning or 
Ministry of Agriculture which is normally responsible for this work. In reality, however, these 
ministries might be subordinated to more central power acting on other rationales. My 




3.7.2 Research and Data Collection before Beginning My Thesis 
 
Although much of the information included in this dissertation was collected during 
my ‘official’ research period, the author began field research in the Tonle Sap in 2000 when 
working with the NGO Forum on Cambodia. Some of the data and facts included in this 
dissertation were collected before the beginning of official PhD fieldwork. Personal 
experiences and long associations have deepened the researcher’s understanding of Tonle Sap 
life and politics.  
 
The researcher first looked into the Tonle Sap issue in 2000 when at that time there 
were widespread fishing conflicts in the Tonle Sap, and NGOs were involved in facilitating 
the conflict resolution. The fishing conflicts eventually led to an official Fisheries Reform in 
which about 56 percent of commercial fishing lot areas were released for local community use 
(FACT & EJF, 2001). Later, during the same year, the researcher studied the ‘social 
vulnerability of fisheries in Cambodia’ and the study report was presented at an International 
Conference in Sydney on ‘Accounting for Development’. During this time, the author began a 
long-time research interest in the Tonle Sap as it is a source of food for the Cambodian 
population, but it is under threat due to poor governance (Sithirith, 2000)5. 
 
In 2002, the author became involved in a study of hydropower development processes 
in Cambodia. This study reviewed the impacts of hydropower dams on fisheries in the 
Mekong and the Tonle Sap Lake. From this time, the researcher began to realize that the 
Tonle Sap Lake was under external pressure due to the impacts of hydropower dam 
development in the upstream countries of the Mekong. This led to an acute awareness in the 
researcher that the Tonle Sap is not only impacted by national issues, but by also international 
issues (Öjendal et al., 2002). Thus, the researcher had established a critical understanding 
                                               
5
 Sithirith, M. 2000. Accounting for Development: Austrlia and the Asian Development Bank in the Mekong 
Region" Conference on in Sydney, Australia 22-24 June 2000. 
 89
about the politics of scale operating within the Mekong Basin before even realizing what 
political geography as a sub-discipline is really about. 
 
In 2003, the author undertook a further study of cooperation in the Mekong River 
Basin, reflecting Cambodia’s experiences in the development of the Mekong Region for 
Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development (RCSD) at Chiang Mai 
University. In this research looked at the Tonle Sap Lake and fishing community and how 
they deal with the changes in the environment of the Lake. From this, the researcher 
developed a deeper scholarly understanding of the Tonle Sap. The study was eventually 
published (Sithirith, 2007). The experience at RCSD also encouraged a desire to undertake 
deeper academic study. 
 
Apart from these studies, the researcher as NGO official undertook detailed work for 
the Fisheries Action Coalition Team (FACT)—a non-governmental organization—working 
on fisheries and natural resources. The organization works with fishing communities in the 
Tonle Sap Lake, organizing them to protect fisheries and natural resources for their 
livelihoods. Through working with FACT, the author was able to build up experience and 
knowledge about the Tonle Sap Lake. Hence, the author was already gathering information on 
the Tonle Sap before becoming a doctoral student in NUS. These various studies frequently 
entailed contacts with fishing communities in the Tonle Sap. Recognizing the importance of 
(but few studies of) spatial politics in resource governance, and having been engaged with my 
supervisor on a couple of fieldtrips involving an educational film work project about the 
Lake, the idea was hatched to undertake in-depth study of the politics of resource space and 





3.7.3 Reliability and Limitation 
 
Although every attempt was made to guarantee the reliability and validity of the 
research methods and techniques as much as possible, it should be emphasized that the 
findings of this research may have some problems. In order to minimize the potential 
problems, the applied research methods and techniques were closely prepared, discussed, and 
reconsidered following numerous and frequent discussions with my supervisor, and also with 
other academic colleagues. We discussed all the methods to be used prior to entering the field. 
While it may be argued that just four study sites offers a small basis for generalization to the 
lake as a whole, these sites were carefully selected and can be regarded as representative, at 
least to a great extent, of other communities in the Tonle Sap Lake. In many ways, certain 
characteristics of the households in the research sites represent a great part of the Tonle Sap 
Lake. This is based on previous field-based understanding.  
 
Nevertheless, there are definite limitations of this research due to the fact that the 
coverage area is huge compared with the limited funding, time and human power available for 
PhD research. Thus, obtaining information about all individual households in study areas was 
not feasible.  However, this research lies on the household as one key unit of analysis and not 
so much on the individuals concerned (although many are involved). In the Cambodian social 
context, a focus on households and families seems highly appropriate. To increase the 
reliability and validity of household surveys the researcher employed several techniques: 
through conducting the interviews with the person in the presence of household or family 
members; consulting key informants; and using statistical data obtained through the village 
headmen. 
Although many individuals were interviewed, the most consistent, in-depth work took 
place with the focus group discussions. The group discussions provide an avenue to raise 
many relevant issues in an interactive manner whereby the researcher becomes an observer, 
and it allows me to contextualize the issues in particular communities. However, the 
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household interviews provide additional information to clarify the results of the group 
discussions. Taking all limitations into account, after collecting and analyzing all data, 
research findings from interviews and group meetings were often presented to key informants 
in order to check whether the finding are relatively accurate or have misrepresented their 
views. Some additional comments or suggestions from those people have ended up in the 
final thesis report.  As thesis researcher I take full responsibility for all the contents and any 
mistakes herein are mine.  
 
3.8 Research Rationale 
 
This thesis focuses on the Tonle Sap Lake for a number of reasons: first, it is due to 
the author’s experience and working knowledge of the Tonle Sap. My long-time involvement 
in management, politics, and fisheries issues of the Lake makes this a logical empirical focus.  
Second, resources in the Tonle Sap Lake are degraded, and one of the reasons, explored in 
this thesis, is due to the territorially contested space, giving rise to conflicts and contributing 
to the poor resource governance, affecting the livelihoods of millions of people. Thus, the 
possibility of doing things better increases, assuming that it is possible to learn from the past 
and current mistakes. Third, the competition over and degradation of resources in the 
Cambodian context is a huge issue directly related to political economy, human livelihoods 
and poverty issues in the country. There have been management systems seemingly allowing 
the governance of spaces in the Tonle Sap, but these have produced devastating conflicts in 
the Tonle Sap, which is another urgent motivation to conduct research. Fourth, good resource 
management, particularly in fisheries, is arguably one efficient way of contributing to 
alleviating poverty and its undesired consequences. High developmental pressure in the 
region around the Tonle Sap Lake, relating to relative resource abundance is actually 
generating conflicts and intensifying problems of poverty for many people. Fifth, the Tonle 
Sap Lake is rich in resources. Many studies tend to focus merely on fisheries resources in the 
discourse of management of the Lake or assume the lake management is equal to fisheries 
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management (UNDP/GEF, 2004). The fisheries management in the Lake so far mainly 
focuses on issues of exploitation for commercial reasons and enforcement problems, favoring 
privatized exploitation for revenue generation—mainly for economic purposes (Van Zalinge 
and Thouk, 2000; Thouk and Sina, 1997; ADB, 2005a). However, there are many alternative 
ways we can envisage the Lake system, particularly given its intricate human-ecological 
relations and myriad communities. This thesis represents an attempt to stress why and how 
political geography insights can help to generate improvements in the way the Tonle Sap is 
conceived, managed, and politically governed.  
 
Many studies look at the Lake from scientific, technocratic, and engineering aspects, 
such as the hydrological modeling, the sedimentation, erosion, water quality—all of 
importance, but these studies tend to leave behind, ignore, or sideline the human and social 
dimensions of water management (MRC, 2003; MRC/WUP-FIN, 2003). A number of studies 
look at the Lake from fisheries perspectives, but these tend to exclude the real complexities 
relating to the human landscape and human associations with a range of aquatic resources, as 
well as social-environmental aspects (FACT & EJF, 2001). Hitherto, no study of the Tonle 
Sap deals specifically with the political geography and the politics of resource spaces in the 
management in the Lake. 
 
A major gap in an existing literature concerning resource management in the Tonle 
Sap is the lack of concern over the spatial and temporal-spatial dimensions of many disputes 
over resources in the Lake (see Chapter Two). This thesis helps fill that gap by focusing on 
complex political geographies of the Lake, particularly the politics underpinning geographical 
classifications, boundaries and zones, and how spatial (and non-spatial) politics and practices 
affect fishing, resource access, sustainability, conservation, practices of exclusion/inclusion, 
and long term livelihood security of people in the Tonle Sap area. In addition to tackling the 
territorialized politics of resource management, the thesis also explores the complex relations 
between actors and agencies in the lake and the associated ‘patron-client’ relations affecting 
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resource management. Thus, the thesis represents the first major study of resource politics 
from a political geographic perspective, incorporating political ecological ideas and 
approaches to examine the complex questions of power. This study helps toward a better 
geographical understanding of the complexity of the Lake, and will hopefully, contribute to 
the future management of the resources in the Lake. The author is very eager to write a thesis 
that can be both academically and practically useful, not just filling gaps in the existing 
literature, but adding new thoughts and ideas to the study of resource governance in the 
Mekong Basin, and specifically in the Tonle Sap. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Spatial Representations and the Production of Space in the Tonle Sap 
 
4.1 Producing Space in the Tonle Sap 
 
This chapter shall utilize ideas that relate to Henri Lefebvre’s (1991) The Production 
of Space in order to reveal different ways the Tonle Sap is represented and imagined by the 
State, Fisheries Administration (FiA), key international and regional agencies concerned with 
resource governance, fisheries management, revenues, conservation and biodiversity issues in 
the Tonle Sap. To appreciate the competing demands and different stakeholders concerned 
with the Lake space it is necessary to consider how and why it is officially represented in 
different, sometimes contradictory ways. It is also necessary to consider why the Lake is at 
once of ‘global’, ‘regional’ and ‘national’ political, economic and environmental significance 
(not to mention the myriad sub-national meanings and imaginings of the Lake). Sometimes 
the formal rationalizations and representations of space at policy-making levels are at odds 
with the social reality of hundreds of thousands of people who are extremely dependent upon 
aquatic resources and whose livelihood security remain vulnerable to human-induced and 
environmental changes to natural resources and environmental conditions. 
  
In this section, I would like to discuss the various representations of space that relate 
to the governance of the Lake and have enormous implications for resource access, 
utilization, control and management. According to Lefebvre (1991: 360) there is ‘nothing 
innocent’ or neutral about space, and as other critical human geographers have noted, we need 
to examine how space becomes implicated in broader political economic and social processes 
(Massey, 2005). This is not to suggest that all of Lefebvre’s ideas regarding the production of 
space , which were mostly applied to capitalist urban spaces, are applicable directly to the 
Tonle Sap, but Lefebvre’s key ideas can be helpful in highlighting the central importance of  
producing and (re)making SPACE as a key element of any analysis of resource governance 
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and conflicts. Some of the fundamental elements of Lefebvre’s spatial analysis are applicable 
in the distinctive context of a freshwater lake and river system, and within the political 
economy context of an authoritarian ‘developing’ state influenced by neoliberal capitalist 
modes of ‘development’ (Springer, 2009a).  
 
“If space is a product, our knowledge of it must be expected to reproduce and 
expound the process of production” (Lefebvre, 1991: 36). The production of space relates to 
its valorization, commercialization, and the vital role that space plays in processes of capital 
accumulation. Thus, space becomes at once a product and part of a process, serving various 
productive roles that help to generate revenues and profits for different agents. Dominant 
ways in which the Tonle Sap is conceived by planners is usually in terms of parcels of 
productive space, such as the commercial fishing lots, conservation zones, public fishing 
areas, and community spaces. The Tonle Sap is subdivided into many territories, each with 
functional specializations, and as such, contains numerous spatial representations, which 
sometimes overlap and contradict one another. However, space is not only ‘a product’ and ‘a 
process’, but also ‘a medium’ (Shield, 2005: 212), which is an idea that significantly relates to 
the potential for various forms of imaginative and popular resistance, multiple spatial 
contestations, and (re)conceptualizations of space.  Thus, the Tonle Sap is constantly in the 
process of being made, (re)produced, conceived in different ways, planned, mapped, 
territorialized, as well as contested, resisted and (re)imagined. This dynamic notion of space 
(as product, process and medium) helps us to understand real resource management issues and 
problems that frequently relate to differing spatial conceptions of distinct agencies involved in 
resource governance.   
 
Following Lefebvre (1991: 38), ‘representations of space’ relate to “conceptualized 
space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social 
engineers,” and various state and other institutions with the ability and knowledge to 
‘represent’ space in particular ways for specific purposes. Crucially, representations of space 
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often require ‘simplifications’ of complex spatial realities for bureaucratic and administrative 
purposes (Scott, 1998), and the creation of specific ‘territories’ that may be emptied and filled 
according to functions (Sack, 1986). Thus, territoriality is fundamental to the implementation 
of abstract representations, as it refers to a social (and political) strategy to control human / 
nature relations and environmental resources in communicated, classified and controlled 
space (Sack, 1986; Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; Vandergeest, 1996; Delaney, 2005; Peluso, 
2005a). State territorializations of ‘nature’ frequently involve forms of zoning for functional 
specialization in order to simultaneously bring unruly spaces under tighter ‘control’ (taming 
nature), enhance ‘legibility’ for planning, exploiting and productivity measurements, and the 
displacement of certain other forms of knowledge, use, practices,  and sometimes people. 
Functionalist, abstract, and technocratic simplifications of space frequently override more 
messy localized poly-uses and multi-purpose meanings of the same space (Scott, 1998: 262-
306). Just as mono-cultures associated with agro-business affect land-use patterns, 
commercialized zones for fisheries similarly affect water-bodies.  
 
Space is not simply produced, however, for it is also vital for everyday lives and 
livelihoods. Lefebvre shows how space is conceived by different organizations in their 
various representations of space, and the ways in which space is actually perceived in the 
‘lived space’ of ‘users’, residents, and ordinary people. The latter relates to Lefebvre’s (1991: 
39) idea of ‘representational spaces’ which embraces the loci of passion, of action and of 
lived situations, and thus immediately implies time. Consequently it may be qualified in 
various ways: “It may be directional, situational or relational, because it is essentially 
qualitative, fluid and dynamic.” This dynamic, relational and contingent idea of ‘lived space’ 
applies strongly to the everyday places and spaces of the various villages situated in the 
Lower Mekong wetlands. Indeed, the Tonle Sap is a ‘lived space’ writ large with its daily 
routines, ways of life geared towards fishing, seasonal and daily rhythms, production, 
reproduction, consumption, markets, seasons, cycles, livelihoods and life-cycles.  
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Lefebvre’s (1991) attention is mostly about urbanized contexts where    
representational space is more likely to be intensively planned and influenced very thoroughly 
by formal representations, but the Tonle Sap has numerous chaotic, grey areas (as we discuss 
in relation to ‘floating communities’), involving multiple subjectivities relating to actual 
‘lived’ perceptions of space. Whilst the official representations of space undoubtedly interfere 
with ‘lived space’ by producing spatial divisions of labour, social differentiation, differing 
spatial functions, and objects at localized levels, there are also aspects of the social ecology 
and community life of the Lake which contradict official representations by their very 
existence. For instance, some ‘floating villages’ do move seasonally to different fixed 
positions, which makes them unsuitable for cadastral mapping and means that village 
territorialities fluctuate depending on the spatial location of the villages at a particular time of 
the year (see Chapter 5).  
 
Sneddon (2007) has correctly stressed the ‘lively materiality’ of ‘nature’ involving 
multiple social interactions that are extremely important in the examination of processes of 
capital accumulation in freshwater fisheries. Equally, there are various non-human nature - 
human society relations that are unique to the Tonle Sap and also serve to complicate, confuse 
and contradict dominant spatial representations of official organizations, Fisheries 
Administration (FiA), and international agencies. Thus, the ‘pulsating ecosystem’ and natural 
rhythms of the Lake have enormous significance to people with high levels of dependence on 
aquatic livelihood resources. Fluctuations in water-levels and seasonal changes also 
complicate the attempts by different agencies to fix boundaries and zones for various 
purposes. Furthermore, formal representations are often confounded by poor governance 
systems, degrees of corruption, and lack of enforcement. As a result, representational space in 
the Lake is dominated, but not as fully dominated as key state and non-state agencies 
responsible for representing space would probably prefer. In other words, there are grey areas 
that relate to the complex social – ecological rhythms of the Lake that complicate the 
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different, sometimes overlapping, projects of resource governance, capital accumulation, 
fisheries management and conservation.  
 
The production of space involves tendencies towards spatial ‘homogenization’ 
according to the demands of represented ‘abstract space.’ Formal representations help to 
materialize, prioritize and order space, and in the process, they can also lead to displacements 
and dispossessions. For instance, commercial fishing lots benefit a few powerful agents who 
gain large profits from bounded spaces that exclude many small-scale fishers, and in some 
areas, such fishing zones have actually displaced fishers from traditional fishing grounds. 
Community fishing zones also produce another kind of homogeneity, which sometimes they 
do not reflect the very different types of ‘community’ and villages that share the lake space 
(Sithirith and Grundy-Warr, forthcoming). Also, the very notion of fixed territorial spaces is 
problematic for those communities that are relatively mobile, such as the ‘floating villages’, 
which have their own territorial adaptability to the rhythms, seasons and annual flood pulse 
(Chapter 5).  
 
The abstract space of planners and technocrats “is never entirely effective,” for as 
Allen (2003a: 165) observes, people may be able “to subvert the codes of the dominant space’ 
or create ‘an alternative way of inhabiting it.” Elmhirst (1999: 818-20) described how on the 
indigenous margins of ‘representational spaces’ in parts of Indonesia lie various ‘unruly 
spaces’ where actual practices and active resistance is challenging the “hegemonic 
representations of an authoritarian state.” Lefebvre (1991: 365) holds out the possibility of 
conflicts to be voiced provided that spatial contradictions are ‘perceived’ and people do not 
subscribe “to representations of space as generally conceived.” These ideas seem to be 
applicable in the case of fishery conflicts on the Tonle Sap, which are frequently related to 
overlapping representations of space, or active resistance to particular representations due to 
the manner in which they restrict resource access, create exclusions, and adversely affect 
livelihood security for certain groups.  
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Lefebvre (1999: 373) also argues that it is often “on the margins of the homogenized 
realm, that is within what is ‘excluded’, that there are potentials for alternative spontaneity, 
forms of resistance and of ‘spatial duality’ that may help to weaken ‘dominated space’.”  
Furthermore, “within all ‘representational space’ there lies the possibility of ‘clandestine and 
underground spatial practices’ to develop outside the norms of the prevailing (enforced) social 
spatialization” (Lefebvre, 1999: 210). I argue that the ‘lived space’ of the Tonle Sap contains 
many examples of ‘dominated space’, yet the Lake is socially differentiated and politically 
dynamic with numerous potential and actual spatial contestations due to intensive competition 
for scarce resources, poor governance, multiple stakeholders, and difficulties in managing 
spatial representations. However, it is also important to recognize that the dominant ways in 
which space is produced and represented in the lake has created certain ‘hidden geographies’, 
or rather the mobile spatiality of ‘floating communities’ has been effectively ‘smothered’ by 
the dominant representations of commercial fishing lots, conservation zones, and community 
boundaries that recognize fixed settlements. Thus, part of the livelihood struggle for such 
communities is being able to re-appropriate space and to be able to legitimize their mobile 
territorial rights and ‘floating’ way of life.  
 
4.2 Power and Representations of Space 
 
As indicated above, space is constructed and re-constructed, and actors are involved 
in the construction of space. Different actors; community, state and non-state; from different 
levels—local, national, regional and global—construct different spaces on the same 
geographical areas, and much of the spatial exercise involves power. Space holds two sources 
of latent power for human being; first, a latent material power—the power to sustain human 
life and second, a latent emotional power. Space comprises the substance that is fundamental 
to human life on this planet. Through its constitution of land, water and atmosphere, space 
encompasses the basic prerequisites of human survival: the food that we eat, the water that we 
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drink, the air that we breathe and the resources for protecting ourselves. This is a latent 
material power of space. Second, when the substantive qualities of space are filtered through 
human experiences of time and process, strong attachments to space has the capacity to 
invoke or release an emotional response. This is a latent emotional power of space. (Penrose, 
2002:279).  
 
Power is relational to space. Different actors employ different spatial techniques and 
strategies to exercise power over space. John Allen demonstrates ‘power’ in three key ways: 
power as an inscribed capacity; power as a resource; and power as strategies, practices and 
techniques (Allen, 1997). The exercise of power may employ spatial techniques and strategies 
(Sack, 1986). All three conceptions of power: power as a capacity; power as a resource; and 
power as a strategy possess spatial characteristics. Power as a strategy, practice and technique 
involves the organization of space and inserts the control over the space, which requires 
forms of territoriality in attempts to control relations and resources in space through 
classification of precise geographic areas, boundaries and communication of those to people.  
 
The organization of space is actually rationalized based on technical and scientific 
capacity, economic and political interests (Lefebvre, 1991). In rationalizing the space of 
engagement, agencies begin by identifying ‘the problems’ affecting the space or the area, and 
then apply spatial and non-spatial strategies to address those problems. This is clearly 
illustrated through the Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve, which was established following the 
rationalization of space in relation to the global significance of biodiversity of the Tonle Sap 
under threat of environmental degradation. As a consequence, global agencies have engaged 
in the Tonle Sap conservation, such as UNESCO, UNDP and FAO (UNDP/GEF, 2004).  
 
Fisheries specialists construct their technical spaces based on their technico-
professional specialization. I call this process creating spaces of specialization. Henri 
Lefebvre (1991) highlights that:  
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Specializations divide space among them and act upon its truncated parts, setting 
up mental barriers and practice-social frontiers. Thus architects are assigned 
architectural space as their private property, economists come into possession of 
economic space, geographers get their own place in the sun, and so on. The 
ideologically dominant tendency divides space up into parts and parcels in 
accordance with the social division of labor (Lefebvre, 1991: 89-90).  
 
These are examples of Lefebvre’s (1991) ‘representation of space’.  Thus, the specialized 
spaces are dominated by the knowledge and skills of scientists, technocrats, experts, and 
bureaucrats. However, in the Tonle Sap, the specialization divides the Tonle Sap into different 
spaces. The Tonle Sap is politically divided into six geographical provinces, economically 
into commercial fishing spaces, publicly into a public fishing space and as a bio reserve arena 
into various conservation spaces. Different competent agencies (international organizations, 
NGOs, state agencies, community-based bodies) tend to have different ways of perceiving the 
space and resources of the Tonle Sap, based on their specialized interests and functional ways 
of seeing the Lake.  
 
To illustrate this more clearly, we can view the Tonle Sap as a space that is 
predominantly functionally constructed in three major ways (commercial fisheries, 
conservation zones, and public space). In addition, there are three broad scalar ways of 
perceiving the space of the Tonle Sap, as ‘global space’, ‘regional space’, and ‘national 
space.’  
 
4.3 The ‘Global Space’ of the Tonle Sap 
 
The Tonle Sap has a global significance of biodiversity. However, various 
international agencies and INGOs (including UN bodies, IUCN, WWF) have argued that the 
biodiversity in the Tonle Sap is under threat. One way of addressing these threats is through 
the conservationist paradigm, which requires specific forms of spatial specialization. 
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4.3.1 The Global significance of biodiversity in the Tonle Sap 
 “The Great Lake is the last stronghold in Southeast Asia for a number of large 
number of rare water birds and many species of endangered reptiles (…) 
Together with the annual reversal of water flow, the existence and role of the 
vegetation encircling the lake are the main wonders of the Tonle Sap. 
Through a phenomenon of decomposition, the flora is the source of the lake’s 
phenomenal fish productivity, making it one of the world’s most productive 
bodies of inland water. It also creates nesting niches for fish, provides an 
important habitat for many wildlife species, as well as a means of livelihood 
and subsistence for many people” (Renaud Bailleux, 2003: 89 and 103). 
 
Undoubtedly, these statements about the rich biodiversity, ecological and social 
linkages, and importance of the inundated forests, vegetation to the fisheries and livelihoods 
of the Lake, touch on the concerns of a variety of international and national agencies dealing 
with issues of conservation and environment in Cambodia. Arturo Escobar (1998) in a paper 
entitled ‘Whose knowledge, whose nature?’ argued for the need to consider who is 
appropriating and conserving ‘nature’ and who benefits from such politics? As Escobar 
(1998: 53) points out we are dealing with a “highly transnationalized nature/culture field” 
where techno-scientific networks operating under the banner of the Convention of Biological 
Diversity are operating across political boundaries and influencing all sorts of policies and 
strategies relating to conservation, natural resource management, wildlife protection, and 
property rights. In Cambodia, conservation paradigms have recently been developed through 
a mixture of what Escobar terms ‘globalocentric’ and national ‘sovereignty’ perspectives, 
primarily involving key ‘global’ agencies and state agencies.  
 
The Tonle Sap is conceptualized as a ‘global space’ based on three key principles: 
1. The Lake is the one of the most important locations for globally significant biodiversity 
including the ‘flooded forests’, with its many endemic plant and reptile species, and 
endangered species of fish and birds. 
2. The ‘global space’ is legalized based on Cambodia signing the 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development and the September 2000 Millennium Declaration.  
3. The global space of the Tonle Sap is defined by a global environmental agencies of the 
UN and also INGO bodies such as WWF as an important area for ‘conservation’ in which 
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Cambodia has to sacrifice parts the ‘Tonle Sap’ for the protection of biodiversity. In 
1997, the Tonle Sap is transformed into a ‘conservation space’ for the world. Initially, the 
State of Cambodia was reluctant to put the Tonle Sap forward as a ‘conservation space’ of 
global significance due to the fact that the Lake is also a major source of economic value 
and national revenue. Moreover, international aid compensating this loss is provided by 
international inter-governmental agencies, such the United Nation Development Program 
(UNDP), UNESCO, ADB and others. Thus, the State has realized that global recognition 
as biosphere reserves, important and unique wetlands, can also earn international aid 
money.  
 
About 500 inland fish species have been recorded in Cambodia and at least 280 
species reside in the Tonle Sap (Van Zalienge et al., 2000; ADB, 2005c), classifying into 48 
species of cyprinids, 7 species of Pangasidae, 5 species of Bagridae and 5 species of 
Siluridae, of which seven inland fish species identified in the Tonle Sap have a global 
significance (UNDP/GEF, 2004). Some 42 reptile species are identified in the Tonle Sap, 
including one species endemic to the Tonle Sap—the Tonle Sap water snake Enhydris 
longicauda; nineteen global significance reptile species including two critically endangered 
and three listed as endangered species; seven turtles and a crocodile (UNDP/GEF, 2004; 
ADB, 2002). Apart from reptiles, the Tonle Sap is also home to some 225 bird species, of 
which 45%– mainly the larger species (ADB, 2002), and Prek Toal and Boeng Chhmar – the 
Core Areas of the Tonle Sap Lake – sustain the most significant colonies of water-birds in the 
whole of mainland Southeast Asia, including twenty-four species of global significance 
(UNDP/GEF, 2004; ADB, 2005c). Although key species such as Asiatic elephant and tiger 
have disappeared during the past decades, at least 15 mammal species have been recorded in 
the Tonle Sap Lake and floodplain during recent years, including at least ten species of global 
significance such as the Indochinese hog deer, hairy-nosed otter, smooth otter, long-tailed 
macaque, Irrawaddy dolphin, fishing cat, Lyle’s flying fox, large flying fox and silvered 
langur (UNDP/GEF, 2004).  
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Given the biodiversity and some rare species in the Lake, the UNESCO and other UN 
put the Lake as a ‘global space’ for biodiversity conservation. In other word, UNESCO has 
worked with RGC to designate the Tonle Sap as a ‘Biosphere Reserve’ which is part of a 
global UNESCO Man and Biosphere Program. The Biosphere Reserves or the ‘global space’ 
are areas of representative ecosystems that have been recognized by the UNESCO and 
Biosphere Program for their value in providing the scientific knowledge, skills and human 
value needed to support the sustainable development. The Biosphere Reserves have three 
main functions—the conservation, the development and logistical supports for demonstration 
project (Gum, 1998). Since then, the Tonle Sap becomes a ‘global space’ for biodiversity 
conservation. As a result, the UNDP/GEF and UNDP/Capacity 21 have developed a project 
known as a Tonle Sap Conservation Project starting in 2003 and has a period of 7 years. This 
project aimed at conserving the Biosphere Reserves (UNDP/GEF, 2004).  
 
4.3.2 Specialization and Rationalization of the Tonle Sap as a Conservation Space 
 
The RGC supports the initiatives to put the Tonle Sap as a ‘Biosphere Reserves 
Areas. In 1997, the Lake was declared as a ‘Biosphere Reserves’, but it was until 2001 the 
Royal Decree was enacted by the RGC to declare the Tonle Sap as a Biosphere Reserves 
Area. The ‘Biosphere Reserve’ as a ‘conservation space’ classifies the Tonle Sap into three 
spaces—the transitional area; the buffer area and the core area. The core area covers only 
three areas—Prek Toal, Boeung Tonle Chmar and Stun Sen—covering an area of 27,697ha 
(Bunhoeur and Lane, 2002; Campbell et al., 2006). The Ministry of Environment (MoE) 
established in 1993 by Royal Government of Cambodia manages this space.  
 
In the transition zone, sustainable resource management practices are to be 
established, while the buffer zone is an area where activities are to be compatible with 
conservation, in order to protect the core zones. The three core zones are Prek Toal 
 105
(21,342ha), Boeng Chhmar (14,560 ha) and Stung Sen (14,560 ha), which were established 
because of their importance for bird colonies (Prek Toal), bird feeding areas (Boeng Chhmar) 
and unique gallery forests (Stung Sen). Boeng Chhmar has also been designated as a Ramsar 
site under the Ramsar Convention, which was ratified by RGC in 1999. At present, only Prek 
Toal is protected to some degree, but even there poaching remains a significant problem 
(UNDP/GEF, 2004; Campbell et al., 2006; Gum, 1998).  
 
Conservation provides a strong rationale for partitioning the Lake into different 
protective zones. However, to manage these zones, specific specialists need to be employed to 
conserve biodiversity and resources. The MoE has authority and technical capacity to manage 
the Biosphere Reserves. However, there is a practical problem in that the ‘conservation space’ 
or the TSBR in the Tonle Sap Lake overlaps commercial fishing lots in some areas, and as a 
consequence of this, they become unclear zones of divergence and disagreement.  
Conservation areas are supposed to preserve patches of flooded forest, fish habitats, wildlife 
reserves, hydrological systems and natural beauty, but in practice there are problems due to 
the grant of fishing concessions in the ‘buffer zones,’ and also due to the fact that there are 
other multiple uses in and around flooded forests (dry season rice, mung bean cropping, 
vegetable gardens, and so on). Thus conflicts between stakeholders and competition over 
resources within designated conservation areas are quite common.  
 
4.4 The ‘Regional Space’ of the Tonle Sap  
 
The Tonle Sap River acts as a key valve or artery connecting the Mekong 
River to the Lake, and thus, we cannot consider the Tonle Sap’s biophysical 
characteristics without reference to the Mekong hydrological regime. First, the Tonle 
Sap Lake takes in a lot of water and helps reduce flooding in the Mekong River 
during the peak flood season and it releases water from the Lake to the Mekong River 
 106
in the dry season helping to reduce salt intrusion in the Mekong Delta. Second, the 
Tonle Sap Lake is a key space for migratory fishes from the Lower Mekong Basin 
into the Lake system during the wet season, and as a key space for fish production.  
For these critical reasons, fishery specialists, biologists and natural scientists perceive 
the Tonle Sap as a critical ‘regional space’ that is a fundamental barometer of 
changes in the Mekong Basin as a whole.  
 
4.4.1 The ‘pulsing ecosystem’ and ‘heartbeat’ of the Mekong 
 
The Lake owes its uniqueness to the natural phenomenon of reverse water flow, with 
approximately half of an annual pulse absorbed by the Lake area from the Mekong River 
during the wet season (May to October) and released back during the dry season.6 This ‘flood 
pulse’ has led one specialist, Anders Poulsen, to describe the Tonle Sap as ‘the pulsating 
heart’ of the Mekong, and goes on to argue that “the flood pulse is what keeps the heart 
beating. If the heart stops, the system dies” (Nikula, 2005:137; Kammu et al., 20088). 
  
• The Tonle Sap a Natural Reservoir for Flood Reduction in the Mekong Region 
 
The Mekong has one flood pulse a year (Lamberts 2001). During May and June when 
the Southwest monsoon arrives, the water level in the Mekong River increases only gradually, 
but does not increase noticeably until July and August when the Mekong River rises. Other 
streams originating in two mountain chains, the Phnom Dangreks and Phnom Kravagn 
(Cardamom chain), also flow into this large reservoir. During September and October, water 
                                               
6
 In the wet season, the surface area of the Lake increases from 250,000-300,000 ha to approximately 
1.0-1.6 million ha, with depth increasing correspondingly from 1–2 m amsl to 9–11 m amsl (CNMC 
and Nedeco, 1998), and storage capacity reaching a maximum of 80 million cubic meters (Sopharith, 
1998). It absorbs 20 per cent of the Mekong River's floodwaters and serves as a flood regulator (MRC, 
2004; ADB, 2002). The drop of the water level in the Mekong in the dry season creates the “reverse 
flow” from the Lake into the Mekong. 
7
 Jussi Nikula, The Lake and its People. MSc Thesis, Helsinki University of Technology, 2005.  
8
 Jussi Nikula, The Lake and its People. MSc Thesis, Helsinki University of Technology, 2005.  
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in the Mekong River is at its maximum level in Kratie province (Nikula, 2005). Annually, the 
Mekong River releases an estimate of 475 km³ to the China Sea (Kummu et al., 2008).  
 
The volume of water flowing downstream floods the areas along the Mekong and the 
Mekong Delta in Cambodia and in Vietnam. As part of the Mekong River, the Tonle Sap 
Lake absorbs a volume of water from the Mekong River in the wet season, estimating at about 
about 45 km³, which is about 10 percent of the Mekong water volume, reducing the flood in 
Mekong Delta in Cambodia below Phnom Penh and in Vietnam9 (Kummu et al., 2008; 
Matsui et al, 2005; CNMC, 2004).   Given the reduction of flood due to the existence of the 
Tonle Sap, the flooded area in the Mekong Delta in Vietnam is maintained between 1.2 and 
1.4 million hectares (Käkönen, 2008)10. However, under the high flood, the flooded areas in 
the Mekong Delta in Vietnam increase to 1.9 million hectares (Tuan et al., 2007)11.  
 
This creates a vast natural reservoir which the Tonle Sap becomes a ‘bladder’ of the 
Mekong basin helping to reduce flooding downstream. Thus, the area along the Mekong, the 
Mekong Delta both in Cambodia and Vietnam is saved from flooding due to large volume of 
flood is absorbed by the Tonle Sap Lake (Bakker 1999; Nikula, 2005; Kummu et al., 2008; 
CNMC, 2004).  
 
• Reducing Salty Intrusion in the Mekong Delta 
 
Apart from absorbing water from the Mekong River in the wet season, the Tonle Sap 
Lake also releases water from the Lake to the Mekong River in the dry season and volume of 
water flow downstream to the Mekong Delta and to the China Sea. This happens due to the 
level of the Mekong water quickly drops to the point below the level of the Tonle Sap Lake, 
                                               
9
 Kummu et al (2008) estimates that the annual inflow of the Tonle Sap is estimated at about 79 km³. 
About 57% of water in the Tonle Sap originates from the Mekong main stem.  
10
 The Mekong Delta in Vietnam covers an area of 39,200 km² (Kakonen, 2008).  
11
 Thanh Be et al., 2007. Challenges to Sustainable Development in the Mekong Delta: Regional and 
National Policy Issues and Research Needs.  
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and thus, creating a condition for water flowing from the Tonle Sap Lake to the Mekong and 
then continue to flow down to the China Sea.  It subsides slowly until January and February 
and continues to gradually recede during March and April. Out-flow water from the 
floodplain and the lake increases the flow of water in the lower Mekong River, improving the 
condition of the Mekong estuary after saline intrusion during the dry period. The water 
released from this storage can also be used to irrigate the dry season crop in many parts of the 
Mekong delta. In this sense, the Tonle Sap Lake is considered by many Khmers to be the 
‘backbone of their struggling nation’s agricultural system’. 
 
The annual average outflow of the Tonle Sap Lake is estimated at about 78.6 km³. 
About 69 km³ (88% of outflow) from the Tonle Sap Lake returns to the Mekong River via the 
Tonle Sap River (Kummu et al., 2008; Matsui et al., 2005; CNMC, 2004). The release of 
water from the Tonle Sap to the Mekong River during the dry season distributes water to the 
Mekong Delta. This water saves the Mekong Delta from salty intrusion. About 2.1 million 
hectares of the Mekong Delta are affected by the salinity during the dry season (Tuan et al., 
2007), and the volume of water from the Tonle Sap acts to reduce the intrusion of salty water 
into the mainland areas. Thus Tonle Sap waters act as a natural flush helping to reduce 
salinity levels in the Delta, which may still be rising probably due to sea-incursions and long-
term sea-level rise.  
 
4.4.2 The Tonle Sap as an integral part of the Lower Mekong fisheries 
 
The inflow of water from the Mekong to the Tonle Sap Lake during the wet season 
induces the fish migrations. Water flows into the Tonle Sap, inundating the forests, swamps, 
special long rice paddies, and the fishes find habitats where they may breed, lay eggs and 
grow there with abundant nutrition. In the dry season, fish also migrate into the Mekong River 
and may move both upstream and downstream. According to Van Zalienge et al., (2000), fish 
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from the Tonle Sap migrates as far up as Laos and far down as the Mekong Delta in Vietnam. 
Thus, fish from the Tonle Sap Lake are distributed all over the Mekong. 
  
According to Rainboth (1996), some 1,200 fish species have been identified in the 
Mekong River Basin. However, Baran (2005) suggests 758 –1500 fish species in the Mekong 
River Basin. Of these, 500 species have been identified in the freshwater bodies in Cambodia 
(Van Zalinge and Thouk, 2000), of which about 280 fish species reside in the Tonle Sap Lake 
(Wright et al., 2004). 
 
These fish species are classified into two main groups—‘black fish’ and ‘white fish’. 
The ‘black fish’ spend most time in the shallow and relatively still waters of the floodplain 
whereas ‘white fish’ tend to migrate in the main river channels depending on dominant water 
currents. ‘White species’ include many species of catfish and river carps. During the dry 
season such white species may be found in deep pools upstream of the main floodplain areas, 
for example in the Mekong and large tributaries in Kratie and Stung Treng Provinces (Deap, 
et al., 2003). In the wet season, the adult fish species migrate downstream and spawn; thus, 
more than 200 billion of fish eggs and fries are carried downstream by currents and swept into 
the floodplain areas that are inundated, where conditions are ideal for the rapid growth of 
young fish. The flooded land provides the nutrients for fish to grow rapidly (Deap et al., 
2003; Thouk, 2009). In addition, there are about 23 migratory species that move downstream 
from the Lake (Thanh Be et al., 2007). Undoubtedly, the Tonle Sap is not just a rich fishery 







4.4.3 Regional impacts and external ecological threats on the Tonle Sap 
 
 
For many international and national NGOs concerned with environmental affairs, the 
Tonle Sap is inseparable from the threats to nature and humans in the greater Mekong Basin 
as a whole (TERRA, 2007; 2008; IR and RCC, 2008; IR, 2009). Hydropower dams on 
upstream tributaries and increasingly planned for the mainstream of the Mekong represent one 
of the major regional threats to the future of the Tonle Sap. By 2007, 82 major Mekong Basin 
hydropower dams were operating in the six countries sharing the River (See Table 4.1). 
Between 1965 and 2005, 23 major hydropower dams were completely built in the Mekong 
River Basin, including mainstream dams along the Lancang River (Mekong in Chinese), such 
as, Manwan and Dachaoshan (CNMC & NEDECO, 1998; MRC, 2003).   
 
Table 4. 1: Major Hydropower Dams in the Mekong River Basin 
Existing large Project  
(operating and Under Construction)  
Potential Large Project  
(Committed and Planned and Identified) 
 Number MW Number MW 
Cambodia 2 222 33 8,009 
Laos PDR 11 1779 32 5788 
Vietnam 30 5,910 65 11,160 
Thailand 11 744 0 0 
Myanmar 21 1,506 15 7,852 
China 5 21,150 34 83,360 
Total 82 31,311 149 116,170 
Source: Peter King, Jeremy Bird, Lawrence Haas, 200712 
 
 
The hydropower dams in the Mekong River Basin since 1965 have a capacity to 
retain an estimate of 15,328 million cubic meters (mcm) (See Table 4.2). This reduces the 
flow downstream. The MRC suggests a decrease in discharge of around 10-12% happening 
since the commencement of major dam building in the middle and upper basin in the 1960s 
(MRC, 2003; CNMC & NEDECO, 1998; CNMC, 2004). 
                                               
  
12
 Peter King, Jeremy Bird, Lawrence Haas. 2007. The Current Status of Environmental Criteria for 
Hydropower Development in the Mekong Region: A Literature Compilation. 
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Table 4. 2: Major water resource development projects in the Mekong basin 
Power characteristic Irrigation potential (ha) Year  No. of 
Projects MW GWh/year Wet season Dry season 
Active storage 
(mcm) 
 1965-1975 9 257 1,266 209000 189000 10012 
1975-1995 6 1681 8330 53000 35000 1058 
1996-2005 8 3240 17597 0 0 4148 
Grant Total 
1965-2005 23 5178 27,193 275,000 227,000 15,328 
Source: CNMC & NEDECO, 1998; CNMC, 2004  
 
The dams in the Mekong River Basin induces two main impacts on the Tonle Sap; 
first, the dam and weir construction for hydroelectric power results in an increased water level 
in the dry season, increased turbidity and reduction in nutrient for fish (Kummu and Sarkkula, 
2008); and second, the dams induce the reduction of the wet seasonal flow of the Mekong 
River.  
 
Due to the considerable variety and ambiguity of different development plan in the 
Mekong River Basin, there is an concern about the impacts on the Tonle Sap and Kummu and 
Sarkkula (2008) assesses the impacts of the flow alteration on the Tonle Sap Lake, based on 
the existing cumulative impact assessments (CIA) conducted by the MRC in 2004 for the 
whole Mekong, the ADB in 2004 for the Nam Thuon 2 environmental impact assessment 
study, and Adamson in 2001 for the analysis of the downstream hydrological impacts of the 
Chinese cascade of dams. Under the CIA conducted by MRC, the wet-season water level 
would be reduced by 0.36m and the dry season water level would be increased by 0.15m; 
whereas under the CIA conducted by the ADB, the water level would be reduced by 0.54 and 
the dry-season water level would be increased by 0.60m. However, under the CIA conducted 
by Adamson (2001), the dry season water level increased by 0.30m (Kummu and Sarkkula, 
2008).  
 
Based on these CIAs, Kummu and Sarkkula (2008) estimate that “the lake areas 
corresponding to water level of 1.44m amsl is 2,300km². Rises of 0.15m, 0.3m, and 0.6, 
representing each analyzed CIA, would result in a permanent lake area of 2,700km², 
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3000km², and 3,200km² respectively. Thus, the permanent lake area would increase between 
400 and 1,000km² (17%-40%)” (Kummu and Sarkkula, 2008: 189).   
 
Kummu and Sarkkula (2008) further illustrate that the predicted dry-season water-
level rise of 0.15-0.60m would mean permanent inundation of large areas of flooded forest 
around the lake. This suggests that if the dry season water level rise by 0.6m, 80.4 km2 of the 
total area of the flooded forest (197.2 km2) will be inundated. That would mean that 41% of 
the present flooded forest area would be lost. The same happens to the protected areas in the 
Tonle Sap Lake. If the dry-season water level rise by 0.15m, 0.30m or 0.60m respectively, 
about 6%, 31% or 83% of the total area of 149km² of the Ramsar site in Boeung Chhmar 
would be inundated.  
 
The wet season flow in the Mekong River will be decreased, and so does the wet-
season water level. Thus, there would be less water to flood the flooded forest and floodplain 
around the Lake and reduces the fishery productivity (Lieng and Van Zalienge, 2001). 
Kummu and Sarkkula (2008) estimate that the area to be flooded would be decreased between 
7% and 16% (Kummu and Sarkkula, 2008). This would have direct impact on the ecosystem 
productivity:  the smaller the area that becomes flooded, the smaller the area between aquatic 
and terrestrial phase, and the smaller the potential transfer of floodplain terrestrial organic 
matter and energy into the aquatic phase (Kummu and Sarkkula, 2008; Lieng and Van 
Zalienge, 2000).  
 
The change in hydrological flow in the Mekong River due to the operation of 
hydropower dams for electricity affects fish migration. Dams physically block fish migration, 
and the change in water temperature, flow and turbidity associated with dam may also 
negatively affect fisheries (Kummu and Sarkkula, 2008). The increased risk of extreme flood 
events, either by dam disaster or through a sudden release of water, is another issue. There are 
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at present no plans to coordinate water release from various planned and existing dams in the 
region (Bakker, 1999). 
 
4.4.4 Regional institutions and the Tonle Sap  
 
4.4.4.1 The Mekong River Commission (MRC) 
 
To address issues and problems facing the Tonle Sap, the Tonle Sap is framed as part 
of the Mekong River Basin, and the Mekong Agreement was designed to guide the four 
Lower Mekong Countries—Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam—in the utilization of 
water resources in the Mekong River Basin as well as the Tonle Sap in a sustainable manner. 
The Mekong Agreement in 1995 recognizes the Tonle Sap as an important area in  the Lower 
Mekong River Basin and the four Lower Mekong Countries—Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and 
Vietnam—agree to protect it (MRC Agreement, 1995).  
 
The Tonle Sap is one of 10 “sub-areas” of the Mekong Basin (See Map 4.1) in which 
institutional arrangements, plans, and programs are developed to address issues and problems 
facing the Lake (MRC, 2003; CNMC, 2004). Among 10 “sub-areas”, the Tonle Sap is given a 
high priority under the regional  framework in which nine areas of intervention were 
identified to address the problems and issues raised above, using regional specialization 
(MRC, 2003; CNMC, 2004). These include an irrigated agriculture, irrigation, fisheries, 
navigation, flood control-management, hydropower, watersheds management, tourism and 
water supply. Each of these areas requires a specific specialization; for instance hydrology, 
fisheries, agriculture, and environment; thus, each specialization—fisheries, hydrology, 
agriculture and environment—establishes a particular ‘spaces’ of bureaucratic, technical and 
scientific engagement for the MRC to dabble in certain affairs of the Tonle Sap. 
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The MRC Agreement in 1995 protects the Tonle Sap in two ways: first, the 
Agreement provides a general direction to safeguard the Tonle Sap and second, it provides a 
specific guarantee to protect the Tonle Sap (Ojendal et al., 2002; Sithirith, 2007; MRC 
Agreement, 1995; Sneddon, 2003). The general direction in the Agreement includes the 
efforts by all parties “to protect environment, natural resources, aquatic life, and conditions, 
and ecological balance of the Mekong River Basin from the pollution and other harmful 
effects resulting from any development plans and uses of water and related resources in the 
Basin” (Article 3). However, dam or hydropower dam is still possible under this Agreement 
as states in the Article: 
The parties agree... To cooperate in all fields of sustainable development, 
utilization, management and conservation of the water and related resources of 
the Mekong River Basin including, but not limited to irrigation, hydropower, 
navigation, flood control, fisheries, timber floating, recreation and tourism, in a 
manner to optimize the multiple-use from natural occurrences and man-made 
activities (Agreement 1995, Article 1).  
 
The Agreement provides the direct protection of the Tonle Sap.  The Article 5 of the 
Agreement guarantees the equitable and reasonable utilization of the Mekong water. It spells 
out a specific clause to protect the Tonle Sap as a ‘tributary’ of the Mekong River and any 
intra-basin uses or inter-basin diversions shall be subject to notification to the Joint 
Committee. The Article 5 also limits activities of riparian states in using water resources from 
the Mainstream Mekong River in both the dry and wet seasons as it states:  
1. During the wet season:  
a) Intra-basin use shall be subject to notification to the Joint Committee. 
b) Inter-Basin diversion shall be subject to prior consultation which aims at 
arriving at an agreement by the Joint Committee. 
2. During the dry season: 
a) Intra-basin use shall be subject to prior consultation which aims at arriving at 
an agreement by the Joint Committee. 
b) Any inter-basin diversion project shall be agreed upon by the Joint Committee 
through a specific agreement for each project prior to any proposed diversion. 
However, should there be a surplus quantity of water available in excess of the 
proposed uses of all parties in any dry season, verified and unanimously 
confirmed as such by the Joint Committee, an inter-basin diversion of the surplus 




The Article 5 forms the strong bases for Cambodia to protect the Tone Sap Lake. 
However, it is argued that the Article 5 can be translated into three different ways: First, the 
Mekong can be dammed and diverted; second, the average flows can be maintained; and 
third, that maintaining average flows in the Mekong during the rainy season is a healthy 
optimum. The question is how to protect the Tonle Sap using this article given it vague 
mearning and confused terms (Ojendal, 2000; Sithirith, 2007). Article 6 also raises two 
concrete points in maintaining flows in the mainstream: 
a) Of not less than the acceptable minimum monthly natural flow during each 
month of the dry season; 
b) To enable the acceptable natural reverse flow of the Tonle Sap to take place 
during the wet season (Article 6, MRC Agreement in 1995). 
 
Despite the assurance to protect the Tonle Sap, it is very vague, and it is clear on 
protecting the dry season flow and the flow levels in general, but what is the dry season? How 
much is the acceptable low flow? How can we ensure the ‘acceptable’ dry and wet season 
flow under the scenarios of hydropower dam development? (Ojendal, 2000; Sithirith, 2007). 
Hitherto, the real meaning of these terms is left out with no clarification and explanation 
(Sneddon, 2003).  
4.4.4.2 Cambodia’s National Mekong Committee 
 
Following the MRC Agreement, each riparian country establishes a National Mekong 
Committee to coordinate the MRC activities at the national level. Under the regional 
agreement, each country in the Lower Mekong Region forms a National Mekong Committee. 
The Cambodia National Mekong Committee (CNMC) was formed under the Mekong 
Agreement as the primary government agency coordinating natural resources management in 
the entire Mekong Basin as well as in the Tonle Sap (Sokhmem & Sunada, 2006). The 
CNMC has 10 ministries as a member, and it is chaired by the Minister of Water Resources 
and Meteology (MOWRAM).   
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 The CNMC externally maintains a direct linkage with the MRC and nationally, the 
CNMC is tasked to assist and advise the government in all matters relating to water policy 
and strategy as well as management and development of the water and natural resource of the 
Mekong River Basin (Sokhem & Sunada 2006; CNMC, 2004). Since 1998, the Tonle Sap has 
attracted international attention both globally and regionally. Thus, the roles of CNMC were 
broadened. Yet the CNMC has to carry out these ambitious tasks with different and often 
conflicting priorities, values and perceptions posed by its member ministries, often with 
particular sector and business interests, and the CNMC has therefore ‘often complained about 
being by-passed or ignored’ (Sokhem & Sunada 2006).Given these limitations of CNMC in 
relation to the Tonle Sap, the UNESCO and the ADB see the needs to persuade the RCG to 
set up the specific institutions coordinating the Tonle Sap work. The UNESCO and UNDP 
influence the RGC to establish the institution responsible for biodiversity conservation while 
ADB attempts to work with RGC to establish the Tonle Sap Basin Management Organization 
(TSBMO) (ADB, 2005b).  Thus, the CNMC was established to link the regional level 
activities to national level activities, although national committees frequently have even 
blunter teeth than the regional mechanism, and they are not necessarily influential in policy-
making circles or on other national bodies concerned with aspects of water governance 
(Hirsch, 2006).  
 
4.4.4.3 Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS): 
Rationalizing Space in the Tonle Sap 
 
Apart from MRC, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is also active in the Mekong 
Region. In 1992, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) initiated the ‘Greater Mekong Sub-
Region (GMS)’ to; first, promoting a regional cooperation of six riparian countries and 
second, boosting economic development of six countries—Cambodia, China, Myanmar, 
Laos, Thailand and Vietnam (ADB, 2005a). Seven priority areas have been initiated by the 
Bank to drive the regional cooperation and economic
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Mekong including transportation, telecommunication, energy, trade and investment, human 
resource development, tourism and environment. Trade between countries is the central 
element of the seven priority areas (ADB, 2005a; Sithirith, 2007).  
 
In the Tonle Sap, the ADB initiates the ‘Tonle Sap Initiative’ in 2002, and this is part 
of the Bank’s Regional Cooperation Strategy and Program (RCSP) for the Greater Mekong 
Subregion (GMS). The GMS-RCSP aims at facilitating economic growth and development in 
the region. Through the Tonle Sap Initiative, the ADB establishes itself as a lead funding 
agency for the Tonle Sap (Rosien, 2006), and since 1998, the Tonle Sap has been heavily 
funded by the ADB. Between 1998 and 2007, ADB financed 29 projects for the Tonle Sap 
with a total budget of US$72.66 million. Out of these, 11 projects were completed, and 9 
projects were active while 9 others were in the pipeline. While 24 projects were financed 





























Map 4. 1: Map of the Tonle Sap Lake in the Mekong Region (Adopted from CNMC, 2004)
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The ADB initiated the projects for the Tonle Sap based on spatial differences. The 
study identifies four spatial differences of the ADB Projects in the Tonle Sap namely the 
‘water body of the Lake’, the ‘floodplain area’, the ‘lowland agricultural area’, and the 
‘watershed area’. I take the example of the ADB projects in the Tonle Sap that demonstrates 
spatial characteristics to show the spatial construction of the ADB in the Tonle Sap.   
 
The Tonle Sap Environmental Management Projects (TSEMP) was designed by the 
ADB, rationalizing environmental problems in the Mekong as a threat to the Tonle Sap. It 
also rationalizes the needs to address these problems using specialization and experiences of 
the Bank. In doing so, the project of US$ 19 million was proposed in 2002 with funding of 
US$10.9 million as loan from the ADB, and about US$ 4.53 million as a grant from UNDP.13  
This is the first ADB lending project for the environmental management and conservation, 
focusing on fisheries and community based resources management in the ‘water body’ of the 
Tonle Sap Lake. The project proposes three main activities; first, developing the coordination 
system and planning for fisheries management; second, building the capacity for biodiversity 
conservation; and third establishing the community fishery (ADB, FAO and DoF, 2003).  
 
A second ADB funded project is the Tonle Sap Sustainable Livelihoods Project. The 
project is funded by ADB (US$15 million), the Government of Finland (US$4.7 million) and 
the Royal Government of Cambodia (US$0.6 million), aiming at producing three important 
outputs (components); first, ‘supporting community-driven development’; second, 
‘safeguarding the core areas’ of the Tonle Sap Lake; and third, ‘building skills and awareness 
for sustainable livelihoods’ (ADB, 2005d). The project covers 37 communes, comprising 316 
villages, including most floating and stand-stilt villages, and some farming-cum-fishing 
villages, with a population of 287,430 in 54,857 families in five provinces (ADB, 2005d). The 
project is effective from June 2006 and will be completed in December 2009 (ADB, 2005d).  
 
                                               
13
 The UNDP-GEF and UNDP Capacity 21 provides US$3.9 million and US$ 636,000 respectively.  
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The ‘lowland agricultural area’ is an area where people living around the Tonle Sap 
Lake cultivate the rice paddy. In this area, the ADB has proposed a ‘Tonle Sap Lowland 
Stabilization Project (TSLSP)’ covering 30 communes in 12 districts located in six provinces 
around the Tonle Sap Lake. The project lays down key activities; first, the project facilitates 
commune participatory development planning (ongoing) for infrastructure development such 
as road, irrigation and rural marketing, and second, the project trains Community Level 
Facilitator (CLFT) to form income generating activity (IGA) groups and facilitating group 
and individual access to technical and financial services.  The project cost US$21.5 million, 
of which about US$10 million come as a loan and US$9 million as a grant from the ADB. 
The remaining budget will be provided by the Royal government of Cambodia (ADB, 2007).  
 
The ‘watershed area’ surrounding the Tonle Sap is an important area having a close 
connection with the Tonle Sap Lake. It is covered largely by a dense forest contributing to 
maintaining the ecological balance of the Tonle Sap (ADB, 2007). However, the watershed 
area has been heavily deforested, contributing to the decline in forest covers and increasing 
the deposit of siltation into the Tonle Sap Lake (ADB, 2007). To address these concerns, the 
ADB proposes a ‘watershed management’ project. The total cost of this project is estimated at 
about US$15 million and this project is scheduled to start in 2010 (ADB, 2007).  
 
Most of projects funded by ADB for the Tonle Sap tend to be executed by 
government agencies, regional and global actors, and consultant firms. The international 
organizations, international consultant firms and international individual consultants benefit 
most from these projects. Thus, the projects funded by ADB for the Tonle Sap have enlarged 
the ‘regional space’ and ‘global space’ of the Tonle Sap for numerous global, regional and 
national actors to become engaged in the Tonle Sap, reifying the ADB role as both financial 




4.5 Tonle Sap as a ‘National’ Resource and Sovereign Space 
 
The Tonle Sap is largely constructed as a ‘national space’ based on cultural, social 
and economic importance of the resources in the Lake. Indeed, there are frequent historical 
references to the Lake in relation to ancient Khmer Kingdoms, particularly Angkor, as Lake 
Fauna is richly depicted on the stone bas-reliefs on the Bayon temple within the Angkor 
complex. In contemporary times, the Lake’s vital importance is as a source of food for million 
of people, and through its natural resources helps provide common pool resources for people 
living in the Basin. It is the latter dimension that will now be considered.  
 
4.5.1 Safety Net, Communal Bank and ‘Space of Dependence’  
 
The Cambodian population was 13.4 million people in 2008. About 80.5 percent of 
its population lives in rural area with a great dependence on natural resources for their living, 
and about 10-11 percent of the total population live in the Tonle Sap floodplain14 (NIS, 
200815; CNMC & Nedeco, 1998; Keskinen, 2003). About 1.4 million people live in the Tonle 
Sap’s floodplain in 2008 (between Highway no.5 and no.6) (See Table 4.3). Of these, about 
892722 people live in floating and stand-stilt villages in the Tonle Sap. This suggests that 
abut 64 percent of the Tonle Sap population is engaged in fishing as a primary occupation. 
Furthermore, at the national level, about 10 percent of Cambodian population is engaged in 
fishing in the Tonle Sap (See Table 4.3).  
 
Fishing in the Tonle Sap is considered as a ‘social safety net’ in which it provides 
food for people that keeps them away from hungry, and due to the presence of the Tonle Sap 
Lake, many people never worry about the famine or food crisis given the fact that the  
Lake is a main source of food. People may live in poverty, but they do not die of hunger as 
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the Lake functions as a sort of ‘social safety net’ (Baran, 2005; Degen, et al., 2000; DoF, 
2001; 2003; Gum, 2000; Van Acker, 2005). In situations of economically or institutionally 
restricted access to capital (i.e. financial capital such as credit) or production factors (such as 
private land), the allegedly relatively easy and/free access to fishing grounds in the Lake 
allows poor people to rely more heavily on local common resources to obtain/ extract the 
goods and service they need to sustain their livelihoods (Van Acker, 2005). Inland fisheries 
are particularly important in this context. The total inland fish catch of small-scale fishing in 
the Tonle Sap is estimated, from the small-scale fishing of five provinces in the Tonle Sap, at 
about 60,900 tons in 1998 (Baran, 2005). This suggests that the total fish catch of small-scale 
fishing in the Tonle Sap constitute about 50 percent of the national fish catch of small-scale 
fishing (See Table 4.4)16.  
 
Table 4. 3: Fishing population in the Tonle Sap and national population 
Type of population 
No. of 
Population 
Percentage of fishing population  against the Tonle 
Sap population an national population (%) 
Fishing population in the Tonle 
Sap 892722a  
Population of the Tonle Sap 1,388,555a 64.29 
National Population 13,388,910b 10.37 
Source: a) Field Notes, 2007 and 2008; b) NIS, 200817. 
 
According to Van Acker (2005) many fishers use the Lake as a sort of ‘communal 
bank’, but it is only the ‘public fishing areas’ under the Fisheries Law, which are effectively 
‘open access’ for the majority of fishers (Thouk and Sina, 1997). ‘Open-access’ or 
‘communal bank’ in this sense provides a critical ‘safety net’ for vulnerable households, 
especially ‘landless household’ when they face a sudden decline in their food. This often 
occurs when the rice harvest is failed and households with many household members often 
face food crisis given their small landholding, and the landlessness has no other sources of 
food part from fishing (Van Acker, 2005; Ahmed et al., 1998).  
                                               
16
 The total small-scale fish catch is estimated at about 115,000-140,000 tons between 1999 and 20003 




Table 4. 4: The catch of small-scale fisheries by province in the Tonle Sap 
Province Small-scale fishing/family-scale fishing (tons) 
Kampong Chhnang 26,300 
Siem Reap 6,500 
Pursat 6,400 
Battambang 15,500 
Kampong Thom 6,200 
Total 60,900 
Source: Ahmed et al., 1998; Baran, 2005 
 
Thus, the Tonle Sap is a critical source of food for the Cambodia population over 
many generations. Thus, access to the Lake’s resources provides a ‘safety-net’ and food 
security for Cambodian population. Hence, people living around the Lake have never realized 
the famine or food crisis in the past. I define these as ‘spaces of dependence’ after Kevin Cox 
(1998: 2) “defined by those more-or-less localized social relations upon which we depend for 
the realization of essential interests and for which there is no substitute elsewhere; they define 
place-specific conditions for our material well-being and sense of significance.” In the Tonle 
Sap, ‘spaces of dependence’ have greater direct meaning than for many urban environments 
due to the presence of natural capital in the form of fisheries, inundated non-timber forest 
products, a variety of flora and fauna, and for farming-cum-fishing communities, terrestrial 
resources that are critical to livelihood security. However, whether we are talking about 
predominantly urban or rural environments, “these spaces are inserted in broader sets of 
relationships of a more global character and these constantly threaten to undermine or 
dissolve them” (Cox, 1998: 2-3). The different ‘global’, ‘regional’, and ‘national’ imaginings 
of the Lake are based upon very distinct representations of space and divergent stakeholder 
interests, which in turn have differing implications for the way in which ‘spaces of 




Map 4. 2: Map showing the complex space of the Tonle Sap (MoE, 2005) 
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4.5.2 State control and commercialization of the Tonle Sap 
  
 Two forms of control have tended to squeeze the area of common pool resources 
since colonial times to the present. First, the French Protectorate transformed the Lake into a 
revenue earner for the colonial authority through the creation of fishing lots. In a sense this 
made it easier for post-colonial states to extend their own versions of the fishing lots, and to 
create research lots as well as conservation zones in the Tonle Sap.  
 
The space in the Tonle Sap is constructed and reconstructed based on the rationalities 
developed around the interests and benefits of concerned actors. For the economic benefits, 
the state rationalizes the Tonle Sap; first, as a ‘commercial fishing space,’ territorializing and 
privatizing it for private control; second, as a conservation area (different from the Biosphere 
Reserves discussed earlier); and third, as a ‘public fishing space’, allowing small-scale fisher 
to fish in these areas for ‘subsistence’ only, not for trade (Degen et al., 2000).  
 
The commercial fishing space was invented by the French Protectorate 
Administration in the 19th century to exploit fisheries in Cambodia, aimed at generating 
revenues for colonial administration. The commercial fishing space is territorialized into the 
commercial fishing lots and it is auctioned for private control18. Under the French Protectorate 
Administration up until 1908, fisheries revenue contributed to 17 percent of national revenue 
for the French Protectorate Regime, and by 1910, the incomes from fishing tax covered one-
third of the administrative budget of the French Protectorate (Degen et al., 2000).  
 
After the French Protectorate Regime, fisheries in the Tonle Sap remain an important 
sector for national economy. The State had depended on fisheries as a major source of 
                                               
18
 The ‘commercial fishing area’ in the Tonle Sap covered 603,880 ha in 1919, but reduced to 444,970 
ha in 1940, and then further down to 390,000ha in 1998. However, between 1998 and 2000, the 
‘commercial fishing area’ increased to 507,371 ha and then it dropped to nearly half between 1998 and 
2000 (See Appendix 4). 
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national revenue. Between 1964 and 1975, the fish production in the Tonle Sap increased to 
54,000 tons and 75,000 tons respectively. Fisheries had been an important sector for a 
national economy after the colonial period as indicated by John Bardach (1959):  
In the view of the fact that the fiscal revenue from fisheries, 50 million riels, exceeds 
the fiscal revenue from forest, and also in the view of the fact that the value of fishery 
produces to the first the producer is over 300 million riels a year against an estimate 
170 million riels from forest at present (Bardarch, 1958: 42). 
 
Between 1999 and 2001, it is estimated that the inland freshwater fish catch was 
estimated at about 295,000-420,000 tons annually. About 60 percent of this catch came from 
a commercial fish catch in the Tonle Sap (Ahmed et al., 1998; Van Zalinge et al., 2000; Van 
Lieng and Zalienge, 2001), equivalent to about 235,000 tons (Van Zalinge et al., 2001). With 
an estimated annual inland fish production, the landing value of inland fisheries is estimated 
at about US$150-200 million (Van Zalinge et al., 2000; FACT & EJF, 2001), but it increases 
to about US$ 250-500 million in the marketing chain (Van Zalienge et al., 2000). In 
comparison, the total monetary value of paddy rice in Cambodia is roughly $350-400 million. 
This indicates the high dependence of the State on the ‘commercial space’ as main source 
revenue for the national budget (Baran, 2005).  
 
In 1995, Thouk and Sina (1997) estimated that fisheries contributed to 3.2-7.4 percent 
of GDP. However, between 2002 and 2003, the contribution of fisheries to the GDP increased 
to about 11.7% (Starr, 2003). After 2003, Van Zalinge et al., (2004) re-estimate the 
contribution of fisheries to GDP and conclude that fisheries sector contributes to about 16% 
of GDP (Van Zalinge et al., 2004). Thus, fisheries section plays an important role in a 
national economy and the Tonle Sap plays a vital role in the fisheries sector. Significantly, 
much of the space of the Tonle Sap has become represented as ‘commercial fishing lots’, 




4.5.3 ‘Public Fishing Space’ in the Tonle Sap 
 
It should be noted that the concept of ‘public fishing space’ applies to both marine 
and inland fisheries19 that is referred to as an inland fishery domain and the marine fishery 
domain, which in turn constitute the fishery domain. The inland fishery domain entails rivers, 
tributaries, lakes, streams, canals, inundated forest areas, natural ponds, and water channels 
(Fiat Law, 1987). The marine fishery domain comprises marine areas extending from the 
coastline to the outer limit of the Cambodian exclusive economic zone (EEZ)20 (Thomson and 
Somony, 2003; Fiat Law, 1987).  The notion of domain used in fisheries is derived from the 
French concept of public domain. The ‘public domain’ is translated into Khmer by fisheries 
experts as a ‘den nesat sathirnak’ or in English as a ‘public fishing space’ (Thouk and Sina, 
1997; Tana and Todd, 2002).  This idea of ‘public space’ in a freshwater lake is not totally 
analogous with public spaces within urban contexts, except that the use of such spaces should 
be ideally be part of some form of ‘common property’ notion. In fact, in Cambodia, the idea 
of a ‘public fishery space’ follows the French concept of the ‘public domain’ in fisheries, in 
which it is  defined first as a  state property, second as allowing regulated access areas for ‘the 
public’, and third as an ‘open space’ (Thomson and Somony, 2003; Thouk and Sina, 1997; 
Tana and Todd, 2002).  
 
The ‘public domain’ as a ‘state property’ means that ‘public fishing’ is not the same 
as common property. The public state properties are inalienable. Consequently, no water body 
or land belonging to the inland or marine fishery domain can be disposed of by the State. In 
other words, these areas cannot be privately owned by any natural or legal private person 
(Thomson and Somony, 2003; Thouk and Sina, 1997; Tana and Todd, 2002).  The public 
state property belongs to the state and people who are citizens of this state are technically the 
                                               
19
 See Kram n° 87-NS of 23 April 1956 on Inland Fisheries and Kram n° 249-NS of 24 January 1958 
on Marine Fisheries.  
20
 See Article 54 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea adopted on 10 December 
1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica.  
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rightful users of this property. In this sense, the state property belongs to all, and yet 
‘everybody property’ is no one’s property (Bromley, 1994). Thus, the public fishing space 
can be accessed by everybody. In other words, the ‘public fishery space’ in the Tonle Sap is 
effectively an ‘open access’ space (Gum, 2000; Sithirith, 2000; Swift, 1997).  
  
The public fishing space is opened up to all people and it is accessible by everybody 
as a citizen of Cambodia (Fishery Law, 2006). However, the accessibility to the public fishing 
space for fishing is regulated by the State through the use of fishing gear and other 
regulations. Everybody could access and fish in the public fishing space using small-scale 
fishing gears and fishing with this scale in this area is only for household consumption, not 
for trade (Fiat Law, 1987; Fisheries Law, 2006). For small-scale fisheries or subsistence 
fisheries, access can be free and open.  
 
As a consequence of the definition of commercial, conservation and public fishing 
areas, we can perceive the Tonle Sap space as one that is intensively partitioned, controlled, 
contested, and where there are likely to be clashes between differing conceptions of space, 
across and within scales of operation. All these issues are discussed in chapters 5 – 8.  
 
4.6 The Management of the Tonle Sap 
 
4.6.1 Fisheries Administration 
 
 The state agency responsible for management of the Tonle Sap is the Fisheries 
Administration (FiA). FiA manages all fishing areas including marine and inland fisheries, 
but among these, the Tonle Sap is the main fishing areas that give Fisheries Administration an 
essential role in the national economy and an important sector in the country’s economy. The 
uses of fishing areas in the Tonle Sap either fishing or non-fishing affecting the fisheries 
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subject to approval from FiA and without this approval, it is considered as illegal in which the 
FiA has the full authority to act to stop its.  
 
4.6.2 The Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve Secretariat—Induced by Global Actor such as 
UNDP 
  
As discussed above, certain ‘global’ agency perspectives of the Tonle Sap as a ‘global 
hotspot’ in terms of biodiversity significance and a key area where native, exotic and rare 
species survive, has influenced the management of resources in the Lake. The conservation of 
the biodiversity started for the first time in the Tonle Sap in 1997 in which the conservation 
space is organized with financial and technical support from various international agencies.  
 
In 2001, the Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve Secretariat (TSBRS) was established by 
Royal Degree as a state agency responsible for the management of the conservation area, and 
it has been considered as a first major step forward in the establishment of environmental 
governance structure in the Tonle Sap (Sokhem & Sunada 2006). The impetus for the 
establishment of TSBR was –like its name says– closely linked to conservation of the Tonle 
Sap system: “Recognizing the unique ecological, environmental, economical, social, and 
cultural significance of the Tonle Sap Lake, a Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve is hereby 
established in accordance with the statutory framework of the World Network of Biosphere 
Reserve” (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2001).  
 
The Degree divides the TSBR into three zones, namely the core areas, a buffer zone 
and a flexible transition zone. It also gives to the TSBR three complementary functions on 
conservation, development and logistics (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2001): 
“The Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve shall fulfill three complementary functions: 
(ii) a conservation function to contribute to the conservation of biological 
diversity, landscapes, and ecosystem, including genetic resources, plant, fishery 
and animal species, and to the restoration of the essential character of the 
environment and habitat of biodiversity;  
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(ii) a development function to foster sustainable development of ecology, 
environment, economy, society, and culture;  
(iii) a logistic function to provide support for demonstration projects, 
environmental education and training, research and monitoring of environment 
related to the local, national and global issues of conservation and sustainable 
development”. 
 
The Royal Degree establishes the TSBR Secretariat “...under Cambodia National 
Mekong Committee (CNMC) to coordinate and strengthen cooperation between ministries, 
agencies, local authorities and communities concerned for the protection and sustainable 
management of the Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve.” This has two interesting implications: 
first, the TSBR Secretariat’s main role is described as to coordinate and strengthen the 
cooperation between different actors working with the Tonle Sap, including sustainable 
development of the area . Secondly, the fact that the TSBR Secretariat operated under the 
CNMC forms a natural connection to the Mekong River Commission (MRC)21, and thus links 
the conservation and development of the Tonle Sap to water management in the entire 
Mekong River Basin.  
  
In 2002, the ADB, GEF and UNDP funded Tonle Sap Environmental Management 
Project (TSEMP). The project was coordinated by the TSBR Secretariat and its central part 
was to establish a coordination framework and information dissemination mechanisms as well 
as to support the TSBR Secretariat in fulfilling its tasks. The project had following aims: “The 
Project will strengthen the TSBR Secretariat. It will create the capacity to address legal and 
coordination issues in the TSBR, rationalize the designation of the various protected areas in 
the TSBR, and formulate common policy objectives for managing the TSBR. The issues 
include agricultural and fisheries practices (especially pesticides), hazardous goods transport, 
solid waste management, and ecotourism. The common policy objectives will be formulated 
                                               
21
 Mekong River Commission (MRC) was established in its current form in 1995, with four Lower 
Mekong countries of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam being its member countries. The MRC 
mission is “To promote and coordinate sustainable management and development of water and related 
resources for the countries’ mutual benefit and the people’s well-being” (MRC 2006).  
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by the TSBR Secretariat through quarterly inter-ministerial meetings called and chaired by 
CNMC” (ADB 2002:25).  
 
In 2007, the TSBR Secretariat published a policy paper describing the management 
challenges in the Tonle Sap area from its viewpoint. The paper emphasizes the need for 
coordinated management and suggests a framework for ‘Common Policy Coordination’ that 
would consist of the TSBR Committee, Technical Advisory Groups, Provincial TSBR 
Management Working Groups and Provincial TSBR Advocacy Forums, with close linkages 
to CNMC and TSBR Partner Agencies, i.e. different ministries and provincial governors (the 
Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve Secretariat, 2007). The paper also recognizes three policy goals 
for the TSBR: 1) Contribute to Biodiversity Conservation and Habitat Restoration; 2) Foster 
Sustainable Socioeconomic Development and Equitable Access to Resources, and 3) Build a 
Support System for Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Development. 
 
4.7 The Tonle Sap Basin Management Organization  
  
The ‘Tonle Sap Initiative’ is established by the ADB under the Cambodia Program 
focusing on the Tonle Sap. Thus, the Tonle Sap Initiative has both financial and technical 
leverages, but it is not a program institutionalized and legalized by the Royal Government of 
Cambodian; hence, making this initiative less active in Cambodian context, particularly with 
Royal Government of Cambodia. Thus, to promote this initiative, the only way is to influence 
the institutional arrangement in which the principles of the Tonle Sap Initiative are integrated. 
The effort has been made to institutionalize the Tonle Sap Initiative through formalizing the 
Tonle Sap Basin Management Organization (TBMO) in which to integrate this initiative into 
the government system as noted by ADB (See ADB, 2006c; ADB, 2005b):  
“the Tonle Sap Basin Strategy identified early the imperative to develop better 
institutional arrangements for basin management. It specified that natural 
resource management plans developed in partnership by communities and the 
Government would outline a transparent and equitable process of resource 
management over the next 10 years. The plans would incorporate community 
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aspirations regarding natural resources and contain the necessary rules relating to 
their management. ... There would be regular reporting between the Government 
and communities on the extent to which the plans are being effective in 
achieving their objectives. In this way, there would be more accountability to 
communities to ensure that all efforts and investments are best placed to deliver 
on results” (ADB, 2006c:15). 
  
The Tonle Sap Basin Management Organization (TSBMO), also called the Tonle Sap 
Basin Organization (TSBO), was proposed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to the 
RGC. In doing so, the ADB provided two technical assistance (TA) projects for Cambodian 
Government to establish the Tonle Sap Basin Management Organization to improve 
institutional and organizational arrangements for managing land, water and biotic resources in 
the Tonle Sap basin (ADB 2005b). The outcome of these TA is that the Tonle Sap Basin 
Organization (TSBO) is proposed to assist the Royal Cambodian Government to sustainably 
develop the Tonle Sap Basin’s economy and infrastructure, advising on (ADB 2006b:36):  
a) Formulation of water policy and strategy to manage, preserve, investigate, 
plan, and develop water and related natural resources, and 
b) Policy and strategy to conserve biological diversity and maintain, use and 
manage natural resources within the TSBR” (ADB, 2006b:86) 
 
The TSBO was proposed to set up by ADB as part of CNMC and to complement the 
CNMC in coordinating the works relating to the Tonle Sap as indicated by Sokhem & Sunada 
(2006) that the “ADB supports the CNMC with technical assistance to define the institutional 
framework for the Tonle Sap management in terms of constitutional mandate; the areas of 
responsibility; the structure; the capacity building and technical and financial support needed” 
(Sokhem & Sunada; 2006:413). The reason of doing this is because the CNMC covers the 
Mekong River Basin as well as the Tonle Sap and the focus on the Tonle Sap needs more 
attention and therefore, TSBO is proposed to fill the gap that CNMC is missing (Sokhem & 
Sunada 2006).  
 Under the proposed TSBO, the Tonle Sap is heavily spatialized in which the 
proposed TSBO has a four-level administrative structure, consisting of the Tonle Sap Basin 
Coordination Committee (TSBCC) and two Secretariats; Sub-basin Committees; Provincial 
Water and Related Resource Committees and secretariats; and District Water and Related 
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Resource Taskforces and secretariats (ADB 2006b). Administratively, the TSBO is proposed 
to be under the CNMC, and then it has the Tonle Sap Basin Coordination Committee 
(TSBCC) as a major institution coordinating the actions of different partner organizations and 
sub-committees. Large part of the actual responsibility for planning and implementation is 
planned to be at lower governance levels i.e. in the sub-basins, provinces, and districts.  
 
The ADB suggested that the TSBO should neither be a new special purpose 
organization nor the new authority to an existing institution, but rather a committee, 
established through new legislation requiring that it exercise broad vision and accept formal 
obligations and mandates (ADB 2006a).  The attempt was to promote the basin-wide 
coordination through a Basin Management Organization rather than a more powerful basin 
authority that would absorb most or all functions of line ministries (Sokhem & Sunada 2006). 
The TSBO comprises representatives from all key water ministries, governors from all basin 
provinces, and selected NGOs and research institutions to deal with policy and planning as 
well as developing procedures and quality control matters and to serve as a forum for 
ministries and local government agencies to consider and agree on common rules of 
operation. Most operating functions and day-to-day management issues would thus remain 
with individual ministries and agencies concerned (Keskinen and Sithirith, 2010; Sokhem & 
Sunada 2006; ADB 2006c).  
  
Despite a plenty of time and resources putting into the planning of the TSBMO as 
well as a considerably well-run process, the ADB’s plan for the establishment of the Tonle 
Sap Basin Management Organization has since 2006 been in essence completely halted. The 
main reason for the halt has not been the criticism by the NGOs, nor the lack of future plans 
or funds (as is clearly illustrated by several ADB’s documents (see e.g. ADB 2006b, ADB 
2006c; Keskinen and Sithirith, 2010), but by the fact that the ADB’s plans for the TSBMO is 
likely to be found from yet another process focusing on setting up a management organization 
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for the Tonle Sap known as the Tonole Sap Authority. More information on this can be found 
below.   
 
4.7.1 The Tonle Sap Basin Authority 
  
The Tonle Sap Basin Authority (TSBA) was established by a Royal Decree in 
September 2007 (RGC, 2007). The establishment of a such authority took many –even 
experts working on the Tonle Sap– by surprise, as the establishment process didn’t include 
similar kind of public engagement and communication procedure as e.g. in the case of ADB’s 
TSBMO. The Royal Decree established the TSBA with following description: “An Authority 
is established for coordination of the management, conservation and development of the 
Tonle Sap Basin areas, called ‘The Tonle Sap Basin Authority’ which is written as (TSBA) 
under direct guidance of the Royal Government of Cambodia”. According to the Degree, the 
TSBA “Serves directly as headquarter of the Royal Government in TSI projects by 
conducting research, monitoring, and providing comments to the Royal Government of 
Cambodia” (RGC, 2007:35). It is interesting to note that although the TSBA was established 
without practically any involvement by the ADB, the Degree refers directly to the ADB-
initiated the Tonle Sap Initiative (TSI), and in essence moves all TSI activities under the 
supervision of the TSBA. Even more important is to realise that the Royal Degree gives the 
authority considerable power, including the possibility to sign agreements, protocols and 
contracts as well as to participate in Cabinet Meetings and inter-ministerial meetings. 
 
The position and authority of the TSBA and its General Secretariat was further 
strengthened by a Sub-degree on organizing and functioning of the General Secretariat of the 
TSBA (RGC, 2008). The sub-degree provides details on the organizational structure of the 
TSBA and its Secretariat, giving remarkable power to Secretariat, including task to: 
“Communicate, cooperate and coordinate with relevant line ministries, institutions, local 
authorities, international organizations, national organizations, non-governmental 
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organizations, and civil societies on all activities concerning the management, conservation 
and sustainable development of the Tonle Sap Basin” (RGC, 2008). The decision on the 
nominations for the composition of the TSBA highlights the strong political powers and 
connections of the TSBA as well. According to the Decision (RGC, 2007), the composition of 
the TSBA consists of a Chairman (Senior Minister), six Vice Chairmen (including five 
Ministers) and 29 Members (including 10 Ministers, 4 Secretary Generals and 11 Governors 
from provinces surrounding the Tonle Sap Lake and River). The TSBA Members also include 
the Secretary General of the CNMC as well as Ministers from all CNMC member ministries 
except Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. An interesting twist in the 
establishment of the TSBA is that the first news about the authority, published in October 
2007 focused on the authority’s potential role in conducting studies and managing possible oil 
reserves in the lake area for interested private investors. Indeed, according to the head of the 
new authority, the authority was established to manage the Tonle Sap Basin and coordinate 
future oil and gas projects with the international partners. In addition, it was noted that 
Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen has “expressed his opposition to the Tonle Sap Basin 
being designated a World Heritage Site, saying that fishing and extraction of oil and mineral 
resources might be constrained as a result of its protected status.” These kinds of views from 
the top representatives of the government raise concerns about the actual motivations for 
establishing the TSBA, and also provide a rather conflicting message on whether 




















Figure 4. 1: The Contested and Abstract Spaces of the Tonle Sap 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
   
The Tonle Sap has a very complex space. On one hand, the Tonle Sap is 
conceptualized into three dimentaions of spaces — the national space, the regional space and 
the global space, and on the oher hand, it is classified into three main functional geographical 
spaces—the commercial space, the conservaton space and the public space. As a ‘national 
space’, the state commercializes the Tonle Sap space as a way to generates revenue for 
national budget that could be used to support the national economy, the administration of the 
country as well as the community (See Figure 4.1). To do this, ‘fishery’ is the key sector in 
which the Tonle Sap is the primary place in the country that is abundant in fisheries. The 
fishery production in the Tonle Sap generates million of dollars to support the country’s 
economy as well as livelihoods of people living dependent on fisheries resources. Thus, the 
Tonle Sap is considered as a ‘fisheries space’. Given this importance, Fisheries 
Administration (FiA) is the sole state agency responsible for fisheries management in the 
Tonle Sap.  
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Similarly, under the framework of ‘regional space’, the regional actors such as MRC 
and ADB rationalize their space of engagement in the Tonle Sap. The rationalization of 
regional space of the Tonle Sap by regional actor centers around the concerns of impacts of 
upper development projects on the Tonle Sap, for instance the hydropower development, and 
a result, the regional actors such as MRC and ADB claims their relevances, and their 
specialization could be utilized to address these concerns. The MRC rationalizes its 
engagement in the Tonle Sap based on its specialization in studying and monitoring while the 
ADB under the GMS rationalizes its engagement in the Tonle Sap based on its approach of 
pro-poor development intervention. In particular, to engage in the Tonle Sap, ADB uses its 
specialization as a Bank to operate in the Tonle Sap in which it lends money through a ‘Tonle 
Sap Initiative’ for the so-called development intervention in the Tonle Sap. The Bank 
rationalizes these development projects as a pro-poor intervention in which it promotes the 
pro-poor economic growth. 
 
A global actor is also engaged in the Tonle Sap as it is defined as a ‘global space’. A 
global actor rationalizes its engagement in the Tonle Sap for conservation purposes, 
especially to conserve the global significance of biodiversity. In doing this, the global actor 
such as UNESCO and UNDP influences the institutionalization of the biodiversity 
conservation in the Tonle Sap through zoning the Lake into transition zone, buffer zone and 
core zone. The Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve Secretariat (TBSR) was established under the 
CNMC also to promote the development and conservation of biodiversity in the Tonle Sap. 
At present, the Tonle Sap Basin Authority (TSBA) is established by the RGC aiming at 
coordinating and promoting development in the Tonle Sap. The TSBA has replaced the 
TSBMO which was proposed by ADB and it has specific roles in relation to the Tonle Sap 




Human-Nature Interactions, Everyday Spaces of Dependence, and Community-Level 
Territorialities of the Tonle Sap 
 
The space in the Tonle Sap discussed in Chapter 4 is very complex from a political 
spatial perspective. It is constructed based on actors and the power of actors at numerous 
interrelated scales. The various official ‘representations of space’ in the Tonle Sap Lake, 
while ‘abstract’, tend to sideline or exclude important elements of the diverse 
‘representational space’, or what I call the ‘everyday space’ of fishing communities (terms 
after Lefebvre, 1991; adapted in Sithirith and Grundy-Warr, forthcoming).  For fishing 
communities the real struggles are to maintain their livelihoods within the highly contested 
‘lived space’. However, it is clear that they live within a very highly rationalized and zoned 
lake, which has global, regional and national dimensions. 
 
In this Chapter, I wish to shed more light on the lived ‘everyday’ representational 
space of ordinary fishing communities, which I argue is largely made up of ‘hidden 
geographies’ or partially obscured geographies (see Chapter 6 for further elaboration). 
Focusing on the banal and ‘everyday geographies’ of ordinary people is critical in order to 
develop more ‘grounded’, potentially more participatory and democratized systems of 
governance. Jonathan Rigg’s (2007) notion of ‘everyday geography’ is based on ideas of ‘the 
spaces of everyday experience’, similar to Henri Lefebrvre’s (1991) ‘representational space’, 
where ‘routinized’, social relations of production and consumption help to continually 
(re)produce the human landscape, and where people formulate their multifaceted notions of 
space and their unique senses of ‘place’. There is an ‘everyday’ politics of space, for as Tania 
Li (1999: 316) has observed, space is being continually affected by many “routine and 
intimate compromise through which relations of domination and subordination are lived.” 
Thus, what is actually conceived by planners may become compromised in actual practice, 
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and there is a need to appreciate how ordinary people’s experiences, actions and interactions 
influence the politics of space.  
 
The title of this chapter also borrows the term ‘spaces of dependence’ used by Kevin 
Cox (1998), and I have utilized it here to relate to particularly important fishery and 
environmental resource spaces upon which localized communities depend greatly for their 
livelihood needs. Of course, such spaces are usually highly differentiated, do not necessarily 
have any clear boundaries, and are subject to multi-scalar human influences (Cox, 1998). In 
the context of the Lower Mekong Basin, there is often a direct relationship between people 
and their immediate environs, with strong human-nature interactions, and a large degree of 
dependence upon living and non-living environmental resources. I wish to examine how 
people and communities have adjusted their spatial behavior to the annual, seasonal, and 
periodic hydrological and bio-physical changes in their environment. Human territoriality is 
socially constructed (Sack, 1986; Paasi, 1996; Taylor, 1988; Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; 
Storey, 2001; Peluso, 2005a, 2005b; Delaney, 2005), but there is also critical non-human and 
ecological influences on human spatial strategies when people are highly dependent upon 
particular physical environments and the ecological services these provide (Casimir and Rao, 
1992; Berkes, 1999; Peluso, 2005b).  
 
A contribution of this research to the discussion of human territoriality in the context 
of the Mekong Basin is to highlight the significance of different types of village organization 
in relation to the annual ‘flood pulse’. I identify three main types of fishing community in the 
Tonle Sap (water-based ‘floating communities’; water and terrestrial ‘stand-stilt 
communities’; mostly terrestrial ‘farming-cum-fishing communities’), which stresses the huge 
transformations to the human landscape associated with the annual rising and falling of water-
levels. Each community ‘type’, and there a variations on these types within the lake system, 
tend to deploy differing social and spatial strategies to maintain, defend or improve their 
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access to vital environmental resources, especially fisheries. In this chapter, I wish to 
highlight peculiar human territorial responses, such as ‘floating’, ‘vertical’ and ‘mobile’ 
territorialities, that have become a central focus of this research project. Before doing that, the 
chapter shall briefly explore why meanings of such geographical terms as ‘landscape’, 
‘place’, and ‘territoriality’ often can overlap and blur, particularly when we are discussing a 
space which is characterized by interactions between the physical and human, between natural 
and human processes.  
 
5.1 Connections between ‘Landscape’, ‘Belonging’ and ‘Place’ within the Water World 
 
 Before we discuss territoriality and its influences on the human landscape of the 
Tonle Sap, it is useful to consider the Lake-space as one vast “water world” landscape. As 
Colin Poole (2005: 46) describes in his richly illustrated Tonle Sap: The Heart of Cambodia’s 
Natural Heritage: “Whilst in the dry season the Tonle Sap Lake ‘only’ stretches for 
approximately 150 kilometres in width, new radar satellite imagery has revealed the true 
extent of the lake’s flood. At the peak of the wet season the Tonle Sap can expand to 250 
kilometres wide. The lake is shallow, measuring only 1-2 metres at its deepest in the dry 
season, rising to more than 10 metres in the wet season. As a result of the floods the total 
inundated area increases four-fold, from 2,500 square kilometers to over 13,000 suare 
kilometers.” Poole’s book is a reminder of the enormous cultural, social, environmental and 
economic values associated with the natural capital of the Lake system, and particularly of the 
incredible biodiversity that lies within this important water world landscape. A key issue to 
stress is that this is a unique and vital freshwater ecosystem, and so, any discussion about the 
political geographies and politics of so-called ‘natural resources’ derived from the Lake need 
also to consider that there are powerful natural influences helping to shape people’s ideas, 
inform and give meaning to the cultural and social landscape. Furthermore, the waxing and 
waning of the areal extent of water has a huge impact on human social and spatial behaviour, 
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actions and livelihoods. Thus, the very physicality of the Lake, the rising and falling waters, 
the wetlands environment, floodplain, and living resources associated with it, have to be 
included in the study of social and political transformations of the Lake’s space.  
 
 Over time, the neak tonle (river and lake people) have developed life-styles that are in 
tune with the natural rhythms and cycles of the Lake system. The watery landscape holds 
deep spiritual and symbolic meanings for the people who live there. Special places where they 
erect spirit houses or shrines near to the inundated forest, or where they go to set fish-traps at 
particular times of the year, or where they anchor their house-boats, or erect temporary 
fishing shelters, or where they remember particular events or mark important rituals in the 
annual calendar, or celebrate the Khmer new year, are all part and parcel of a heavily 
‘inscribed’ human landscape connected to the natural world. As David and Wilson (2002: 6) 
observe, “all landscapes embody memories,” and for people whose livelihoods are strongly 
tied to particular localities and the environmental resources found within there are extremely 
deep attachments, not simply to ‘place’ but to the physical landscape. And there is in such 
settings a deep connection between landscape, sense of belonging and place. “Landscapes are 
thus inscribed, not just through physical marks such as monuments or rock-art, but through 
social engagement that serves to anchor people in place” (Wilsom and David, 2002: 6). 
Whilst in industrialized and postmodern societies a ‘return to nature’ helps to reinvigorate 
vital connections with the earth and “takes away our alienation from our land and our 
community” (Lovell, 1998: 2), for people who live so closely to natural elements, as in the 
Tonle Sap, there has developed a social symbiosis within the natural world that is hard for 
‘outsiders’ (including the researcher) to fully appreciate without deep immersion within that 
water world.  
 
As noted in earlier chapters, this comes through in the way local people use 
terminology like ‘tuk tonle’ (rising river water), ‘tuk long’ (rising water), and ‘prey ronnim’ 
(water forest) as opposed to using the common city-folk or international terms for ‘flooding’. 
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To these people, the rising waters are perfectly ‘natural’ and ‘social’ in that they adjust their 
practices and behaviour in accordance with what is happening in the physical space. The 
feelings of belonging that people have to specific localities within the Lake means that 
particular parts of the Lake landscape take on even deeper meanings and associations, but 
these are still informed by broader ecological and social mechanisms (Folke, Berkes, and 
Colding, 1998). The fact is that people need their ‘place’ to live but that space is also part of a 
larger human-physical landscape where access to aquatic resources provides the basis for 
numerous livelihoods. Tim Cresswell (2004: 11) observes, “place is not just a thing in the 
world but a way of understanding the world.” If your ‘place’ is defined by rising and falling 
waters, by access to patches of inundated forest, by the urgency (and necessity) of fishing to 
make a living, then ‘understanding the world’ is intensively influenced by numerous social-
ecological connections which is hard for urbanites to comprehend.  
 
As noted above, this chapter examined different types of communities, including 
water-based ‘floating communities’; water and terrestrial ‘stand-stilt communities’; and 
terrestrial ‘farming-cum-fishing communities’ that are integral to the overall Tonle Sap 
human landscape. However, each of these communities in a sense represents unique ‘places’ 
influenced by the differential ways the rising and falling of the Lake waters produces distinct 
place-based associations and different strategies in terms of fishing, territoriality and even 
‘ways of seeing’ the world. The fact that some of the ‘places’ are also mobile adds another 
interesting dimension to the notion of ‘belonging’ and ‘rootedness’ for truly ‘floating 
communities’ do not have the same sorts of roots (or indeed, may not have roots) as say a 
fixed paddy settlement on the edge of the floodplain does. Thus, this chapter is not simply 
about differing territorialities, but also different social-ecological connections that define the 




5.2 Social-Ecological Aspects of Territoriality and Territories 
 
 In Chapter 2 the key conceptual foundations of this thesis were introduced, 
particularly the concept of ‘human territoriality’ (emphasis added). Whilst a large part of this 
thesis concerns the ‘politics of space’ and discusses boundaries and territories as critical 
issues in many resource conflicts in the Lake space, there are other significant dimensions to 
the concept of territoriality that require attention. Social geographer, Robert Sack (1983; 
1986) argued that human territoriality is always socially-constructed and disassociates the 
theory of human territoriality from biological, instinct, and purely environmental 
determinants. This perspective does not mean that we should ignore the ways in which non-
human ‘natural’ elements and processes affect human territorial behaviour. Indeed, this idea 
is embedded into Sack’s analysis when he compares the hunter-gathering and seasonal 
agriculturalist Chippewa Indians’ ‘social definitions of territory’ with the ‘territorial 
definitions of society’ eventually superimposed across vast areas of North American space by 
the ‘white settlers of European decent’ (Sack, 1986: ch.2). In a sense, the clash in conceptions 
of space and ‘territory’ was also related to fundamentally different social-economic and 
cultural connections with the natural physical environment. Nevertheless, Sack (1986) also 
argued that territorial behaviour is dynamic over time and can fundamentally change with 
altered conditions, including demographic, socio-economic changes and more intensive 
competition over physical space and resources.  
 
 Natter and Zierhofer (2002) call for epistemology which ‘presumes the co-existence 
of humans and non-humans as co-determinants of any given territory’ in order that we are 
better able to take into account ecological dynamics. Their ideas lie within studies of the 
political economy of ecology focusing on the transformations of human and non-human 
elements and processes within ‘unsentimental’ regimes of resource accumulation. For Natter 
and Zierhofer (2002: 226) observe: “For ‘Nature’, we hardly need to remind ourselves, 
displays quite a variety of spatialities and territorialities; many animals and plants claim their 
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own territories and they all show specific mobilities.” As discussed earlier, the human/non-
human and social-ecological aspects of life and landscape in the Tonle Sap are very direct, 
immediate and profoundly affect, influence and impinge upon many aspects of human and 
social life, livelihood choices and decisions, as well as strategies in relation to subsistence, 
survival, advantage, profit and loss. Rivers, streams, hydrological processes, the ebb and flow 
of the lake produce numerous complex non-human and human spatial dynamics, which are 
never totally within or under ‘human’ control. The way humans negotiate the non-human 
dimensions help to continually define or make and (re)make ‘social nature’ in the Lake (after 
Castree and Braun, 2001). Further, as Natter and Zierhofer (2002: 226) point out: “[Nature’s] 
spatialities do usually not and can very often not correspond to the spatialities of human 
activities, particularly to the territorialities and their orders / structures of scale in politico-
administrative activities.” In other words, non-human ‘agencies’ frequently do not match the 
human-made representations, and ‘escape mapping and regulation’, often ‘causing trouble’ 
(Ibid., 227) to human policy-makers, resource users and ordinary people. As we shall see (this 
chapter and chapter 6), political representations ‘from above’ have greatly complicated the 
territorial and non-territorial strategies that ordinary communities living on and around the 
Lake have already adopted and adapted to non-human processes associated with the rising 
and falling waters. Human territorialization has tended to create further mis-match between 
human and non-human ‘nature’ and has also helped create highly differential access, 
utilization and ownership of space and resources in a Lake which now has a dense population, 
intense competition over environmental resources, and very distinct community-places 
sharing the same landscape.  
 
Following from the above, it is important to note that not all forms of territoriality are 
the result of political imposition ‘from above’ and that ‘indigenous knowledge’ and social – 
ecological connections also help to shape human territoriality (Barnard, 1992; Casimir and 
Rao, 1992; Berkes and Folke, 1998). Of particular relevance here are the ways in which inter-
generational and socio-ecological adaptations have helped to develop creative social and 
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sometimes territorial adaptations in the human-physical landscape. This relates to issues of 
horizontal and vertical territoriality associated with the annual flood pulse and rising and 
falling waters of the Tonle Sap (discussed below). As Nancy Peluso (2005b:2) has discussed 
in relation to her study of Selako Dayak inter-generational and inheritance tree practices in 
West Kalimantan, such “alternative territorialities or ways of seeing property in the landscape 
can confound the intended rationalities of formal government and property practices.” In a 
similar way, it is important to consider the ways in which communities and places on the 
Tonle Sap have developed particular social and spatial adaptations in response to human and 
physical processes affecting their ‘everyday spaces’.  
 
Whilst there still exist many uniquely ‘indigenous’ dimensions to human territoriality 
in the Tonle Sap lake it is important to stress that these are also impinged upon and influenced 
by modern political geography, which has accompanied both colonial and post-colonial state-
led attempts to territorialize the governance of the Lake and its abundant resources. These 
processes of representation, mapping and actual territorialization are related to ‘global’ 
processes that have shaped the world political map. As Thongchai Winichakul (1994) so 
brilliantly explained in relation to the history of the geo-body of the nation of Siam, ‘the 
coming of modern geography’ to Southeast Asia and other parts of the world, has tended to 
lead towards a dilution, loss or domination over multiple pre-existing indigenous geographies 
and concepts of space. What he was describing was the formation of distinct and indivisible 
national territories with clear sovereignty, “a new kind of political geography in which neither 
overlapping margin nor multiple sovereignty was permitted” (Winichakul, 1994: 106). Any 
indigenous geographic alternatives that did not conform to this modern political geography 
were literally removed or completely ignored on the new geopolitical map. In a similar way, 
internal processes of state-centred territorialization (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995) have 
continued where the national boundary lines left off, by literally creating a whole plethora of 
new forms of zones, territories—concessions, parks and boundaries within each national geo-
body (see chapter 6). The purpose of mentioning it here, is that there has been a strong 
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tendency over time, in many parts of the world, region, and within Cambodia, for previously 
loosely defined ‘bundles of rights’ and ‘common property arrangements’ to also be subject to 
the rigours of modern political territoriality. Thus, the politics of the commons has 
increasingly become more territorial (Cuasay and Vaddhanaphuti, 2005). And as Peluso 
(2005a: 6) has aptly argued: “Territorialization differs from place-making because 
territorialization produces places in relation to claimants: it makes places into territories.” 
This is something that is particularly profound in the Lake space, and especially for those 
communities with almost complete reliance upon aquatic resources as a basis of livelihoods as 
shall be illustrated in the case of ‘floating’ and ‘stand-slilt’ villages.   
 
5.3 Human-Nature Interactions and the ‘Pulsing Ecosystem’ 
  
As already observed, the Tonle Sap is characterized by a ‘flood pulsed ecosystem’ 
(Eloheimo et al., 2001; Sarkkula et al., 2003; Kummu et al., 2006; Lamberts, 2006), a term 
that is applied to the Lower Mekong based on research in other tropical river-floodplain 
systems (Junk et al., 1989; Junk, 1997; Junk and Wantzen, 2004), which I prefer to call the 
‘pulsing ecosystem’22 (Junk, 2007, quoted in Kummu et al., 2006:503). As Lamberts 
(2006:491-2) in attempting to assess the productivity of the pulsing ecosystem of the Tonle 
Sap has stressed the current lack of sophisticated knowledge of its various dynamic 
components, arguing that a lack of understanding of ecosystem productivity seriously 
undermines any effort to create more integrated water resource management measures. 
However, there is no doubting that the annual ‘flood pulse’ (timing, modality, speed, height, 
duration) is of tremendous importance to fisheries productivity and fish migrations in the 
lower Mekong Basin and Tonle Sap system (Rainboth, 1996; Poulsen, et.al., 2002; MRC, 
2003). It is also a fact that the ‘flood pulse’ transforms both the physical and the human 
landscape of the Lower Mekong, and the Tonle Sap, submerging vast areas during the wet 
                                               
22
 “Ecosystems that experience fluctuations between terrestrial and aquatic conditions are called pulsing 
ecosystems, and fall within the domain of the flood pulse concept” 
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season, exposing those areas in the dry season, creating inundated forests with unique species 
adapted to the rhythms and cycles of the pulsing ecosystem, and providing a wonderful 
habitat for many species of flora and fauna. 
 
In this chapter, I wish to focus on particular spatial adaptations of human beings to the 
pulsing ecosystem. Human territoriality normally stresses the political, economic and cultural 
influences on human spatial behavior, but this chapter examines how territoriality is both 
socially and ecologically influenced in the lake system. In a sense, this builds upon studies of 
resource governance that also take into account ‘non-material’ as well as ‘material’ aspects of 
‘nature’ (Castree, 2001; Sneddon, 2007), and the urgent need to understand the complexity of 
local social-ecological systems (Gadgil, et.al., 1993; Folke, Berkes, Colding, 1998). I believe 
that a stronger empirical understanding of how and why different communities in the lower 
Mekong adjust their social and spatial behavior to changing ecological conditions is relevant 
to a broader appreciation of livelihood practices and livelihood security, and it is consistent 
with a better appreciation of how to incorporate local indigenous knowledge into more 
sustainable management practices (Folke, Berkes, Colding, 1998; Ostrom, et.al., 2002).  
 
5.4 Fishing Communities in the Tonle Sap  
 
Fishing villages in the Tonle Sap Lake are classified into three different groups; land-
based village, water-based village and water-land based village (Rab et al., 2005; Navy et al., 
2006; CDRI, 2007a; Field Notes, 2007-2008). The ‘land-based village’ is a village where 
villagers are engaged more in farming and less in fishing depending on the distance between 
the lake and land (Rab et al., 2005; Navy et al., 2006; CDRI, 2007a; Field Notes, 2007-2008). 
The ‘water-based village’ refers to a floating village, where fishing is a primary occupation 
for villagers. The third group is the ‘water-land based villages’, which are physically located 
six months within water and six months on land.  These villages are in the ecological zone 
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mostly affected by seasonal water level (Field Notes, 2007-2008). Details of each community 
are listed in Table 5.1.  
 
The water-based community is literally based on floating homes which make up 
‘floating villages’. Floating villages float and move from one location to another on water, for 
instance, Anlong Raing or Kampong Loung communities float and move approximately 5–
7km/year in distance (Sithirith, 2007; Field Notes, 2007). Based on a village survey in the 
Tonle Sap, I identify 53 floating villages in the Tonle Sap Lake, having similar characteristics 
with Anlong Raing and Kampong Loung. These floating villages are located in 10 districts 
and 18 communes spread over five provinces. Each floating community has a unique cycle of 
movement and settlement in line with the rise and fall of the lake water. Floating communities 
consists of many floating houses, which can be classified into four different types: boat 
houses, ferry floating houses, bamboo rafting floating houses and pen floating houses. Each 
of these dwelling types has its own characteristics and provides material indications relating 
to household socio-economic status in the village. Rafting boat house is a floating house 
constructed on bamboo rafts while boat houses are houses built on boats. The ferry boat house 
is a type of floating house that is built on iron ferry and this is a modern floating house (Field 
Notes, 2007).  
 
Water and land based community is a community where people live six months on 
land and six months over water in the Tonle Sap. The house is built on stilts about 6–8m 
above the ground which could stand in water for six months without any effect. In the dry 
season, water recedes in the lake and the whole village is located on land. The community 
thus lives on land as with other normal land-based villages. In the wet season, the water flows 
into the lake and floods the village’s areas around the village. The whole village is in water 
for six months and individual houses become ‘individual islands’ (AFN, 2004; Field Notes, 
2007; Marschke, 2005; Marschke and Berkes, 2005a; Marschke and Berkes, 2005b). The 
water level rises almost up to the house floor which is about 6–8m high from the ground. The 
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house is located in the same position all year, although the community experiences two 
extreme environmental conditions—flooding and drought conditions.  Thus, in my typology, I 
call these ‘permanent stand-stilt communities’. Many of these settlements are located in Siem 
Reap, Bantey Meanchey and Kampong Chhnang. It is estimated that there are about 36 stand-
stilt villages, home to 5,527 families living in 12 communes of 7 districts in Siem Reap, 
Kampong Chhnang, and Banteay Meanchey (See Table 5.1).  
 
The land-based community is a community where people settle on land and the rising 
Tonle Sap waters do not usually flood the village. Most of these villages are located in higher 
areas between the area 6m above sea level (asl) and along National Roads 5 and 6 (Keskinen, 
2003, 2006; Field Notes, 2007). People living in the land-based communities are engaged in 
farming and fishing, depending on how near the villages are located to the water body. They 
cultivate rice as a primary occupation and fishing is a secondary occupation to supplement 
their farming (Field Notes, 2007).  
 
About 948 villages in the Tonle Sap floodplain are identified as land-based villages 
which are home to about 0.8 million people (See Table 5.1). According to Rab et al., (2005), 
farming communities are those communities with at least 80 percent of households engaged 
in farming. However, fishing is also a key activity of most farming communities in the Tonle 
Sap floodplain, but the degree of fishing among villages in this area depends on distance to 
water body. Rab et al., (2005) call the community engaged in both farming and fishing as a 
‘farming-cum-fishing’ community. Based on the 2003-2004 survey of 270 households in 
Kampong Chhnang and Siem Reap provinces, Rab et al., (2005) indicated that almost 66 
percent of fishing-cum-farming households fished all year round. However, fishing is an 
important source of income for fishing-cum-farming villages (Hori et al., 2006; Field Notes, 
2007). Hori et al., (2006) examined the significance of fishing to farmer-cum-fisher 
communities in Srey Rangit and Svay Ear in Chamnakroun commune, Stung district of 
Kompong Thom province. This study (Hori et al., 2006) found that almost all households 
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conducted rice cultivation and 75% of them are engaged in fishing. Fishing was an important 
income source for households and a supplement to rice production (Hori et al., 2005).  








Battambang 10 2 117 129 
Siem Reap 12 14 269 295 
Kampong Thom 10 0 109 119 
Kampong Chhnang 6 16 63 85 
Pursat 15 1 238 254 
Banteay Meanchey 0 3 152 155 
Tototal 53 36 948 1037 
Source: Field Notes, 2007 
 
 
Rice and fish form the backbone of the Khmer Society. Traditionally, rice is 
cultivated by farming communities and fish is caught by fishing communities. Every year, 
after the rice harvest and during the peak fishing season, farmers travel to the river with a 
sack of rice to barter for fish. Similarly, fishers collect fish to barter for rice. They meet one a 
year at the Kampong (landing area near to the river) to exchange their produce, especially fish 
and rice (Bonhoeur and Lane, 2001; Ahmed et al., 1998; Field Notes, 2007-2008). This 
represents the ‘rice-fish economy’ in the Tonle Sap.  
 
5.5 The ‘Flood Pulse’ and Territorialities of Fishing Villages in the Tonle Sap  
  
The communities of the lower Mekong Basin, in the Tonle Sap and the delta zone of 
the Mekong are literally on the front-line of ecosystem functioning and long-term 
environmental changes. These myriad and diverse communities form a dense population in 
the Basin, and hitherto, there has been a tendency to regard their struggles, livelihoods, 
dependence on fisheries, relation to the wetlands, and fish-rice economies as being relatively 
similar. In fact, there are very interesting and important distinctions to be made between 
different types of community, location, and human-nature interactions. The foregoing 
discussion about three distinct kinds of community is not just ethnographically significant, but 
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also relates to distinctive associations with aquatic resources according to the pulsing 
ecosystem and seasonal patterns. In this regard, we should consider ‘natural’ in terms of non-
material and non-political influences on human territoriality.  
 
Whilst there has been much scholarship devoted to social-ecological systems 
(Ostrom, 1990; Gadgil, et.al., 1993; Folke, et.al., 1998; Berkes, 1999; Ostrom, et.al., 2002) 
there has been relatively little focused attention given to indigenous territorialities. Casimir 
and Rao (1992) provide one of the rare collections that examines ‘the social and spatial 
boundaries among foragers, fishers, pastoralists and peripatetics (nomadic groups)’, and what 
is significant here is that such groups have not been fully integrated into markets, not fully 
incorporated into state systems, and whose alternative territorialities are shaped by unique 
human-nature relations, as well as ecological influences upon access to vital livelihood 
resources and food security. Whilst there are many disturbances on those ways of living as a 
result of state territorialization and commodification, there are still important ways in which 
bio-physical forces, natural rhythms and cycles affect human social and spatial behavior. 
Thus, whilst I strongly agree with Robert Sack’s (1983; 1986) conception of human 
territoriality as always being ‘socially constructed’ and as being a ‘human strategy’ to affect 
and influence relations in space between people, things and resources through the delineation, 
communication and control of precise geographic areas, I also see that in the Tonle Sap there 
are powerful non-human and ecological influences on human spatiality. Thus, the following 
definition of territoriality has direct relevance to the discussion here: “Human territorial 
behavior is a cognitive and behaviorally flexible system which aims at optimizing the 
individual’s and hence also a group’s access to temporarily or permanently localized 
resources, which satisfy either basic and universal or culture-specific needs and wants, or 
both, while simultaneously minimizing the probability of conflicts over them” (Casimir, 
1992: 20).  
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Adopting the above idea of territoriality brings into play different ways indigenous 
groups adapt flexible responses to both ecological and social constraints upon their access to 
vital ‘localized resources’ in order to meet basic livelihood, subsistence or income-earning 
needs. Whilst a lot of attention in this thesis is on the political and economic geographic 
dimensions of human territoriality, it should be clear that in a wetlands environment, social-
ecological interactions can and do influence spatial actions. Furthermore, territoriality can be 
examined as a way in which individuals and groups use space to maintain, improve or expand 
livelihood options. The banal forms of human territoriality discussed by Casimir and Rao 
(1992) often involve religious, cultural and symbolic attachments to resource spaces that do 
not easily fit modern political geographic spatial practices. Also, indigenous territorial 
behavior in relation to the pulsing ecosystem of the Tonle Sap has been in existence for many 
generations, and in only recently, such spatial behavior has become more problematic within 
(and partly due to) the context of multiple stakeholder demands, as well as increasingly 
commercialized spaces and contested resources in the lake system (see Chapter 6). As Taylor 
(1988:9-10) observes, territoriality often helps groups and individuals to ‘get along’, and 
“relations within groups, and across groups, in particular settings, would be even more strife-
torn without territorial functioning.” In a sense, this chapter sets out to examine different 
indigenous territorialities and socio-spatial adjustments to the pulsing ecosystem and 
changing socio-political context of the lake. Chapter 6 focuses much more explicitly on state 
territorialization and formal political geographic divisions of the lake, which has had 
numerous consequences upon indigenous communities and geographies.  
 
The different settlement types imply significant human-nature and human-Lake 
relation distinctions. Each village within the same broad category may have similar 
adaptations, but there are some marked distinctions between categories. In May, the water 
level in the Tonle Sap Lake reaches the lowest level, estimated at about 0.77-0.89m between 
2000 and 2003 (MRC, 2005; Field Notes, 2007), and then, the location of floating villages is 
located well into the lake (MRC, 2005; Field Notes, 2007). In June, water levels in the Tonle 
 153 
Sap Lake rise up to approximately 0.5-1m. The water level continues to rise up until it 
reaches 9-9.5m in October (see Figure 5.1). As a consequence, floating communities move up 
and then, it reaches the highest position in October. Thus, floating communities move upward 
when the water level rises up and moves downward into the lake when water level goes down. 
They also move location at the seasonal extremes (MRC, 2005; Field Notes, 2007).  
 
Different fishing communities have multiple ways of adapting to water levels in the 
Tonle Sap through the seasons. According to Barnard (1992), territoriality is a way in which a 
particular community may organize themselves to adapt to the environment and social 
pressures, particularly ensuring access to vital resources for their living (Barnard, 1992; 
Casmir and Rao, 1992). My research reveals that in the Tonle Sap, human territoriality is very 
dynamic in terms of its intimate connections with ‘nature’, particularly as ecological 
conditions affect fishery resources. For instance, some fishers of the Lake exhibit forms of 
‘mobile territoriality’ similar to other social groups living closely and directly to livelihood 
resources (Berland, 1992; Streck, 1992). As Casimir (1992: 5-6) notes, “the practice of 
mobility itself can be considered a resource; maintaining flexibility through mobility is, for 
instance for herding communities, the best guarantee of continued and optimal exploitation of 
resources in unpredictable ecological conditions.” For the ‘floating communities’ of the Tonle 
Sap, micro-mobility is an aspect of gaining access to ‘living space’ and resources in the 
absence of clearly defined property rights, no claims to terrestrial resources, and indigenous 
knowledge of rising and falling water-levels, fisheries and the inundated forests. There are 
other non-spatial ways in which fishing communities organize themselves to respond to 
changing environmental conditions, including setting up distinctive homes better adapted to 














Figure 5. 1: Water level in the Tonle Sap measured in Kampong Loung (MRC, 2005) 
 
The annual flood pulse generates rising/falling water levels in the Tonle Sap, which in 
turn influences the everyday life of floating communities. Rising waters in May urge floating 
communities to develop their strategies and systems to live in the high water level 
environment; first, they have transformed their fishing gears to continue fishing in the high 
water levels; and second, they protect themselves from natural disasters due to the sudden and 
violent storm surges and strong winds. In late October or early November, water recedes, the 
water level starts to drop drastically, forcing floating communities to float further into the lake 
proper and they prepare themselves to actively engage in fishing. This ‘floating territoriality’ 
is highly distinctive in that is based in close human-nature interaction.  
 
However, floating territoriality is not the same for every floating village as some 
floating villages float and move laterally, whilst others float, but do not move in the 
horizontal plane. For the first group, when water rises, they alter location moving up rivers or 
near to flooded forest. When the water falls, they move to the lake’s natural margins 
(permanent water edges), which is a process I call a ‘mobile territoriality.’ The latter villages 
do not move location ever though the waters rise and fall, this is largely due to that fact that 
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they are in areas near to fishing lots and the Biosphere Reserves Areas. These villages exhibit 
what I call a ‘vertical territoriality.’   
 
In contrast, the stand-stilt homes are static, but are well adapted to the flood pulse, 
spending half the year on dry land and half the year over the water (See Figure 5.2) (Kummu 
et al., 2008; AFN, 2004; Field Notes, 2007-2008). Even though the village does not 
physically move, I argue that their home constructions, livelihood adaptations, and altered 
fishing practices are part and parcel of their territoriality in relations to the Tonle Sap’s 
ecosystem and seasonality (Field Notes, 2007). I call this ‘pulsing territoriality’ (see Figure 
5.4). 
Figure 5.2: Territorial system of stand-stilt communities studied in Kampong Phluk 
 
The farming-cum-fishing communities are much less directly affected by the rising 
and falling of waters in the Tonle Sap. Although the water rises up to the peak level, it does 
not flood or submerge the farming-cum-fishing village. Thus, people living in farming-cum-
fishing communities live on land (Field Notes, 2007). Thus, their livelihoods are organized 




5.6 Maps, Political Geography and Community Spaces 
  
As a fisheries researcher and activist, I have often been aware that many so-called 
fishery specialists are either too engrossed in particular scientific aspects of management, or 
are too preoccupied in the top-level administration of fisheries, that they seem to be largely 
remote and oblivious of the day-to-day livelihood struggles of ordinary fishers on the Tonle 
Sap. As a political geography researcher, I have become more and more aware of the power 
of maps and political significance of modern mapping in the resource planning and policy 
environment. Critical historical cartographer, J.B. Harley (1989), has helped to deepen 
scholarly awareness of the representational distortions of maps, plans and official spatial 
orderings, which frequently and often deliberately ignore, marginalize or omit indigenous 
notions of space for overtly power-political and economic reasons. His valuable work has 
emphasized how the ‘spatial disciplining’ brought about through mapping, has been as 
important as the ‘time disciplining’ of the clock in factories of the industrial world. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, different rationalizations and representations of space by state 
agencies, international agencies and resource managers have led to a top-down view of a 
thoroughly ‘disciplined’ space, complete with fishery zones, biosphere reserves, research lots, 
conservation lots, and even community territories. However, the reality of the ‘lived space’ of 
the Tonle Sap is much more complex, far less ordered, and there are many over-lapping and 
unplanned actions within the Lake space. There are many ‘silences’ in the official map, 
whether by design or accident.  
 
Mapping is a process which can be a double-edged sword for many small local 
communities that were previously largely ‘off the map’ and beyond state ‘gaze’ (Fox, 2002; 
Fadzilah-Cooke, 2003; Laungaramsri, 2002; Scott, 1998). It is double-edged precisely 
because modern mapping exposes complex commons and cultural spaces to state 
simplifications, to potential privatizations, new forms of enclosure, spatial surveillance, and 
territorialization processes that may not necessarily reflect the nuances and values of pre-
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existing social arrangements, complex bundles of rights, and community systems for 
organizing space (Peluso, 2005a and 2005b). As Fadzilah-Cooke (2003) observed, 
participatory counter-mapping by local communities in Sarawak faced by the extensions of 
logging and plantation regimes into their resources spaces, has often produced contradictory 
results. As she notes, “being included in official conservation maps can be a double-edged 
sword” primarily due to the loss of decision-making powers over key access and utilization 
decisions which are taken away from the local communities (Fadzilah-Cooke, 2003:273). 
Similarly, Nancy Lee Peluso (2005b) reveals in West Kalimantan that dominant state-led and 
international territorialization processes do not ‘see property rights’ in the same ways as the 
indigenous Dayak communities. Indeed, these modern maps are often incompatible with 
indigenous ways of seeing space and property rights, for the latter often involve inter-
generational, temporal, fluid and flexible boundaries, cultural and spiritual dimensions that 
are simply not necessarily translatable into the ‘Cartesian-Newtonian space embedded in our 
(modern) cartography and GIS’ dominated world (Rundstrom, 1995; 1998).  
 
Chapin (1998:7) has observed that “people with maps come to perceive their 
landscapes differently.” I believe this is a very profound statement when applied to the space 
of the Tonle Sap. Looked at from the perspective of an ADB map or a Fisheries Department 
map, the Tonle Sap is a ‘knowable’ and rational space. However, many of the fishers in the 
Lake are illiterate, and many of them are carto-illiterate, and they do not use maps. Even if 
they do use maps, they tend to perceive space very differently from the ‘abstract space’ of 
planners and policy-makers. To them, ‘localized resources’ are absolutely critical for their 
livelihoods, for feeding families, for obtaining basic needs, for barter or trade. Whilst there 
has been little research on this, it would be fascinating to understand the mental maps of the 
‘areas’ ordinary fishers utilize in the Lake. For sure these maps would indicate that 
territoriality is not fixed the whole year round, for all fishers are subject to immense changes 
in their lifestyle and practices according to the annual ‘flood pulse’ and variations in the 
horizontal extent of the Lake and vertical water-levels. Fishers with access to both land and 
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water resources will have different territorial behavior from those who rely totally, the whole 
year round, upon the fisheries and aquatic resources. This is why empirical examination of 
different social and spatial behavior is central to a better appreciation of human-nature 
relationships, fishery management issues, and livelihood security.  
 
In the following section I wish to draw attention to communities who are still by and 
large obscured, ignored, or only partially recognized on the modern maps of Cambodia – the 
‘floating communities’. Jefferson Fox (2002) has written that many peripheral areas of 
Cambodia, such as Ratanakiri Province in the country’s northeast, have only in relatively 
recent transitional political and economic times become subject to the sorts of intensive 
territorialization that affected neighbouring Siam (Thailand) since the late 19th century. 
However, the mapping process in Cambodia is rapid, partly fuelled by the greed for land and 
the expropriation of resources in the frontier zones. Mapping and claims to resources go hand 
in hand and are voracious process, and as Fox (2002:75) bluntly asserts: “we have to map – 
there is no alternative – you are either on the map or you run the risk of being gnawed away.” 
Whilst the Tonle Sap is in many ways situated in the heartlands of Cambodia, I argue that the 
spatial representations of top-down agencies actually serve to obscure, ignore or confuse 
different localized realities. This is particularly the case with many ‘floating communities’. 
Whilst the larger of these communities are officially recognized, being firmly, if statically, 
‘on the map’, several smaller floating villages are still mostly ‘off the map’. They are poorly 
served with services such as schools, clinics, and so on, and they have continual struggles to 
maintain access to vital fishery resources, flooded forest resources, and basic survival needs. 
To be floating is not to be free, and due to the impact of other forms of territorialization, these 
communities are not freely floating. In the following section, the intention is to highlight 
peculiar human-nature aspects of human territoriality, and in chapter 6 to discuss in much 




5.7 Floating Territoriality 
 
As discussed above, there is still relatively little empirical understanding of what it 
means to be a ‘floating community’ on the Tonle Sap. Many of these floating people are 
relatively poor (Field Notes, 2007). Marginalization is partly related to their lack of official 
recognition, notwithstanding some of the potential problems that recognizing them officially 
on the map may also bring (Fadzilah-Cooke, 2003). Floating communities often have no 
sense of real ‘ownership’ over water space, although as communities they do have their own 
sense of ‘communal space’, but as they  definitely have no legal property rights over land-
based resources, access to water-space is absolutely critical to their cultural and livelihood 
survival. Floating communities have also been part of the Tonle Sap ‘waterscape’ for many, 
many generations, which means that they are deeply embedded communities in the rich 
cultural landscape of Cambodia as a whole (Field Notes, 2007). Nevertheless, as my research 
indicates, many of these floating communities lie at the razor’s edge of cultural and economic 
survival within a rapidly transforming national economy and highly competitive fishery 
sector. Thus, empirical research is needed to better appreciate the lives and livelihoods of 
such communities, particularly as these people are the most dependent on fisheries, but the 
least represented in terms of fishery governance mechanisms and specialist knowledge(s) 
about the Lake system.  
 
‘Floating’ has become a lifestyle associated with the rise and fall of water levels in 
the Tonle Sap Lake. I classify the ‘floating territoriality’ into two main types— one, mobile 
territoriality, and two, vertical territoriality; each of which will be discussed in detail below.  
 
5.7.1 Mobile Territoriality 
 
The rise and fall of waters in the Tonle Sap Lake between the wet and dry season 
induces the floating villages to move up and down in the lake. The mobility of the floating 
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villages occurs within space that is often bounded or zones designated for other uses, such as 
fishing lots, and fish sanctuaries. Thus, the floating village floats and moves, but this is not 
without restrictions, as they often have to define their own territorial space in accordance with 
other stakeholder zones. The unique forms of mobility, resource use and fishing practice 
adaptations, the design of homes and collective strategies they follow to ensure continued 
access to livelihood materials forms a very important component of my unfolding ideas about 
human-nature adaptations through human territoriality (Field Notes, 2007). 
 
5.7.1.1 ‘Floating territory’ of a floating community 
 
Upward and downward mobility and floating takes place within defined territories 
and boundaries set by other functions and stakeholders. Villages do not float and move freely. 
For the purpose of this study, I take an example from Kampong Loung, for instance, in 
Kampong Loung, there are approximately 1029 households and it is assumed that one 
household occupies one house (Seila, 2005). Kampong Loung houses are all ‘floating’ (See 
Appendix 6, Picture 1). There are four types of floating houses—boat houses, ferry floating 
houses, bamboo rafting floating houses and pen floating houses. Each of these types has its 
own characteristics and could tell us the household status in the village. The house is 
classified according to the household status; the rich, the medium, the poor and the poorest. 
As a rough guide to the status and incomes of people living in this floating village, the richer 
occupants own houses of 4.5m in width, and 15m in length, the medium owns house of 3m in 
width and 12m in length, the poor and the poorest own house of 3m in width and 8m and 6m 
respectively in length. An average the size of house in Kampong Loung is estimated at about 
34.59 m2. If one house occupies 34.59m2, the whole Kampong Loung occupies roughly 35593 
m2 (3.55ha) (Field Notes, 2007 and 2008; see Table 5.2). 
 
An interesting aspect of floating existence is that legal-political space is often well 
defined on land, but not in rivers and lakes. Floating houses are built on water. The ownership 
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over the ‘space’ on water is not discussed in most of Cambodian Laws. According to 
Fisheries Law and the Cambodian Constitution, the river, stream and seas are state property, 
but these laws assume no human settlement on water and therefore, none of Cambodian Laws 
discuss the ownership of the floating communities on water. At the same time, the ownership 
becomes more problematic as the floating houses move up and down following the rising and 
falling waters in the Tonle Sap Lake. In the case of Kampong Loung, ownership is ambiguous 
and could give occasion for competition over rights to space for houses, because on water no 
legal body recognizes their house location from the previous year and therefore they may not 
be able to return to the old location to park their houses. 
 
Table 5. 2: The size of the floating house by household categories. 
Size of the House Width Length Size of the house (m2) 
House of the rich household 4.5 15 67.5 
House of the medium 3 12 36 
House of the poor 3 8 24 
House of the poorest 3 6 18 
Total 13.5 41 553.5 
Average 3.375 10.25 34.59 
Source: Field Notes, 2007 
 
 
Kampong Loung, like other communities, is not free floating. It floats within defined 
territory and within this territory; it floats back and forth within a year. In a year, Kampong 
Loung moves up and down 5-6km according to rising and falling waters, thus the total 
movement of the floating town is 10-12km annually. Thus, the households use valuable 
productive time to move location. Moreover, the width of the main channel (for boats) of 
Kampong Loung is estimated at about 500-1000m. Thus, Kampong Loung has a sizeable 
territory, but the precise configuration of houses, shops, clinics, schools and religious boats 
institutions may alter considerably due to mobile territoriality (Field Notes, 2007). The 
‘floating territory’ is organized into different sections in which each section is used by 
floating community to park their houses according to the rise and fall of water in the Tonle 
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Sap Lake (See Figure 5.3). By having different sections, the community knows when to park 
where, which help provides them with some security and a safety net for their daily living.   
 
5.7.1.2 Restricted boundaries of a floating community 
 
As I have stressed, a floating village is not free floating and free mobility. It floats and 
moves within a limited and defined territory, which is set by official representations of space. 
The boundaries of floating villages are not defined by community leaders, but external 
entities such as fishing lot operators, fish sanctuary limits, and Biosphere Reserves. For 
instance, two fish sanctuaries are located close to Kampong Loung in the eastern site, namely 
Kampong Prak and Chroy Sdey, which effectively mark the outermost boundaries of 
Kampong Loung. The in-lake movement of Kampong Loung can not encroach closer to either 
the Kampong Prak or Chroy Sdey sanctuaries.  Kampong Prak covers an area of about 4,500 
ha while Chroy Sdey is estimated at about 1,950 ha (DoF, 2003). As the name suggests, a fish 
sanctuary is an area where fish are protected and encouraged to breed in order to increase the 
fish stock. By their characteristics they belong to the Lake’s ‘conservation space’.  
 
Totally, Chroy Sdey and Kampong Prak cover 6,450 ha. These fish sanctuaries are 
also protected by the Fisheries Administration and fishing in these areas is prohibited. These 
fish sanctuaries have existed there for a long time, in fact since the 1940s (Thomson and 
Somony, 2003; Field Notes, 2007). As fishing is prohibited, fish sanctuaries play a major role 
in protecting some fish stocks and the threatened fish species from over-fished, and 
maintaining a breeding stock for replenishment. Local fishery offices known as ‘sangkat 
nesat’, in Kampong Loung—the lowest rung of Fishery Administration Offices help manage 
the fishery resources and protect the fish sanctuaries.  
 
These areas are controlled by the Fishery Administration, whereby fishery officials 
assert their power over this space through various rules and regulations. The floating 
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community is restricted to fish in that space and they have not been consulted since the 
beginning of the establishment of the fish sanctuary, but local people had accepted these 
zones across generations. As a result, community residents accept the authority of the 
Fisheries Administration in these areas, and realize that activities such as encroaching inside 














Figure 5.3: Mobile territoriality of floating community 
 
Another terrestrial dimension close to Kampong Loung relates to the space of the 
flooded forest. These forests are protected by FiA for fish habitats. In Kampong Loung, the 
flooded forest along the earth road acts as a boundary line for floating territory of Kampong 
Loung and floating houses, while floating could not move beyond the flooded forest areas. 




5.7.2 Vertical territoriality of a floating community 
 
The verticality of rising and falling is significant aspect of the human territoriality of 
floating communities. Many floating villages float and move from areas of about 1.50m 
above the sea level in the lake in the dry season to an area of about 9-10m above the sea level 
in the lake in the wet season (See Figure 5.4). This is what I call a ‘vertical territoriality.’ 
There is another and differing political meaning to ‘verticality’, which relates more to socio-
political relations between actors within special boundaries. The verticality I refer to here is 
related to biophysical and human-nature relations, and should not be confused with other 
types of vertical social relations that may influence human territoriality (see Delaney, 2005). 
The kinds of physical space verticality I wish to stress here are driven by the pulsing 
ecosystem and annual flooding cycle. 
 
Furthermore, in the Tonle Sap, I classify the floating communities into two types; 
first, some floating communities float vertically and move laterally as the water level of the 
lake rises up gradually, and I call this type of floating a ‘mobile vertical territoriality’; and 
second, however, some floating communities float up vertically, but do not move laterally and 
I call this ‘vertical territoriality’. The following section discusses each type of territoriality.  
 
5.7.2.1 Mobile Vertical Territoriality 
 
To understand this idea clearly, I take an example again from Kampong Loung to 
illustrate what is ‘mobile vertical territoriality.’  
 
a) The Wet Seasonal Mobility of Floating Community 
 
In the dry season, as water recedes the lake, the floating community such as Kampong 
Loung moves downward into the lake and it reaches the ‘lowest position’ in the lake in March 
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when the water level reaches the minimum of about 0.50-1m. The entire floating community 
of Kampong Loung stagnates in that ‘lowest position’ in the lake from March to May.  
 
When the monsoons start, roughly in late May or June, the water levels in the lake 
gradually rise up from around 1m in May to 1.50-2m in June (MRC, 2005; Field Notes, 
2007). By mid-June, there is enough water to push the floating houses upward in Kampong 
Loung. The upward movement of floating houses in a narrow channel creates traffic 
congestion (for boats) and heavy water pollution is created by the movement of engine boats.  
 
Figure 5.4: Mobile vertical territoriality of floating community 
 
The floating houses start to move upward in the lake by mid-June (water level is 2-
3m) from their ‘lowest position.’ For 15 days (Mid-June to July), the water level reaches 
2.50-5m and each floating house moves up approximately 10-15 times; each time takes  a 
very short distance, and totally each house could move upward approximately one kilometer. 
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From July to August, the water level rises up from 5m to approximately 7m, and the whole 
floating community moves 3-4 times and each movement take one kilometer. In other words, 
for 30 days between July and August, the floating houses could move 3-4km upward.  From 
August to mid-August, the floating houses move slowly and by late September or early 
October, they reach their ‘highest position’ at the end of the rainy season. The whole floating 
community stays in the highest position when the water is estimated at about 9-9.50m (see 
Figure 5.4).  
 
I call the ‘highest position’ of the floating community in Kampong Loung a ‘resting 
space,’ because during this period sudden and heavy showers affect ecological and fishery 
conditions on the open lake, making life more difficult and sometimes dangerous for floating 
houses. By positioning floating houses in the ‘highest position’ area, they are better able to 
attach their houses to trees in the inundated forests, which serve as a protective barrier from 
strong waves and lake storm surges. Thus, mobile vertical territoriality is a human strategy in 
response to changes in the season, weather, water levels and environmental conditions of the 
Lake.  
 
b) The Dry Seasonal Mobility of Floating Community 
 
In the dry season, especially starting in later October, the water level in the Tonle Sap 
is estimated at about 9-9.50m. From October onwards, the water recedes in the lake system. 
From their ‘highest position’ (9-9.50m), floating houses follow reductions in water level to 
approximately 7-8m, and for around 15 days, the floating village could move about one km in 
position. During this period, the physical mobility of the village is a very sluggish process, 
and each day, each floating house organizes their movements, but progress is tedious. In 
January, the water level reduces to 4-5m, and the whole floating community of Kampong 
Loung reaches the ‘mid-way’ level, which is about 2.5-3km from the highest position (Field 
Notes, 2007).  
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From January to February, the water level is reduced to approximately 3m, and the 
floating community moves down slowly, but with frequent small adjustments. In this period, 
the area around Kampong Loung becomes shallower, making the movement more disturbing 
of the living environment and unpleasant due to the pollution generated by dense housing on 
shallow water. The heavy and large floating houses cause the water to be muddy and create 
awful stink. The floating houses which are pulled downward by sturdy engine boats generate 
a lot of noise pollution and nasty fumes from engine fuel.   
 
In early March, the whole floating community reaches the ‘lowest position’ (0.77-
0.90m in depth) of the floating mobility path, which is the last stop of downward and lateral 
movement of about 5-5.5km from the ‘highest position’. The ‘lowest position’ of Kampong 
Loung is very restricted and all floating houses assemble in a relatively small and densely 
populated area. The whole floating community stays permanently in this area for a period of 
3.5 months from March to mid-June (Field Notes, 2007). Low water levels of 0.5-0.8m or less 
mean that between April and May, the high density of people and floating houses generate 
massive human effluent around the village, but the whole Kampong Loung is literally trapped 
in situ and so people have to cope with extremely shallow and relatively unpleasant living 
conditions (Field Notes, 2007).  
 
When water in the lake recedes, the fishing season starts. The whole floating 
community moves down into the lake partly to do fishing. If the floating houses do not move 
down, they will have difficulty in fishing as the fishermen have to consider distance to fishing 
grounds, fuel cost, time and efforts devoted to moving. Competition for fishing access is 
extreme and so close proximity to fishing grounds is advantageous.  
 
During the fishing season, farmers complete the rice harvesting. Many farmers move 
down to the lake with a large bag of rice to exchange for fish to make a fermented fish known 
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as ‘prohok.’ In Cambodia, most people love to eat prohoc as a key ingredient in their food 
and the prohoc business is deeply intertwined with the fish-rice economy and local food 
culture. Indeed, the air is thick with the pungent aroma of prahoc in many settlements of the 
Tonle Sap. Fishers from floating communities catch fish and sell fish for rice at the Kampong 
Loung. Fishers from many floating communities take their fish catches to Kampong Loung. 
Thus, Kampong Loung becomes a local regional ‘market place’ for fishers from many 
floating communities (Field Notes, 2007).  
 
Obviously, movements up and down also relate to lateral mobility of the whole 
community. This mobility and up and down movement is ‘mobile vertical territoriality.’ No 
studies have focused on these actions as a territorial strategy, and when these movements and 
complex spatiality are better understood we can see how they relate to survival, livelihoods 
and the fish-rice economy. 
 
Upward and downward movements are within restricted geographical spaces or 
territories created by the boundaries of others. In this sense, the issue of ‘mobile vertical 
territoriality’ is also geopolitical in that contested spaces, unclear boundaries and access to 
fisheries (and forest) are involved.  
 
5.7.2.2 Vertical territoriality: Floating up and down without changing location 
 
Some floating communities float, but they do not alter locations. This happens to 
floating communities that are surrounded by a fishing lot, for instance, the floating villages in 
Peam Bang Commune. Peam Bang is subject to seasonal up and down vertical movement, but 
the houses remain within relatively fixed positions. This is what I call a ‘vertical 
territoriality’. Within Peam Bang, I focus in details on Pov Veuy and Doun Sdoeung Villages 
(See Map 5.1).  
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a) ‘Floating’ fishing lots and floating territoriality of villages 
 
Peam Bang commune is home to 619 families with a total of 2929 people living in 
five villages (Seila, 2005). Khmer ethnics are predominant in this commune and following 
by Vietnamese. It was reported that there are around 30 Vietnamese households in Peam 
Pang village (Sophat et al., 2005). The commune covers an area of 15,755ha (Commune 
Data, 2006). The whole commune area falls within the commercial fishing space and this area 
is classified into three commercial fishing lots, namely fishing lot no.4, fishing lot no.5 and 
fishing lot no.6,  covering 55,203 ha as a ‘commercial space’ (DoF, 2001). The fishing lot 
no.6 and fishing lot no.5 are almost entirely located in Peam Bang, covering, estimating of 
25,905 ha and 9,908 ha respectively (DoF, 2001). In addition, large areas of about 28,000 ha 
in Peam Bang are designated as a Biosphere Reserve Areas. There is an overlapped space 
between fishing lot areas and Biosphere Reserve Areas (ADB, 2006a; Kosal and Vanna, 
2001; Field Notes, 2007).  
 
When water levels are low around 0.5-1.40m, the fishing lot area is estimated at about 
55,203ha, and when water level reaches the maximum of 7.50-9.50m in the wet season 
(MRC, 2005), the fishing lot territory is still maintained at about 55,203ha. This has notable 
consequences in terms of the limited space devoted to public and community fishing access 
(Field Notes, 2007). This relates to the commercial fishing territoriality and to what I classify 
as a ‘floating territories’ of fishing lots.    
 
The fishing lots cover a large space in the Peam Bang vicinity. Apart from the fishing 
lot area, large areas in Peam Bang are allocated as a Biosphere Reserve named as ‘Beoung 
Chmar Core Area.’ The remaining area from the fishing lot and conservation in Peam Bang is 
a village space. To understand the ‘village space’ in Peam Bang, it is important to look at the 
‘house space’ of individual households, the territory and boundaries of the floating villages. 
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(i) Floating territory of floating villages in Peam Bang 
 
Peam Bang Commune is home to about 619 households living in five floating 
villages. Based on the discussion with key informants in Peam Bang, households in Peam 
Bang are classified into four different types: the rich households, the medium households, the 
poor households and the poorest households. Whilst these distinctions are not always easy to 
make, there are some clear socio-economic status divisions within the Commune. According 
to my own Field Notes taken at various times in 2007 and 2008, the richer households tend to 
be in Peam Bang proper, but not in the other villages of Peam Bang Commune - Pov Veuy, 
Daun Sdeang, Balat and Pechakrey. Many poorer and medium household are found in all 
villages in Peam Bang Commune. While socio-economic indicators vary, there is a strong 
tendency for ‘space of houses’ to indicate relative wealth and social status in the Tonle Sap 
communities, especially those houses that are ‘floating’ and also have land entitlements. 
Other relevant criteria are ownership of fishing boats, gears, nets, and household consumer 
goods. This is complicated due to the fact many fishers loan money to purchase equipment, 
boats, and nets. So indebtedness is a fact of life for many people, even those with relative 
household luxuries such as TV and karaoke machines (Field Notes, 2007 and 2008).  
 
Definitely you need a lot of capital to build a house with a ‘large space,’ estimating at 
about 5m x 16m (Field Notes, 2007). Such houses are usually built on floating tanks, and each 
house would have a zinc roof and solid wooden floors and walls. The ‘rich household’ usually 
owns 1-2 small engine boats and one big engine boat and they fish with ‘large fishing gear’ 
employing 3-4 hired workers. The ‘medium household’ owns the house that covers less space 
than the larger houses, estimated at about 3.5m x 12m, whilst the ‘poor household’ and the 
‘poorest household’ owns a ‘house space’ estimated at about 3m x 8m and 2.5m x 6m 
respectively (Field Notes, 2007). It is more important to consider size of ‘house space’ in a 
context where communities live on the water and rely almost entirely on that water space their 
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survival. This would not be the same criteria for land-and-water based or farming-and-fishing 
communities, because they have land ownership (See Table 5.3).  
 
Table 5. 3: The house space by house category 
Size of the House Width Length Size of the house (m2) 
House of the rich household 5 16 80 
House of the medium household 3.5 12 42 
House of the poor household 3 8 24 
House of the poorest households 2.5 6 15 
Average 3.5 10.5 40.25 
Source: Field Notes, 2007 
 
Based on my estimates, the average size of house is estimated at about 40.25 m2. With 
the total number of houses of 619 houses, the total area of the floating houses in Peam Bang is 
estimated at about 21,335m2. Peam Bang village covers the largest area, estimating at about 
7,325m2, while Pechakrey cover the smallest area in the Stung River. The floating villages in 
Peam Bang are floated year round, but the ‘floating space’ of these floating villages is unlike 
the other floating villages in the Tonle Sap. The ‘floating space’ of these villages in Peam 
Bang is zone-locked by the existence of the ‘fishing lots’ and the ‘Biosphere Reserves’ (Field 
Notes, 2007). Thus, there exist few opportunities for the boat houses of Peam Bang to move 
laterally and plenty of scope for incursions, transgressions and poaching. All this means a 
greater likelihood of conflicts over space and resources (See Table 5.4). 
 
Table 5. 4: The village space by village 
Village No. Family Thatch roof Zinc  Roof Total houses Total area (m2) 
Pov Veuy 113 81 9 90 3622.5 
Pechakrei 76 56 6 62 2495.5 
Peam Bang 207 169 13 182 7325.5 
Ba Lat 115 98 9 107 4306.75 
Doun Sdaeng 108 83 6 89 3582.25 
Total 619 487(91.89%) 43 (8.11) 530 21332.5 




 Map 5. 1: The overlapped space of fishing lots and the Biosphere Reserve 
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(ii) ‘Floating boundaries’ of floating villages in Peam Bang 
 
The boundaries of the floating village are marked in some areas by fishing lot 
boundaries.  The fishing lot owners often erect bamboo fences, stuck into the mud beneath the 
water around their fishing lot areas. During the open fishing season, from October to May, the 
fishing lot owners build fences around their fishing lots to protect property and maximize 
catches within the lot. Bamboo fences around the lots effectively create a large pen to catch 
fish. The fishing lot owner no.6 fence around Boung Tonle Chhmar has blocked the river at 
the entrance and the outlet.  The fishing lots no.5 and no.4 do the same as fishing lot no.6. 
The floating villages float, but they are effectively zone-locked by the ‘territories’ of fishing 
lots (Field Notes, 2007). This is similar to the ways in which maritime boundaries, exclusive 
economic zones, and territorial waters sometimes create zone-locking situations at sea 
(Grundy-Warr and Schofield, 2010). However, in the Tonle Sap it is not the territories of 
States that are zone-locked but the fishing areas and living spaces of small village 
communities that are surrounded by fishing lots and overlapping Biosphere Reserve Areas. 
Thus, the official boundaries of commercial lots or Biosphere Reserves form the official 
limits of the space of floating villages. Official territorialization defines communal spaces by 
default.  
 
Pov Veuy Village 
 
Pov Veuy floating village is located in Stung River. However, the whole Stung River 
from Boeung Chmar upward belongs to fishing lot no.6, and Pov Veuy is located in Stung 
River inside the fishing lot. Moreover, Pov Veuy is a floating village, but it is not mobile and 
it is located in a given location defined by the fishing lot owner. The areas of the village in 
Stung River inside the fishing lot no.6 is estimated at approximately 3622m2 in the dry season 
and it is two to three times larger in the wet season (Field Notes, 2007).  
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The territory of Pov Veuy village is actually located inside the fishing lot and it is the 
fishing lot owner who permits villagers to settle their houses inside the fishing lot. It seems 
that this ‘village area’ was not a ‘village space’, but it was given to villagers to settle their 
houses at the mercy of the fishing lot owner no.6. In the Tonle Sap, the officially designated 
representations of space take precedence over the fishing and living spaces of ordinary 
people.  
 
Pov Veuy covers about 3,622m² in the dry season. Beyond this area is the commercial 
fishing zone. At the both ends of Pov Veuy village, the fishing lot No.6 placed a bamboo 
fence to demarcate the boundary and the ‘village space’. The floating house could only move 
within this classified space. Often villagers move in and out everyday to fish in the public 
fishing areas. The public space for fishing extends beyond the river bank. In fact, the ‘public 
fishing space’ is mostly dry in the dry season and the area is fully under the protected flooded 
forest, which is not officially meant as a fishing area. People in Pov Veuy complain that the 
‘public fishing space’ near their village is often fished by ‘neak leu’ (highlanders) whereas 
people in Pov Veuy are ‘neak tonle’ (river and lake people) often move to fish in the areas 
near the lake. Thus, conflicts sometimes arise between the neak leu and neak tonle over rights 
of access to the lake resources. As such, this is an example of clashing indigenous 
territorialities, as some people perceive the Tonle Sap as a free-for-all common property 
space, whilst resident floating communities view it more in terms of their own vital livelihood 
space belonging to neak tonle, not to the outsider neak leu (Field Notes, 2007). 
 
Doun Sdaeng Village 
 
Doun Sdaeng village consists of Doun Sdaeng and Anlong Taour hamlets. However, 
these two hamlets are grouped into one village known as a Doun Sdaeng, which is a floating 
village located in the Stung River below Boeung Chmar Lake in Peam Bang Commune. 
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Below Boeung Chmar, Stung River is considered as a ‘public fishing space’, and the fishing 
areas located along both river banks are under the fishing lot no.5.  
 
The geographical location of this village varies between the dry and wet season. In the 
dry season, Doun Sdaeng village is located in Stung River, and surrounded by fishing lot no.5 
and No.6. On the eastern area of the Doun Sdaeng village, about 300-500m from the village, 
we can see the bamboo fence trap placing as a boundary line of the fishing lot not.6 cutting 
across the Stung River, and there is a ‘small entrance’ and ‘check point’ that control the 
movement of boats that travel across the fishing lot no.6. Inside the check point, 2-3 fishing 
lot guards watch out the entrance for boat movement (Field Notes, 2007 and 2008). 
 
Behind (southern area of the village) and in front (northern area of the village) of 
Doun Sdaeng village in the dry season, we can see the ‘bamboo fence’ placing along both 
side of the Stung River Bank, marking the ‘boundary’ and ‘territory’ of the fishing lot no.5. 
As a result, Doun Sdaeng village could not move eastward, northward and southward as it has 
been limited by the fishing lot. The only area this village can move is the ‘westward,’ 
particularly along the Stung River. However, along this river there are a number of ‘brush 
park’ (fishing traps) belonging to powerful people who are also entitled to utilize the ‘public 
fishing area.’ The further westward movement of this village would create serious conflict 
with the ‘brush park’ owners. This scenario only applies in the ‘open fishing season’ from 
October to May every year. As a consequence, as a floating village, the location of Doun 
Sdaeng village seems to be fixed in a particular area. As a floating village, it does not move 
when the water rises and falls, unlike the other floating villages in the Tonle Sap. As a fishing 
lot area surrounds the village, except the River, the floating houses congregate in the body of 




However, in the wet season from the end of May to the end of September, the bamboo 
fence traps along the river banks and the boundary of the fishing lot are removed. The 
activities of the commercial fishing lot business are not supposed to be active at this time. The 
security guards and workers are removed from the fishing lot areas. During this period, the 
floating houses of Doun Sdaeng Village face less restriction from the fishing lots in locating 
their houses. The villagers spread their floating houses in the huge ‘water space’ and they 
enjoy a large area for their houses. However, the floating houses cannot move further inside 
the fishing lot areas because they would have a conflict with the fishing lot owners. In fact, 
although the fishing lot owners remove their fishing equipment from the fishing lot areas and 
do not have any activity during the dry season, they still have de facto ‘power’ over the area. 
They keep up surveillance on their fishing lot areas to ensure that they are not damaged by 
other fishers. Furthermore, they often put tree branches inside the fishing lot areas during the 
wet season to attract fish to accumulate in their lots. Any activity by the villagers that threaten 
their fishing lot areas would lead to quick responses by lot owners, who are usually close to 
senior government people and official fisheries agencies.   
 
Therefore, although the villagers in Doun Sdaeng village enjoy more space during the 
wet season, this does not mean that they could float their houses all over the place, even in the 
fishing lot areas. In this case, the eastward, the southward and northward movement of Doun 
Sdaeng village is highly restricted. The only area that the village could move during the wet 
season is the westward, but moving westward is against the direction of the water current as it 
flows eastward while rising up. Naturally when the water level rises up, the floating villages 
move upward in a parallel direction with the water flow. Thus, Doun Sdaeng’s territorial 
adaptations are not as they would be if it was more freely floating and moving.  Thus, floating 
territoriality is a human strategy of what is possible to do only in response to official 
territorial designations, boundaries and the highly constrained space for floating community 
movement in the Lake. 
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5.8 “Pulsing Territoriality”  
 
Many communities in the Tonle Sap experience the ‘flood pulse’ in which the whole 
community stays six months on land and six months on water. As noted earlier, I call these 
communities ‘stand-stilt communities’ (a term I have adapted from AFN, 2004). The 
everyday geography of stand-stilt communities is affected by the ‘everyday water level 
fluctuation’ in the Tonle Sap Lake. The changes in water level shape the ‘everyday 
geography’ of the stand-stilt community, and the ‘everyday space’ for fishing (AFN, 2004; 
Rigg, 2007; Kummu et al., 2008; (Field Notes, 2007 and 2008). As noted earlier, the ‘pulsing 
ecosystem’ has both terrestrial and aquatic dynamics, and what is of interest here is the 
particular human-ecological relationships that are made according to the annual flood pulse. 
My preferred term is ‘pulsing territoriality’ which relates to human responses to natural cycles 
and rhythms, although in the context of the lower Mekong, human adaptations are 
increasingly affected by the political territorialization of space and commodification of 
environmental resources. Even so, the seasonal ecosystem dynamics are still powerful 
influences on human actions.  
 
To help illustrate the notion of ‘pulsing territoriality’, I utilize the example of 
Kampong Phluk—a fishing community in the Tonle Sap Lake. Under the influence of the 
‘pulsing ecosystem,’ each stand-stilt community such as Kampong Phluk has both terrestrial 
and aquatic phases (See Appendix 6, Picture 2 to 4). First, in the terrestrial phase about six 
months of the year, people in stand-stilt communities adapt their living strategy according to 
land system and they engage in fishing and farming as a primary occupation—this is a 
‘terrestrial territoriality,’ with access to parcels of land and forest. Second, in the aquatic 
phase about six months of the year, people adapt their living based on a water system and 
they use boats as a mean of their living, and I call this ‘aquatic territoriality.’ I will discuss 
each of these in the following section.  
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5.8.1 Human terrestrial territoriality in Kampong Phluk 
 
As I have argued, there are distinctly bio-physical elements affecting human-nature 
interactions and human territoriality in the Tonle Sap. In Kampong Phluk, houses are built 
based on knowledge of ‘flood pulse,’ and each house is built on tall stilt that will not be 
submerged under the water during the peak flood season, but it could stand in the water for at 
least six months as well as another six months on the dry land. House stilts are 5-6m above 
the ground, so this is what I call a ‘stand-stilt house’. There are four different types of houses 
in Kampong Phluk; thatch houses, tile houses, fibro houses, zinc houses and concrete houses. 
About 58 percent of houses in Kampong Phluk are built on stilts with zinc roofing and 41 
percent are stand-stilts roofed with thatch. The houses with fibro cement roof account for one 
percent (Field Notes, 2007 and 2008).  
 
In Kampong Phluk, the ‘stand-stilt house’ is classified into two types—the 
‘permanent stand-stilt house’ and the ‘seasonal stand-stilt house.’ The houses are built face to 
face and are permanent stilt house structures. As such, they do not migrate upland as the 
water rises, as some other communities in the lake do. The housing is dense with a little space 
between the houses. Underneath the houses, people keep some spaces for keeping fishing 
gears and some spaces to rest during the day time given that they do not need to claim the 
house frequently.  
 
People walk on land for approximately six months, especially from January to May. 
Local people say in Khmer that they ‘chheung chan dei’ or ‘step on land’ for six months, and 
this is the period that people could walk from house to house by bare feet, or sometimes they 
use motorcycle or bicycle during the dry season. At the back yard of the house, the Kampong 
Phluk River stands as a source of water for fishing as well as a navigation channel and people 
do practice agriculture. Houses built here extend the edge of the house into the river. The 
river is also considered as a ‘public space,’ but those who live close to the river take 
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advantages over other users for fish cage culture, making navigation in the dry season 
difficult and narrow.  
 
The ‘seasonal stand-stilt house’ is based upon seasonal patterns of settlement. During 
the dry season, especially in February every year when water levels in the Tonle Sap Lake are 
reduced to 1-1.5m, Kampong Phluk residents move down from the ‘permanent stand-stilt 
house’ into the Tonle Sap Lake, and build a ‘seasonal stand-stilt house’ there for fishing. This 
stand-stilt house is built on stilt about 1.5-2m above the water. However, in late May or early 
June, the water level in the Tonle Sap rises up, and it is time then for Kampong Phluk people 
to move their ‘seasonal stand-stilt house’ upland and villagers return to ‘permanent stand-stilt 
house’ in Kampong Phluk. People practice this every year as an integral part of their 
livelihood strategies. The ‘seasonal stand-stilt house’ is a ‘mobile stand-stilt house’ is an 
aspect of temporal mobility, similar to the strategies employed by the floating communities. 
The location of each ‘settlement’ is not fixed in any particular place, and there is no 
ownership over the area that each ‘settlement’ occupies. Villagers have developed their own 
social agreement to determine who stays where. These localized indigenous understandings 
are usually determined within communities, and outsiders are often unaware of these 
arrangements.  
 
Prior to the 1970s (a period of civil conflict followed by the Khmer Rouge era), 
during the driest months, all households (100 percent) moved to settle in the lake during the 
dry season, firstly because they could access to water for their fish cage culture, and secondly, 
they could easily fish in the lake. In the current time, only about 50 percent of households in 
Kampong Phluk move out into the open lake and establish ‘temporary housing’ there from 
where it is easier to care for their cages of fish or crocodiles, as well as perform their daily 
fishing activities, because of two reasons: firstly, fish cage culture with carnivore species is 
banned, and secondly, the Kampong Phluk River was enlarged, allowing more water flowing 
into the village and therefore, 50 percent of household did not need to move into the lake 
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anymore (AFN, 2004). This is a wonderful illustration of how the changing ecological and 
local environmental conditions affect human territoriality over time (Field Notes, 2007).  
 
5.8.2 Terrestrial territoriality 
 
As indicated above, the ‘terrestrial territoriality’ is a strategy of a stand-stilt 
community to adapt their living strategies to the terrestrial phase of ‘pulsing ecosystem’ of the 
Tonle Sap. It is organized according to the land system that is submerged under the water for 
a period of six months a year.  
 
In order to live on ‘land space’, first, households prepare their houses in two ways: (1) 
building their semi-floor structure under the permanent stand-stilt house so that they could 
rest or stay there day and night rather than climbing up and down every hour to their tall stilt 
house; (2) building the houses close to the fishing areas so that they could have easier access 
to catch more fish. Given these circumstances, many households move into the lake and build 
‘mobile’ or ‘temporal stand-stilt houses’ in the lake between January and April.  
 
In addition, each household uses certain fishing gears in order to improve their catch 
sizes. The ‘rich’ households use large-scale fishing gears, usually long bamboo fence traps 
that require large fishing grounds, especially in the open lake. Similarly, the ‘medium 
income’ households act to the rich households and often they compete with other fishing 
groups for fishing grounds. The ‘poor’ and the ‘poorest’, households gain access only to less 
productive fishing grounds, with limited access to the streams, the creeks and the ponds, and 
their fishing gears are smaller and some of these people are hired as labor by larger fishers. 
 
However, the poor and the poorest household fish with different fishing gears given 
their weak social position in defining their fishing space. Mostly, the poor and the poorest 
fishing households actually fish with ‘saiyoeun kampeh’ or ‘shrimp traps’ to catch the 
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freshwater shrimp known as ‘kampech’. This gear is fixed to one or two poles which are 
firmly pushed into the soil in order to anchor the trap in the current, mainly in the period from 
July to January. One fisher may utilize 30 to 80 shrimp traps at a time. Frequently the traps 
are connected by a long line for easy collection. Another shrimp trap used for fishing by the 
poor and the poorest household is ‘kansom kampeh’ or ‘brush bundle for shrimp’ made of 
small branches. The bundle is attached by means of a nylon rope to a floating wooden stick 
indicating the location of the bundle. It is operated in the open water of the Tonle Sap Lake 
from June to February.  
 
Thirdly, the household has to sell their fish catch for the cash and to buy rice and 
other household items. People in Kampong Phluk sell fish differently, depending on 
household types. Given their motor boats and frozen facilities available, some rich households 
take their fish catches to sell at Chong Kneas' fish landing area (12 km from Siem Ream 
Town). However, some rich households sell their fish catches to the fish trading middlemen at 
the village level. Due to the geographical location close to Siem Reap, the ‘clientele system’ 
is developed in Kampong Phluk between the fishing households either the rich, the medium 
or the poor and the fish trading middlemen. The ‘clientele system’ is called in a local term as 
a ‘moy’ which means that the fish trader is a ‘moy’ who buys the fish from the fishing 
households, and the fishing household is a ‘moy’ to sell the fish to only that fish trading 
middlemen, and no one else (for details, see Chapters 8 and 9). 
 
However, politically, Kampong Phluk is organized into a community fishery (CF). 
Under the pulsing ecosystem, in the terrestrial phase, Kampong Phluk is zoned into four 
different zones for fishing and control of fishing areas: Zone 1, zone 2, zone 3, and zone 4 
(see Map 5.2). Each zone is defined by boundary lines demarcating territory. Among these 
zones, zone 4 is the most important for Kampong Phluk, which I term a ‘primary space of 
dependence’ (a term I have adapted to Lake conditions from a reading by Cox, 1998). The 
rest of the zone is considered as a ‘secondary space of dependence’. ‘Primary’ and 
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‘secondary’ here merely refer to areas that are considered of first-order or second-order 
importance to villagers in terms of livelihood resources, fish, and incomes. As Kampong 
Phluk people testify (Field Notes, 2007 and 2008), not many fishing households from 
Kampong Phluk fish in the ‘secondary space of dependence,’ but this space is fished mostly 
by people from Kandek or Rolous, neighbouring communities of Kampong Phluk. Instead, all 
fishing households fish in zone 4, which has effectively become a ‘primary space of 
dependence’ in that villager reliance upon the fisheries here is critical for livelihood security 
needs.  
 
To fish in these zones, the ‘license system’ was introduced in which all households 
from within and from outside the Community fisheries (CF) Kampong Phluk must apply and 
must fish according to the defined fishing gears for both close and open fishing seasons. To 
limit the number of fishers in this zone, the best way forward was to introduce license system 
in which fishing households must apply to fish in those areas and must follow instructions 
about the use of gears.    
 
In practice, such zoning promotes a ‘commercialization of space’ within the most 
productive CF areas and increases the control and surveillance of relations in space. Whilst 
the ‘license system’ was introduced to help generate incomes, in fact it has tended to disturb 
the relative harmony of fishing practices within Kampong Phluk as well beyond the 
community.  The question is that will the fishers from outside the Kampong Phluk 
Community Fishery buy the ‘fishing license’ to fish in these zones? For example, ‘outsiders’ 
from Kandek, Rolous, Kchas and Danrun tend to consider the Tonle Sap as a ‘communal 
bank’, and they migrate every year down to fish in the Tonle Sap Lake after the rice harvest in 
order to catch fish for food during the cultivating season. Thus, the license system must 




Map 5. 2: The zoning of Kampong Phluk (Adopted from AFN, 2004) 
 
 
The notion of a ‘communal bank’ is similar to notions of ‘natural’ and ‘social’ capital, 
values that are hard to calculate as they are based upon extensive and intensive indigenous 
knowledge of the lake, fisheries and ecological system ‘services’ (Lansing, Lansing and 
Erazo, 1998; Berkes, 1999; Hirsch, 2003). However, indigenous ideas about resources have 
become much more territorial and possessive than in the past. What we see happening within 
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the Tonle Sap seems to be part of a global tendency associated with the expansion of markets, 
territorialization of space with the introduction of more exclusive property rights, and 
commodification of natural resources, transforming definitions of ‘communal property’ away 
from ‘bundles of rights’ into ‘territories’ (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; Peluso, 2005a; Le 
Billon, 2000; Nevins and Peluso, 2008). In the Mekong Basin as a whole, rivers have become 
commodities for use by large-scale irrigation and hydropower developments, which is 
reducing common property access and wild-capture fisheries, which are vital components of 
natural and social capital (Baird, 1999; 2000; 2006; Baird & Flaherty, 2004; Baran & 
Myschowada, 2009; Baran & Ratner, 2007; Lebel et al., 2007; Molle et al., 2009). 
Commercial uses are also gradually transforming the meanings of ‘community’ and 
‘communal property’ within the Lake. Within the territorial Lake system, the zoning of the 
CF areas and the boundaries marked on the CF areas has begun to exclude neighboring 
communities and seasonal inward migrants from using the so-called ‘communal bank’.  
 
As indicated in Chapter 3, empirical ethnographic-type research is very necessary in 
order to appreciate how and why zoning is often a very imperfect management tool. In the 
case of Kampong Phluk, zoning is made ineffective due to heavy competition in zone 4 and 
rather slack enforcement of community regulations. This raises the question about why 
‘zoning’ is used at all since each village does not use chosen zones for the purposes they were 
originally designed. For instance, in the Kampong Phluk area only zone 4 seems to have 
become a heavily used community fishing zone, and not the other designated zones. If people 
do not use the zones following community set rules, it reflects the probability that they do not 
consider these zones as imperative, and therefore, they do not pay attention to ‘protect’ these 
zones. In such circumstances, it is very hard to mobilize people to participate in long-term 
resource management. Further research on the implications of more intensive territorial 
community measures and its applications for managing community fisheries is very much 
needed in the Tonle Sap. My research represents an initial examination, for indeed, there are a 
great many cases like this in the Lake, some of which have become the source of real conflict. 
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The fact that fisheries are so vital to household incomes, to food security and to livelihoods, 
means that researching on sensitive issues of managing community spaces is time-consuming 
and requires considerable patience in order to find out how and why social and spatial 
measures are actually operating in the lake space.  
 
One purpose of zoning is to affect the use of the fishing gears in each zone during the 
close and open fishing seasons. The CF has technical supports from FAO and Provincial 
Fisheries Office to define the fishing gears to be used in zone 4 and the CF regulations 
include fines for violations of these rules. However, each fishing household tend to want to 
fish in this zone do not use fishing gears defined by the CF regulations, but tend to utilize 
gears designed to maximize fish catches. As I have indicated elsewhere in this thesis, there is 
a strong inclination for village fishers to continually search ways to up-scale, rather than to 
conserve resources.  
 
Not every household has joined the Community Fishery and so there exist loopholes 
for illegal fishing activity to take place within the CF areas. For instance, ‘illegal fishing’ 
known as ‘bor’ is widely spread out during July-Sept, 200723. About 50-60 households in 
Kampong Phluk do practice illegal fishing with bor. The Community Fishery arrangement 
does not stop them, primarily because local Fisheries officials and the ‘Commune Chief’ have 
vested interests in not helping the CF to enforce all of its rules for certain payments are at 
stake (Field Notes, 2007 and 2008). Those who practice bor pay 300,000-500,000 Riel per 
fishing season to local corrupted officials, including economic police, local fishery personnel, 
and kla 5 (tiger 5), not part of the CF. This undermines the notion of the Community Fishery, 
and some other agents are able to invade the boundaries of the CF to take money away from 
other fishing households (pers.comm. with Ouk Bunna, owner of bor from Thnoat Kampot, 
11 Sept., 2007). Issues of patronage and petty corruption are discussed in Chapter 8.  
                                               
23
 ‘Bor’ is fishing gear and it is arrow-shaped capture chamber with a fishing trap attaching to it, made 
of nylon mesh size net. The use of this gear for fishing is illegal given the size of net.  
 186 
5.8.3 Aquatic territoriality of Kampong Phluk 
 
The rise of water levels in the Lake begins in May. The gradual rise of water levels 
urges people settling in the Lake to move their temporal settlements back to Kampong Phluk. 
When people return to their ‘permanent stand-stilt house’ in Kampong Phluk, water levels in 
the Tonle Sap Lake rise up slowly, inundating village areas and creeping up to the base and 
stilts of the houses. From August to December, the entire area of Kampong Phluk is 
submerged, except for a small area around the temple.  
  
The depth of the water is estimated about 8-9 m deep in Kampong Phluk River and 6-
7m in the village. The ‘public space’ in front of houses becomes the navigation channels for 
boats and a natural swimming pool for children.  Boats are parked in the public space and 
children swim around, making this space crowded. Access to these houses is by boat and 
economic activity with villagers during this period is through boat, but less active.  
 
To live in a ‘water space’, the high stilt homes, estimated at 6-7 m high, keep homes 
dry even at the peak of the rising waters; secondly, each house effectively becomes an 
‘individual island’ during the high flood of the aquatic phase; third, boats are essential as a 
means of transportation; fourth, people make sure that they reserve enough rice reserves to 
last at least for the period of six months. Therefore, during the fishing season, they do their 
best to maximize fish catches, some of which is used to barter for rice, reserving the rest for 
food during the wet season. They also fish in the wet season, but they tend to catch less fishes 






5.9 Farming-fishing territoriality in the Tonle Sap Lake 
 
Numerous farming-fishing communities surround the Lake and edges of the Basin, 
and understanding these settlements is critical to appreciating human-nature relations in 
relation to the flood pulse, human adaptations to the changing ecosystem and access to 
environmental resources, as well as for examining differing human territorialities. These 
villages are extremely common in the wider floodplain of the Tonle Sap, indeed in the whole 
of the lower Mekong region. As Figure 5.5 shows, there is a high density of these types of 
village around the Tonle Sap. 
 
Farming-fishing communities lie upon elevated land that is not usually flooded during 
the wet season, but situated close to the Lake. Households in this community engage both in 
farming and fishing. For more understanding of the farming-fishing communities, I examine 
Kampong La village (See Appendix 6, Picture 5). 
 
Households in Kampong La organize their lands, water and resources around the 
village into two main categories - a ‘primary space of dependence’ and ‘secondary space of 
dependence’ (using my own adaptations from a term I have adapted from Cox, 1998). The 
‘primary space of dependence’ is a ‘farming space’ where villagers cultivate rice as a 
‘primary crop’ and a ‘primary occupation’ over this area for living. The ‘secondary space of 
dependence’ is also a ‘fishing space’, which is a ‘secondary occupation’. However, some 
villagers engage in both farming and fishing whilst others are engaged either in fishing or 
farming. Only a small percentage of households in Kampong La is engaged purely in fishing. 
This does not imply that fishing is unimportant, for as many agency reports by the ADB, 
FAO, MRC, Fisheries Department, the World Fish Center, and FACT, have revealed, fishing 
is an essential element of the rice-fish culture of the lower Mekong. 
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In the wet season, villagers organize a ‘farming space’ into two categories—‘sreleu’ 
(rainfed lowland rice field) and ‘srekrom’ (floating rice field) for rice cultivation (see Javier, 
1997). Furthermore, villagers territorialize srekrom into ‘srekrom vealreap’ (medium 
deepwater rice-field) and ‘srekrom tomneap’ (lower deepwater rice-field). This classification 
is based on the nature of the rising and falling water, the geographical location of the area, the 
productivity of the area, and the influence of the hydrological regime of the Tonle Sap.  By 
2007, sreleu in Kampong La covers only 108 ha while Srekrom covers an estimate of about 
188 ha. Rice is the main crop cultivated in sreleu and srekrom for mainly household food 
(Field Notes, 2007 and 2008).  
 
a) “Sreleu” (rainfed lowland ricefield) 
 
The geography of sreleu has three main characteristics— geographical location, the 
level of dependence on rainfall of sreleu for rice cultivation and the influence of the Lake 
hydrology on sreleu (Javier, 1997). It is called sreleu because it is located in the upper 
geographical area of the Tonle Sap floodplain.  Sreleu is translated by agriculturalist experts 
as ‘rain-fed lowland rice fields’, which are geographically located in low-lying areas between 
eight and ten meters above sea-level in the Tonle Sap floodplain (Keskinen, 2003). The rice 
cultivation in sreleu is entirely dependent on rainfall, not on the lake hydrology. However, 
sreleu and srekrom is important for people livelihoods and it is considered as a ‘primary space 
of dependence’ for farming-cum-fishing communities.  
 
In 2007, out of 189 households in Kampong La village, 137 households owned sreleu. 
Sreleu for households in Kampong La is a productive territory, producing a lot of rice paddy, 
feeding people for many generations in Kampong La. One crop a year is cultivated in the 
sreleu, starting in May, ending in August.  Farming in sreleu is a labour intensive exercise, 
employing many people. If local people could not cultivate sreleu it would lead many 
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households to food shortages. Thus, it is not difficult to conclude that sreleu is both a 
‘primary space’ of production and dependence for the people of Kompong La. 
 
b) “Srekrom” (Deep water rice/floating rice field) 
 
Srekrom means ‘lower field’ and it is a term used by local people in Kampong La 
based on the deeper geographical location inside the floodplain, and the dependence of rice 
cultivation in srekrom on the hydrology of the Tonle Sap Lake (Javier, 1997). Srekrom is 
translated into ‘a deep-water rice-field, geographically located closely to the Lake, 
approximately within the zone of 6-8m above sea level (Keskinen, 2003). Srekrom is 
submerged by the rising water in the Tonle Sap Lake during the wet season, and as a 
consequence, it is classified into two categories - srekrom tomneap (lower deepwater rice 
field-field) and srekrom vealreap (medium deepwater rice field).  
 
Srekrom vealreap (or medium deepwater rice-field) is located deeper inside the 
floodplain area, lower than sreleu, but higher than srekorm tomneap, about 1500m from the 
village. The soil quality in srekrom vealreap is sandy soil or sandy clay, and it yields 
relatively low rice productivity, estimated at about 400-500 kg per hectare (Field Notes, 2007 
and 2008). Farmers cultivate "srove leung tuk" in srekrom, known as a ‘floating rice’ in 
English, but local people call this rice a ‘rising water rice’, as naturally it grows according to 
water level - when water levels rise up with the flood pulse, thus the rice also grows up high. 
This is another indigenous and vernacular difference to the common idea in English of rice 
that is suitable in conditions of flood. Actually, the local people do not regard the land as 
‘flooded’ and see this purely as a ‘natural rising of the waters’, which is a regular and not an 
unusual event (Field Notes, 2007).  
 
Despite the distance of srekrom vealreap from the village, and low rice yield 
compared with sreleu, Kampong La villagers see the value of cultivating in srekrom vealreap. 
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As a ‘primary space of dependence’, srekrom vealreap provides a substantial quantity of rice 
production for households and it ensures food security for farming-cum-fishing villagers. 
Thus, srekrom vealreap, for Kampong La villagers, is a crucial ‘secondary space of 




‘Srekrom Tomneap’ is located deeper inside the Tonle Sap floodplain, which means 
about 4 km from Kampong La village. Soil is fertile and the rice yield is estimated at 1.5-2 
tons per hectare. However, given the relative remoteness in terms of walking distance from 
the village, villagers do not provide enough attention to srekrom tomneap, contributing lower 
yields. At the same time, the rising water in the Tonle Sap influences the rice productivity of 
srekrom tomneap. Thus, farmers cultivate rice varieties that grow and rise according to water 
levels named as a ‘srove leung teuk’, translated as ‘rising water rice’ in English.  
 
The hydrological regime of the Tonle Sap affects the rice yields in srekrom tomneap 
in several ways; some times, water stay longer in the Tonle Sap, affecting the harvesting 
season; some time, low water quality in the Tonle Sap affecting the rice production in 
‘Srekrom Tomneap’; and some time the rat damage the rice field, contributing to low yield. 
For Kampong La residents, srekrom tomneap is important, but it is considered as a ‘tertiary 
space of production’ of rice.  
 
Srekrom tomneap is plowed in mid-March or early April while srekrom vealreap is 
plowed in mid April or early May and they broadcast immediately after plowing. Srekrom in 
Kampong La is owned by 133 households out of 189 households. However, the rice yield is 
still low due to less protection and care over srekrom. Moreover, in some years, srekrom is 
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Sreleu, Srekrom, Srekrom tomneap and srekrom vealream are further classified into a 
smaller field known as ‘sre’ (ricefield), and hundreds of rice-fields exist in sreleu and 
srekrom separated one from another by high and low dykes. Thus, it is possible to envisage 
agricultural and aquatic resource spaces ion terms of human-nature relations and the 
territorialization of space as both a livelihood security measure and in terms of the political 
economy of resources in a commercializing, but not yet fully commercialized space. The 
production space in the Tonle Sap is both top-down through various representations, plans, 
boundaries, and territories created by State and other agencies, and also bottom-up in relation 
to myriad human-nature adaptations to the annual flood pulse, pulsing ecosystem, and 
adaptations within the rice-fish economy.  
Figure 5.5: Territorial system of farming-cum-fishing community in the Tonle Sap 
 
c) Fishing Areas as a Secondary Space of Dependence 
 
Kampong La has borders with the lake proper in an easterly direction, and to the west 
with land areas. The geography of Kampong La is dominated by wetlands and water spaces 
such as rivers, the lake proper, streams, creeks, canals and natural ponds. The wetlands and 
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the water bodies form a natural secondary space of dependence for people in Kampong La. 
People fish and collect non-fish resources in this area for their food.  
 
Fishing is secondary occupation for the majority of villagers in Kampong La, but for 
some, it is a primary occupation for two reasons: First, households in Kampong La treat 
fishing as a ‘safety net’ for food; and second, the Tonle Sap is not only a ‘space of 
dependence,’ but also a ‘communal bank’ belonging to everybody (Van Acker, 2005). In the 
high flood season, people fish in an area about 2-3km from the village, but in the dry season, 
they fish in the lake about 9-10 km from the village.  
 
The majority of households in Kampong La do fish all year round, but fishing is 
considered as an ‘off-farm’ activity. People fish according to the seasons. The ‘high fishing 
season’ starts from November to March. During this period, villagers migrate down with the 
whole family to the lake and settle for fishing in an area about more than 10km from 
Kampong La. Some households move down to the Lake with draft animals since they do not 
return home within 3-5 days. Many of them stay in fishing areas until the rainy season starts, 
and they return home when the water levels rise up, particularly in May. As water levels rise 
up, fishing is not so active and catches are not that high in the low fishing season. The ‘low 
fishing season' does not mean they do not fish, but their fishing activity is less than in the 
‘high fishing season’.   
 
Villagers from farming-fishing areas set up what they call ‘fishing camps,’ or ‘tov 
prang’ or ‘tov mat’ in local Khmer terms.  The ‘fishing camp’ or ‘tov prang’ or ‘tov mat,’ is a 
temporary fishing settlement where people from Kampong La and residents from farming-
fishing villages settle for fishing during the off-farm season in the Tonle Sap floodplain. The 
temporal settlement in this sense lasts about 2-3 months. As this thesis demonstrates, temporal 
territoriality is a common and significant facet of human-nature relations in the Tonle Sap. It 
is still relatively little understood by fishery managers at higher levels, and its relevance to 
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fishery governance should be carefully considered as it is related to fishery productivity and 
food security matters in the Lake system. 
 
About 30-40 households from different farming villages, for instance, Kampong La, 
Chek Chao and Moat Prey villages settle in an average ‘fishing camp’ at a time. Within the 
fishing camp, there is a small market where people sell their consumer goods like rice, instant 
noodles, salt, soap, clothes, fishing nets and fishers sell their fish. Fish traders travel to the 
'camp' everyday to buy fish from fishers in the ‘camp.’ The ‘fishing camp’ is a ‘small 
community’ that farmer-fishers assemble there once every year to fish in the Tonle Sap. In 
order word, this is a ‘traditional temporal fishing community,’ that has been practiced for 
many generations. There are many other fishing camps around the Lake, and this is one of 
them around the lake. 
 
The fact that temporary fish camps are another deeply embedded feature of the human 
landscape or waterscape of the Lake, and one that is so critical for food security is another 
reason why it is necessary to undertake empirical research on the territorial adaptations of 
ordinary people and communities of the Tonle Sap.  By organizing their resources, 
households could ensure high benefits and they could access and use these resources more 
effectively. 
 
5.10 Everyday forms of conflict and resistance of fishing communities in the Tonle Sap  
 
Given the partially ‘hidden geographies’ of these villages, through this research we 
see that many fishing communities struggle everyday to construct their ‘everyday space’ for 
fishing and for rice-farming to feed their family members. These struggles are forms of 
‘everyday resistance’ in the face of State mappings and simplifications (Harley, 1989; Scott, 
1998) and rationalizations of space, particularly privatization (see Chapter 6). Forms of 
‘everyday resistance’ apply to all fishing villages in the Tonle Sap, but as the above sections 
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have tried to show, each community ‘type’ has differing human-nature relations and adopt 
slightly different territorial adjustments and strategies to meet their livelihood security needs. 
But, in addition to social-ecological changes and responses by ordinary people, there are other 
political geographic issues that the village people of the Lake must face.  In James Scott’s 
(1985) Weapons of the Weak he defines resistance is a constant struggle between the 
peasantry and those who seek to extract labour, food, taxes, rents and interests from them. In 
Jonathan Rigg’s (2007) Everyday Geographies of the Global South, the author also refers to 
‘everyday forms of peasant resistance.’ What I have been describing in this chapter are 
different everyday forms of territoriality, and different social and spatial responses to 
changing ecological, economic and political conditions in the Lake.  
 
In the Tonle Sap, the everyday forms of resistance are also struggles against the 
diminishing of open access fishing areas, partly due to the commercialization of fisheries by 
the powerful groups. And the resistance against the extension of fishing lot boundaries into 
the public fishing areas, the resistance against the water gates across the fishing lot areas by 
the fishing lot owners and the conflicts between agriculture and fishing inside the fishing lots. 
Some of these important issues are discussed below. 
 
5.10.1 The ‘closing water gate’ across the fishing lot area  
 
Fishers from fishing villages around the Tonle Sap struggle everyday with the fishing 
lots surrounding their villages, in which villagers have no right to enter the fishing lot area 
without permission from the fishing lot owner, even to collect firewood or pass thought the 
lot area. If they want to go through the area, they have to pay for kbal touk (per boat per 
entry) as a fee to enter the lot or rowing the boat along the designated areas defining as a 
navigation channel such as in fishing lot no.6. The payment is about 3,800R (nearly 1US$) 
for each boat even when villagers just enter to collect firewood or cut some tree branches for 
attracting shrimps (ta som) (Gum, 1998; Vuthy et al., 2000; Piseth, 2002). 
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The lot boundary has been restricted and guards are hired to patrol it at all times. The 
guards are equipped with guns and they are given orders to shoot at or arrest anyone who tries 
to enter the fishing lot without permission. The chief of the guards is usually a very powerful. 
Villagers are very afraid of them. During the lot operation, people are not allowed to enter the 
fishing lot during day or night (Gum, 1998; Vuthy et al., 2000). 
 
Villagers in fishing villages depend exclusively on natural resources: fishing for food 
and collecting firewoods for cooking. Since the fishing owners have extended the fishing lot 
boundary, fishers are denied access to their tradition fishing areas. As a consequence, fishers 
have very often resorted to sneaking into the lot and looting as a mean of accessing their 
fishing areas in order to extract fisheries resources for their livelihoods. Consequently, a 
variety of serious conflicts arise. However, the conflicts tent to be less intensified among 
others who can afford to pay for access to fishing or have good relations with the lot owners.  
 
5.10.2 The ‘extension of fishing lot boundaries’  
 
Extending the fishing lot boundaries commonly occurs in the lots located around the 
Tonle Sap Lake. This happens when the fishing lot boundaries are not clearly marked. For 
example, one side of the fishing lot boundary is open ended. This allows the lot owner to 
extend the lot. Extending the fishing lot boundaries bring more benefit to the lot owners. The 
conflicts in fishery resources have accelerated as the lot owners try to expand their lot 
boundary and deny access of small-and medium scale fishers to fish.  
 
Villagers in many fishing villages recognized that the demarcation of fishing lot 
boundaries show on the map by the lot owner was not correct because even their houses were 
included in the lot. Since no one had officially complained about the problem, the lot owner 
insisted on maintaining the rights to patrol the lot boundary (Swift, 1997; Hasselskog et al., 
2000). The situations described above reflect the general condition faced by fishers living 
 196 
near the fishing lots around the Tonle Sap Lake who depend on fishing for their livelihood. 
The conflict over access to fishing area continues to remain as serious issues and sometimes 
leads to violence between the fishing lot owner and local villagers.  
 
The fishing lot owners claim that ‘everything within the lot boundaries except for 
specially designated common property areas are under the jurisdiction of the lot owners 
during the open season’ (Swift, 1997:17). Hence, even peoples’ housing area may be under 
the jurisdiction of the lot owners if water reaches it during the open season. People living in 
the fishing lot areas have no legal right to fish at any scale during the open season, even if 
their own homes fall within the lot boundaries. As a consequence, conflict occurs in areas 
where villagers are forbidden to fish ever around their own homes (Swift, 1997). 
 
5.10.3 The sale of open access fishing areas 
 
Powerful people, such as politicians and senior officials or military officers 
sometimes take and sell away the public fishing areas to individual fishermen. The benefits 
will then go to the individual lot owners and their patrons. The livelihoods of the communities 
are adversely affected by diminished public fishing zones. The process of selling good fishing 
grounds was common before 2000, but is less so following widespread public protests, and 
subsequent fishery reforms that have established official recognition of community fisheries.  
 
I take the case studied by Hesselskog et al., (2000) in Peam Ek in Battambang 
Province where the selling of a public fishing-grounds had high level support; first, district 
officials sold some fishing areas to the lot owners; then, the provincial governor sold more 
fishing areas; and finally, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery sold all fishing 
grounds in the area (Hesselskog et al., 2000). According to Heasselskog et al. (2000), both 
the process of selling the fishing-grounds and the commercial lot boundary expansions were 
carried out through collusion between businessmen and government officials. In Chapter 8, I 
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discuss the entrenched and peculiar system of patron-client relations in the Tonle Sap, which 
in turn, facilitates forms of encroachment and displacement to take place.  
 
5.10.4 Conflicts between agriculture and fishing  
 
During the rainy season, the villagers’ farmland is flooded and some parts of that 
farmland fall within the fishing lot areas. The proclaiming of the Fiat-Law clearly prohibits 
activities that are ‘detrimental to fisheries production’ (Gum 2000). It includes prohibition of 
inundated forest including the transportation, stocking or trading of firewood and charcoal 
originating from the inundated forest. It means that all activities in the fishing lot including 
farming in the flooded area is totally prohibited (FACT & EJF, 2001).  
 
However, farmers use some areas within the fishing lot for rice farming long before 
the issue of this law. Hence, conflicts often happen as the fishing lot owners try to control the 
area. The flooded forest is a place for fish to thrive, but people need to cut forest for firewood 
and use the land for agricultural purposes. Another type of conflict comes from overlapping 
usage of water (Sithirith, 2000; Swift, 1997). During the flooding season, some farmers dig 
canals to bring water into their rice fields, but the fishing lot owners do not agree and threaten 
to destroy the irrigation dikes. The commercial lot owners argue that when water flows into 
the rice fields, fish also follow, thereby reducing the quantity of fish in the lots. However, 
during the dry season, some lot operators pump water and drain the ponds surrounding the 
Lake, which are used for catching fish (Sithirith, 2000; FACT & EJF, 2001; Swift, 1997). 
This water is crucial for agricultural irrigation during the dry season. Some conflicts have 
resulted in the shooting incidents directed at farmers by fishing lot guards in Battambang and 
Siem Reap province. Several fishers have previously been injured in conflicts with lot 
operators and guards (Degen et al., 2000; FACT & EJF, 2001). 
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5.11 ‘Everyday space’ and ‘everyday practices’  
  
Most of the time, small-scale and medium-scale fishers compete for their access to 
fishing-grounds. Two places where small and medium-scale fishers could gain access to 
fishing are in the public fishing area and the lot areas. To access to the public fishing area, 
fishers have to build a good relationship with officials in charge of the fishing ground. 
However, access to fishing lot areas depends on social relations fishers have with the lot 
owners. In the contractual relation system, each fisher has to negotiate and bargain with the 
lot owners. Some fishers may gain more and some may get exploited.   
 
The space constructed by the state such as the commercial fishing space, conservation 
and the public fishing space ignores or excludes everyday space of fishers, but fishers fish 
everyday and therefore, they construct their ‘own space’ despite official ignorance of relevant 
State agencies. None of the ‘representation of spaces’ mentioned above relate easily to 
‘everyday lived spaces’ of fishing villages. An ‘everyday space’ for fishers in the Tonle Sap 
is the ‘public fishing space’, within which each fisher has a tendency to maximize their fish 
catches in the ‘everyday space’ due in part to the intensive territorialization and exploitation 
of the Lake space squeezing available fishing zones. Hence, the maximization of fisheries 
resources in ‘everyday space’ has induced a decline in household fish catches, making fishing 
less reliable as a source of livelihood (Field Notes, 2007, 2008, 2009). Thus, fishers worry 
about their ‘everyday survival’ and so, they practice a ‘safety first principle’ in order to 
maintain catch sizes above the minimum level for subsistence (Scott, 1976).  To do this they 
need constant access to the ‘everyday space’ for fishing, upgrade fishing gears to ensure the 
maximum catch, and seek protection from powerful people or ‘patrons’ to fish in good fishing 
spaces. To do this fishers construct ‘spatial relations’ with ‘patrons’ who are able to influence 
the distribution of access rights to the ‘public spaces’. Many patrons are government 
employees (Piseth, 2002; Gum, 1998; Vuthy et al., 2000). In order to make a living in a duty 
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station with low salary, ‘patrons’ provide a service to fishers who become their ‘clients’ 
(Field Notes in Peam Bang, Kampong Phluk, and Kampong Loung, 2007).   
 
To fish in an ‘everyday space’ or ‘public fishing space’, fishers pay for the access, 
and fishers maximize the fish catch. In doing this, small-fisher often upgrades their fishing 
gears. Moreover, most of fishers in the Tonle Sap claim they fish for subsistence or as legally 
designated ‘small-scale’ operators, but ‘everyday practice’ the ‘small-scale’ fishing is 
misleading (Field Notes, 2007). However, according to Fisheries Law, small-scale fisher is 
allowed to fish in small-scale for subsistence only, and if they fished using gears larger than 
small-scale must get permission from Fisheries Administration (FiA) (Fiat Law, 1987; 
Fisheries Law, 2006). Thus, using upgraded fishing gear for fishing is illegal according to 
Fisheries Law, but they still fish with those gears. If they did not pay, but fish with illegal 
fishing gears, immediately they are pushed out, arrested or gear confiscated (pers.comm. with 
Sangkat fishery official, Chief, in Peam Bang, 2007).  
 
5.11.1 Everyday practices for fishers in the fishing lots  
 
Most of fishing lots in the Tonle Sap are classified into ‘sub-lots’ which the fishing 
lot owners lease out to small-leaseholders. In addition, the lot owners and small-leaseholders 
sell fishing rights to individual fishers or groups of fishers from local communities (Vuthy et 
al., 2000; Degen et al., 2000). This makes it possible for smaller scale fishers to fish inside 
the fishing lots. But frequently this means that fishers have to have a good relationship with 
lot owners, the leaseholders and the sub-leaseholders; second, fishers have to protect the 
interests of the lot owners, the leaseholders and the sub-leaseholders, who are all ‘patrons’; 
and third, fishers have to share portions of their fish catches with their ‘patrons’ by as much 
as 50 or 60 percent.  
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5.12 The freshwater lake as an ecological-political-territorial ‘matrix’  
 
Spaces in the Tonle Sap are very complex, but as much of this chapter has discussed, 
some of the complexity relates to human-nature relations. Mobile, vertical and floating 
territorialities involve particular place-specific social adaptations to biophysical, ecological 
and political constraints. Many of these territorial strategies have really not been discussed in 
detail by other researchers and this is one of the contributions of this thesis. Chapter 4 
discussed how State agencies, global agencies and regional agencies construct or represent 
spaces in the Tonle Sap. These spaces frequently ‘lived spaces’ of the many fishing 
communities in the Tonle Sap. In this chapter we have seen that there is a ‘hidden geography’ 
of fishing communities, particularly ‘floating communities’ in the Tonle Sap. Furthermore, 
these small communities struggle everyday to maintain, construct and defend their spaces of 
dependence in spite of the multiple abstract spaces constructed by the State, global and 
regional agents as well as commercial and conservation agents operating in the Tonle Sap.  
 
The geography of fishing communities is ‘hidden’ in two critical ways; first, the 
different territorialities of farming-cum-fishing, stand-stilt and floating communities is little 
understood at official governance levels, rarely discussed, and everyday adaptations to 
ecological and hydrological dimensions are not considered to be important elements of 
fishery management by relevant agencies, including the Fishery Administration; and second, 
geographies are ‘hidden’ as a result of dominant politics that promote certain viewpoints at 
the expense of smaller-scale fishers and often sideline the floating communities completely. 
Finally, in order for ordinary fishers to subsist, to maintain livelihoods, and to survive in the 
highly competitive and increasingly territorialized Lake environment they have to collude 
with officials, which often means bribes, gifts or payments of one kind or another. Sharing 
fish catches with lot owners, leaseholders and sub-leaseholders adds to the complex social-
political-spatial power webs of the Tonle Sap.    
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 CHAPTER 6 
Territorialities and Political Geographies of a Freshwater Lake 
 
One of the most often cited phrases from Robert Sack’s (1986) Human Territoriality 
is “territoriality is a primary geographical expression of social power” (p.5). Less widely cited 
are the following statements which are just as vital to the concept, that territoriality “is the 
means by which space and society are interrelated. Territoriality’s changing functions helps 
us to understand the historical relationships between society, space, and time.” This statement 
is particularly relevant for analyzing the long-term changes in state and inter-state sovereignty 
in Southeast Asia over the past two hundred years or so. Thongchai Winichakul (1994: 17) is 
acutely aware of the centrality of ‘modern’ geographical notions of political space, boundaries 
and territories in his analysis of the making of the national ‘geo-body’ of Siam. “We all know 
how important the territoriality of a nation is. Unarguably it is the most concrete feature, the 
most solid foundation, literally and connotatively, of nationhood as a whole.” What is very 
important here is that the Siamese state eventually became as adept as rival colonial powers, 
Britain and France, at utilizing the political map alongside military force to delineate, carve 
out (by coercion when necessary), and create a territorial ‘nation’. Having done so, internal 
state-led nation-building processes became territorialized too, and national space (as still 
evidenced in territorial and boundary disputes between Cambodia and Thailand) became a 
fundamental part of inter-state relations, linked with active spatial socialization within the 
‘nation’, involving intense material, psychological and emotive ingredients (Paasi, 1996; 
Hassner, 1997; Storey, 2001; Penrose, 2002; Delaney, 2005). As Jan Penrose (2002: 280) put 
it: “Through territoriality, specific places (including territories) are constructed and it is this 
process that allows people to harness the material and emotional potential of space.” In 
Penrose’s terminology, territoriality helps harness ‘the latent powers of space’. Furthermore, 
territoriality, viewed as a component of power is not only a medium of creating and 
reproducing social order, but it also creates much of the geographic context through which we 
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experience the world and give it meaning (Storey, 2001; Paasi, 2003; Delaney, 2005; Peluso, 
2005a).  
 
This Chapter sets out to examine territoriality as “a geographical expression of social 
power” (Sack, 1983; 1986) within the national geo-body of Cambodia, primarily through the 
territorialization of natural resource management on the Tonle Sap lake. I examine 
territoriality of the Tonle Sap in three different ways. First, I focus on ‘commercial fishing 
territoriality’; second, I examine ‘public fishing territoriality’ for ordinary family fishers; and 
third, I discuss ‘conservation territoriality’. Last, but not least, I explore the implication of the 
territorialized system of the Lake on broader issues of resources and fisheries management. 
However, before examining specific ways political territories and boundaries are applied to 
fishing (commercial, community and subsistence) and conservation issues in the Tonle Sap, I 
wish to explore how and why political territoriality relates to ideas about power, bio-power, 
state-society relations, and resource governance conceptually and within the empirical realm 
of Southeast Asia, before returning to the Cambodian context more specifically.   
 
6.1 Political Territoriality, Access and Resource Politics 
 
I conceptualize territoriality as a strategy aimed at reifying aspects of political 
control for different purposes, often economic ones, and with specific applicability to the 
management and control of natural resources. Territoriality as a geographical human 
behaviour and strategy is not necessarily benign or malevolent, but it could be either: “Overall 
there is the suggestion that territoriality can help increase the efficiency of an organization 
(whether it is a state, a business or a church) up to a point, and that it can help shift an 
organization’s goals from benign to malevolent” (Sack, 1986:41). In other words, territoriality 
is a strategy for controlling relations within precisely defined ‘territories’ which can be at any 
scale, and as a strategy of control the purposes can be manifold. Political geographer, Richard 
Muir (1997:12) who discusses Sack’s concept of human territoriality points out that Sack’s 
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definition is largely based on ‘rational’ economic and political reasoning and therefore 
sometimes omits the ‘human irrationality’ factor, which means that some aspects of 
territoriality may be chaotic, and less ordered in practice. However, Muir and Sack both argue 
that territoriality is always socially or humanly constructed and should be kept distinct from 
many scientific studies animal or biological territoriality. That said, as noted in chapter 4, 
there is no denying that there exist significant human-ecological dimensions to ‘human’ 
territoriality, and bio-physical factors do influence fishing and spatial behaviour in the Tonle 
Sap.  
 
Johnston (1995:213-225) and Delaney (2005) take Sack’s treatment of territoriality as 
an essential component and strategy utilized by modern territorial States to maintain order, to 
extend administrative-bureaucratic administrative mechanisms, and to control environmental 
resources (and citizens). Indeed, as noted above, human territoriality is a core notion and 
‘concrete manifestation’ of ideas about nationhood (Winichakul, 1994: 17), within which 
strong societal attachments to ‘territory’ and ‘place’ are central (Penrose, 2002). Within 
national geo-body spaces, territoriality is often employed in strategies by states as a means to 
exert, influence and extend forms of ‘state control’ over people, things and resources within 
national territory (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; Vandergeest, 1996; Paasi, 2003; Peluso, 
2005a; Alatout, 2006).  
 
Resource politics is largely a politics of ‘access’ (see Ribot and Peluso, 2003) and 
about issues of state centralization and decentralization (see Wittayapak and Vandergeest, 
2010), and within these important political strategies and policies relating to allocating and 
distributing rights to ordinary people there are both territorial and non-territorial aspects. This 
chapter is focusing on the how and why ‘political’ territorialization has become so significant 
in resource governance matters in the Tonle Sap. Returning to Sack’s (1986) ideas we get 
valuable clues from the way he outlines the theory of human territoriality. As Sack (1986: 26) 
puts it: “Setting places aside and enforcing degrees of access means that individuals and 
 204 
groups have removed some activities and people from places and included others. That is, 
they have established different degrees of access to things” (my emphasis). The ‘access’ 
politics associated with all the forms of territoriality discussed later in this chapter are 
fundamental problems of resource governance for the whole Tonle Sap. In this way, territorial 
boundaries do bring to the forefront the ‘latent powers of space’ and in turn help to ‘reify 
power’ (Sack, 1986: 32) of particular commercial users, whilst “displacing attention from the 
relationship between the controller and the controlled” (Ibid., 33). For the actual fishing lot, 
users are not the ones who are ultimately responsible within the state for the auctioning and 
allocating of primary fishing space in the Tonle Sap. The key ‘controllers’ are mostly hidden 
from view of the supposedly ‘controlled.’ Furthermore, some of the geographical 
classifications of space for conservation activities really do help to make some relationships 
about access, and decisions about resource use, more impersonalized, because local 
communities are largely remote from the agencies and individuals who have determined some 
zones are for conservation and others are not. In these and many more ways, Sack’s ideas 
about territoriality have direct things to tell us about the formal political representations of 
space in the Tonle Sap. But, the concept of human territoriality alone does not explain all of 
the complications and aspects of ‘power relations’ involved in the everyday politics of 
territories and contested space in the Lake. For this we need to consider some other ideas 
relating to ‘power’.  
 
6.2 Territories, Power and Bio-Power 
 
‘Power is present everywhere’ and in all social practices (Foucault, 1980), thus there 
are territorial and non-territorial aspects to power (Sack, 1986). And as Paasi (1996: 20-21, 
after, Cosgrove, 1989) observes: “geography is everywhere – both in the large-scale territorial 
processes and in the local contexts of everyday life and inherent experiences and meanings 
(…) Social life, like everyday activity, is essentially a practice of demarcation, of continually 
making social and cultural distinctions. ‘Geography’ in this sense distinguishes and connects 
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individuals, groups and states, human beings and nature.” Further, as Johnston (1986: 364) 
observes: “the exercise of power over people necessarily involves the creation of 
geographies.” Sack (1986: 26) argues that “human spatial relations are the results of influence 
and power. Territoriality is the primary spatial form power takes” (my emphasis). But, it is 
important to add here that human spatial relations are not necessarily always territorial, and 
many are not, and that ‘influence and power’ may have complex relations and influences on 
particular territories, which relate to the different way in which ‘power’ is mediated and 
activated simultaneously in various ways and forms through actors and agents. Further, 
territoriality as ‘the primary spatial form power takes’ means that there may be other forms of 
power operating simultaneously and other ‘power effects’ that relate to the operation of 
particular territories and territorial behaviour. 
 
Power is not ‘a thing’ that can be containerized or held. Power necessarily involves 
social relations and ‘relational’ dimensions. John Allen (2003a: 1-2) writes in Lost 
Geographies of Power: “In a world where it has almost become commonplace to talk about 
power as networked or concentrated, distributed or centralized, even decentred, 
deterritorialized or radically dispersed, it is all too easy to miss the diverse geographies of 
power that put us in place.” Allen argues that the geographies of power are not simply related 
to the creation of walls, boundaries and fences, but involve complex power relations, vertical 
and horizontal, that lie within and across politically classified ‘territories’ and ‘places’. 
Similarly, Delaney (2005) argues that even though territoriality is a key expression of power 
and territories do help to make certain forms of ‘power’ more visible, there are also many 
cross-cutting social relations, which complicate the functions and meanings of territories 
(such as complex social hierarchies and stratified relations of power, and relations of power 
that affect policies, events and influence social relations within and between territories).  
Allen (2003b) draws our attention to what he calls ‘the particularities of power’ and ‘diverse 
and specific modalities of power’, which are exhibited in both territorial and non-territorial 
social relations. In other words, Allen (2003b: 3) suggests that political geographers tend to 
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be too obsessive about the ‘spaces of power’ and do not consider enough “how geography 
affects the workings of power” for “power is inherently spatial, and conversely, spatiality is 
imbued with power.” As such, Allen is concerned with how power works across space, rather 
than simply through territories. Nevertheless, Allen acknowledges that power is frequently 
‘situated’ and that we are all “placed within a tangled arrangement of power relationships” 
(Allen, 2003b: 10). Most people experience ‘power’ at first hand through relationships that 
are situated within particular places or territories. There are many types of power involved, 
including state ‘infrastructural power’, institutional ‘power over’, various forms of 
‘associational power’ (through alliances, unions, networks), and power functioning through 
people’s own behaviour (Foucault, 1991; Allen, 2003b). Whilst power is ‘an imminent force’ 
and is ‘inseparable from its effects’, there are still variable geographical effects as power is 
mediated through particular places and territories (Allen, 2003b: 103).  
 
This brief consideration of the various forms that power takes, of the spatiality of 
power, and of various power effects (geographical and social), means that we should realize 
that human territoriality is one way of considering how power may be reified and produces 
certain effects, but there are numerous other forms of power at play that have ‘extra-
territorial’ attributes. Samer Alatout (2006) offers some insights that are of direct relevance to 
this research on human territoriality within the Tonle Sap. Alatout’s main concern was on the 
politics and storylines (after Hajer, 1995) associated with hydro-politics in the Israel-Palestine 
context. His work examines statist hydro-political discourses that reflect dominant structural 
forces (institutional and discursive) and are deeply embedded in socio-political structures. 
This relates to ideas about dominant ‘representations of space’ by politicians, policy-makers, 
technocrats, and map-makers influencing the complex realities of ‘representational space’ 
within which most people, things and resources interplay (Lefebvre, 1991; Sithirith and 
Grundy-Warr, forthcoming).  
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Alatout (2006: 603) argues that Sack’s (1983; 1986) ideas about human territoriality 
are isolated from theories of power. However, it is very clear from this author’s reading of 
Sack’s theory of human territoriality that his socially constructed notion of territoriality has 
power relations, the politics of space, and unequal socio-economic and political access to 
resources running through the entire discussion of territoriality. In other words, power 
relations are always present within the theory of human territoriality, although there is no 
particular theory of power within Sack’s study. As Alatout (2006: 603) concedes, “the very 
definition [of territoriality] implies territoriality’s embeddedness in relations of power.” As 
noted earlier, unequal power relations comes through in the fact that territoriality is “a 
strategy for establishing differential access to things and people” (Sack, 1983: 55). And this is 
central to the political geographies that relate to and result from applications of territoriality in 
the Tonle Sap Lake. In addition to this recognition, Alatout applies Foucault’s notion of ‘bio-
power’ to discuss some of the ‘extra-territorial forms of power’ that are inherent in hydro-
politics and the politics of resources, calling these ‘extra-territorial (bio) power’ (Alatout, 
2006: 604). Thus, at any one time there are ‘mutually constitutive’ territorial and extra-
territorial forms of bio-power operating through the institutions, actors and agencies, through 
the places, specific territories and people of the Tonle Sap. This chapter focuses primarily on 
particular applications of political territoriality and its effects, but the following chapters, 
particularly chapter 8 on the political economic transformations in the rice-fish economy and 
patron-client relations deals much more with issues that could be examined as ‘extra-
territorial (bio) power.’ The following section examines the extensive processes of 
territorialization in relation to state-building and environmental resource control. 
 
6.3 State Territorialization and Resources in Southeast Asia 
 
Using Sack’s theory as a basis, Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) discussed the 
importance of controlling rural space, people and resources through the strategy of 
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‘territorialization’, which they define as the “process by which states attempt to control 
people and their actions by drawing boundaries around geographic space, excluding some 
categories of individuals from this space, and proscribing or prescribing specific activities 
within these boundaries” (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995: 257). Following their analysis we 
can see that many states in Southeast Asia have “territorialized state power to achieve a 
variety of goals,” including making claims to space in order to gain income from taxes and 
revenues from environmental resources; to advance commercial plantations and market 
economics to outlying rural peripheries; to extend modern state bureaucracies; and to utilize 
territorial means as forms of control and surveillance about different local populations, 
especially ethnic minority and racial groups viewed with suspicion (see also, Vandergeest, 
2003; Roth, 2004). Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) write specifically about ‘territorialization 
and state power’ in Thailand, although many of their observations and arguments would be 
usefully applied in different parts of the region. They focus on internal territorialization and 
its applications to the allocation, ownership, distribution and realization of natural resource 
access rights. They argue that all modern states divide their territories into complex and 
overlapping political and economic zones, rearrange people and resources within these units 
and create regulations delineating how and by whom these areas can be used.  
 
Many of the state-led applications of territoriality in the sphere of forestry and land-
use enable certain orderings, categorizing and simplifying for specific purposes and functions 
deemed rational to particular agencies of control. Indeed, one of the key political dimensions 
of creating national parks, forest reserves, plantations and other forms of enclosure is to 
transform areas that were once unruly and messy commons into orderly and systematic 
territories serving ‘national’ (read, ‘state’) interests. Indeed, state territorialization can often 
serve to transform and make more legible “the complexity and variability of local production” 
(Scott, 1998: ch.1). 
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Practically all the states in post-colonial circumstances have utilized colonially 
inherited ideas about ‘scientific’ and territorial resources management, including Thailand 
which was never formally under direct colonial rule in the same way that Burma and 
Indochinese states were (Sowerwine, 2004; Tho Xuan Phuc, 2008). Vandergeest (1996) has 
argued that many developing states attempted to subvert or take over local resource 
management regimes through the employment of territorial control. For instance, in Thailand 
the administrative definition of the forest has changed from one based on classification by 
species to one based on territory. The Thai central government claimed a monopoly on the 
administration of property right to natural resources. The process took ‘place’ in three stages; 
first the government declared that all territory not claimed by permanent cultivators or other 
government agencies was forest under the jurisdiction of the Royal Forestry Department. 
Second, it demarcated the forest into reserve and protected forest. Third, it mapped all forest 
land as well as non-forest land according to ‘scientific’ land use classifications, which became 
the basis for policies to determine control, rights of use, access and occupation, and in the 
process excluded many highland people and upland ‘minorities’ from extensive areas of 
designated superior watershed areas and protected zones (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; 
Vandergeest, 1996). However, this approach has not always been successful for the state to 
control all natural resources within these territories. Furthermore, the evidence of forest loss 
shows that in the 1950s probably over half Thai national territory, was still under forest cover, 
compared with today where the figure is between 10% and 20% (Vandergeest, 1996).  Thus, 
we need to scrutinize the purposes of territoriality and to carefully examine the consequence, 
which may contradict intended goals.  
 
Finally, another pertinent aspect of the territorialization of resources concerns the 
notion of ‘abstract space’ (Tuan, 1977) versus ideas about ‘lived space’ (Lefebvre, 1991). As 
Vandergeest and Peluso (1995: 388) put it: “Abstract space dimensions are ‘linear,’ they can 
be cut up into discrete unit … and measured. Abstract space is homogenous in that it is 
represented as uniform within any given territory; any unit can be compared and rendered 
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equivalent to another unit by spatial categories. The construction of such abstract, comparable 
grids permits the location or nesting of an area in a larger abstract space.” Such as, the 
location of fishing lot number 7 and a fishery conservation area nearby, both within Pursat 
Provincial boundaries, within a larger grid of precise delimitations making up the space of the 
Tonle Sap. In this way space through the process of becoming ‘abstract’ is actually made 
knowable and controllable through a grid-like system to key state agencies, management 
institutions, planners, scientists and officials.  Thus, territorialization is integral to ongoing 
efforts to submit everything to the ‘discipline’ of modern maps, which “are instruments by 
which state agencies draw boundaries, create territories, and make claims enforced by their 
courts of law” (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995: 389). Nevertheless, the creation of territories 
on the map does not necessarily imply that these may be neatly and unambiguously applied 
on the ground, or in the Tonle Sap’s case, on the water. Localized messiness, indigenous 
practices and various forms of resistance may likely result in contested applications of 
enclosure and conflicts over boundaries and their meanings.  
 
In contrast to attempts to rationalize space by employing ‘abstract’ notions of space to 
create functional territories, we may view ‘lived space’ as being literally ‘alive’ and a space 
‘of action and of lived situations’ much as Lefebvre’s (1991: 42) notion of ‘representational 
space.’ Or as Vandergeest and Peluso (1995: 389) describe, ‘lived space’ is “experienced 
territory or space’ which is ‘located, relative, and varied.” One of the major concerns of this 
chapter is in fact “the lack of fit between lived space and abstract space” (Ibid.). Indeed, this 
lies at the core of some of the most serious and seemingly intractable resource and spatial 
conflicts in the Tonle Sap over the past decade.  
 
6.4 Territorialization and Mapping in Cambodia 
 
 In many respects, the most intensive period of territorialization and 
(re)territorialization within Cambodia has been during the last two decades, since the 
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transitional ‘peace’ phase and opening up of Cambodia’s resource economy to greater 
investment from outside. Indeed, Cambodia’s forests and environmental resources have 
witnessed unprecedented levels of exploitation (Le Billon, 2002). The lure of huge revenues 
has led to a transformation in the property rights landscape as speculators, investors, state 
agencies and transnational companies all competitively and often in alliance strive to carve 
out timber concessions areas, land for commercial plantations, and other revenue-earning 
opportunities.  
 
 Jefferson Fox (2002) examined how and why the process of land-grabbing and 
claiming space in the northeast province of Ratanakiri was leading to pressures on local 
communities to urgently become more territorialized themselves through processes of 
‘counter-mapping’. For whilst modern mapping has the tendency to destroy ‘indigenous 
conceptions of space’ by replacing ancestral and deeply held social meanings with ‘imagined 
lines on the ground’ (Fox, 1998, 2002; Kosek, 1998; Rundstrom, 1998), participatory 
exercises in counter-mapping can at least help to make communal practices and commons 
more legible in effort to defend community rights of access, sacred forests, and alternative 
resource practices. In the vast border spaces of northeastern Cambodia the ‘coming of modern 
geography’ has been historically recent but very sudden and violent, generating many actual 
conflicts. Fox (2002) realized the difficult dilemmas faced by ordinary people as they are 
more or less coerced into having to map their lands in order to prevent further encroachments, 
and enclosures crossing over into once common property spaces. As Fox (2002: 73) observes: 
‘Fluid and flexible boundaries within and between villages help to minimize conflicts.’ It is 
once the boundaries are ‘mapped’, fixed, ‘legitimized by the state’ that “conflicting images of 
reality cannot be overlooked any longer and must be addressed.” However, as discussed 
elsewhere in this thesis, formal mapping and territorialization, even by ordinary villagers, 
does not guarantee that traditional and communal rights will be protected, and may also create 
new territorial conflicts within and between villages.  
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 Unlike Ratanakiri, the Tonle Sap territorial system was heavily influenced by the 
fishing lot system introduced by the French colonial rulers, and so internal territorialization 
for resource revenues has at least one hundred years of history in the Lake. Even so, the Lake 
space continues to be re-envisioned and (re)territorialized ‘from above’ (commercial and 
conservation territorialities) and ‘from above’ and ‘below’ (public fishing spaces and 
community fishing territories), and the rest of the chapter shall focus on these processes.  
 
6.5 Freshwater Lake Territoriality and the Tonle Sap 
 
Virtually all discussions of territoriality in rural areas have focused on terrestrial 
issues, whether this be related to state territoriality associated with different institutions, land-
uses, or in Southeast Asia, control over forest resources (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; 
Vandergeest, 1996, 2003; Laungaramsri, 2002; Peluso, 2005a, 2005b). Relatively little 
attention has been afforded to the intensive territorialization affecting rivers, inland lakes and 
wetlands, which is ‘freshwater territoriality’ (Sithirith and Grundy-Warr, forthcoming). In the 
study of ‘freshwater territoriality’, I discuss how and why the Tonle Sap is territorialized by 
different agencies, sometimes in contradictory functional ways, which has fed into real tussles 
over resource rights, resource utilization and access. Prior to this research, these have not 
been much analysis of territoriality in relation to the lake, or indeed the Mekong Basin. Thus, 
this thesis intends to fill this gap. Furthermore, territoriality in the Tonle Sap involves great 
fluctuations of water level between the dry and wet seasons which is characteristic of the 
monsoonal Lower MekongWetlands. The ecological influences on human territoriality in this 
region are highly relevant and thus political territoriality discussion requires analysis of 
human-nature relations.  
 
 ‘Land territoriality’ controls movement in/out and within particular zones, and rules 
may be applied relatively to particular activities, such as cutting trees, collecting firewood, or 
other non-forest timber forest products. In ‘freshwater territoriality’ rules are applied zonnally 
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and territories relate to commercialization of fishing. The difference between freshwater 
bodies and forest on land is that there is already a natural waxing and waning, a rhythm of 
nature that affects water levels and the areal extent of water bodies.  
 
Water territoriality in the Tonle Sap is complex, partly due to its varied physical 
landscape, ecology and micro-habitats (Asian Development Bank, 2004; Campbell et al., 
2006; CNMC / Nedeco, 1998; Tana, 2000), and partly due to the political, economic, 
administrative and environmental divisions and zones affecting natural resource management. 
There are numerous ways in which the Tonle Sap area is territorialized and affects fishery 
practices. As Peluso (2005a: 6) has stressed: “territorialization produces places in relation to 
claimants”, and there are numerous territories and places in and around the Tonle Sap. In 
addition there exist problems of over-lapping claims, multi-functions (often with 
contradictions between fishery and conservation goals) in the same zones, boundary disputes 
exist between commercial, middle-scale and family fishers, and there is great ambiguity over 
the specific territorial and resource access rights afforded to different communities (even 
those within the same communities) (Sithirith & Grudy-Warr, forthcoming). 
 
As discussed earlier, the territorialization of the lake into fishing lots began with 
French Protectorate regime and has taken on new functional boundaries over time. The 
territoriality in the Tonle Sap is complex due to physical geographical, ecological, political 
and economic functions, and also due to population density around the lake with many 
settlements. My typology of different territorialities affecting the politics of space and 






6.6 The Commercial Fishing Territoriality 
 
In this section, I discuss the territorialization of freshwater lake of the Tonle Sap, 
tracing back to the history of the fishing lot and its evolution, and examine the implication of 
this system on the current fisheries management in the Tonle Sap.  
 
6.6.1 The Commercial Fishing Lot Territory in the Tonle Sap 
 
Large fishing area in the Tonle Sap is territorialized as a commercial fishing area. In 
1919, the commercial fishing area in the Tonle Sap Lake covered 603,880ha, but declined in 
1940 to about 444,970ha. However, after the Khmer Rouge (1979), the areas under the 
commercial fishing areas in the Tonle Sap Lake increased to about 507,731ha (Cheyvy and 
Le Poulain, 194024; Degen et al., 2000). By year 2000, the total commercial fishing lot area in 
the Tonle Sap remained an estimate of approximately 500,000 ha (DoF, 2001) and in 2001, 
the Royal Government of Cambodian reformed the fisheries sectors and released 46 percent 
of commercial fishing lot areas in the Tonle Sap Lake for public uses; thus, brought the total 
areas under the commercial fishing lot down to 271,127 ha (DoF, 2001).  
 
To promote a commercial exploitation of fisheries, the commercial fishing area is 
territorialized into different fishing territories, and each is demarcated with a boundary, 
covering a specific fishing territory, naming as a ‘fishing lot’. The fishing lot system was first 
established by the French Protectorate Regime and had been used even after the French 
Protectorate Regime (Degen and Thouk, 2000).  However, the fishing lot system was put into 
dysfunctional by the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979, and then by the Vietnamese 
supported government between 1979 and 1989 (Degen et al., 2000; Sneddon, 2007). Until 
late1980s, the State of Cambodia revisited the fishing lot system and re-introduced to inland 
fisheries management in Cambodia. The government’s main motivation for a return to the 
                                               
24
 Chevy and Le Poulain, 1940 is cited by Degen et al., 2000.  
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fishing lot system in 1989s appears to have been the need to raise national revenue (Degen et 
al., 2000; Gum, 2000; Sneddon, 2007). Such a motive has intensified in the transitional 
political economic period from an isolated socialist state to a multi-party, but still 
authoritarian state open to the world economy in the 1990s to the current time (Le Billon, 
2000; Springer, 2009b). So-called economic liberalization has served to enhance commercial 
territoriality in the country as a whole, and the fisheries of the Tonle Sap in particular. 
 
After the fisheries reform in 2001, the remaining commercial fishing areas in the 
Tonle Sap Lake were territorialized into 38 fishing lots; of which 9 fishing lots are located in 
Battambang province, covering 102,718 ha; 12 fishing lots in Kampong Chhnang Province, 
covering 45,085 ha; 7 fishing lots in Kampong Thom covering 69,353 ha; 5 fishing lots in 
Pursat Province covering 24,848 ha; 3 fishing lots in Siem Ream Province covering 22,725ha, 
and 2 fishing lots in Bantey Meanchey Province covering 6,398 ha (DoF, 2001). These range 
from 20 km2 to 350 km2 and include lake areas, river areas and inundated forest² (DoF, 2001).  
 
The fishing lots in Cambodia and in the Tonle Sap Lake are classified into two major 
types, namely the ‘fishing lot’ and ‘Dai lot’. First, ‘Dai lot’ is a kind of bagnet or stationary 
trawler positioned in the river to capture migratory fish. Many of these are located along the 
Tonle Sap and Mekong Rivers. Second, the ‘fishing lot’ is also classified into the ‘sand bank 
fishing lot’, which is found in the upper Mekong River in Kampong Cham and Kratie 
provinces; and riverine and lacustrine fishing lots, which are located around the Tonle Sap 
Lake and the major flood plains of the Mekong and Bassac river systems (Fiat Law, 1987; 
ADB, FAO and FiA, 2003; Vuthy et al., 2000; Degen and Thouk, 2000). 
 
As discussed previously, there are ‘auctioned fishing lot’ and those lots set aside for 
state fishing enterprise as ‘research fishing lot’ (ADB, FAO & DoF, 2003; Sneddon, 2007). 
While the former lots are at least auctioned to high bidders, the research lots are more 
communist inspiration in which it is not auctioned but granted based on connections (See 
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Figure 6.2). These lots were formulated by ‘comrades’ during the communist regime in 1997 
when Cambodia moved into the ‘market economy’ from a command economy, but they are 
still given over to private ownership without a public bidding process (Fisheries Law, 2006). 
The procedure governing these territorial lot determinations are not transparent and have 
reportedly led to irregularities (ADB, FAO & DoF, 2003). 
 
The territorialization of water in the Tonle Sap has serious implications for the the 
management of fisheries and it generates conflicts between the fishing lot and communities 
such as the boundary conflicts, the destructive fishing and poaching. These conflicts have 
produced many local tensions between fishing communities and fishing lot owners and 
caused intervention by the Royal Government of Cambodia (See Figure 6.2). 
 
6.6.2 The Power of the Fishing Lot Owners 
 
In political geography, ‘power’ is often seen in contigent, dispersed, and not 
necessarily territorial ways (Allen, 2003b). However, it is also the case that territorial control 
is significant in many environmental resource disputes (Vanergeest and Peluso, 1995; Peluso, 
2005b; Sithirith and Grundy-Warr, forthcoming). The analysis of power is relevant in the 
study of the fishing lot system in the Tonle Sap, and the analysis of power is detailed in the 
following section. Fishing lot owner is powerful in the Tonle Sap. This power can be seen in 
seven forms, which is territorial in different ways. First, fishing lot represents ‘power’ in two 
ways; (i) it is rich in fisheries and (ii) it covers huge fishing areas. Thus, as a space, fishing 
lots is a source of ‘latent material power’ (Penrose, 2002), which is a power to sustain life 
through extracting resources for commercial business. Those who have authority over the 
fishing lot areas are powerful because they win in a competition of politically and 
economically influential people to get control over the fishing lots. To be awarded a big 
‘fishing lot’, fishing lot owners employ ‘political power’ sometimes through their influence 
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upon or bribes to corrupted officials for protecting them in the competition. This represents 
the ‘terrestrial power’ of the fishing lot owners.  
 
Second, the large space of the fishing lot contains resources and Allen (1997) 
describes ‘resources’ as ‘power’. Third, the big fishing lot generates ‘big money’. The money 
represents the ‘wealth’ and ‘influence’ of the fishing lot owners over the management of the 
fishing lot, and this is another form of ‘power’ described by CDRI (2007a) and Allen (1997) 
as an ‘economic power’ and with this power, he/she is able to influence those who make 
decision over the allocation of the fishing lots and provide pay off to protectors to protect 
their benefits.   
 
Fourth, with ‘wealth’ and ‘influence’, fishing lot owner is powerful and as I have 
discussed, power is everywhere, it is mediated and contigent, and it is never static (Allen, 
2003b; Routledge, 1996). The power associated with fishing territoriality is partly related to 
extra-territorial bio-political relation and connetion (Alatout, 2006) found in Cambodia’s 
deeply entrenched patronage networks (Le Billon, 2000; 2001; 2002). This power can be 
represented at different levels with different people. At the national level, the fishing lot 
owners relate their power to the high ranking Government officials or ‘patrons’ of the 
Fisheries Administration in order to maintain their ‘long-term control’ over the fishing lots.  
In this context, the fishing lot owners build political connections in order to gain more 
‘political power’ in this business. In building ‘political power’, the fishing lot owners flex 
their economic muscles. Such ‘political power’ support is vital because most key decisions 
are made at national level and without such ‘political support’; it is not possible to get control 




















 Map 6. 1: Map of the Fishing Lots in the Tonle Sap Lake 
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With a ‘political support,’ the fishing lot owner has ‘khnong’ (backing) or political 
supporters at their backs, which could ensure their business security over rivals (Piseth, 2002; 
CDRI, 2007a). ‘Khnong’ is not easy to build, for it could develop only on ‘economic power’. 
However, even with economic power, it is difficult to have ‘knong’ or political supporters. In 
order to have ‘khnong’, they need to have a ‘khser’ (string or line) that connect them with the 
higher level officials. Some bodies with ‘khnong’ and ‘khser’ build the foundation of business 
opportunities for the fishing lot owners in the fishing lot.  
 
Fifth, the ‘big fishing lot’ is often located in ‘productive fishing spaces’ with ‘high 
productivity’, such as fishing lot no.6 in Peam Bang in Kampong Thom Province. The power 
of the fishing lot owners may be presented in the form of employing the labourers and armed 
groups to protect their fishing lot areas, and engaging the commune chiefs or district 
governors on their side. The analysis of this ‘power’ could be seen in the form of 
‘dependency’ on favor, economic inducements, and paymenrs for services rendered. Lastly, 
brute force or ‘coercive power’ is evident in the use of armed guards and private militia in 
order to guard lots. To control the big fishing lot, the fishing lot owner employs a ‘military 
power’, which means they employ security personnel with guns to protect the fishing lot 
areas.  
 
Sixth, as indicated above, many fishing lot owners, for instance fishing lot no.6, no.5 
and no.4 in Peam Bang, have been running their fishing lots more than 10 years. These prove 
that these owners have advantages over new challengers.  The current fishing lot owners are 
in possession of extensive knowledge about the real productivity of the fishing lots, which 
may differ substantially from the official reported figure. The current fishing lot owners have 
empirical knowledge about the social relations and behavior of poachers. They have built 
relations with fisheries officials and have developed efficient protection mechanisms for the 
fishing lots. These advantages reduce transaction costs, such as the cost of acquiring 
information, negotiating contracts and enforcing them (Degen and Thouk, 2000; Piseth, 
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2002). This suggests that knowledge is power. The current fishing lot owners have ownership 
over large-scale fishing equipments.  
 
Last, but not least, the fishing lot owners use ‘discursive power’, which is provided 
by the legal framework such as existing ‘fisheries laws’ and sub-decrees in their control over 
fisheries, following the wining in the bidding process. With this power, the fishing lot owners 
have received exclusive power over the fishing lot areas and they act to include those who 
supports and exclude those who are against them.  
 
6.6.3 The Management of the Fishing Lots in the Tonle Sap 
 
The fishing lots are effectively privatized state property. The state controls and 
manages the fishing lots through renting it to private investors through auctions as well as 
other means. In this system, the high bidders will win the auction process and will have 
exclusive ownership over the fishing lots while the non-auctioned systems are the so-called 
research fishing lots which are granted to private owners without bidding. The following 
section discusses the management of fishing lots.  
 
6.6.3.1 The Fishing lot Territoriality in the Tonle Sap 
 
Fishing lot is controlled and managed by the fishing lot owner. Many fishing lot 
owners have run their lots for more than 10 years, for instance, the fishing lot no.6 in 
Kampong Thom and fishing lot no.2 in Battambang Provinces; and thus, they have developed 
a fundamental control system over their fishing lot area.  Generally, fishing lot owners agree 
on sub-contracts prior to the auction in order to collect the starting capitals for bidding. The 
fishing lot might be owned by only one fishing lot owner, for instance the Dai fishing lot 
(bagnet fisheries) or by more than one owners in the case of riverine and lacustraine lots, but 
followed by various  sub-leaseholder and sizeable number of sub-sub subcontractors (Vuthy 
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et al., 2000; Degen et al., 2000; Van Acker, 2005). The fishing lot owner receives a full 
control over the fishing lot areas and classifies it into small lots. In most cases, the lot owner 
leases out some parts of the fishing grounds to the leaseholders by signing contracts on a 
yearly basis and leaseholder sub-leases out some parts of the fishing grounds to sub-
leaseholders. These leasers, sub-leasers fence and pen lots, practicing a total harvest approach 
to fish production within their lots, using a variety of illegal and unsustainable fishing 
methods and practices  in an attempt to catch all fish inside the lot  (Vuthy et al., 2000; see 
Figure 6.1).  
 




The fishing lot owners lease out the sub-fishing lots to different leaseholders. For 
instance, the fishing lot no.2 in Battambang Province was classified into 8 sub-lots by the lot 
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owners, consisting of creeks and lakes such as Prek Long Ong, Stung Chase, Prek Da, Prek 
Ang Krong, Prek Moss, Prek Spot, Prek Preah Dam Cheur, and Prek Norea. He then leased 
out 8 sub-lots, but kept the sub-lot located in the Tonle Sap area for fishing himself. 
Specifially, he leased out Prek Norea sub-lots located inside the lot no.2 for US$9,000 to the 
leaseholder for fishing season of 1997-98 (Gum, 1998). Each leaseholder manages his own 
sub-lot the same way as the fishing lot owner. This means that each leaseholder sub-divides 
the sub-lot into sub-sub-lot, such as discrete lakes or creeks, and sub-leases them to sub-sub-
leaseholders under various arrangements (Gum, 1998).  
 
Subsequently, the lot owners and leaseholders sell fishing rights to individual 
fishermen or groups of fishermen with certain conditions after the end of main fishing 
operations. The main fishing right arrangements include a fee per boat, a fee for certain 
fishing grounds, a fee for certain fishing gears, sharing of fish catch for certain fishing 
grounds or certain fishing gears…etc (Vuthy et al., 2000). For instance, in the fishing lot no.2, 
the fishing lot owner fishes the lake himself using seine net and then allows people to fish in 
areas he had fished already. These people gave him 40 percent of the catch and kept 60 
percent. The leaseholder of the creeks in lot number 2 leased fishing rights to people in four 
phases; the first phase is in October and cost US$30 per boat for the month; the second phase 
in November cost US$24/boat/month; the third phase is in December and cost US$18; and the 
fourth phase is after the creek has been seined by the bamboo fence, a process referred to as 
‘kimnear’. People are also allowed to fish this area after bamboo fence has finished already, 
giving the owner 40 percent of the catch, leaving 60 percent for the crew (Gum, 1998). 
 
Another example is taken from the fishing lot no.6 in Kampong Thom in Peam Bang. 
This fishing lot has 3 co-shareholders, and they lease out some parts of the fishing grounds to 
four different leaseholders. As a strategy of the fishing operation, the lot owner allows 55 
families to stay inside the fishing lot and operate with their own fishing equipment in assigned 
fishing areas. All the catch has to be delivered to the lot owner at a lower price than the 
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actually prevailing price in the area.  In practice the informal fishing lot management is quite 
complicated (Vuthy et al., 2000). The fishing lot no.19 in Takeo province in 1997 was 
divided by the fishing lot owner into 18 sub-lots and he leased out the sub-lots to 14 different 
leaseholders. Each leaseholder spent a lot of money to pay the lot owner for the control of the 
sub-lot (Swift, 1997; Degen and Thouk, 2000).  
 
Moreover, the fishing lot areas tend to be more fragmented, and that the average area 
per fishing lot tends to be declined. Both movements are a way of allowing more operators 
into the commercial sector; different sites for one lot for example, tend to be sub-leased by the 
concessionaire to other operators. The possible reason for this is consistent with the argument 
presented in the text. On the one hand, as the commons become more crowded, the privatized 
enforcement costs of physical expansion imposed by the institutional model of exclusion of 
subsistence fisheries would tend to increase in an exponential fashion. To intensify operations 
(to sustain higher yields on a given surface), more capital needs to be added. As a 
consequence, fishing operations tend to become more capital-intensive. If all operators follow 
the same line, a new entrant will be forced to do the same to achieve a comparable yield. 
 
6.6.3.2 The Controls of the Fishing Lots 
 
Territoriality is related to asserting ‘control’ over resources and people (Vandergeest, 
1996). Vandergeest gives an example in Thailand that the state territorialized forest resources 
for state control. Similarly, the fishing lot system in the Tonle Sap is also a ‘strategy’ 
employed to control resources in the lake through controlling fishing area, controlling people 
and controlling access to fisheries (See Figure 6.2). The French Protectorate Regime and the 
following regimes demarcated the fishing lot with boundaries, and set the rule for crossing the 
boundary (Degen et al.., 2000). The ‘boundary rules’ define which social actors have access 
(Ostrom et al.,1994).  
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The control of access to fishing lot is categorized into five types including the spatial 
control, temporal control, control of the fishing gears used, the control of people movement, 
and ideological control. The discussion of each of these controls is detailed in the following 
section.  
 
a) Spatial Control 
 
The spatial control refers to the control of areas within the boundary of the fishing 
lot. The spatial control starts at the time the fishing lot owners received official grant 
(research fishing lot) or won the public auctioning (auctioned lot). The fishing lot owner is the 
legal person, having a sole authority to control the fishing lot territory. However, the fishing 
lot territory is geographically large, with size varying from 20 km2 to 350 km2, including lake 
areas, river areas and inundated forest (Van Zalinge et al., 2000; Degen and Thouk, 2000). 
Hence, the control of the fishing lot area is more complex (See Figure 6.2). 
 
Spatial Control is not the control for land or water; but, it is a control to keep fish 
inside the fishing lot areas; and people could go across the fishing lot areas without problem if 
they do not catch fish or disturb fish. Thus, the control of areas or water bodies where fish 
live is spatially important, such as the control of deep water pool inside the fishing lot areas. 
To control fish in areas mentioned above, fishing lot owners fence and pen fishing lots using 
the different fishing equipments such as the amboo fence and mess sizenet to trap fish inside 
fishing lots (See Figure 6.2).  
 
b) Temporal Control 
 
The temporal control is the control of fishing activities both in the close and the open 
fishing seasons. The temporal control is classified into two types; ‘legal temporal control’ and 
the ‘biological temporal control’. The ‘legal temporal control’ is a control of the fishing lot 
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areas by the lot owner through a legal process including auctioned process and officials 
awards. The ‘legal temporal control’ for the auctioned fishing lot is two-year period, while the 
research fishing lot is six-year period. During these periods, fishing lot owners have exclusive 
rights to control the fishing lot areas (See Figure 6.2).  
 
However, the ‘biological temporal control’ is the control of fishing activities inside 
the fishing lot based on the biological function of fish including the time and season when 
fish breed, lay egg and grow up. Thus, the ‘biological temporal control’ is classified into the 
‘close and open fishing’ seasons. The ‘open fishing season’ starts from October and ends at 
the end of May. Morever, the ‘close fishing season’ starts in June and ends in October (Law 
on Fisheries, 2006). During the close fishing season, fishing activities using fishing gears 
larger than the small-scale fishing is not allowed, as this is a time for fish to lay egg, breed 
and grow up.  
 
c) Control of Fishing Gear 
 
The control of the fishing gears is another type of control that fishing lot owners 
employ to limit neighboring fishing communities to fishing with small fishing gears in both 
close and open fishing seasons. As stated earlier, fishing lots are fished intensively in the open 
fishing season, but not in the close fishing season (Fisheries Law, 2006; Van Acker, 2005). 
According to Fisheries Law (2006), small-scale fishing is allowed through out the year, even 
inside the fishing lot areas during the close fishing season; but, fishing lot owners eventually 
do not allow small-scale fisher to fish inside the fishing lot areas during the ‘close fishing 
season’, because they believe that fishing in a ‘close fishing season’ would disturbs the 
biological function of fish in their lot area, and damage the fish habitats. In the control of 
fishing lot areas, fishing lot owners restrict the uses of fishing gears that could scare fish away 
from their lot areas (per.comm with fishers in Peam Bang, August 2007). The electrocute 
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fishing gear is totally prohibited in both open and close fishing season given their nature of 
destructive characteristics (See Figure 6.2).   
 
d) Control of People Access to Fisheries 
 
Fishing lot owners actually control people movement across fishing lot areas. They 
employ private guards to check people travelling across fishing lot areas to see whether there 
is fish caught inside the lot or illegal fishing gears. On the other hand, fishing lot owners keep 
the movement of people across fishing lot areas to a minimum possible due to the fact that 
this movement could scare away fish (Gum, 2000; Swift, 1997; Sithirith, 2000). Vuthy et al., 
(2000) demonstrate that fishing lot owners even do not allow villagers to travel across fishing 
lot areas although their houses located within the fishing lots. He also mentioned that fishing 
lot guards ask villagers to pay if they travel across the fishing lot areas (See Figure 6.1).  
 
For the river, fishing lot owners often block the river with bamboo gate, leaving only 
one third for the navigation. Navigation across the bamboo gate is not easy. The response to 
the control by local communities was the widespread of conflict between fishing community 
and the fishing lot owners (Sophat et al., 2004; Sithirith, 2000; Van Acker, 2005). 
 
6.6.4 Boundary of Fishing Lots in the Tonle Sap  
 
The fishing lot territory is delimited with boundaries. Fishing conflicts between 
fishing community and fishing lots occur due to unclear boundaries of fishing lots (Vuthy et 
al., 2000; Degen et al., 2000; Van Acker, 2005). Moreover, in the Tonle Sap, ‘boundary’ of 
fishing lot can be understood in three different ways. First, ‘boundary’ is used to demarcate 
the fishing lot territory, to exclude people from fishing inside the fishing lot areas and to 
control people movement across the boundary. Second, however, the boundary of the fishing 
lot in the Tonle Sap is used for fishing, controlling the fish—this is extraordinary how 
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boundary be used for controlling fish in the open water body as fish migrates borderless. 
Third, the boundary is marked on fluctuated water levels varying from 1.5m above sea level 
(asl) in the dry season to 9m in the wet season. For understanding of boundaries of 
commercial fishing lots in the Tonle Sap, I categorize the ‘boundary’ of fishing lot into two 
main categories—the ‘fixed boundary’ and the ‘floated boundary’ and I discuss each of these 
in more details (See Figure 6.2).  
 
6.6.4.1 The Floated Boundary of a Commercial Fishing Lot 
 
Boundaries of fishing lots in the Tonle Sap are contested due to nature of rising and 
falling water systems. It is contested in two ways due to fluctuated water levels both in the 
dry and wet seasons in the lake; first, one side of the fishing lot, especially the side facing to 
the land area is an open ended boundary line, and thus, fishing lot owners claim ‘tuk dal na, lo 
dal neung’ (where the rising water reached, the boundary of the fishing lot is out there) (See 
Figure 6.2). This has led to a rise of fishing conflicts throughout the lake between fishing lot 
owners and fishers (Van Acker, 2005; Sithirith, 2000; Gum, 2000).  
 
Second, on the other side of the fishing lot, especially the side facing to the open 
water bodies in the Lake, the boundary is rising in the wet season and failing in the dry 
season—when water levels rise up, then the boundary line is up; when water levels fall down, 
then, the boundary line is down. As a consequence, fishing lot owners extend its boundaries 
or ‘vang’ (buffering) into this area, conflicting with local communities (Sithirith, 2007; Gum, 
1998). Extending fishing lot boundaries bring more benefits to fishing lot owners (Vuthy et 
al., 2000; Degen et al., 2000), but conflict with local communities (Van Acker, 2005; Gum, 




6.6.4.2 The Fixed Boundary of the Fishing Lot 
 
The boundary line of the fishing lot is clearly mapped on the paper. The map is used 
to delineate the boundaries of the fishing lots. As a result, the fishing lot owners fence around 
the lot areas with a bamboo fence. This is what I call a ‘fixed boundary’. According to Fishery 
Law (2006), fishing lot owners fish inside fishing lot areas only in the open fishing season 
(October to May), and end their fishing actvities in the close fishing season. As a result, 
during the close fishing season, the bamboo fence is removed, particularly from the end of 
May, returning fishing lot areas to ‘open access’ for a period of six months (May to October), 
but it is a ‘control open access’, in which all types of fishing activities, except small-scale 
fishing, are not allowed in these areas during the close fishing season. Thus, the fixed 
boundary of the fishing lot is only temporal, but it is renewed every six months under the 
rising and falling water levels between the wet and the dry seasons, making its more 
contested. Then, I categorize the fixed boundary in the Tonle Sap into two types—spatial 
boundary and temporal boundary (See Figure 6.2).  
 
a) Temporal Boundary of the Fishing Lot 
 
The boundary of fishing lot is contested between the dry and the wet fishing seasons, 
or the open and the close fishing seasons. In the open fishing season, the fishing lot owner 
fences around fishing lot areas. The fence functions in three ways; first, as a boundary of a 
fishing lot; second, as control of the movement of people across the fishing lot areas; and 
third, as trap of fish inside the fishing lots. In other word, I call the bamboo fence a ‘physical 
boundary’ of the fishing lot that can be seen clearly—half of the bamboo fence is above 
surface of water and another half goes underground (See Figure 6.2).  
 
In the close fishing season, the fishing lot owner ends their fishing activities and by 
the legal framework, the ‘bamboo fence’ or the ‘physical boundary’ is removed from the 
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ground, returning the fishing lot areas to an open access. As a result, fish migrate all over the 
place to breed, spawn and grow in the flooded forest where there are abundant fish nutrients.  
 
Thus, the removal of ‘physical boundary’ and then the reinstalment of the boundary 
give a notion of a ‘temporal boundary’. The installment of physical boundary turns the fishing 
areas into the commercial fishing lot, managed by the private. However, the removal of a 
physical boundary of the fishing lot turns the fishing lot areas into the open access. The 
removal of ‘physical boundary’ at the end of the open fishing season, and then the 
reinstalment at start of the open fishing season under the falling and rising water levels system 
give rise to the fishing lot’s boundary contestation.  
 
b) Spatial Boundary of the Fishing Lot 
 
The frequent removal and instalment of ‘physical boundary’ induce an unfixed 
location of the boundary of the fishing lot. This means that the location to mark the bamboo 
fence as a boundary of the fishing lot last year is not the same for this year as well as the 
subsequent year. I call this type of boundary a ‘spatial boundary’ of fishing lot, often inducing 
more conflicts with fishing communities (See Figure 6.2).   
 
When the the bamboo fence is removed in the close fishing season, the boundary 
becomes an ‘imagined boundary’, and the level of imagination increases under the rising and 
falling water levels between the wet and dry seasons; and when the bamboo fence is installed, 
it is never installed in the same location.  The removal and instalment of bamboo fence as a 
boundary makes the possibility for fishing lot owner to expand the boundary of the fishing 
lot. However, while it is imagined, it is also changing; on one hand, it is marked on rising and 
falling waters between the wet and dry seasons; and on the other hand, the boundary line, 
which is based on the bamboo fence, is frequently removed. Thus, the fishing lot boundary is 
contested and never exact on rising and falling water.  
 230 
Thus, the boundary of the fishing lot is moving within a spatial area due to; first, the 
nature of rising and falling water levels; second, the frequent removals and installments 
ofbamboo fances; and the location, marking the boundary varies from years to year, 
contributing to conflicts over boundaries. In other word; the boundary of fishing lot moves 
and changes within the ‘boundary space’, in which the boundary is not a single line, but a 
collection of lines, forming a space. Thus, the boundary line changes within the ‘boundary 
space’. Boundary space is a ‘space’, and within ‘space’, line is constructed. Thus, boundary in 
the dry season may be different from the wet season, but can be in a ‘boundary space’.  
 
6.6.4.3 Fishing Lot Tenure System 
 
Fishing lot is a form of state privatizing fishing areas to private ownership. It is given 
to private ownership through bidding or non-bidding processes. The fishing lots are managed 
based on the system of the close and open fishing seasons, in which  fishing lot owners only 
have exclusive rights over fishing lot territories in the open fishing season, effective from 
October to May25.  Thus, fishing lot owners have an ownership over fishing lots temporally, 
and I call this a ‘temporal tenure’ over the fishing lots.  The concept of the temporal tenure 
gives a sense of lacks of a long-term responsibility, resulting in over-exploitation of fisheries 
resources.  
 
However, in the close fishing season, effective from May to October, fishing lot 
owners have no rights over fishing lot areas. All forms of fishing activties by fishing lot 
owners inside fishing lot areas are removed, and the whole lots are converted into an open 
access. Fishing activities of all scales in the open access areas are banned, except small-scale 
                                               
25
 Fishing season is categorized into 2 specific seasons; open fishing season and closed fishing season. Open 
season is: from 1 October to 31 May in the area located north of the parallel “Quatre Bras”; from 1 November to 
30 June in the area located south of the parallel “Quatre Bras”. The open fishing season is applied for both medium 
and large scale fishery. Closed fishing season starts from 31 May to 1 October every year. In this period, fishing 
gears must be removed from fishing grounds. Medium and large scale fishing stops its operation,; small scale 
fishery can operate in both open and close fishing season. 
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fishing. I call this a ‘temporal absence of tenure’ between May and October. During this 
period, everyone can access and thus, there is a tendancy of competition from users, leading 
to possibility of maximizing the catch.  
 
Moreover, as many fishing lot owners owning fishing lots longer than 10 years, the 
‘temporal tenure’ develops into a ‘semi-permanent tenure’, in which fishing lot owners have 
exclusive rights over fishing lot territories both in the close and open fishing seasons. This is 
contrary to theoretical and legal rhetorics claiming that fishing lot owners do not have legal 
rights over the fishing lot territory during the close fishing season (Fisheries Law, 2006). This 
is not simply determined by a ‘open or close fishing seasons’ as stated in the fisheries laws, 
but by an ability of the fishing lot owner to pay to get the fishing lot territory under his/her 
control. Similarly and legally, small scale fishing could fish throughout the year and all over 
the place (Fisheries Law, 2006), but practically, villagers in Pov Veu, Daun Sdeung claim that 
fishing lot owners even do not allow small-scale fishers to fish in the territory of the fishing 
lots during the close fishing season (Field Notes, 2006-2007). 
 
Table 6. 1: The fishing lot guards and weapons by selected province in the Tonle Sap 




per lot  
No.of 
weapon 






No. of arm 
per guard 
Battambang 9 82 9.1 64 7.1 0.8 
Bantey 
Meanchey 
4 34 8.5 21 5.2 0.6 
Kampong 
Chhnang 
6 >51 >8.5 128 21.3 2.5 
Pursat 4 42 10.5 204 51 1.2 
Source: Extract from fishing lot inventory conducted by the Management Component of the 
Cambodian Freshwater Capture Fisheries of the MRC Fisheries Section Program, 2000 
 
The fishing lot owners organize their own armies and privatize the enforcement of the 
Laws, leaving a little room for participation of villagers. Frequently, even in the close fishing 
season in the lot area itself, when commercial operations do not have a franchise in these 
areas, fishing lot operator maintained their armed guards in the lot area to protect fish (See 
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Table 6.1). For example in Kampong Thom Province, the fishing lot owners of lot no.6 
closely cooperate with the military division based inside the fishing lot areas. The military 
protects the fishing lot areas whole year round in exchange for exclusive rights to fish trading 
in certain part of the fishing lot (Vuthy et al., 2000; Degen et al., 2000). In Kampong 
Chhnang in two fishing lots, two months before the start of the open fishing season (1999-
2000), the lot owner intimidated and threatened villagers with destroying the irrigation dikes 
inside the fishing lot area (Degen et al., 2000). 
 
6.7 The Conservation Territoriality 
 
Large fishing area in the Tonle Sap is designated as a conservation area (See Chapter 
4). This has happened since 1940s and continues till today. The conservation in the Tonle Sap 
is classified into two categories: the ‘fish sanctuaries’ and the ‘biosphere reserves’. The ‘fish 
sanctuary’ is formed as a part of the commercial fishing lot areas and in support of the 
commercial fishing lots. However, in 1993, after the reunification of Cambodia, the increased 
environmental concern resulted in the formation of the Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve (TSBR). 
It was initiated under the UNESCO Program of a Biosphere Man.  The ‘fish sanctuary’ and 
the ‘Biosphere Reserve’ is a form of conservation territoriality in the Tonle Sap Lake (See 
Figure 6.2).  
 
6.7.1 The Fish Sanctuary 
 
The ‘fish sanctuary’ was established in 1940s under the French Protectorate Regime, 
and it continues to exist since then in the Tonle Sap Lake (ADB, FAO & DoF, 2003). It has 
been created with the objective of providing refuges for fish broodstock to escape intensive 
fishing inside the fishing lot and the public fishing areas during the dry season so as to 
improve replenishment of the fish stocks during the breeding season. The serious decline in 
some fish stocks and the threatened status of some fish species makes protection of 
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broodstock a high priority. Fish sanctuaries play a major role in achieving this objective. By 
1998s, the fish sanctuary covered 24,680 ha in the Tonle Sap (ADB, FAO & DoF, 2003). Fish 
sanctuary is a territory that is specifically designed to protect spawning grounds (Articles 3 
and 16, Fisheries Law, 1987).  
 
Fish sanctuary is territorialized into 8 different fish sanctuaries, distributed all over 
the Lake including four in Pursat, 2 in Kampong Thom, one in Siem Reap and one in 
Battambang. The first largest fish sanctuary is a ‘Kampong Phluk fish sanctuary’ located in 
Siem Reap Province, covering 6,400 ha; the second largest fish sanctuary is Dei Roneath 
located in Pursat province covering an estimated area of about 6,000 ha, and the third fish 
sanctuary is a Kampong Prak in Pursat province. The rest of the fish sanctuary is relatively 
small, covering an area ranging between 1,000 and 1,900 ha (See Table 6.2).   
 
Fish sanctuary, either small or large, is delineated with boundaries the same as the 
commercial fishing lot, but it is not fenced with the bamboo fence, but with six concret pillars 
placing around the sanctuary in the open water body that can be seen both in the wet and the 
dry seasons. Given this, the ‘boundaries’ of fish sanctuaries functions in two ways; first, it 
allows all forms of navigation26 across the fish sanctuaries since it has no bamboo fence 
placing around its like fishing lot; and second, however, it prohibits all forms of fishing 
activities inside the fish sanctuary. This is a physical boundary of fish sanctuaries and this 
‘boundary’ is abstract given the change in water level between the dry and wet season in the 
Tonle Sap Lake.  
 
‘Fish sanctuary’ is a state property and it is controlled by the state, but this means two 
things; on one hand, it means that the ‘state property’ is everybody property and on the other 
hand, state property is no body’s property (Bromley, 1992; 1991; Dolsak and Ostrom, 2003). 
                                               
26
 It is not clear if negative impacts on fish sanctuaries might arise from commercial navigation 
especially when the lake level is low. 
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This affects the management of fish sanctuaries. To control fish sanctuaries, Fisheries 
Administration (FiA), as a ‘state agency’, sets a ‘physical control’, including the ‘spatial 
control’ and ‘temporal control’. To manage fish sanctuaries, FiA employs a ‘spatial control’ 
to enforce the management of ‘fish sanctuaries’, and they assign technical staffs to guard fish 
sanctuaries, most of them stationed in the lowest unit of FiA known as a ‘sankat nesat’. 
Furthermore, the location of some fish sanctuaries in the Tonle Sap Lake is also questionable, 
as some are in shallow waters. Fish sanctuaries should ideally be situated in the deepest parts 
of the lake (where larger broodstock could be expected to congregate during the dry season) 
or habitats which play critical roles in life cycles. However, staffs receive a low salary, and 
they suffer from lack of financial supports from a government. This affects the enforcement 
and management of fish sanctuaries (ADB, FAO and DoF, 2003). In addition, FiA controls 
fishing activities through a ‘temporal control’ in which some fishing activities are allowed in 
the open fishing season while others are allowed in the close fishing season. However, in fish 
sanctuaries, all fishing activities are prohibited in close and open fishing seasons inside the 
fish sanctuaries.  
 
Table 6. 2: The fish sanctuary in the Tonle Sap Lake 
Province Name of fish sanctuary Area (ha) 
Battambang Pak Kantel 1200 
Pursat Dei Roneath 6000 
 Raing Til 1800 
 Kampong Prack 4,500 
 Chroy Sdei 1,950 
Kampong Thom  Balot 1800 
 Pistoun 1030 
Siem Reap Kampong Phluk 6,400 
Total  8 fish sanctuaries  24680 
Source: DoF, 2003 
 
6.7.2 The Biosphere Reserve Territoriality 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the global significance of the Tonle Sap for biodiversity 
conservation. For the conservation purposes, Royal Decree designates the Tonle Sap Lake as 
a multiple-use protected area in 1993, and furthermore, the lake was declared as a Biosphere 
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Reserve Areas in 1997 under the Man and the Biosphere Program of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Following that the Tonle Sap 
Biosphere Reserve (TSBR) was established by Royal Degree in 2001 (RGC, 2001; Sokhem & 
Sunada, 2006). 
 
The Degree gives to the TSBR three complementary functions on conservation, 
development and logistics: 
a) a conservation function to contribute to the conservation of biological 
diversity, landscapes, and ecosystem, including genetic resources, plant, 
fishery and animal species, and to the restoration of the essential character of 
the environment and habitat of biodiversity; 
b) a development function to foster sustainable development of ecology, 
environment, economy, society, and culture; 
c) a logistic function to provide support for demonstration projects, 
environmental education and training, research and monitoring of environment 
related to the local, national and global issues of conservation and sustainable 
development” (Article 1, Royal Decree on the Establishment and Management 
of the Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve, RGC, 2001). 
 
To conserve the resources and biodiversity in the Tonle Sap, the Lake is 
territorialized into three main territorial zones—the transitional zone, the buffer zone and the 
core zone (See Map 6.2). This is what I call a ‘conservation territoriality’ of the Tonle Sap.  
This section discusses the detail of each territoriality and its functions and management 
system  (See Figure 6.2).  
  
6.7.2.1 The Transition Zone 
 
The transition zone covers an area of 899,600 ha, which is limited between the outer 
boundary of the buffer zone and National Road N5 and National Road N6 (RGC, 2001).  This 
is an area encircling the lake which includes most of the Great lake floodplain and some areas 
of upland wet season rice production known as a sreleu (Keskinen and Sithirith, 2010). The 
transition zone is an integrated economic zone, where there are more agricultural activities, 
more human settlement and different types of land uses (RGC, 2001). The transition zone is 
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set to promote the management of resources and human activities in the transitional areas of 
the Tonle Sap in order to reduce the adverse effects on the buffer zone and the core zone of 
the Tonle Sap Lake.  
 
The transition zone is marked by a boundary which could be visualized clearly on 
map, but poorly on the ground. There is no significant boundary demarcation of the “transion 
zone” on the ground (See Map 6.2). However, the transition zone falls largely in the area 
known as a public fishing area which is defined by FiA as an open access. Unlike the public 
fishing area, however, there is no specific control mechanism set for the transition zone by 
MoE; thus, making the transition zone an ‘open access for conservation which sounds 
impractical (See Figure 6.2).  
 
6.7.2.2 The Buffer Zone 
 
The buffer zone covers the core area of the Tonle Sap Lake, extending outward upto 
the outer boundary of the ‘transition zone’ with an estimated coverage of 541,482 ha (See 
Table 6.3). The buffer zone is used for the research; the management of flooded forest, 
fishery, agriculture, housing settlement, land use, water resources, navigation and tourism; 
and preserving the environment and fish (RGC, 2001). Activities in this area are managed to 
be consistent to the protection and conservation of the core areas.  
 
The same as the ‘transition zone’, the boundary of the buffer zone is clearly marked 
on map, but no demarcation occurred on the ground; thus, making the control of the buffer 
zone a problematic. There is no clear control mechanism set for the buffer zone. However, 
large area of the buffer zone falls within the commercial fishing lot areas, in which they are 
privatized for commercial exploitation of fisheries resources. Thus, the management of the 
buffer zone is largedly dominated by the private control and commercial exploitation; and so, 
questioning the role of buffer zone for conservation functions.  
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  Map 6. 2: Map of The Biosphere Reserves Areas in the Tonle Sap Lake 
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6.7.2.3 The Core Zone 
 
The buffer zone is territorialized into three territorial zones; namely Prek Toal, Boeng 
Tonle Chhmar, and Stung Sen, covering an estimated area of 42,257ha (See Table 6.3). They 
are called a core zone of the Tonle Sap. The designing of the core zone is to securely protect 
the sites for conserving biodiversity, monitoring minimally disturbed ecosystems, and 
undertaking nondestructive research and other low-impact uses such as education. The core 
zone is characterized by a preserved flooded forest, rich river systems, and biodiversity; 
nearly 100 water bird species are found there, a dozen of which are of global significance; and 
the areas are known for species such as crocodiles, turtles, macaques, capped langurs, otters, 
and water snakes (TSBR, no date). Thus, the core areas are defined likewise national park or 
wildlife sanctuary, which are devoted to long term protection and conservation of natural 
resources and ecosystem. Management activities that would cause degradation and 
destruction of biodiversity are not permitted (UNDP/GEF, 2004). 
 
Table 6. 3: The Core Zones in the Tonle Sap Lake 
Core Zone Coverage area Fising lot No. village 
Prek Toal 21,342 
2 (Fishing Lot no.2 and some parts of  
fishing no.1 in Battambang Province) 8 
Boeung Chmar 14,560) 
3 (mainly fishing no.6, no.5  
and partly fishing lot no.4 5 
Stung Sen 6,355 
3 (mainly fishing lot no.3, and  
Partly fishing lot no.1 and no.2 5 
Total 42,267 7 18 
Source: TSBR, 2007; Field Notes, 2007 
 
Prek Toal Core Zone in Battambang Province covers 21,342 ha and two fishing lots 
(fishing lot no. 1 and no.2) are located inside the Prek Toal Core Zone. Within the Core area, 
there are 8 villages located inside the Prek Toal Core Zone (See Table 6.3). These villages are 
fishing villages where most of the people depend primarily on natural resources (RGC, 2001; 
TSBR, 2007). Some 8 fishing lots fall within the buffer zone of the Prek Toal Core Zone, 
most of them located in Battambang Province (Gum, 1998; TSBR, 2007).   
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The second Core Zone is located in Peam Bang Commune in Kampong Thom 
Province, covering 14,560ha and three fishing lots are located within the ‘Core Zone’, namely 
fishing lot no.4, no.5 and no.6 and it is called a Boeung Chmar Core Zone (See Table 6.3). 
The Boeung Chhmar Core Zone is home to many fishermen living in five floating villages 
located within the ‘Core Zone’. Boeung Chmar is a big lake located in the center of this ‘Core 
Zone’ (RCG, 2001; Sophat et al., 2004; TSBR, 2007). As a Core Zone, Boeung Chmar is 
surrounded by buffer zone covering fishing lots and villages. This ‘Core Zone’ covers large 
area in Kampong Thom Province and small area in Siem Reap Province. In Siem Reap, one 
village known as Moat Khla and fishing lot no.7 in Siem Reap is located within the Boeung 
Chmar Core Zone. Three fishing lots—fishing lot no.6, no.5 and no.4—and 5 villages in 
Kampong Thom are located in the Boeung Chmar Core Zone (RGC, 2001; TSBR, 2007; 
Sophat et al., 2004).  
 
The third Core Zone is located in Stung Sen in Phat Sanday commune, Kampong 
Thom Province. This Core Zone covers an area of 6,355ha. Five fishing villages and three 
fishing Lots—fishing lot no.1, no.2 and no.3 are located within the Core Zone. The Stung Sen 
is surrounded by a buffer zone which extends beyond the core area covering 7 villages.  This 
buffer zone is not that large compared to the first and second Core Zones (See Table 6.3).  
 
The same as the ‘transition zone’ and ‘buffer zone’, the boundary of ‘core zone’ is 
clearly marked on map, but not clearly demarcated on the ground, and thus, making the 
control problematic. The control and management of the “core zone” and the ‘buffer zone’ 
become more problematics as about half of the ‘buffer zone’ overlaps the fishing lot areas 
(TSBR, 2007). The ‘Prek Toal core zone’ overlaps fishing lot # 2 in Battambang Province; 
and the ‘Boeng Chhmar core area’ overlaps fishing lot # 6 and the ‘Stung Sen core area’ 
overalaps fishing lot # 3 in Kompong Thom Province (DoF, 2003). Apart from fishing, the 
TSBR is also home to 2,218 people (Seila, 2005).  
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The fishing lot no.2 in Battambang is owned by the same person for more than 10 
years. He spends annually an estimate of US$45,000, and it is estimated that he would catch 
approximately more than 2,000 tons a year to make his profit and to continue his business and 
his control over this fishing lot as lucrative (Gum, 1998). This poses a major threat for 
conservation. Similarly, the Boeung Chmar Core Zone overlaps fishing lot no.6, no.5 and 
no.4 in Kampong Thom Province. The annual fishing fee of the ‘fishing lot no.6’ was varied 
between 200,000,000 Riel (US$50,000) and 220,000,000 Riel (US$55,000). The annual 
estimated fee from the fishing lot no.6, no.5 and no.4 was estimated at about US$103,750-
US$114,500 (DoF, 2003). To make a profit, the fishing lot owners maximize the fishing and 
therefore, it affects the conservation efforts in Boeung Chmar.  
 
The fishing lot is given to private lot owner for commercial exploitation by FiA and 
MAFF; and therefore, there is less sense of conservation with the fishing lot owner. However, 
the core zone is under two juridical systems; one by MAFF and another one by MoE. Thus, 
on the same area, there are at least two different legal frameworks use to enforce on the same 
space. There is a conflict between the fishing lot and the biosphere reserve plus the conflict of 
institutional interests. All affects the management of the fishing lots as well as the 
conservation of the biosphere reserve (RGC, 2001). 
 
6.8 The Subsistence Territoriality in the Tonle Sap 
 
Area outside the fishing lot, the fish sanctuary and the cultivate area is named as a 
‘public area’. The public area in the Tonle Sap is used by people for fishing; settlement; and 
navigation, estimating at about 874,781ha (See Table 6.4). The public area encompasses both 
water area and land areas, and water area is mostly used by people for fishing. The public 
fishing area has been increased as a result of fisheries reform in 2000 due to the release of 46 
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percent (236,592ha)27 of commercial fishing areas in the Tonle Sap for community uses (DoF, 
2001).   
 
As indicated above, the release of the fishing lots in 2000 led to an expansion of 
public fishing area or the open access area. The increase in a public fishing area induces 
different forms of fishing conflicts. In addressing these conflicts, efforts have been made by 
Fisheries Administration to control public fishing areas and integrate this control into a state 
strategy. As a result, the state territorializes the public fishing areas into the ‘subsistence 
territoriality’ and community-based resources territoriality or ‘ccommunity fisheries’. To 
understand this, I first discuss the ‘subsistence territoriality’ and then the ‘community 
fisheries’ (See Figure 6.2).  
 
Table 6. 4: The categorization of the Tonle Sap by a functional area 
Classification of the Tonle Sap Area (ha) 
Area between Road 5 & 6 1,776,000 (CNMC & NEDCO, 1998) 
             Cultivated area 605,400 (CNMC & NEDCO, 1998) 
              Fish sanctuary 24,680 (DoF, 2003) 
              Fishing lot 271,139 (DoF, 2003) 
              Public fishing area 874,781 (Based on calculation)  
Source: Field Notes, 2006 
   
6.8.1 The Subsistence Territoriality 
 
The territoriality involves the classification of the area for different group of people, 
for instance the territorialization of forest area in Thailand. This is a form of control to include 
those into the classified area and exclude those from that area (Sack, 1986; Vandergeest, 
1996, Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995). Similarly, large fishing area in the Tonle Sap is set 
aside for public fishing area. Public fishing area is a fishing area assigned for small-scale and 
medium-scale fishing, but not a commercial fishing. To access to public fishing areas, one of 
the key elements is that fishers must fish small-scale for subsistence, fishing for household 
                                               
27
 In 2000, the RGC reformed the fisheries and released 56 percent of commercial fishing lot areas all over the 
countries and in the Tonle Sap Lake, about 46 percent of fishing lot areas were released for community uses.  
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consumption only, not for trade, using small-scale fishing gears (Fisheries Law, 2006; Fiat 
Law, 1987). Thus, I call this a ‘subsistence territoriality,’ which is a strategy to designate 
specific fishing area for subsistence fishing. To understand the ‘subsistence territoriality’ in 
the Tonle Sap, I first discuss the boundary of the public fishing areas and the control strategy 
over the public fishing area.  
 
6.8.1.1 Boundary of Public Fishing Area 
 
Generally, the public fishing area is an ‘open access’. The ‘open access’ in the case of 
the Tonle Sap could be explained in two ways; first, fisherman could fish everywhere and 
second, it is a borderless. Fishers do not fish according to administrative boundaries of 
provices, for instance, fishers from Siem Reap Province could fish in Battambang or 
Kampong Thom Provinces or vice versa. This gives a sense that ‘public fishing area’ is  an 
open access and aborderless (Van Zalinge et al., 2000; Degen and Thouk, 2000).  
 
Moreover, boundaries of public fishing area are existed in practice, but it is 
influenced by the boundaries of the fishing lots and the fish sanctuaries. The boundary is 
often enforced by fishing lot owners and Fisheries Administration and often fishing lot 
owners extend fishing lot boundaries into public fishing areas. Actully, fishing lot owners 
enforce the boundaries of the fishing lots while no one used the public fishing areas influence 
the boundaries of the open access areas, unless fishers are arrested by the fishing lot owners 
for the reason of invading the fishing lot areas. Thus, I call this type of boundary an ‘abstract 
boundary’ in which it could not be used to control the public fishing area or control the 
movement of fishermen across this boundary. It is an ‘abstract boundary’ because it is not 
clearly demarcated politically depending on the fishing lot owners on the one hand, and, on 
the other hand, on the natural fluctuation of water level between both the wet and the dry 
season. In fact, the boundary of the public fishing area is determined by the boundary of the 
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fishing lots, or the boundary of the fish sanctuaries and its boundary varies over time, place 
and space (Sithirith, 2007; Sithirith and Grundy-Warr, forthcoming; Van Acker, 2005).  
 
The territory of the public fishing space is not fixed. It is contracting or expanding 
according to the change of water level in the Tonle Sap Lake. In the dry season, the public 
fishing area is getting smaller as volume of water recede the Lake, but in the wet season the 
public fishing area is expanding as more water entering the lake. The rising and falling water 
in the Tonle Sap gives a great uncertainty of the boundary and this is highly potential for 
fishing lots to expand its boundaries into the public fishing areas, making the boundary of the 
public fishing area highly contested.  
 
The extension of fishing lot boundary induces fishing conflicts between fishing 
communities and fishing lots owners. These conflicts are wide spread and have happened for 
quite sometimes already. While fishing lot owners expand the lot boundaries and maximize 
fiseheries exploitation unsustainably,  fishing communities do the same, competting to use 
resources in the public fishing areas; leading to fishing conflicts between fisherman and 
fisherman, between rich and poor fishermen, between small-scale and large-scale fishermen.  
 
6.8.1.2 The Control of the Public Fishing Area 
 
Public fishing area (open access) is opened up for all fishers to fish. Theoretically, 
two distinct types of an ‘open access’: first; it is totally unregulated, in which both fleet and 
the catch taken by the fleet are uncontrolled; and second, it is a regulated access, in which the 
output of the fisheries, for instance the catch and size of fish may be regulated, but not the 
inputs, e.g. the number of boats (Charles, 2001). Furthermore, the ‘open access’ in inland 
fisheries in Cambodia is regulated in three ways; first, it regulates the use of fishing gears for 
fishing in the public fishing areas into small-scale and medium-scale; second, it regulates 
fishing activities in the public fishing spaces into ‘open fishing season’ and ‘close fishing 
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season’; and third, small-scale fishing is fished for subsistence only—for household 
consumption only, not for trade. 
 
All fishers could fish in public fishing areas year round, using small-scale gears. If 
those fish in the public fishing areas using larger fishing gear than the small-scale subject to 
approval or fishing licenses from Fisheries Administration (Fisheries Law, 2006). For small-
scale fishing, access can be free and open, and without permission or license from Fisheries 
Administration. However, the medium-scale fishing is allowed to fish in the public fishing 
areas in the open fishing season from October to May (Fisheries Law, 2006).  
 
6.8.2 Re-territorialization of the Public Fishing Area 
  
The public fishing area covers approximately 874,781ha (See Table 6.4). As a public 
fishing area could be fished by either small-scale or medium-scale fishing, there is a 
competition going on in the public fishing area between the small-scale and medium-scale 
fishing. However, in the competition, the small-scale fisher upgrades their fishing gears and 
most of them fish with large fishing gears. It is matter of the fact that small-scale fishers do 
not care about the fishing-scale provided in the Fisheries Law, but are more concerned on 
how they could catch enough fish for their “survival”. As a result, the medium-scale fisher 
fish using fishing gears larger than the medium-scale gears allowed by the Fisheries Law.  As 
a consequence, this has led to maximizing fisheries resources in the public fishing area. 
 
Facing such a difficult situation, the state re-territorializes the public fishing area into 
a community fishery as a mean of reducing anarchic fishing activities in the Tonle Sap. By 
2005, an area of about 412,205 ha of public fishing areas within six provinces around the 
Tonle Sap had been territorialized into 175 ‘community lots’ (See Table 6.5). Finally, the 
‘community lot’ is technically called as a ‘community fishery’. The process of classifying and 
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organizing the public fishing area into a community fishery is named after a ‘community 
fishery territoriality’. 
 
175 community fisheries around the lake are home to 61613 households living in 361 
geographical villages in six provinces around the Tonle Sap, of which 38 percent of them are 
dependent on fishing as a primary occupation, and the rest are fishing as well as farming for 
the livelihoods (See Table 6.5).   
 
Table 6. 5: The community fisheries around the Tonle Sap 
 
 On the other hand, the allocation of the public fishing area into the ‘community 
fishery’ is a strategy to control the fishing in the public fishing area. To control this, it 
restricts the members of community fisheries to fish for subsistence using small-scale fishing 
gears. At the same time, each community fishery (CF) is demarcated with a boundary and 
map is drawn to differentiate one CF from the others. Member of one CF is tagged to exclude 
them from other CFs.   
 
In Kampong Chhnang Province, there are 52 CFs and Battambang is ranked as a 
second with a total number of 38 CFs, followed by Kampong Thom, Pursat and Siem Reap. 
The CFs cover a large fishing area, representing the subsistence territoriality in the Tonle Sap. 




No. of  
HH 
 







No. Fish  
sanctuary 









Chhnang 51 6470 0 42071 0 6523 6349 
Siem Ream  129 21698 15052 90728 1232 11852 9622 
Pursat 52 5808 619 85712 155 5950 4910 
Kg. Thom 54 4631 5232 40994 201 4852 4154 
BTB 62 20197 2402 144506 157 8964 5808 
BMC 13 2809 67 8194 33 1358 1053 
Total 361 61613 23372 412205 1778 39499 31896 
Source: TSBR, 2007 
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fishery is established on the public fishing area and 71395 fishermen are a member of 175 
community fisheries, of which man represents 55 percent of the total members of these 
community fisheries. The member of the CFs has to fish for subsistence only, using small-
scale fishing gears, and those, who are not a member of CF, are not allowed to fish inside the 
CF area, unless they get permission from the CF committee. Among the CFs in the Tonle Sap, 
172 CFs have a list of membership which is important for members to fish inside the CF areas 
(See Table 6.6).  
 
Table 6. 6: Community fishery in the Tonle Sap by province 
Province 








Siem Ream 22 22 22 21 
Kampong Thom 30 30 30 30 
Kampong Chhnang 52 52 52 52 
Pursat 27 26 25 25 
Battambang 38 38 38 37 
Bantey Meanchey 6 4 4 2 
Total 175 172 171 167 
Sources: TSEMP, 2007 and TSBR, 2007 
 
6.8.2.1 Boundary and Map of Community Fishery 
 
To control the CFs, the CF area is demarcated with boundary cutting across the 
traditional relationship of different fishing communities by excluding some as ‘insider’ and 
excluding others as ‘outsider’. According to Clayton Hawkes (2006), about 100% of CFs in 
Siem Reap had boundaries and maps delineated by global positioning system (GPS) 
instruments and geographic information system (GIS) software. Kompong Thom's CFs was 
the next furthest along with mapping and boundary delineation. Seventy-eight percent of the 
CFs had boundaries, and 45% had maps. However, boundary delineation and mapping 
remained to be done for most of the CFs in Kompong Chhnang, Pursat, and Battambang 
(Hawke, 2006).  
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The boundary is a ‘physical exclusion and inclusion’ of insider and outsider. This 
even marks a clear division between the outsider and insiders and in this sense, between the 
neak tonle (river people) and neakleu (highlander). The outsider and insider or neak tonle and 
neakleu seems to have a suspicious relationship given the installation of a physical boundary 
of the CF. The issues of ‘outsider’ and ‘insider’ or neakleu and neak tonle creates a ‘social 
exclusion which intensifies the tension between the insider and outsider or neakleu and neak 
tonle.  
 
Boundary and map is a form ‘physical exclusion’ or ‘physical control’ of the CF area 
and the issues of outsider and insider is a form of ‘social exclusion’ or ‘social control’. The 
‘physical control’ and ‘social control’ is reinforced by a ‘community law’. Finally, the 
‘community law’ is approved by the FiA and those CF community laws inconsistent with the 
FiA guideline are hardly recognized by the FiA, and therefore, affecting the political position 
of the CFs. As a consequence, the CF is influenced by the FiA and to approve the ‘community 
law’, it gives a ‘political power’ to CF to reinforce the boundary, the map and the 
membership of the CF and therefore, the CF has a ‘political control’ over the CF areas with 
political supports from the  FiA. Among all CFs, 171 CFs have a “community law” which is 
developed based on a guideline given by the Fisheries Administration (FiA) and it is drafted 
with an assistance provided by the FiA staff. 
 
6.8.2.2 Fish Sanctuary as Control Strategy 
 
The public fishing area of 412,205 ha is classified into 175 community fisheries in six 
provinces of the Tonle Sap. Within 412,205 ha of public fishing areas, 1778 ‘fishing 
sanctuaries’ attaching to 175 CFs were developed. For instance, in Siem Reap, the Kampong 
Phluk community fisheries set aside 48 small fish sanctuaries with the community area of 
11891 ha while the Lvea Community Fisheries and Preaek Sramaoch Community Fisheries 
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establish 100 and 123 small fish sanctuaries on the CF area of 1528 ha and 557 ha 
respectively. However, Thnal Dach CF is organized by 5 villages with 2339 households 
joining to manage the CF areas of 2152 ha. Within this area, 920 fishing areas were allocated 
as a small fish sanctuary (See Table 6.5; TSBR, 2007)28.  
 
Based on the data from FiA, among 175 CFs, only 82 CFs have a fish sanctuaries, 
and the fish sanctuary is classified into three categories—the fish sanctuary, the protected 
flooded forest and planting flooded forest. The fish sanctuary, either fish sanctuary, protected 
flooded forest or planting flooded forest, established inside the CF area is another strategy 
developed to control the access and fishing activities within the CF area. Not all fishing areas 
within a community fishery area is fished, but some small fishing territory is tagged as a 
‘protected territory’, used as a strategy to control the fishing areas and limit the access of the 
fishers to these areas. To avoid the overlapped meaning, the fish sanctuary designated within 
the CF area for fish conservation is called a ‘community fish sanctuary’. Fishing in the 
‘community fish sanctuary’ is forbidden by the community law. The community fish 
sanctuary covers 700 ha, consisting of 84 community fish sanctuaries in 82 community 
fisheries in six provinces around the Tonle Sap. Similarly, some areas covering a flooded 
forest are classified as a ‘protected flooded forest’. Totally, 20 plots covering 5,424 ha located 
within the Tonle Sap floodplain in six provinces have been classified as a ‘protected flooded 
forests’. As it is protected, access to areas defined as a ‘protected flooded forest’ is 
determined by the community law. Some areas within the CF areas are classified as a 
‘planting flooded forest area’ and this area is subject to re-plant the flooded forest. Some 14 
identified plots within 82 CFs are classified as ‘planting flooded forest area’. 
                                               
28
 TSBR 2007 database records all community fisheries around the Tonle Sap.  
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 Map 6. 3: Map of Community fisheries in the Tonle Sap Lake
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Thus, the public fishing area is classified into community fisheries and each 
community fishery area is classified into different territories including community fishery, 
community fishery sanctuary, protected flooded forest and planting flooded forest. The 
classification of the community fishery into different territory provides that there is different 
territory providing different functions. The classification has led to different control and 
access and each people have different roles to different territories. The community fishery, the 
community fish sanctuary, the protected flooded forest and the planting flooded forest is a 
form and a strategy designed by the state to control the access and fishing in the “public 
fishing area”.  
 
Many CF members display good interest and enthusiasm for their CF and a belief that 
CF presents a potential for improving their livelihood and fish production. At the same time 
they display a strong sense of wanting to protect and conserve the natural resources of their 
CF. These attitudes suggest that properly organized and managed CF may have a good 
potential to a achieve sustainable fisheries and livelihoods.  A widespread threat voiced by CF 
is incursions by outsiders into CF areas to carry out various destructive activities (poaching of 
fish, burning and clearing forest to plant crops and hunt wildlife such as crocodiles, snakes 
and water birds). 
 
Table 6. 7: Community fisheries by province around the Tonle Sap Lake 






  # of 
CFs 

















Siem Reap 11 12 76 5 2,807 2 445 7 167 
Kampong 
Thom 
16 23 82.95 6 598.16 1 8 10 107 
Kampong 
Chhnang 
10 10 124 0 0 3 2.61 5 76 
Pursat 20 20 263.74 9 2018.61 4 1332.23 11 201 
Battambang 21 14 120 0 0 4 27 3 33 
Bantey 
Meanchey 
4 5 33.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total  82 84 700.49 20 5,424 14 1814.84 36 584 
Source: TSEMP, 2007 
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 The community fishery in the Tonle Sap Lake suffers from poor governance in the 
Lake and inadequate legal framework. Although the new community-oriented provisions 
provide an alternative to current fisheries management, the pre-existing territoriality of the 
Lake continues to influence the management of all fishing territories in the Lake. Current 
policy actually enables centralized management and favors restricted control.  
 
The fishing lot areas presently released to Community Fisheries are less productive as 
it was cut from the cheapest fishing lot areas valuing less 30 million Riel. This affects the 
ways in which local communities organize community fisheries. However, many of the best 
fishing areas are still under the management of fishing lots (FACT & EJF, 2001). Therefore, 
the community fishery development is moving slowly. Another constrain is that the 
community fishery is politically given a limited rights and power to manage the community 
fishery, and the FiA seems to centralize the management of community fisheries, leaving a 
little roles, responsibility, right and power to CF to manage the community fishery. This 
includes the right to protect the area from illegal fishing (ie. direct enforcement) and the right 
to harvest fish on a large scale to raise funds for the community.  
 
Most existing CFs have been established at the initiative of FiA, donors such as ADB 
and NGOs, rather than the initiative of fishing communities. There are no clear common 
guidelines to establish a Community Fishery. Consequently many different approaches are 
taken by the various provincial DOF offices and by the various NGOs.  The CFs are new 
organizations, suffering from weak capacities. Many are not fully representational, and 
committees and members may not be fully aware of their rights and responsibilities.  It is 








The territoriality in the Tonle Sap Lake is very complex as shown in Figure 6.2. It has 
happened since the French Protectorate Regime following the 1908. At present, the 
territoriality of the Tonle Sap is still at large applicable. The old form of territoriality, the 
increased fishing population in the lake, the increased development around the lake and the 
change in the environment of the lake contribute to resource degradation and fishing conflicts. 
The complex territoriality in the Tonle Sap induces the poor governance of fisheries and 
natural resources.  
 
The Tonle Sap Lake is territorialized into commercial area, the public areas, and the 
conservation area. Each of these spaces is further territorialized into a smaller area, with a 
specific territory, boundary demarcation and control system. For instance, the commercial 
space is further territorialized into a smaller commercial space known as a commercial fishing 
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lot, while the conservation space is further classified into the transition zone, the buffer zone 
and core zone which is known as a ‘Biosphere Reserve Area’. The public fishing space is also 
territorialized into the community fisheries and public fishing areas. These induce the 
overlapping territories which lead to conflicts in resource exploitation, institutional conflicts 
over the overlapping territories and resources over-exploitation. 
 
The territoriality in the Tonle Sap is different from territoriality on land in which the 
boundary of the fishing lot, Biosphere Reserve and Community Fisheries is marked on water 
which is fluctuated significantly between the dry and wet season. The boundary that was used 
to control people movement across the boundary line is now used to control fish and fishing 
activities in the Tonle Sap. Thus, boundary constructed on the fluctuated water level is varied 
from fixed boundary to floated boundary, and from temporal boundary to spatial boundary. 
Given the boundary issues, the control over each territoriality is also an issue. The boundary 
is used to control the fish and fishing.   
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 CHAPTER 7 
Politics of Fishery Scales in the Tonle Sap  
 
The Tonle Sap is rich in fisheries and the State manages fisheries through 
territorializing the fishing areas into the commercial fishing areas, the public fishing areas and 
the conservation areas, in which the commercial fishing area is fished with large-scale fishing, 
while the public fishing area is fished with small-scale and medium-scale fishing. In addition, 
large-scale and medium-scale fishing is allowed to fish in the open fishing season, effective 
from November to April while the small-scale fishing is allowed in both open and close 
fishing seasons.  
 
These narratives denote the ‘scales’ in fishing in the Tonle Sap Lake, particularly the 
‘geographical scale’ of fishing, the level of fishing using different fishing gears to fish or the 
‘fishing-scale’ and the ‘fishing season’ or the ‘temporal-scale.’ These accounts suggest 
‘scales’ an important concept for fisheries management; but, the understanding of ‘scales’ in 
Cambodian context is limited, and therefore, the uses of ‘scales’ in fisheries management 
becomes politics of fisheries management in the Tonle Sap and it has an implication on 
resources management. Thus, this study sets out to examine the ‘politics of scale’ of fisheries 
management.  
 
The chapter begins with an introduction of the theoretical framework of the ‘scale’ 
and analyzing the ‘scale’ of the fisheries management in the Tonle Sap, and then I return to 
the empirical study of the ‘scale’ in the Tonle Sap Lake where I explore the politics of scales 
in fisheries management in the Lake. My main purpose in this chapter is to contribute to the 
understanding of the ‘scale’ from Cambodian context.  
 
At the outset it is necessary to differentiate the theoretical arguments within political 
geography concerning the politics of scale and the specific way scales are often used within 
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fisheries management. I wish to draw our some of the linkages and differences in these 
distinct ideas about ‘scale,’ which has important theoretical and empirical-methodological 
dimensions (within the discipline of Geography in particular), and peculiar specific 
applications as a term used to describe different fishing operations and operatives in the Tonle 
Sap. 
 
7.1 The Politics of Scale in Political Geography 
 
‘Scale’ is an important concept in geography and environmental sciences. In 
geography, ‘scale’ has three important dimensions: geographical scale; the cartographic scale 
of mapping; and methodological scale of a geographical study (Howitt, 2003; Jonston et al., 
2000; Delaney and Leitner, 1997). In environment, environmentalist may study the 
environmental change of particular place or space over a period of time. They might find that 
the environmental change may occur at small-scale or large-scale; at local level, national level 
or regional level (Gibson et al., 2000; Kummu, 2008). In fisheries, ‘scale’ is also used for 
fisheries management because fish migrates across the state boundary and therefore, fisheries 
can be managed at international level (Charles, 2001; McGoodwin, 1990; Bene et al., 2007; 
Welcomme, 1979). Thus, ‘scale’ is conceptualized into three dimensions: temporal scale, 
spatial scale or geographical scale and organizational level (Wu and Li, 2006; Charles, 2001) 
and each of these is used to manage environment and fisheries resources.   
 
The ‘geographical scale’ relates to sizes of the area, both geographically and 
administratively (Charles, 2001; Welcomme, 1979). ‘Size’ can become a ‘level’ when the size 
of the area varies across space—when the size of the area is small located within the country, 
it refers to local level, when the size of the area covering the country, it then refers to a 
country level, and when the size is larger than the coutrny, it refers to the international level. 
This is clearly illustrated in fisheries management, in which fishery exploiting is considered 
highly migratory that ranges over the water bodies of many countries. Within a specific 
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nation, the relevant fishers may operate under that nation’s management framework (Charles, 
2001; Welcomme, 1979). The ‘geographical scale’ of fisheries management in this case 
focuses on fisheries resources within the nation’s border. However, fish migrates across the 
country boundary and therefore, the management of fisheries extends beyond the country’s 
border, leading to creating international management mechanisms such as the ‘Common 
Fisheries Policy’ of EU in which fish stocks within EU are assessed and total allowance catch 
(TAC) set for the stock is subdivided among the relevant countries. Then, each country is able 
to manage its fishery systems which consist of that nation’s allocated portion of the TAC. At 
the same time, each country allocates fishing areas to community to manage sedentary species 
than the migratory species, for a case in which fishers are restricted to relatively geographical 
boundaries in their local areas (Charles, 2001). 
 
Environmental and fisheries resources vary greatly over time. The concept of ‘scale’ 
is used to study the environmental changes in the Mekong Region over a period of time and 
this is called a ‘temporal scale’. The environmental changes in the Mekong occur within the 
multiple temporal scales (Kummu, 2008; Lebel, Garden and Imamura, 2005; Hirsch and 
Wyatt, 2004; Lovell et al., 2002). In fisheries management, fisheries resources vary greatly 
from month to month, season to season, and year to year, and thus, management decision may 
be best made on a comparable scale. The ‘temporal scale’ in fisheries management includes 
the month, season and year (Charles, 2001; Welcomme, 1979); and the fisheries management 
takes into account the month and season that fish breed, lay egg and grow, and thus, the 
fisheries management system limits fishing activities that could damage the fish stock; and 
the time that fish could be caught for marketing (Charles, 2001; McGoodwin, 1990; Bene et 
al., 2007). The management decisions are made based on a time scale compatible with the 
market for fisheries products. If market agreements are made annually to sell certain amounts 
of product to exporters or wholesalers, but management decisions are made on a short time 
scale, one could envision a situation where a fishery is close at such a time as to leave harvest 
and processors unable to meet market commitments. This could lead both to large immediate 
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losses and loss of markets, owing to an inability to guarantee delivery. So differing time 
scales can have significant consequences for all players in fishery system (Charles, 2001; 
Welcomme, 1979).  
 
Levels’ are defined as units of assessment that are located at the same position on a 
scale (Gibson et al., 2000). Often ‘levels’ are ordered hierarchically but not necessarily 
(Turner et al., 1989; Wu and Li, 2006; Kummu, 2008). In geography, ‘level’ is used most in 
the cartography and methodology. The cartographic scale refers to the level of detail of 
abstraction at which map is constructed. In mapping, small-scale and large scale maps show 
different details. Small-scale map represents a map that shows a large area but at the expense 
of considerable details. Large-scale map represents a map that has a greater detail but over 
restricted terrain. The cartographic scale is important in determining what is included and 
excluded in a map and overall image a map convey. Moreover, methodological scale refers to 
the choice of scale for gathering information at particular scale such as research at local scale, 
provincial level or national level. The choice of the research scale depends on the research 
problem, the available information, the cost of data collection and data processing (Howitt, 
2003; Jonston et al., 2000; Delaney and Leitner, 1997).  
 
In fisheries management, ‘scale’ is used to group fishing population into two 
categories—small-scale and the large-scale fishing, based on the size of fishing gears used for 
fishing, the capital investment in fishing, the mode of production, the fishing areas, the 
fishing effort and marketing (Charles, 2001; McGoodwin, 1990; Bene et al., 2007; 
Welcomme, 1979). Interestingly, small-scale fishing refers to a group of fishing population 
that fish with a small-scale capital commitment; low productivity; low yield rates; and also 
usually implies small-scale power that is an inability to influence fish markets, little 
representation in the formulation and implementation of fisheries management policies, and 
inability to safeguard fisheries against the environmental degradation caused by external 
development. Large-scale fishing is a group of fishing population that is fished with 
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sophisticated fishing technologies, involving heavy investment outlays which make them 
inaccessible except to a new class of capitalists arising from outside the fisherman 
communities (McGoodwin, 1990; Alexander, 1995; Bene et al., 2007; Welcomme, 1979).  
 
Based on above, Marston (2000) suggests three basic principles of scale: first, scale is 
not an existing—it establishes and is established through a social interaction; second, the 
ways in which scale is constructed have tangible and material consequences, they are not just 
rhetorical practices, but are inscribed in both everyday life and macro-level social structure; 
and third, the constructing of scale is often contradictory and contested, it is recognized that 
the fixing of scale is in itself a political act practiced by  both state and non-state actors. In 
this regard, the state routinely constructs scales, as it creates and structures local government 
institutions, as it formulates and implements policies and as it decides which issues is 
appropriately dealt with at which scale. But scales of political action are also constructed by 
non-state actors. To construct the ‘scales’, it involves the politics and this calls a ‘politics of 
scale’.  
 
Cox (1998) sees what described by other scholars in relation to the politics of scale as 
‘not a scale’, but ‘a social network’ that connect people from local, national to global and 
through the social network that local people organize the resistance, opposition and campaign 
to claim their rights over space as the case of communities in the Se San River in Cambodia 
struggling across the scales to protect the Se San River within Vietnam and Cambodia from 
daming (Hirsch and Watt, 2004). According to Howitt (2003), through a social network 
people are mobilized together to oppose the social injustice often imposed by the higher level 
(Howitt, 2003). The “way in which local groups constitute their identity within a relatively 
local politics, and how they seek to counteract disempowerment by jumping scales to assert  
their specific concerns  at wider more general scale” is desribed Howitt (2003) as ‘politics of 
scale’ (Howitt, 2003:138). Delaney and Leitner (1997) discuss the ‘politics of scale’ and they 
argue that politics of scale involved the politics of interests and of consciousness and their 
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connections. In the politics of scale, local people, campaigner, local authority could jump 
from local to global scale to seek solution to their problems (Judd, 1998). Cox (1998), Howitt 
(2003) and Jonston et al., (2000) call this as a ‘jumping scale’ which is a way upward or 
downward in order to achieve the ended goals aimed by the social group. In the jumping scale 
the politics of scale involves the ‘politics of representation’ which the “local group actively 
shaping the discourse within which their struggles are constituted and discursively 
representing their political struggle across scale” (Howitt, 2003:141). However, often the 
power relations that imposed by the state's construction of scale through jurisdictional, 
administrative and regulatory structure limits the opportunity for resistance, jumping scale or 
upward or downward representation (Howitt, 2003; Judd, 1998).   
 
7.2 The Scale of Fisheries Management in the Tonle Sap  
 
The Tonle Sap is rich in fisheries resources. To manage fisheries resources in the 
Lake, the Tonle Sap Lake is territorialized into the commercial fishing area, the public fishing 
area and the conservation area. The auctioned commercial fishing area is effectively for 
‘large-scale’ fishing. However, the public fishing area is set aside for public access and this is 
an ‘open access’. Fishers are permitted into these zones with designated ‘medium-scale’ and 
‘small-scale’ fishing gears. In practical terms, it is useful to stress that many fishers are 
continually trying to ‘up scale’ gears within the public fishing areas, sometimes utilizing 
technologies which contribute to over-fishing, and sometimes using equipment and methods 
that are technically illegal.  
 
Fishing is managed and controlled via officially designated ‘seasons’. The ‘large-
scale’ and ‘medium-scale’ fishing may take place within the commercial fishing zones and 
public fishing areas respectively only in the ‘open fishing season’, effective from October to 
May. However, ‘small-scale’ subsistence fishing is permitted (at least on paper) everywhere 
in the lake during the closed fishing season, whereas, in the open fishing season, it is allowed 
 260 
only within the public fishing area (Degen et al., 2000; Van Acker, 2005; Sithirith and 
Mathur, 2007).  
 
Table 7. 1: Fishing Scale of the Freshwater Capture Fisheries in the Tonle Sap 




Large-scale Only in the open fishing  
season : 
- 1st October to 31 May for the 
fishing grounds located north of 
Phnom Penh 
- 1st November to 30 June for the 
fishing grounds located south 
of Phnom Penh 
Inside the fishing lot 
area but outside the 





Middle Scale Only in the open fishing  
season : 
- 1st October to 31 May for the 
fishing grounds located north of 
Phnom Penh 
- 1st November to 30 June for the 
fishing grounds located south 
of Phnom Penh 
Public fisheries 
domain (The area 
outside the fishing 
lots, fish sanctuaries, 






Small-scale Both in:  
Open fishing season 
- Close fishing season 
Everywhere except 
inside the fishing lot 
during the open 
season, and inside 
the conservation area 
Conservation territory  No fishing  Fish habitat 
Source: Fiat Law, 1987; Fisheries Law, 2006 
 
 
As a result, I conceptualize the fisheries management in the Tonle Sap Lake into three 
main scales—the ‘geographical scale’, the ‘fishing-scale’, and ‘temporal scale’. Table 7.1 
provides the detailed characteristics of the ‘scales’ of fisheries management in the Tonle Sap 
and each of these will be discussed in more details in the following section. 
  
7.2.1 The Geographical Scale of Fisheries Management in the Tonle Sap Lake 
 
The Tonle Sap Lake is classified into ‘commercial fishing area’, ‘public fishing area’, 
and ‘conservation area’. This classification is what I call a ‘geographical scale’ in the Tonle 
Sap. Then, I refer to Chapter 4 that discusses the commercial fishing areas, the public fishing 
areas and the conservation area respectively. However, in this section, I will continue to 
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discuss each of these, focusing more on the ‘geographical scale’ of fisheries management in 
the Tonle Sap Lake.  
 
It would be wrong to characterize the commercial fishing area purely as homogenous 
fishery space for capital intensive operations. In fact, these areas occupy space that is 
extremely both ecologically diverse and biologically productive due to the existence of five 
main ‘habitats’, including the ‘streams’, ‘Great Lake’ proper, the ‘rivers’, ‘natural ponds’, and 
‘inundated forests’. For instance, there are commercial fishing areas located along the Tonle 
Sap River and the lower Mekong River which are grouped under the ‘Dai fishing lot’, and 
these spaces are very distinct from the commercial fishing areas that are located around the 
Great Lake and the major flood plains of the Mekong and Bassac river system, which are 
grouped into the ‘riverine’ and ‘lacustrine fishing lots’ (ADB, FAO & DoF, 2003).  
 
Furthermore, each fishing lot space produces its own political geography and 
occupies a unique area. An example is fishing lot no.2 in Battambang Province, which is the 
largest fishing lot in the Tonle Sap Lake, covering approximately 50,624 ha. In contrast, the 
smallest fishing lot is fishing lot no.7 located in Kampong Chhnang, covering a mere 213 ha.  
Among 270 lots existed from 1999 till now in all over the country, 135 fishing lots are named 
after the lake-stream fishing lots, 63 fishing lots are placed in the river and names a ‘bag net 
fishing lots’, and 20 fishing lots known as a ‘sandbank fishing lot’. Beside the 270 fishing 
lots, which have been operating, another 13 fishing lots have been regulated as reservoir and 
research fishing lots (ADB, FAO & DoF, 2003). 
 
In the Tonle Sap Lake, the commercial fishing lots are located in Pursat, Battambang, 
Siem Reap and Kampong Thom Provinces, categorizing as fence and pen fisheries, while the 
fishing lots in Kompong Chhnang as barrage fisheries situated in the Tonle Sap River and its 
tributaries. In addition, there are Dai fisheries lots in the lower Tonle Sap River in Kandal 
Province and Phnom Penh. By 2001, there were 38 fishing lots in the Tonle Sap. These lots 
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are potentially the most productive fishing grounds in terms of fish yield and fish habitat 
(ADB, FAO & DoF, 2003). The average size of lot is about 15-25 km long and 5-10 km wide 
(ADB, FAO & DoF, 2003; Van Zalinge et al., 2000).  
 
‘Public fishing areas’ are located outside the commercial fishing lot boundaries and 
conservation zones and they are mainly in the middle of the Tonle Sap Lake or the near-shore 
areas close by main rivers and roads connecting to the land-based rice paddy communities. 
The public fishing areas have three different spatial characteristics; first, they are accessed for 
year-round fishing; second, the spaces are also used by many village boats for navigation 
between settlements; and third, some floating villages occupy the public fishing areas.   
 
As these public areas are available to everybody, it is an ‘open access’. However, 
fishing in the ‘public fishing areas’ is supposed to benefit small scale and medium scale 
fishers, although in practice there are often encroachments, illegal fishing and conflicts 
between different stakeholders. Highly capitalized commercial operators are not supposed to 
access these public zones, and the public area boundaries are effectively decided by the limits 
of the commercial fishing lots and the conservation areas. In order words, the public zones 
have no specific zonal boundaries and also the physical boundaries vary between wet and dry 
seasons due to the fluctuations of water level in the lake. As argued elsewhere, the seasonality 
and annual flood pulse of the lake creates political geographic dilemmas and contribute to 
human-made boundary tensions. 
 
The Tonle Sap Lake is considered as a conservation area. The Conservation area 
was enacted following the Royal Decree on Protected Areas issues in 1993, followed by a 
decision in October 1997 by UNESCO to designate some 70,837 ha into a Biosphere Reserve 
Areas, which were finally confirmed in 2001 by the Royal Degree. These areas are divided 
into sub-zones of ‘core areas’ surrounded by ‘buffer zones’ and beyond that ‘transitional 
zones’ (Bunhoeur and Lane, 2002; Campbell et al., 2006). The ‘Core Area’ is further 
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classified into three ‘sub-core areas’ known as Prek Toal, Boeung Tonle Chmar and Stun Sen 
Core Areas.  
 
The ‘transitional zone’, the ‘buffer zones’ and the ‘core zone’ characterizes the 
‘geographical scales’ of the conservation areas in the Tonle Sap Lake. The ‘geographical 
scale’ of the conservation in the Tonle Sap Lake denotes the different level of control and 
management over different geographical areas. The ‘core area’ reflects the strong and 
intensive control and management of resources in the core areas, aiming at protecting it, 
prohibiting human invasion into the biodiversity areas and preserving the significant 
biodiversity species and its habitats. The ‘buffer zone’ functions as an area to buffer the ‘core 
area’ from human action, in which some human activities for subsistence livelihoods are 
allowed, while other activities other than these are prohibited. However, the ‘transitional 
zone’ is an area where there are more human settlement and diversified human activities 
taken place. Thus, the ‘zoning’ illustrates the ‘scale’ or the ‘level’ of human interaction within 
each zone. The ‘scale’ or the ‘level’ of human activities in each zone reflects the ‘scale’ or the 
‘level’ of control and management in each zone for resource conservation.  
 
The conservation areas are supposed “to preserve flooded forest, fish, wildlife, 
hydrological systems and natural beauty”, but in practice there are problems due to the 
allowance of fishing concessions in the ‘buffer zones’, and also due to the fact that there are 
other multiple uses in and around flooded forests (dry season rice, mung bean cropping, 
vegetable gardens, and so on) (Bunhoeur and Lane, 2002).  
 
7.2.2 Fishing Scales and Fishery Management 
 
As I have outlined earlier, ‘fishing-scale’ is used by the state (Fisheries 
Administration) and other official fisheries agencies) to control activities of different 
officially designated fishing groups according to regulations concerning specific fishing gears 
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permitted in particular zones and at different seasons. Table 7.2 illustrates the grouping of 
fishing gears in relation to these official ‘scales’ in Cambodia.  
 
Table 7. 2: Fishing gears commonly used various scales of fisheries. 
Fishing gear Small-scale Medium-scale 
fisheries 
Large-scale fisheries 
Harpoon/Spear *   
Bamboo/rattan traps * *  
Cast net * *  
Scoop/lift net * *  
Dragnet * *  
Hook and line * *  
Bamboo fence entrap  * * 
Bamboo barrage trap   * 
Beach seine net  *  
Purse seine net  *  
Set bag net (Dai)   * 
Source: DoF, 2003 
 
 
These have effectively been adapted since the days of the French Protectorate 
Administration. The post-colonial state continued to use the colonially-inspired ‘scale’ 
categories to guide fishing activities based on the economic interests of the state by limiting 
household fishing to ‘small-scale’ and ‘medium-scale’ with commercial lots being used to 
generate revenues.   
 
‘Large-scale’ fishing is commercial fishing in fishing lots. The most important gears 
used in commercial fishing are probably the ‘barrage traps’ (Thnours) and ‘bag nets’ used for 
both fish and freshwater prawns (Deap et al., 2003; Gum, 2000). A barrage traps is a large 
structure fixed across a stream or small river in the precinct of a fishing lot. Beside the fishing 
gear used for large-scale fishing, seine nets, gillnets, cast nets, hooked lines and bamboo traps 
have also been used for medium-scale fisheries, and spears, cast nets (<5m), small gillnets, 
single hooked lines and bamboo traps have been used for family small-scale fisheries (Deap 
et al., 2003; ADB, FAO & DoF, 2003). In the Tonle Sap, a great many commercial fishery 
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methods were developed by up-scaling indigenous technology gears, such as the ‘arrow traps’ 
seen in many parts of the lake. 
 
Common gears used by ‘medium-scale’ fishers are bamboo traps, nets, fishing hooks 
and lines. These fishers have adapted bamboo fence traps (lop, nor, rav) of less than 500 m in 
length with stakes interspersed within no more than 0.5 m. Other common methods include 
big cylindrical drum traps, big vertical slit traps, small cylindrical drum oblong traps (lop, 
sayoeun, tru) of more than 0.8 m in height, more than 0.3 in diameter. The Fisheries 
Administration also permits the seine net, which must not exceed 400 meters in length in 
public fishing areas other than the Tonle Sap Lake; and 1000 meters in the Tonle Sap Lake 
(Article 15 of Fiat Law, 1987). It is prohibited to use any gill net or seine net of a mesh size 
less than 1.5 cm and; any fish barrage made up of sticks set less than 1.5 cm apart from each 
other (Article 17 of Fiat Law, 1987). Poor enforcement of mesh size regulations led the 
Minister responsible for fisheries to adopt Proclamation n° 259 of 12 August 2002 reasserting 
that it is strictly prohibited, within Cambodian inland waters, to fish by means of a seine net 
whose mesh size is less than 1.5 cm. It also prohibits the use of any type of mosquito nets for 
fishing purposes. From the above, it should be apparent that unless there are extremely 
efficient, non-corrupt, and well-resourced governance agencies, there exists plenty of scope 
for fishers to up-scale or adopt practices that do not comply with the ‘scale’ regulations.  
 
‘Small-scale fishing’ refers to fishing for a subsistence and household use, but not for 
trade (Fisheries Law, 2006; Fiat Law, 1987; ADB, FAO & DoF, 2003). In practice, these 
fishers are restricted by limited capital availability, the use of mostly family labour, relatively 
low productivity, and thus they tend to catch fish to sell for living essentials, particularly rice 
(especially so for floating households with no land) and household materials. The vicious 
spirals of indebtedness, plus the risks inherent in livelihoods dependent upon aquatic 
resources, means that up-scaling is desired but very difficult for these fishers.  
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 Small-scale gears include: individual harpoons, gears made out of bamboo and rattan 
such as a wide variety of species specific or fish size specific fishing traps and scoops, fishing 
nets, hooks and lines. There is also the three-arrow harpoon (chbok) and 3-prong spear (sam), 
which are commonly used. Similarly, rattan and bamboo scoop nets and traps can be used. 
Other indigenous traps include small cylindrical drum traps, small vertical slit traps or small 
cylindrical drum oblong traps (lop, sayoeun, tru) which are ‘small-scale’ only if they have 
less than 0.8 m in length and less than 0.3m in diameter without utilizing bamboo fences to 
connect the traps (another practice in the lake).  Fishing nets include the cash nets, V-shaped 
dip nets (thnang), raft mounted lift nets (chhnuoc), and small drag nets and gillnets. As for the 
other traps there are official size restrictions relating to nets, for instance, the cash net is 
small-scale only if it is less than 5 m in length. Similarly, V-shaped dip nets (thnang) are 
considered small-scale if they have an opening less than 2 m in diameter. Raft mounted lift 
nets (chhnuoc) should have each side less than 2 m in length  and small drag nets and gillnets 
should have less than 3 m in length.  To reiterate, even the poorest fishers wish to up-grade, 
including making technological changes to their fishing activities, as there is great 
competition over the resource and food insecurity is an ever-present problem.  
 
Clearly, the Tonle Sap is a fantastic living museum for specialists interested in 
indigenous technologies used for fishing in the Mekong Basin. The Tonle Sap probably has 
the greatest variety of different traps, nets, and fishing methods of any water-body anywhere 
in the world. However, what my descriptions here intend to reveal are the problematic fishery 
‘scale’ designations that influence fisheries governance, and the actual complexity involved in 
utilizing such notions for a technologically diverse, socio-economically differentiated, 





7.2.3 Temporal Scale of Fisheries Management  
 
Temporal scales are the ‘closed’ and ‘open’ fishing seasons, which influence political 
geographies of fishing. North of the ‘Quatre Bras’ including the Tonle Sap, the ‘open fishing 
season’ starts from 1st October to 31st May. However, the fishing areas located in the southern 
part of the ‘Quatre Bras’ could be fished in the open fishing season starting from 1 November 
to 30 June. The fishing area located in the northern part of the ‘Quatre Bras’ could be fished 
from 1st October (Fisheries Law, 2006). During the ‘open fishing season’ is applicable for 
medium-scale fishing and large-scale fishing is allowed in commercial lots.   
 
During the closed fishing season (end-May to end-September) fishing lot territory is 
reserved for fish breeding and spawning. All fishing equipment and bamboo fences should be 
removed from the fishing lot areas at this time. In spite of the Fisheries Law prohibiting 
commercial fishing during this season there is evidence to indicate it continues in some areas. 
For instance, in Peam Bang, the fishermen indicate that the fishing lot owners keep a close 
watch over the fishing lot territory during the closed season. Sometimes they deploy 
traditional methods to lure more fish into the lot areas. Thus, it seems that some lot owners 
continue to behave as if they own their lots in the closed season (Field notes, July 2007, in 
Peam Bang).  
 
It is clear from my research that the officially designated fishing scales are highly 
problematic and difficult to implement. Research has found that numerous fishers choose to 
‘cross scales’ by up-grading and up-scaling fishing gears and practices, which has the de facto 
effect of intensifying fishing activity, as well as introducing some ‘illegal’ and damaging 
practices into many areas, such as the use of electro-fishing gear, mosquito net fishing, poison 
fishing, and so on (Sithirith and Grundy-Warr, forthcoming). Thus, there is often a gap 
between the official categorization of ‘scale’ and what is actually happening in the fisheries.  
 
 268 
7.3 Politics of Scale in the Tonle Sap 
 
‘Scale’ in the Tonle Sap is constructed and reconstructed. It was constructed by the 
Frech Protectorate Administration and was reconstructed by the post-colonial administration. 
The practices of ‘scale’ in the Tonle Sap implicate the ways in which resources are accessed 
and used in the Tonle Sap. At the same time, the application of fisheries scale for fisheries 
management in the Tonle Sap implicate on livelihoods of fishing communities living 
dependent on fisheries resources. As a consequence, local fishing communities construct their 
own fishing scales in response to official representation of fishing scale. These form the main 
base of the politics of fishing scale in the Tonle Sap. Thus, the following section discusses in 
details the politics of scale in the Tonle Sap and relate its to the governance of resouces in the 
Lake.  
 
7.3.1 Politics of Commercial Fishing in the Tonle Sap  
 
The scale as a social network (Marston, 2000) and the ‘jumping-scale’ (Howitt, 2003) 
is relevant in the Tonle Sap. Given this, the politics of scale of large-scale fishing in the Tonle 
Sap is not about fishing, but about the relationship constructed by the fishing lot owners 
across scales—down-scaling and up-scaling. The fishing lot is classified into two groups; 
auctioned fishing lots and research fishing lots. Management of respective fishing lots is 
slightly different, but the exploitation of fisheries resources within the lots is entirely similar 
(Watt and Hirsch, 2004; Lebel, Garden, and Imamura, 2005; Gum, 2000).   
 
7.3.1.1 Politics, Patronage and Power in Commercial Fisheries 
 
As Bryant and Parnwell (1996: 9) observed in relation to natural resource politics in 
Southeast Asia, resources often provide a “source of political patronage designed to award 
supporters and punish opponents in the broader struggle for political power.” The issuing of 
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fishing lots in the Tonle Sap needs to be examined as an aspect of a much more generic 
political patronage system, within which having the ‘right connections’ is of the utmost 
importance. Cambodia’s political economy has been described as a ‘hybrid democracy’ 
(Kheang, 2005) combining elements of coercive authoritarian politics, a relatively young 
democratic process, and deeply embedded patronage politics linking senior state officials with 
business tycoons. Within this ‘hybrid’ political economy control over environmental 
resources is strongly tied to ‘networks of obligation’ (Hughes, 2003: 127) of the patronage 
system that influences processes of resource control, access, production and exchange (Le 
Billon, 2000).  
 
As described elsewhere, ‘public bidding’ for fishing lots is not an open process but is 
influenced by patron-client relations. This means that the allocation of fishing lot to the 
‘fishing lot owner’ is very much depended on the relationship between the fishing lot owners 
and their ‘patrons’ who have authority to allocate fishing lots. Lot owners may be powerful 
patrons to others, but in this system they are also clients and their ‘patrons’ include those with 
influential government positions and interests in the fishing business. Support and protection 
from a ‘patron’ requires payments from clients, and there is little transparency in this system.  
 
Three forms of power are embedded into the patronage system to exploit natural 
resources; first, ‘power’ to act includes ‘power’ to earn a living, protect one’s rights and guide 
others including community and family members; second, power is associated with wealth 
and influence, which allows people to do what they like without fear of the law, buy rights 
and authority and oppress others; third, power is a ‘connection’ and ‘influence’ known as a 
knong or ‘political back’. This refers to a person or network above an individual in the kser or 
‘string’ of patronage relationships that link ordinary villagers with higher status individuals 
who can provide them with protection and connection to others in the network (CDRI, 2007a; 
Piseth, 2002).  
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Above all, this is a form of pak pourk or ‘nepotism’ in the patronage system that may 
happen in two forms; a) ‘kser’ happens through ‘relatives’ or ‘friends’ working in the fishery 
business at the higher level government office, and b) ‘khnong’ happens through a ‘kser’ or 
‘string’ in English, which means that the fishing lot owner has a ‘pak pourk’ in one level of a 
government office, and that person in government office connects the ‘client’ to his friends or 
relatives in a second level of government office through a system of bribery. This so called 
‘kser’ may involve a hierarchy of connections. The stronger the kser then the more effective 
the pak pourk will be (CDRI, 2007a; Piseth, 2002). In return, the fishing lot owner uses their 
‘economic power’ or financial resources to build ‘khnong’ or political support for their 
business. As much party political power in Cambodia is based on developing and maintaining 
connections whilst restricting opportunities to rival parties (Kheang Un, 2005), then 
commercial fishing businesses also require these political ties.  
 
Fishing lot owners with ‘khnong’ (political backing) are able to ensure their business 
security over rivals (Piseth, 2002; CDRI, 2007a). Khnong is based on ‘kser’ and economic 
power. In the other words, in the fishing lot business, ‘khnong’ is a form of ‘social power’ 
based on complex social relations, often involving relatives, friends, bosses and political party 
allegiance. Economic strength without khnong is relatively useless. Thus, to have khnong, 
commercial operators also need to have a ‘khser’ that connect them with higher level officials 
with decision-making influence. Some fishing lot owners with ‘khnong and khser’ are able to 
restrict competition from rivals. Thus, we can not appreciate fishery politics in the Tonle Sap 
without understanding something about the power relationships involved (Degen and Thouk, 
2000; Piseth, 2002).  
 
Territoriality comes into play due to the importance of the fishery spaces under the 
commercial lots. ‘Power relation’ in ‘large-scale fishing’ is related to the size of the fishing 
lot which is then called as a ‘territorial power’, and the fishing lot owners actually build their 
relationship with powerful actors through their ‘power’ to maintain control over the fishing 
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lots, both research and auctioned lots. Large-scale fishing is based on patronage from 
powerful people in order to secure long term control over the lots.  In fact, most commercial 
owners have control over their fishing lots for more than 10 years. Long duration control 
means they have advantages, such as ownership of means of production; extensive knowledge 
about the real productivity of the fishing lot; experience in lot management; and strong 
relations with fisheries officials. Each lot owner has their own security forces as well as good 
relations with police and military officials. Thus, newcomers face uneasy entry into the 
fishing lot business and often they could not compete politically, economically and socially 
with the current fishing lot owners (Degen and Thouk, 2000; Piseth, 2002; CDRI, 2007a; 
Field notes, 2007-9).  
 
7.3.1.2 Fishing Lots and Sub-Lots  
 
Sub-dividing and sub-letting are part of the commercial fishing lot system, as owners 
try to maximize productivity by partitioning their lots into the most productive zones, which 
they normally control themselves, and less-productive fishery zones, which are then open to 
leases by other fishers. For instance, in the open fishing season  of 2006, Fishing Lot no.6 was 
sub-divided into three sub-lots—the Boeung Chhmar sub-lot, the Stung sub-lot located along 
the Stung River upto Boeung Chhmar, and the sounthern sub-lot covering a swamp area and 
part of the flooded forest. The owner of Lot no.6 only kept the Boeung Chhmar Sub-lot to fish 
for himself whilst sub-leasing other two sub-lots—the Stung sub-lot and the Southern sub-lot 
to sub-leasees (Vuthy et al., 2000; Field Notes, 2007). Another case is Fishing Lot no.5 in 
Peam Bang which was divided into 3-4 sub-lots. The lot owner kept the most productive sub-
lot for himself with the rest of the fishing zone being rented out (Field Notes, 2007).  
 
Field-based interviews reveal that this system creates a very intensive fishery. First, 
the lot owners and the sub-leaseholders have a great incentive to fish out their zones until 
there are no more fish. Further sub-divisions of fishing grounds do occur as sub-leaseholders 
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then further partition their sub-lots to a third tier of leaseholders. Very often other fishers are 
sub-contracted to fish these lots, and so all parties have vested interests to exploit the fishery 
to the maximum. In this arrangement, the fisherman catches fish inside the sub-lot, but has to 
share their fish with the fishing lot owner or sub-leaseholder. The fishers could keep 60 
percent of the catch for their own and provide 40 percent of the catch to the fishing lot owner 
or sub-leaseholder. Finally, the fishers have to sell their catch to the fishing lot owner, but at a 
cheaper price than would be sold on open market (Field Notes, 2007).  
 
So the fishery has effectively built up the patronage system with patrons (lot owners 
and leaseholders, who are also clients) and fishermen clients. The ‘patron’ is actually 
allowing their ‘clients’ to fish inside their ‘sub-lot areas’ because they benefit from the 
catches without necessarily having to invest too heavily in new boats and gears, whilst their 
fishermen clients are paid by the patron in the form of sharing the fish catch. Fishers face 
most of the risks of uncertain harvests and declining catches within this system.  
 
Fishing lot owners are contracted by the Fisheries Administration representing the 
Royal Government of Cambodia to manage the fishing lot areas for 2-6 years. However, the 
sub-leaseholder is sub-contracted by the fishing lot owners on a year-by-year basis, not 2-6 
years, to manage a ‘sub-lot areas’. Fishing lot sub-divisions and sub-leasehold conditions are 
effectively under the control of lot owners, not the Fisheries Administration. Therefore, the 
fishing lot owners are, in effect, the legal owners of the fishing lot areas (albeit under set time 
periods). The ‘patron’ protects the ‘client’ to ensure the fishing business accumulates wealth, 
and sub-leaseholders have a vested interest in ensuring productivity remains high.  
 
7.3.2 Politics of Small-Scale Fishing  
 
‘Small-scale’ fishing was defined by the French Protectorate regime 100 years ago, in 
which it was assumed that fishing community in the Tonle Sap is homogenous and thus 
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small-scale fishing was imbedded into the everyday practice for all fishing communities 
(Fisheries Law, 1987; Ratner, 2006; Marschke, 2005; Marschke and Berkes, 2005a). A very 
important dimension of my thesis is the actual homogeneity that exists within the so-called 
‘small-scale’ of fishing in the Tonle Sap, particularly between distinct villages with different 
human-ecology relations to environmental resources found between the floating, stand-stilt, 
and farming-cum-fishing communities. Livelihood security is variable and these villages face 
fundamentally different problems depending on the broader ecological conditions determined 
by the annual flood pulse. In fact, the current ‘scales’ written into the Fisheries Law do not 
take into account the variable human-nature relations, different community types, and 
complex realities of trying to survive day to day, month to month and year to year on aquatic 
resources.  
 
7.3.2.1 The Settlement Scale and Community Types in the Tonle Sap 
 
A major contribution of this thesis to the study of the Tonle Sap is in its recognition 
and elaboration of the problems confronted by different types of settlements in the Tonle Sap. 
In reality, some of these places are not settlements in that they are not ‘settled’ but actually 
mobile as floating communities. Analysis at the ‘scale’ of settlements and communities is 
vital because it reveals the fact that there are basically very distinctive sets of relations with 
fishery and other environmental resources of the Lake and floodplain areas. There are also 
differences in degrees of dependence on the wild capture fishery. Finally, whilst many of the 
fishers in the floating, strand-stilt and farming-cum-fishing villages do practice what 
technically ‘small-scale’ is fishing, in fact, they employ very different methods of fishing 
depending on the season, and also in relation to particular environmental – ecological 





a) Time Scales in Fishing 
 
Kampong Phluk is a stand-stilt community with agricultural land and rice fields. 
Whilst land is available, people in the village own no cultivated lands (Commune Data, 2005; 
AFN, 2004; Marschke, 2005; Field Notes, 2007). However, Peam Bang is a floating 
commune, covering 15,755ha, most of them are under the water and thus, having no land for 
agriculture, and entire population are engaged in fishing as a primary occupation (Commune 
Development Plan, 2006; Field Notes, 2007). Large areas of Peam Bang fall within the 
fishing lot areas, covering 22,131 ha (DoF, 2001). The administrative areas and the fishing 
lots overlap the areas assigned as a ‘Core Area’ of Biosphere Reserve, covering 14,560 ha. 
These basic differences greatly affect the household incomes and livelihood strategies 
employed in the two communities.  
 
Table 7. 3: Geographical Landscape of Studied Communities 












Flooded forest 7328 Flooded forest 13392 F looded forest 590 
Agricultural land 1409 Agricultural land 0 Agricultural land 217 
Swamp 118 Fishing lot 22,131 Uncultivated land 27 
Wetland 5378 Core area 14,560 Crop field/guarden 3 
Housing areas 14 Housing areas Floating 
village—n/a 
Housing areas 37 
Commune area 14247 Commune area  15755   
Source: a) Commune Data, 2005; b) Commune Development Plan, 2006; c) CFDS, 2002 
 
 
Given little or no farmland, most of households in both Kampong Phluk and Peam 
Bang are engaged in fishing as a ‘primary occupation’ (Marschke and Berkes, 2005b; Field 
Notes, 2007 and 2008). Based on a field study in Kampong Phluk and Peam Bang, it is 
estimated that about 90-95 percent of the households are engaged in fishing as primary 
occupation. Apart from fishing, about 32 percent of households in Kampong Phluk and about 
one percent in Peam Bang raise pigs. However, petty trading is also carried out by people in 
Kampong Phluk and Peam Bang. Fishing is vital to these communities, with almost all 
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households and practically all families, men and women, engaged in the activity in some form 
or another (See Table 7.4).  
 












% No.  
Household 
% No.  
Household 
% 
Fishing  412 94.28 123 90.44  84 44 
Agriculture 0 0 3 2.21  143 76 
Fish processing 148 33.87 n/a n/a  n/a - 
Raising fish and pig 138 31.58 2 1.47  n/a - 
Growing vegetable 108 24.71 0 0   
Petty trading 53 12.13 3 2.21  25 13 
Others 51 11.67 5 3.68    
Total Total no. of household 
437 
136 100  189 100 
Source: a) Field Notes, 2006; b) Commune data, 2005; c) Field Notes, 2007 & 2008 
 
 
However, Kampong La is a farming-cum-fishing community. About 76 percent of 
households are engaged in farming as a ‘primary occupation’ and they supplement their 
incomes by fishing. Fish has been used secondary to rice for household consumption and it is 
considered as a secondary occupation. About 35 percent of households in Kampong La are 
engaged in fishing as a ‘part-time’ occupation, and nine percent of the total households are 
engaged in ‘full-time’ fishing, as they are landless. Totally, about 44 percent of households, 
both with land and landless, are engaged in fishing (Field Notes, various times, 2007; See 
Table 7.4). 
 
b) Fishing Gears Used by Floating and Stand-Stilt Fishing Communities 
 
Based on my field study, fishing gears used by fishermen in Peam Bang and 
Kampong Phluk are categorized into seven main types, which are; fishing traps; gillnets; 
seine nets; scoop nets; prawn fishing gear such as ‘sainyeoun’ (shrimp traps) and ‘ta som’ 
(shrimp traps made of tree branches); torch and spear fishing at night; and seventh, is ‘cham 
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chhnas’ (‘waiting with a spear’). Of these only five types of fishing gears are used in farming-
cum-fishing communities (see Table 7.5). 
 
Indigenous use of fishing traps is well established in many parts of the Lower 
Mekong Basin, and numerous types of traps are found in the Tonle Sap. The fish trap is called 
in Khmer a ‘lop’. Among fishing households interviewed in Peam Bang and Kampong Phluk, 
there are many kinds of lop in use, although many fishers do not rely only on this method.  
Lop is a tube made of bamboo slats with an entry slot for fish to come in, but the shape of the 
entry point does not permit the fish to escape back. There are so many types of lop, and each 
lop is named after the particular local name given to the target fish; for instance, a lop used to 
catch a snakehead fish is named as a ‘lop trey ros’ and lop used to catch eel is named as a ‘lop 
antong’. Many lops may be connected together by the use of bamboo fences in the water. The 
bamboo fence is placed in a fishing area in two lines like an ‘arrow’ or ‘heart’ shape 
connecting to the ‘lop’ at the end of the arrow. Fishermen in this area call this type of practice 
a ‘lop lok’. 
 
The second practice that is relatively common is the use of gillnets. Gillnets or  
‘moung’ are used by a large number of fishermen in Peam Bang and Kampong Phluk, but the 
size of this gear varies significantly from household to household, and from fishing village to 
fishing village. There are so many types of ‘gillnet’, such as stationary gillnets, drift gillnets, 
hand dragged gillnets and encircling gillnets. In Peam Bang village, most of fishers use a 











Table 7. 5: The categorization of fishing gear 
Fishing Practices Floating village (Peam 
Bang) 







Fishing trap Barrage trap, arrow shaped 
bamboo fence trap, 
gourami trap—5% of 
villagers own this gear 
Barrage trap, arrow shaped 
bamboo fence trap, gourami 
trap—5% of villagers own this 
gear 
 
Gillnet 62% own gillnet of 100-
500m, 12% own between 
500-1200m 
• 40% owns gillnet of 500-
1200m, 
• 20% own gillnet of 100-
500m, and, 




out of 189 
households 
Seine net 3% of population use seine 
net of 700-1000m pulled by 
engine boat. Most of them 
a leaseholder.  
n/a n/a 
Torch fishing Yes n/a n/a 
Shrimp trap 14% of households 49% of households n/a 
Cham Theas 
(waiting with spear 
fishing) 
Yes n/a n/a 
Fishing line/hook Yes   
Source: Field Notes, 2006-9 
 
 
Third, fishing using fishing gear known as ‘oun’ (seine nets) is used by a small 
number of fishing households. Only 3 percent of the fishers interviewed in Peam Bang fish 
with oun, most of them are sub-leaseholders who sub-lease the fishing lot areas, while none of 
fishermen in Kampong Phluk reports to use seine net (oun). In the Tonle Sap, between 
February and May, the practice of ‘encircling seine nets’ is used in the commercial areas, 
approximately at water-levels of 2-3m. The catching capacity is roughly one to two tons a 
day. To operate oun, an average, it requires 10-15 people to run at least three engine boats to 
pull these nets, which explains why many households are not engaged in the method (Field 
Notes, 2007; see Table 7.5).  
 
Fourth, scoop net fishing is practiced by small number of fishing households. My 
study finds only a few fishing households in Peam Bang and Kampong Phluk currently using 
this indigenous method. Fifth, saiyoeun or ‘shrimp traps’ are used by fishermen in both Peam 
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Bang and Kampong Phluk. This typical fishing gear is mainly used for harvesting shrimp in 
the Tonle Sap, mostly used by small-scale fishers. About 11 percent of interviewed 
households in Peam Bang and 8 percent in Kampong Pgluk indicate that they use saiyoeun to 
harvest shrimp, mostly in the wet season. Among 136 interviewed households in Peam Bang, 
only 19 households own saiyoeun. These days there is very little spear fishing, or torch and 
spear fishing at night. In times when fish were more plentiful these indigenous practices were 
more common than they were today (Field Notes, various times, 2007). 
 
c) Fishing Gears Used by Farming-cum-Fishing Community 
 
Fishing for majority of the households in Kampong La is for household consumption 
rather than market sale. However, the landless fishing households in this community do fish 
for both consumption and sale, and the income from fish sales is used to purchase rice, 
vegetables and eggs. To get enough fish for both household consumption and sale, the fishing 
household possesses necessary fishing equipments, such as boat(s), fishing nets and fishing 
traps. About 73 percent of households in Kampong La own fishing gears and fishing boats. 
This in microcosm is representative of a much broader phenomenon, and that is that 
predominantly rice paddy villages around the Tonle Sap are also heavily involved in fishing.  
 
Five fishing practices are carried out by farming-cum-fishing households in Kampong 
La. First, mong ray (fishing net) is used at the household level, deployed in the less shallow 
water to catch fish and most of the households own mong ray. It costs 25000-50000 Riel for 
50m of fishing net. Some households take cash advances from fish traders in the village and 
make the payment by selling the fish to these traders at a lower price than the actual price in 
the market. The length of nets could tell us the degree of fishing village households are 
engaged in. In a selective interview of 45 households in Kampong La, most households own 
fishing net between 0-100m long, representing 28 percent of household interviewed. The 
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fishing net of 150-220m and 270-300m respectively is owned relatively by small number of 
households. 
 
Second, mong oun (gillnets) are made of a hard nylon thread that is used for  larger-
scale fishing in the deeper waters of the Lake  and only one family in Kampong La fish with 
such gillnets. This is largely because gillnets are only feasible in ‘open water space’, and they 
are not really suitable for inundated forest areas.    
 
Third, the fishing line-hook is widely used for fishing by villagers in Kampong La. 
The fishing line is made of nylon threat and the hook is made of iron with hooks that snare 
fish. The fishing line and hooks is place-based fishing gear that is placed in a row in certain 
locations in fairly deep water. The number of fishing hooks varies greatly between 
households from 100 hooks to 3000 hooks. About 60 percent of interviewed households own 
fishing lines with 100-500 hooks and only six percent of interviewed households own fishing 
line with 1000-3000 hooks.  
 
Fourth, bamboo fishing traps are a placed-based fishing gear that people place in 
specific locations in the evening and collect in the morning. These methods are very suitable 
for shallow waters, and are widely used in different parts of the inundated forest zones.  
 
Fifth, another fishing practice carried out by fishermen from Kampong La is ‘korn’, 
which are wooden pieces connected by ropes. Two people pull the korn at both ends to 
surprise the fish. When fish jump, other fishers move at the back of the korn to catch fish with 
a specially designed round trap known by local people as ‘angrot’. This is yet another 
example of the indigenous ingenuity of local fishers who have adapted techniques extremely 




d) Scale in Fish Catches 
 
In the Tonle Sap there is much debate about fish stocks, and with so many ordinary 
people dependent on wild capture fisheries it is important to be able to estimate household 
productivity. Fish catches vary greatly from household to household, depending on the fishing 
gears each fishing household uses, the number of household members (and employees) 
engaged in fishing, and the time they spend in fishing.  Approximately 40 percent of the 
fishing households in Peam Bang Commune catch about 5-10kg/day, while 28 percent could 
catch approximately 1-5kg/day. However, about 24 percent of the fishing households could 
catch 10-20kg/day.In Kampong Phluk, during the high fishing season, about 34 percent of the 
households catch 2-5kg of fish/day. About 26 percent of households have caught 5-10kg of 
fish a day and 20 percent for 20-50kg a day. In Kampong La village, about 60 percent of 
households interviewed report the fish catch during the peak fishing season to increase to an 
average of 5-10 kg/day. This is reported for the period between December and February 
(Field Notes, various dates, 2007).  
 
Given the high percentage of small fishes in the average catch, the catch is classified 
into the following main categories—‘trey nu’ (bait fish), ‘trey mong’ (gillnet fish) or ‘trey 
chamros’ (mixed fish), ‘trey thom’ (large fish) and ‘trey be’ (cultured fish). Firstly, ‘trey nu’ 
is a low quality fish, people use it for feeding cage culture fishes, making animal feed and 
fertilizers, and not usually for human consumption. Trey nu consist more of ‘trey riel’ 
(cyprinid fishes) but its size is small. The price of trey riel varies, but it was 200-300 Riels in 
the last 5-10 years, but it increases to 800-1000 Riel during periods of increased demand. For 
example, in late 2007 and early 2008, it increased to 1200 Riel/kg or 1500 Riel/kg. Large 
quantities of trey nu is harvested everyday by fishing households using small mesh size net to 
feed the raised fishes and farmed crocodiles, and left overs from their use is discharged into 
the water as ‘trash.’ 
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Second, ‘trey mong’ is the second category of fish that is caught by gillnets 
composing of different fish species in the catch, which are called ‘trey chamros’ (mixed 
fishes), most of them a small fishes such as (in Khmer) ‘trey kampeang’, ‘trey kragn’, ‘trey 
riel’, ‘trey Kanchos’. When people sell ‘trey mong’, they do not classify them by species or 
commercial values due to small quantity and each species does not make enough weight to 
gain a real value, but the usual practice is to sell the whole catch to middlemen. Given the 
diversity in catch, the price per kilogram does not specifically follow any price of particular 
species. The price of ‘trey mong’ per kilogram was about 500-600 Riel in the last 5-10 years 
ago. At the time of writing (late 2009), the price of fish is increased from 1000 Riel to 1500 
Riel per kilogram of the catch.  
 
However, the rich fishing households using a long gillnet, arrow-shaped bamboo 
fence trap and bor tend to classify their fish catch by species as their catch is often a large 
quantity. The price of fish by category is dependent on the fish itself and it seems that they 
got a high price than the poor and the poorest fishing household. Similarly, the fish traders 
buy ‘trey mong’ from fishing households and they classify them into commercial values. By 
doing this, the fish trader even make more profits from buying ‘trey mong’.  
 
Third, ‘Trey thom’ (large fish) consists of ‘trey deap’, ‘trey phtouk’, ‘trey andeng’, 
‘trey pra’, ‘trey chhdor’, ‘trey ros’, most of which have a high commercial value. ‘Trey thom’ 
is caught by those fishermen using large-scale fishing gears such as ‘seine net’ (oun), and fish 
trap with arrow bamboo fence known as ‘lop lok’. The fishermen subleasing the fishing lot 
areas catch more trey thom (large fish) as they use a large-scale fishing gears. The fishing lot 
owners tend to catch more large fish from their fishing lot areas. Small fisherman could catch 
a large fish only if they use a ‘big fishing gear’29. Trey thom is mostly fished by a ‘big 
                                               
29
 The “big fishing gear” refers to those fishing gears upgraded from the small-scale fishing gears aiming 




fishermen’, the fishing sub-leaseholders and the fishing lot owners as they fish in larger 
fishing spaces. However, the small fisherman catch less trey thom as they fish in the ‘public 
fishing area’, using small-fishing gears, where there are many fishermen fishing in the same 
areas. Interestingly, it may be that Trey thom tend to move towards the fishing lot areas as in 
the public fishing areas there are more fishers, the noise of the engine boats is common, and 
the floating human settlements frighten away the bigger fishes.  
 
Fourth, trey be means raised fishes. Each fishing household raises fish in a cage 
known as a ‘be’, and therefore, people have names such fish as trey be. Trey be is sold when 
it weights about one kilogram which is equivalent to one year. Trey be is usually a large fish, 
comprising of snakehead or try pra. The price of trey be has averaged 2,000-3,000 Riel in the 
last 10 years, but it can increase to 4,500-7,000 depending on market conditions and 
availability of large wild capture fishes, which have been on decline over the past ten years 
(Field Notes, 2007). The prices given here are actual village prices, but the urban market price 
may easily be twice this price. In this case, trey be refers to a good quality commercial fish, 
and many people in the Tonle Sap wish to increase their trey be capacity (Field Notes, 2007). 
 
7.3.2.2 Fishing Household Scales 
 
Fishing households may broadly be classified into four main scales—the rich, the 
medium, the poor and the poorest. These households are characterized by house size and 
conditions within fishing communities, the ownership of fishing gear by different households, 
the source of incomes, labour and capital availability. The poorest villages constitute, 
according to my own research, approximately 35-40 percent of households, whilst the poor 
and the medium households constitute about 30 percent respectively. Kampong La has the 
highest percentage of the very poor, accounting for as much as 77 percent of households ( See 
Table 7.6).   
 
 283 
Table 7. 6: The scale in household fishing by different fishing community 
 Kampong Laa) Peam Bangb) Kampong Phluka) Total 
Rich 0 0 8 7.02 31 7.09 39 5.41 
Medium 6 3.53 34 29.82 177 40.50 217 30.10 
Poor 33 19.41 48 42.11 132 30.21 213 29.54 
Very poor 131 77.06 24 21.05 97 22.20 252 34.95 
Total  170  100 114 100.00 437 100.00 721 100.00 
Source: a) Commune Data of Kampong La Village, 2005; b) Field Notes, 2007 & 2008 
 
A ‘rich household’ uses large-scale fishing gears, usually the long bamboo fence traps 
that require a ‘large space’ in the fishing grounds, especially in the open lake. To maintain a 
‘large space’ within the public fishing areas, which are highly competitive fisheries, requires 
local political connections and financial resources. Similarly, the ‘medium household’ acts in 
a similar way as the richer households. They often compete with other fishers for ‘fishing 
space’. As noted above, if fishers have access to patrons, to money-lenders, and are able to 
up-scale, then they are often also able to negotiate for more fishing space and then employ 
other local fishers are labourers. The poor and the poorest households gain access to less 
productive parts of the public fishing grounds, as well as streams, rivers, creeks and ponds. 
Their fishing gears do not really permit fishing over large areas of open waters. However, as 
we have seen, they have devised many methods of fishing suitable for particular ecological 
conditions and water-levels. Many of these people are relatively poor in terms of capital and 
technology, but they may also be vulnerable because they rely heavily on fishing for 










Table 7. 7: Ownership of fishing gear by community types and household status 
 
Rich Medium Poor Poorest 
Stand-stilt community 
Characteristics and Ownership of boats  
Big motor boats Two or three big 
motor boats 
One big motor 
boat 
No big motor 
boat  
No big motor 
boat  
Small motor boats Two or three 
small motor 
boats 
One small motor 
boat 
One small motor 
boat 
No small motor 
boat  
Paddling boats Two or three 
paddle boats 
One or two 
paddling boats 





Fishing equipment Use big scale 
fishing gears as 
commercial 
activities 
Use fishing gears 
that could catch 
more fish 
Use small scale 
fishing gears  




Characteristics and Ownership of boats 




Two or three 
engine boats 
(power: 6-24 cc) 
No big engine 
boat 
No big engine 
boat 
Small engine boat One or two 
engine boats 




(power: 8-15 cc)  
One small engine 
boats (minority) 
Paddling boats One or two 
paddle boats 
One or two paddle 
boats 
One paddle boats  One small paddle 
boat (some don't 
have) 
Fishing equipment Fish with fishing 
gears  such as 
bamboo fence 
trap, long gill 
net drag by 
engine boat  
Fish with fishing 
gears  such as gill 
net about 200 to 
300 metre  






Characteristics and Ownership of boats 
Big engine boat No big engine 
boat 
No big engine boat No big engine 
boat 
No big engine 
boat 
Small engine boat No small engine 
boat 
No small engine 
boat 
No small engine 
boat 
No small engine 
boat 
Paddling boats One paddling 
boat 
One paddling boat No paddling boat No paddling boat 
Fishing equipment Fishing with 
gillnet, fishing 




fishing net, fishing 
trap 
Fishing with 
fishing net and 
trap 
Provide labor and 
work as laborer 
Source: Field Notes, 2007 and 2008 
 
An example of how capital, technology, fishing techniques and methods differ 
between households is a comparison between bor and saiyouen fishing practices in Kampong 
Phluk. In this stand-stilt settlement during the dry season from January to February, all fishing 
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households fish in the ‘open lake’. The main fishing gears used is known in local language as 
a bor which is similar to the ‘arrow-shaped bamboo fence trap’—a long fish weir connected 
to heart or arrow-shaped capture chambers with big lop traps attached to them (Deap et al., 
2003). Each bor is about 200 to 500 m long in the shallow water about 1.2m in the lake. 
However, in the wet season from August to September, the bor (50-200m) is placed in the 
flooded forest as shown in the map further inside the land areas. At the time of this research, 
it was recorded that 120 bors operate in the ‘primary space of dependence’ of Kampong 
Phluk by 60 households, and 13 bors are operated by outsiders. This fishing space is socially 
constructed through the continuous use of this space over many consecutive years, and 
through local power relations involving bor owners and other stakeholders. Given this use, no 
body else could dare to take over this fishing space. The rich and the medium fishing 
households have a firm position in the bor system and the poor and poorest fishers with 
different fishing technologies are in a weaker position to negotiate fishing space.  
 
Mostly, poorer fishing households of Kampong Phluk fish with saiyoeun kampeh 
(shrimp traps) to catch the freshwater shrimp known as ‘kampech’. This is a placed based 
gear that is fixed to one or two poles which are firmly pushed into the under-soil of the lake in 
order to anchor the trap in the current, mainly in the period from July to January. One fisher 
may utilize 30 to 80 shrimp traps at a time. Frequently the traps are connected by a long line 
for easy collection. Another shrimp trap used for fishing by the poor and the poorest 
household is ‘kansom kampeh’ (brush bundle for shrimp) made of small branches. The bundle 
is attached by means of a nylon rope to a floating wooden stick indicating the location of the 
bundle. It is operated in the open water of the Tonle Sap Lake from June to February.  Thus, 
we can often estimate the ‘scale’ of fishing activity according to fishing grounds, technology 
employed, methods and type of fish caught (Field Notes, 2007).  
 
In floating villages such as Kampong Loung or Peam Bang, the ‘rich’ fishing 
household acts as a fishing lot leaseholder; or merchandiser; or timber, bamboo, fish trader; or 
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some are money lenders. In the fishing business, the ‘rich’ households in a floating village 
hire labour and they generate a lot of capital from fishing. The ‘rich’ households have huge 
capital assets that can be used for fishing. Apart from fishing, the ‘rich’ households also raise 
fish and crocodiles in order to supplement their income from fishing. Given their business, 
they could borrow money from moneylenders or Banks and they work closely with the urban 
fish traders in order to get their fish to market. The ‘medium’ households derive their living 
from fishing and petty trading. In fishing, they use more boats and bigger capacity fishing 
gears than the small-scale fishers. Unlike the commercial fishers, most ‘medium’ households 
fish themselves, only few hire a labour for fishing. Apart from fishing, they also raise fish and 
pig to supplement their incomes (Field Notes, 2007).  
 
As for the ‘poor’ and the ‘poorest’ households, they tend to fish for subsistence 
purposes and small trade using lower productivity gears. Some households sell labour to rich 
households in order to get income to support families and some undertake independent small-
scale fishing. The ‘poor’ and the ‘poorest’ households borrow money from fish traders or 
moneylenders for fishing equipment and materials, but agree to sell their fish catches back at 
a cheaper price to middlemen or moneylenders and thus they become heavily indebted in the 
process, and cumulatively so over a period of a few years. Often fishing could not generate 
enough income and therefore, income from fishing is used to pay the debts and for foodstuffs, 
and thus, they often face a food shortages. In return, they have to borrow more money for 
maintaining existing gear or buying new fishing gear so that they can keep fishing.  
 
Thus, given the difference between fishing households, they often use different 
fishing gears to fish for their different needs. As fish catches for fishing households is 
declining, there is a strong tendency for fishers to up-scale their activities and gears if they 
can borrow enough money. Every fisher is involved in ‘survival’ and therefore, at the fishing 
grounds, everyone is trying to catch enough to pay off debts, to catch enough to earn some 
profits, and technically, nobody is in the purely subsistence bracket of the official designation 
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of ‘small scale’. However, richer fishers may actually prefer to call themselves ‘small scale’ 
operators, even though they enjoy big advantages over other fishers in terms of patronage, 
fishing space and capital availability. 
 
7.3.2.3 The Survival Scale for Fishing Communities in the Tonle Sap 
 
People living in floating and stand-stilt communities in the Tonle Sap are very much 
concerned about how to sustain their living and survive in the situation of a decline in 
fisheries. Given fishers’concerns about their survival in fishing, they do whatever they can to 
fish as much as they can to ensure their ‘daily survival’.  As indicated above, ‘small-scale’ 
fishing is not surivival, but fishers in floating and stand-stilt communities need to fish at least 
for a ‘minimum need’ as decribed by James Scott (1976) or in my own term a ‘survival’. 
Thus, small-scale fishing is not small, but a survival and in achieving this, as shown in James 
Scott (1976), small-scale fishers practice a ‘safety-first principle’. This means that small-scale 
fisher up-grades and up-scales fishing activity, and they are not concerned with the official 
notion of ‘small-scale fishing’.  
 
As shown in the previous section in this Chapter, most fishing households in the 
Tonle Sap practice fishing scale regardless of the official ‘scales’ and as a consequence, it is 
hard to determine what ‘fishing scale’ they are fishing with and actual practices do not fit 
criteria defined in the Fisheries Law, but are in official terms, technically ‘illegal’ (in terms of 
gears and other criteria). From the fishermen’s side, ‘illegal fishing’ is viewed as technically 
‘illegal’ but locally ‘licit’ as it is for ‘surivival’ only, and they see the practice as something 
they pay to do (pers.comm., Sangkat fishery official, Sept. 11, 2007), and then and I call this 
the ‘survival scale’.  ‘Illegal fishing’ is an official language, but ‘survival-scale’ relates to 




Table 7. 8: Scale of Fisheries Management in the Tonle Sap 
Politics of Scale 
of Fisheries 
Management 
Scale in Fishing 
communities 
Scale in Fishing 
Households 




- The fishing lots, public 
fishing area and conservation 
area. 
- Fishing community—the 
Floating, the Stand-stilt and 
Farming-Fishing 
Communities—is allowed to 
fish only in the public 
fishing area.  
There is a competition 
among fishing 
households—the Rich, 
the Medium, the Poor 
and the Poorest—to fish 
in the public fishing 
areas.  
-Some fishers build 
relationship with fishing 
lot owners and fish 
inside the fishing lot. 
- Some fishers bribe the 
officials and they fish in 
public fishing areas 
using large-scale fishing 
gears. 
Fishing Scale -Small-scale, medium-scale 
and large-scale fishing. 
- Fishers fish in small-scale 
in public fishing areas for 
subsistence only, not for 
trade. However, small-sale 





The Rich and the 
Medium fishing 
households fish using 
larger fishing gears, 
catching more fish, but 
poor enforcement on 
them, while the poor 
and the poorest is 
subject to strictly 
control and 
enforcement.   
Fishers fish and sell fish 
to fish traders. Fishers 
borrow money from fish 
traders to upgrade their 
fishing scales, but agree 
to sell their fish catch to 
fish trader cheaper than 
market price.  
Temporal 
Fishing Scale 
There is an open and close 
fishing seasons. Fishing 
communities fish throughout 
the year with small-scale, but 
fishers do not limit 
themselves to small-scale, 
but to the degree that they 
can survive.  
The Rich and Medium 
fished using larger 
fishing gears could fish 
in both open and close 
fishing season.  
Fishers fish larger than 
the small-scale in both 
open and close fishing 
season. In doing this, 
fisher bribes the 
officials and officials 
protect fishers. Officials 
accept this due to their 
low salary.   
 
 
It is widely known, and all people (officials and communities) know that it is 
destructive to the fisheries and livelihoods of people in the longer term, but they can not get 
rid of it because it affects their immediate livelihoods. Fishing scale has been played by both 
fishers and officials in charge to sustain their immediate living, and thus, putting the resources 
under pressure. Hence, the ‘official scale’ is not practical, but very destructive in fishing 
business, inducing a very complex system of politics of scale in fisheries management in the 








In this chapter I have discussed many different ways in which ‘scale’ can be 
employed, not in the same theoretical ways as employed in ‘politics of scale’ discussions in 
academic geography, but in practical everyday ‘politics’ as it affects fishers using different 
methods and operating in different communities. I have argued that Fisheries Administration 
categories of fishing ‘scale’ are complex and are actually impractical for fisheries governance. 
However, applications of different scales help us to appreciate the differing ‘power webs’ of 
the deeply embedded patronage politics of Cambodia, which does have spatial and local 
variations on a theme, as illustrated by the examples from the different settlement types and 




Political Economy of Fishing in the Tonle Sap: Commercialized Spaces, Patron-Client 
Relations, and the Moy System 
8.1 Resource Economy Transformed 
“When I was young, I saw fish abundances in the Tonle Sap Lake. I 
paddled by boat, fish jumped in and if I took a long ride, I could get 
almost enough fish for my meal. At present, we use a small mesh size 
net to fish; we still catch less fish.” Om Chhim, fisher in Kampong 
Phluk, 65 years old.  
 
Om Chhim’s lament is nothing unusual. It reflects three vital issues confronting the 
fishers of the Tonle Sap. First, the decline in fish abundance, which as Om Chhim remembers, 
was once taken for granted in the Tonle Sap. Second, is the fact that many fishers are 
resorting to methods that will only exacerbate the fish stock declines, such as the use of fine 
mesh nets. Third, Om Chhim is caught in a cycle of over-fishing, which relates strongly to a 
transformation in the political economy of fishing within Cambodia as a whole. As explained 
in earlier chapters, territorialization has been strongly associated with commercialization of 
fisheries, and in turn, aspects of the traditional economic relations based on fishing for 
subsistence, bartering fish for rice, even the nature of patron-client relations, have all been 
subsumed to the rationality of fishing to make money. Om Chhim’s lament is just one story 
narrating the resources change in the Tonle Sap, affecting the livelihoods of fishers, but it 
should be viewed in the broader political economic context of changes affecting Cambodia’s 
place in the regional and global economies, and in relation to a rapid “opening up” of the 
primary resource sectors of forests and fisheries, particularly since the early 1990s (Le Billon, 
2000).  
 
Following James Scott’s (1976) discussion of the economics of subsistence in rural 
society, the notion of the “moral economy of the peasant” could also have been applied to 
fishing villages of the Tonle Sap. In the “moral economy”, Scott (19976) argues that the 
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peasant family is a unit of consumption and production, in which it produces and consumes to 
meet a subsistence minimum and they struggle for the subsistence minimum in the context of 
shortage of land, capital and outside employment opportunities.  Under such a system, shared 
activities, divisions of labour, and economic relations were mostly geared towards the 
maintenance of community life. Under such a “moral economy” it can be argues that 
‘community’ identity helped promote consensual decision-making, and helped prevent 
individualistic forces that dominate atomized capitalist societies. Patrons would be expected 
to share their surpluses to some degree with other members of the community, such as at 
religious festivals or important calendar events in rural society. In Cambodia, at least until the 
long periods of civil strife and the emergence of the Khmer Rouge, the commercialization of 
fisheries in the Tonle Sap was far from being ubiquitous, and community and inter-communal 
socio-economic relations were less dominated by markets than they have been since 
Cambodia’s ‘transitional’ political economic phase, beginning in the early 1990s. In this 
chapter, I wish to emphasize certain changes in social and community relations that have 
occurred with the transformation of Cambodia’s political economy, and the relatively rapid 
commodification of many aspects of life.  
 
For Scott (1976), under the “moral universe” of pre-modern rural society, the 
legitimacy of patron-client relations was based on the notion that elites must not invade the 
subsistence reserve of poor people. Such an idea has been critically analyzed by other writers, 
such as Samuel Popkin (1979) who argued that the ‘moral economy’ of peasant societies is 
too idealized, and that many peasants developed competitive strategies for coping with the 
subsistence crisis, sometimes cooperating with more powerful groups, sometimes utilizing 
private, family investments to improve their position and long-term security. Thus, socio-
economic differentiation and economic conflicts have always been a part of rural society. In 
addition, the patron-client relationship is changeable, renegotiable and malleable in 
accordance with considerations of power and strategic interactions among individual. The 
dyadic nature of the relationship is not inherent, but is a matter of the ability of the lord or 
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patron to individualize relations and prevent collective bargaining. This, in return, means that 
resources of the patron will be invested, not only to improve the security and subsistence of 
the clients, but to keep relations dyadic and prevent the client’s acquisition of any skills that 
might lead to different balance of power (Popkin, 1979). This explores how the intensification 
of market relations has both been influenced by macro changes in the political economy and 
by micro shifts in the nature of patron-client relations within rural society, with particular 
reference to rural fishing communities of the Tonle Sap. 
8.2 Cambodia’s “Hybrid” Democracy, “Transitional” Political Economy and Patron-
Client Relations 
 
As noted above, patron-client relations are never static, and they are subject to many 
changes over time (see Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984). What is interesting in Cambodia’s case 
is that the old patron-client relations were virtually wiped out in the 1970s, firstly by violent 
civil conflict exacerbated by US bombing in the countryside, and then by the rise of the 
Khmer Rouge, who in their efforts to completely alter the fabric of society and turn Cambodia 
into a rural-based communist country they eliminated many former elites, and broke up 
former community-based structures. Thus, it is rather peculiar that we can still talk about 
patron-client relationships in Cambodia.  
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, this thesis is mostly concerned with the effects of political 
geography on power relations and the governance of natural resources in the Tonle Sap. 
Whilst power is spatial in many ways (Allan, 2003b), it is not necessarily territorial (Sack, 
1986; Alatout, 2006). Indeed, understanding the resurrection of patron-client relations in rural 
society is critical to explaining why power is diverse, relational and takes both spatial and 
non-territorial forms (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984). As discussed in chapter 7, the politics of 
fishing scales requires knowledge of patron-client relationships. Furthermore, we should note 
that these relations are relatively strong in situations when the central state apparatus is poor 
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at servicing or supporting rural communities. Patrons can often help to fill gaps in providing 
services to ‘local’ clients in the relative absence of a fully functioning state-based system of 
service provision. In fact, in Cambodia, the patron-client system can be viewed as a sort of 
‘shadow’ institutional arrangement that to some extent relies on broader political patronage 
networks with senior officials and government ministers, and to some extent is relatively 
independent of the state.  
 
Caroline Hughes (2003) argues that the patron-client relationships in Cambodia were 
revived during the so-called ‘transitional’ political economic period during and following the 
UN Transitional Authority phase of the 1990s. According to Hughes, it was during this period 
that central control into rural areas was extended through the co-opting of local patrons, as 
well as military and political elites with strong connections in the provinces and districts. 
Hughes (2003) discusses the differences between ‘traditional’ patron-client relations, of the 
type studied by Scott (1976) and the ‘modified’ forms of patron-client relationships that 
emerged again at the end of the socialist era (under Vietnam’s influence in the 1980s) and 
during Cambodia’s political economic transitional phase. Traditionally, the patrons extracted 
resources and labour from clients by virtue of their landholdings, or control over space and 
natural resources, and other privileges. However, the patrons provided a degree of stability for 
rural communities. As Hughes (2003: 61) notes, “the patrons helped to guarantee the social 
and spiritual fabric of village life. This was achieved through the building of temples, the 
sponsorship of religious festivals and the provision of contributions to funerals and 
weddings.” Thus, the patron-client relationship helped to preserve “the stability of rural 
hierarchies, operated to ameliorate the consequences of unequal distributions of land 
ownership among members of a community, entangled in a common set of social relations 
and cemented by adherence to the same ritual calendar.” The extent to which this holds true is 
debatable; however, it is undeniable that in Cambodia such patron-client relations were very 
significant in rural life until the 1970s.  
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 Hughes (2003: 62) has argued that the “patron-client relationships of the ‘transitional’ 
era until the present time are effectively based on resurrected and new socio-economic and 
political elites becoming patrons, many of whom have political allegiances to the dominant 
political party (the Cambodian Peoples Party or CCP), or else with other military and 
bureaucratic elites who have influence within government circles, and that such a system has 
greatly increased the scope for rent-seeking, resource exploitation, and extending ‘political’ 
agendas in the countryside.” According to Hughes’ analysis, the ‘modified’ patron-client 
relationships are part of some new legitimizing myth for describing state-society relations’ in 
an era of expanding market penetration, external neo-liberal influences on the types of 
‘development’ being implemented by a relatively authoritarian central state under the heavy 
influence of the dominant political party. It is legitimizing because it harkens back to and 
utilizes the memory (however distant) of some essentially ‘Khmer’ form of “moral economy” 
to borrow Scott’s terminology. In other words, whilst the ‘new’ patron-client relationships are 
based on increasing commercialization and resource extraction that tend to favour certain 
political and economic elites at macro levels of the political economy, the ‘localized’ nature 
of these relations still resembles the ‘traditional’ structures and to a certain extent mimics the 
former power relations at commune and village levels. However, these ‘modified’ patron-
client relationships have also extended the scope for immense socio-economic differentiation 
to occur as environmental resources become increasingly territorialized, privatized, 
partitioned, and are locally competitive within larger national and regional market structures. 
In practice, as Hughes (2003: 62) observes, “the relative ‘rewards’ for clients are little, if at 
all, from any patronage or protection in return.” Part of the problem is that today’s patrons 
may be less reliant on particular localities for their socio-economic “power domain”, and less 
obligated to uphold rural traditions than was the case in the times prior to the huge socio-
political upheavals of the 1970s. Thus, patron-client relationships today may serve 
communities less than they did in previous times, and this may be because they tend to serve 
certain personalized sets of relations and personal agendas, as opposed to “societal goals” or 
“the rule of rights” (Le Billon, 2000: 796).  
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This is not to argue that patron-client relations are the same everywhere in Cambodia, 
because in reality such “power webs” (my term) of socio-economic and political relationships 
are uneven and variable across space. Indeed, there are definitely cases of the system working 
relatively fairly in some instances and with mutual benefits for patrons and clients. However, 
patronage politics is strong in the rural society partly due to the weakness of the government 
system in supporting myriad local communities, and partly due to the way in which the 
Cambodian state has encouraged the resurrected patron-client system so long as it yields 
political support for the ruling party. Kheang Un (2005) has argued that the intertwining of 
state-support in exchange for offering opportunities for rent-seeking and resource wealth 
accumulation has been a feature of Cambodia’s “hybrid regime” caught between outright 
authoritarianism and a full-fledged democracy (see also, Lewitsky and Way, 2002). Patronage 
politics allows for material inducements in exchange for political allegiance, and according to 
Kheang (2005: 213) the commune system and district authorities help provide a basis for “a 
national chain of patron-client networks that ensured the accumulation and extension of 
power throughout the country.” Thus, there is a political culture that has developed around the 
‘modified’ patron-client system and it’s associated “networks of obligation and flows of 
resources between officials and key participants” (Hughes, 2003: 127).  
 
As the Cambodian economy opened up to external forces, international donors, 
foreign direct investments (particularly in the relatively abundant natural resource sectors), 
and became interlinked in the fast developing regional resource economy in the 1990s (Le 
Billon, 2000; Hughes, 2003, Springer, 2009a), there were new localized opportunities for 
multiple patrons. However, Hughes (2003: 64) suggests that this was not a “reassertion of 
‘traditional’ values, but a process that was linked to the nature of state politics and of the 
transitional political economy at a time of tremendous change.” As Simon Springer (2009b: 
18) has explained:  “indigenous elites endorse neoliberalization as an opportunity to rapidly 
line their own pockets through shadow state mechanisms that enable informal control over the 
privatization process.” In the fishery sector, like the forestry sector (see Le Billon, 2000;  
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Springer, 2009a; Global Witness, 2009), there are plenty of opportunities for benefitting from 
“neo-liberal” reforms that “open up” rural areas to larger markets, coupled with the 
commercialization of space, increasingly state surveillance of different forms of “public 
space”, rent-seeking, and so on. Undoubtedly, the opening up of Cambodia’s economy since 
the early 1990s has been done with extraordinarily rapid, state-sponsored, but poorly 
regulated resource exploitation in all sectors. Even so, Hughes (2003: 64) suggests that this 
“modern system of control and expropriation has been received with ambivalence even by 
those who have no choice but to participate in it and gain from it in their everyday working 
lives.” Cambodia has witnessed excessive resource extraction and associated forms of 
‘violence’ (such as dispossession from land) during the relatively geopolitically peaceful 
period of market reforms (Le Billon, 2000; Springer, 2009a).  
 
In the case of patron-client relations in the Tonle Sap, we can see that there exists a 
disproportionate degree of influence, political and economic power with a relatively small 
fishery elite, including senior politicians, fishing lot ‘owners’, wealthy and well capitalized 
fishers, certain trades, and officials with connections within relevant state agencies. The 
expansion of commercial fish production has undoubtedly enabled a reinforcement of the 
“power webs” of complex patron-client relationships in the Cambodian freshwater fisheries 
sector. Conversely, as noted in earlier chapters, many smaller-scale fishers are trapped in 
cycles of debt and relational dependency, with vulnerable livelihood security, and prospects 
of diminishing returns if fish stocks are over-exploited in the future.  
 
The rest of this chapter shall focus on the transformation of the traditional rice-fish 
economy of the Tonle Sap into a highly competitive ‘dual economy’ of farmers and fishers. I 
will then examine the rice – fish economy of Kampong La and the fish – rice economy of 
Kampong Phluk. Throughout this discussion I wish to stress some of the critical distinctions 
between mostly ‘land-based’ socio-economic relations versus mostly ‘water-based’ socio-
economic relations on the Tonle Sap. Finally, I shall focus on the issue of fish buying and 
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selling in relation to two floating communities – Kampong Loung and Peam Bang. This leads 
to a more detailed discussion of patron-client relations involved in what is called the ‘moy 
system’ of trading fish in the Tonle Sap.  
 
8.3 Rice–Fish Economy of Fishing Community in the Tonle Sap 
 
8.3.1 Traditional Forms of Patron-Client Relations in the Rice–Fish Economy 
 
Rice and fish are central to Cambodian society and culture (Ahmed et al., 1998). Rice 
is produced by farmers called ‘neakleu’ and fish are caught by fishers who are called ‘neak 
tonle’. ‘Neakleu’ and ‘neak tonle’ consume both rice and fish. Rice provides the carbohydrate 
fuel for metabolic energy, and fish provides the specific fatty oils that are mandatory 
constituent for organ development and function (Hand, 2002; Bonheur and Lane, 2001; Field 
Notes, 2007 and 2008).  
  
Rice accounts for at least 68 percent of all Cambodian caloric intakes. This represents 
an annual per capita consumption estimated at 151-200 kg per person or about 600-700g a 
day/person (Jean Delvert, 1961 quoted in Bonheur and Lane, 2001). At the same time, 
Cambodia is a fish-eating country—people catch fish, process fish and consume fish. Fish is 
consumed with rice, and it is consumed fresh or processed; and rice and fish is a popular food 
for majority of Cambodians (Ahmed et al., 1998; Bonheur and Lane, 2001; Field Notes, 2007 
& 2008).  
 
Whilst farmers do fish, rice is the main part of the farming economy (Ahmed et al., 
1998), which was traditionally connected to the fishing communities through the barter trade 
(Sithirith et al., 2005). Thus, the ‘rice-fish economy’ is a bartering economy of neakleu 
(farming people) and neak tonle (river people). The ‘bartering economy’ depicts the ‘social 
relations’ developed through this system. Neakleu and neak tonle traditionally benefitted from 
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this mutual system as it is complimentary bartering of rice for fish and vice versa. Neak tonle 
catch fish for consumption but need paddy rice to supplement their diets and the surplus 
resulting from fish catches is thus exchanged with paddy rice. For both neakleu and neak 
tonle the rice and fish are the backbones of household economies (Ahmed et al., 1998; Field 
Notes, 2007 & 2008).  
 
The ‘bartering economy’ between farming (neakleu) and fishing communities (neak 
tonle) was based on two local systems namely ‘dor’ (exchange) and ‘bondak’ (pay rice in 
installments). Dor means a fisher gives fish and farmer exchanges rice at the same time. 
However, bondak means the farmer takes fish now and gives rice during the next harvest 
season, which means there is a time lag (pers.comm. with Sounthy, September 2006). Thus, 
the actual quantities bartered in the dor were not the same as under the bandak approach. 
People used their ‘local’ knowledge and scale measures to work out appropriate quantities of 
rice for fish in the dor and bondak business. For instance, a dor (exchange), could be one 
kilogram of fermented fish (sour fermented fish called prohok) equal to approximately equal 
one tao of rice paddy (one tao is 12-15kg of paddy rice), but for bondak, one kilogram of sour 
fermented fish was equal 1.5 tao. In the dor business, three ‘chongkak’ of smoked fish (one 
chongkak has five fish) is equal one ‘kralor’ of rice paddy (0.5 tao), and 2-3 pieces of a dry 
fish was one kralor of rice paddy (Field Notes, 2007). This practice was commonly carried 
out before the 1970s, which was a period of tremendous change due to civil conflict and then 
the collectivization and dispossessions of the Khmer Rouge era (pers.comm. with group of 
villagers in Kampong La, February, 2007; Field Notes, 2007).  
 
The ‘bartering’ of rice and fish between neakleu and neak tonle is similar to what 
described by James Scott (1976) as “equal exchange” in the moral economy of peasant 
society. More specifically, it means that “a gift or service received creates, for the recipients, 
a reciprocal obligation to return a gift or service of at least comparable value at some future 
date. The notion of ‘equal exchange’ was a general moral principle of peasant society” (Scott, 
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1976: 167). ‘Reciprocity’ is seen as a basic moral principle underlying social action in the 
peasant society. In the Philippines, the patterns of personal alliances has been interpreted 
largely by reference to reciprocity or the notion of that service received, solicited or not,  
demands a return, with feeling of shame and obligation providing the motivation force. 
Reciprocity underlies the typical pattern of labor exchanges during the transplanting or 
harvesting...This same principle often structure the exchange of food resources...(Scott, 
1976). This is similar to what happening in the Tonle Sap in relation to the exchange of rice 
and fish between neakleu and neak tonle. James Scott (1976) argues that: “In peasant societies 
not yet permeated by class cleavage, these relationships commonly take the form of patron-
client bonds” (Scott, 1976: 168-169), and he further argues that: “If the growth in permanent 
disparities in power opens the way to what we might call patronage” and it opens the way for 
exploitations (Scott, 1976:170). Thus, I would argue that rice-fish economy in the Tonle Sap 
is a form of traditional patron-client system. In this system, the reciprocating parties are of 
more or less equal standing, the exchange tends to be balance and stable (Scott, 1976). The 
reason is that the neakleu is motivated to help neak tonle since he himself needs the same 
assistance from neak tonle (Field Notes, 2007).  
 
Fish and rice is key food element in the tradition-client system. Fresh fish is generally 
available from December to March. In this period, many rural Cambodians complete their rice 
harvest, and after finishing the rice harvest, rural Cambodians, especially farmers from 
different parts of Cambodia went to the ‘Tonle’ (River) to barter their rice for fish (Ahmed et 
al., 1998; Degen et al., 2000; Thouk and Sina, 1997; Field Notes, 2007).  During the peak 
fishing season (December to February), farmers move to places where fish production is high 
for making prohok to bring to the original villages. Prohok is a foodstuff that is incredibly 
linked to the food culture of Cambodia. Such migration of Khmer farmers for searching 
prohok was originated probably since the Angkor time, though Chou Ta Kuan did not 
mention about this special food at all. However, Baradat (1941) described amazing facts 
about how Khmer farmers traditionally travelled from home villages in the direction of the 
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Tonle Sap Lake searching for sources of prohok (Jean Delvert, 1961 quoted in Bonheur and 
Lane, 2001). In 1926, there was 280 Oxcarts of Khmer communities living in Thailand 
travelled across the political boundary to the Tonle Sap to make prohok for their food, and 
before 1907 when Battambang was still annexed to Thailand, Mr. Baradat counted 4000 to 
10,000 Khmer oxcarts from Siam (Thai of Khmer origin) moving from Battambang and Surin 
provinces to the Tonle Sap for prohok. Such movements to source prohok were significantly 
reduced after 1936 when crossing borders became more stringent. But such a transborder 
Khmer food culture is still centred on prohok today. Thousands tons of prohok, usually made 
from fresh wild capture fish from the Tonle Sap Lake, is exported to Thailand every year to 
supply to the Khmer ethnic minority (Bonheur and Lane, 2001; Bruce and Yim, 2004).  
 
Fish is not so abundant for the whole year round (May to October), fish production 
reaches high peak in the dry season which last for about 4 months and decreases sharply 
during the wet season. Besides, fish production is not proportionally distributed throughout 
the Lower Mekong; the highest production is derived from the Tonle Sap Lake while the 
lower output occurs in upland areas far remote from the Tonle Sap (Bonheur and Lane, 2001). 
Moreover, most Khmer farmers are busy during the wet season and have no time to go 
fishing. So to maintain food requirement for a year cycle, Khmer communities have to work 
out how to preserve fish for long use. Prohok is an example of Khmer culture in fish 
processing which is treated as a great delicacy during the farming season (Bonheur and Lane, 
2001; Degen and Thouk, 2000; Ahmed et al., 1998; Field Notes, 2007). Prohok is kept stored 
as a household food for many months. The way Khmer people preserve fish for long time use 
is a long held cultural phenomenon. Prohok can be used for one year or more, and almost 
every Cambodian enjoys consuming it.  
 
Kampong La is a ‘farming-cum-fishing’ village where most of villagers are 
considered as ‘neakleu’. The barter exchange of rice and fish used to be done in Kampong La. 
Farmers from nearby villages, such as from Chek Chau, Porkod came down with rice to 
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exchange for fish at Kampong La with the fishers from the floating community of Anlong 
Raing. In the old days, Kampong La was a fish landing site and people exchanged fish and 
rice in front of Wat Thkol, a local temple. The river in front of the temple was deep, 
approximately 3-4m in the dry season and the width was 25m. The river was navigable in 
both dry and wet seasons, but nowadays, the river below Kampong La down to the lake has 
changed and the landing area is not so good (pers.comm.with group of villagers in Kapong 
La, February, 2007).  
 
The fishers, after exchanging fish with rice, could not bring rice paddy back to their 
homes. Thus they built a rice storage facility within Kampong La. The rice was kept at the 
house of a person they regularly dealt with in Kampong La. Those people who did not pay the 
full amount of rice were said to be ‘in debt’ for one season and the fishers came back to 
collect the unpaid rice paddy in the following season. The deal between neakleu and neak 
tonle was simple. This deal was based on mutual trust. It was a local system of ‘equal 
exchange’ based on reciprocity, give and take at the same time, with no commission charges, 
no intermediary agents, no cash involved and no institutional interference.  The ‘equal 
exchange’ served as the basis for the structure of friendship and cooperation between the 
farming and fishing communities (pers.comm. with group of villagers in Kampong La, 
February, 2007; Field Notes, 2007).  
 
People living in Kampong Phluk are counted as a ‘neak tonle’.  Neak tonle barter their 
fish for rice with neakleu from nearby villages of Rolous and Kandek in Prasat Bakong 
District, and people in Meanchey and Samrong communes of Prasat Bakong and Danrun and 
Kchas communes in Sotr Nikum District of Siem Reap Province. In line with this, neakleu 
from Meanchey and Samrong, Danrun and Kchase come down to Kampong Phluk and grow 
mungbeans in the area close to the Tonle Sap Lake in Kampong Phluk. About 321 ha of areas 
in Kampong Phluk was cultivated mungbean for a long time by people from Meanchey and 
Samrong communes of Prasat Bakong and  Danrun and Kchas communes of Sotr Nikum 
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District during the dry season neak tonle in Kampong Phluk exchange fish with other 
agricultural produces such as mungbean. The social relations of neak tonle and neakleu is 
deeply rooted in the rice-fish economy, allowing for different forms of exchanges – fresh fish, 
dried and fermented fish for rice, and also other agricultural products needed by the fishing 
communities. This relationship allows neak tonle and neakleu to complement one another, 
and each becomes specialized within and between their respective communities. Neak tonle 
and neakleu live together as part of one mutual system, each respects the function of the 
others. A form of dependency and reciprocity was established between neakleu and neak 
tonle to share their resources for their livelihoods (See Figure 8.1).  
 
Figure 8. 1: The Reciprocal Fish – Rice Economy of the Tonle Sap 
 
8.3.2 Territorialization of the Tonle Sap and the neakleu – neak tonle relations 
 
Territitorialization (discussed at length in previous chapters) has affected resource 
uses of and the relationships between ‘neakleu’ and ‘neak tonle’, and has had many impacts 
on the economies of fishing villages. The floodplain area of the Tonle Sap between Highway 
no.5 and no.6 covers 1,776,000ha (CNMC & NEDCO, 1998). Within this area are 
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commercial fishing areas covering approximately 271,139 ha (DoF, 2003) (after the fisheries 
reform in 2000), classified into 38 commercial fishing lots located in six provinces around the 
Tonle Sap Lake; the fish sanctuaries covering 24,680ha classified into 8 fish sanctuaries 
(DoF, 2003); cultivated areas covering some 605,400ha (CNMC & NEDCO, 1998); and the 
public fishing areas covering around 874,781ha (See Chapter 6).  
 
The public fishing area is further territorialized. After 2000, the Fisheries 
Administration has effectively territorialized the public fishing area into zones for community 
fisherines. An estimated 412,205 ha of the public fishing area, covering six provinces around 
the Tonle Sap was territorialized and organized into 175 ‘community fisheries’ around the 
Tonle Sap Lake, being home to an estimated 61,613 households living in 361 villages around 
the Tonle Sap (See Table 8.1).   
 
Table 8. 1: The community fisheries around the Tonle Sap 
Province No. of Community  
Fisheries 




No. of  
Household 
No.HH Depending  
on fisheries  
Siem Ream 22 90728 129 21698 15052 
Kampong Thom 30 40994 54 4631 5232 
Kampong Chhnang 52 42071 51 6470 0 
Pursat 27 85712 52 5808 619 
Battambang 38 144506 62 20197 2402 
Bantey Meanchey 6 8194 13 2809 67 
Total 175 412205 361 61613 23372 




The territorialization of the Tonle Sap has led to delimitation of new boundaries of 
fishing lots areas, fish sanctuaries, public fishing areas and new CFs. Each community fishery 
(CF) is delimited with a boundary and map is drawn to differentiate one CF from the others. 
These new boundaries both exclude and include the neak tonle and neakleu depending on the 
nature of local demographics, village locations, and geography. Community fisheries (CFs) 
exclude neakleu from fishing in parts of the Tonle Sap. As such, territorialization is a source 
of new tensions between the neakleu and neak tonle. I argue that the territorialized nature of 
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the Tonle Sap, plus other economic changes in to traditional relationships between neakleu 
and neak tonle, has greatly affected the functioning of the “rice-fish economy”. In the 
following section, I will discuss the changes in the economy of neakleu - neak tonle relations 
in a greater detail.  
 
8.4 Market Economy of Fishing Community in the Tonle Sap 
 
The territorialization of fisheries in the Tonle Sap increases the commercialization 
and privatization of fisheries, leading to maximizing fisheries exploitation. Also, the 
territorialization induces control over resources, and different power is emerged through 
control (Sack, 1986). As Scott (1976) states: “Once substantial power differences are 
introduced, this ‘invisible hand’ disappears and exploitation may enter” (Scott, 1976:170). 
These have affected the resource uses of neakleu and neak tonle, and transformed a reciprocal 
and complimentary relationship into one characterized by market exchanges, profit motives 
and increased competition. Territorialization enabled the tax system to be introduced into the 
management of zones, with those fishers able to enjoy access into a particular territory being 
subject to taxes or fees. Thus, neakleu and neak tonle were gradually forced into adopting a 
monetary economy as the State imposed on them different duties, taxes, and access rights 
payable by cash. Markets were organized based on ‘buying’ and ‘selling’ where fishers and 
farmers could sell their produces. In buying and selling, farmers and fishers need to have 
cash; otherwise they are excluded from the market system. Therefore, they must try to sell 
fish, rice, or other agricultural produces to middlemen to get cash in order for them to enter 
into the market economy.  
 
Fish and rice have to be sold at designated market places, no longer at ‘kampong’ 
landing sites as in the old days, and often small farmers with 2-3 baskets of paddy rice and 
small fishers with a few kilograms of fish find themselves in difficulty to enter into the 
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market and it is costly to travel from village to market centres, sometimes over 10-20 km 
away, which may have to be traversed by boat and along dirt roads. As a result, the 
middlemen traders come into play, acting as an arm of the market, extending the market from 
the district or provincial centres to farmers and fishers. Local trader - buyers take fish from 
fishers and then sell it to farmers and other groups of middlemen, and in turn the middlemen 
buy rice from farmers and then sell it fishers (Field Notes, 2007; see Figure 8.2).  
 
 
Figure 8. 2: Market Relations in the Tonle Sap 
 
Thus, the formerly direct bartering between the neak tonle and neakleu is broken. For 
instance, Kampong La and Anlong Raing is politically one village, but the two sites are 
geographically located 12 km away from each other, and socially Kampong La is a farming-
cum-fishing village located on margin area of the Tonle Sap, while Anlong Raing is a typical 
floating village located on water. In Kampong La, there are 2-3 middlemen functioning in the 
village to buy rice from villagers and supply items needed by farmers including fish, salt, 
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soap, fertilizers, and basic household items. Farmers can repay for goods after harvest time or 
they can buy and hand over cash at the same time. In Anlong Raing, there are three fish 
traders in the village that buy fish daily from fishers and bring the catches to Kampong Loung 
(district market) every 2-3 days, and there they sell fish to farmers and other buyers (Field 
Notes, 2007). 
 
Given the interplay of market economy in the buying and selling fish and rice, the 
prices of rice and fish are not determined by farmers or fishers, but by middlemen and market 
demand. Farmers and fishers are free from price setting and they are price takers. As price 
takers, they have less say and those who can only sell a few kilograms of rice and fish have 
very limited bargaining power and they are constantly anxious about losing or spoiling their 
small fish catches or rice harvests. In this sense, the former bartering exchange economy of 
rice for fish is no longer functioning. Furthermore, middlemen intervene between the neak 
tonle and neakleu who are in competition over scarce resources between themselves. In the 
process, the farming communities have reduced dependency on fishing communities, and vice 
versa. However, the commercial nature of relations has persuaded many farmers to transform 
themselves into fishing businesses to supplement household incomes and avoid middlemen 
prices. At the same time, fishers encroach to capture land and clear them for agriculture to 
avoid having to pay higher prices for rice and other agricultural goods. However, for some 
floating communities such land captures are highly restricted. 
 
Thus, a kind of ‘dual economy’ (Figure 8.3) has developed in and around the Tonle 
Sap, which involves less direct relations between farmers and fishers in the rice-fish 
economy. Each community turns to depend on markets to provide them resources needed to 
secure their livelihoods. As a consequence, the economy of farming communities combines 
both rice and fish or rice-fish economy, but it is different from the rice-fish economy in the 
former times when neakleu and neak tonle lived dependent on each other, whilst the new rice-
fish market economy separates neakleu from neak tonle (Field Notes, 2007).  
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Figure 8. 3: Dual economy of fishing communities in the Tonle Sap 
 
The extension of markets has actually tended to make relations between the neakleu 
and neak tonle more strained and troublesome because of intensified localized competition 
over available land-based and water-based environmental resources. Neakleu have sought to 
undertake commercial fishing. Fisheries are of high commercial value, and by doing both 
farming and fishing, they are no longer ‘dependent on the supply of fish’ from the fishing 
community. Competition between communities is sometimes in the form of increasing fishing 
boats, up-scaled gears, fishing longer time, and claiming the same fishing grounds 
traditionally utilized by the Anlong Raing fishing community.  
 
Kampong La is farming village; and majority of household in Kampong La relies on 
farming as their main economic activities. However, Kampong La was dependent on Anlong 
Raing to provide them fish and they exchanged their rice with fish from Anlong Raing. 
However, the exchange of rice and fish between Kampong La and Anlong Raing is broken 
down. As population increased and the increase in landless population, fishing is significantly 
increased in Kampong La. Among total households in Kampong La, about 35 percent of 
households in Kampong La are engaged in both farming and fishing. For these households, 
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fishing is the secondary occupation. However, 9 percent of the households in Kampong La 
rely on fishing as a main occupation, given their lack of cultivated land. Totally, throughout 
the village, 44 percent of household, both with land and landless, are engaged in fishing 
(Field Notes, 2007 and 2008). Villagers in Anlong Raing, apart from fishing, claim the land 
for rice farming. This happens in recent year.  
 
Similarly, the same happens to Kampong Phluk. Kampong Phluk is home to 513 
fishing households (Commune data, 2006). About 94 percent of the population is engaged in 
fishing as a primary occupation. Given the decline in fish catch, fishing households in 
Kampong Phluk envisions the need to shift from fishing to farming, but they face difficulty in 
realizing this. However, fishers in Kampong Phluk notice there are dry season rice and bean 
growing areas, covering 1083 ha, but most of these areas are cultivated by 100-130 families 
coming from Rolous and Kandek, Meanchey and Samrong, Danrun and Kchas communes of 
Sotr Nikum District.; and these communities also come down to fish in the lake as well 
(pers.comm. with commune council, August, 2007).  
 
Given these, Kampong Phluk has conflicts with farming communities such as Rolous 
and Kandek as Kampong Phluk forms their fishing areas into a community fishery and 
restricts the access of people from outside to fishing and farming in the newly defined 
community fisheries. As a consequence, the farming communities become offensive to 
fishing communities and their relationship ends up in highly competition. Thus, farming 
community is no longer dependent on fishing community like Kampong Phluk to supply them 
fish, instead they encroach the community fishery. Nowadays, farming communities near the 
lake become both farming and fishing communities, but Kampong Phluk remains a solely 
fishing community.  
 
Seeing this, the Kampong Phluk households make an effort to retain the flooded land 
in the Kampong Phluk jurisdiction, but cultivated by people from Rolous and Kandek, as an 
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area of community fishery controlled by Kampong Phluk in the name of conservation of 
flooded forest. In 2006-7, villagers in Kampong Phluk envision rice farming as an alternative 
livelihood given the decline in local fish catches. In 2007, about 500 families from Kampong 
Phluk put a formal request to the Provincial Administration to turn 1,690 ha of flooded forest 
areas into dry season rice production (pers.comm. with Commune Councils of Kampong 
Phluk, August, 2007). The reasons of doing this include the decline in fish catch, 
encroachment of highlanders into the flooded forest areas, taking land for agriculture, and 
other forms of land speculation in the vicinity of the community. However, this was opposed 
by local administration and some community members.  
 
8.5 Contemporary Forms of Patron-Client System in Fishing Community in the Tonle 
Sap 
 
Small-scale fishing in the Tonle Sap is defined as not small, not free fishing and not 
survival (per.comm.with Fishers in Kampong Loung, July 2007). To fish for survival, fishers 
must build a relationship with officials around them. This is called a ‘contemporary form’ of 
patron-client system in fishing in the Tonle Sap. In this form, small fishers would do whatever 
they can to ensure that their ‘subsistence security’ or at least the ‘minimum need’ in daily 
fishing is met as described by James Scott (1976) a ‘safety-first principle’ of fishing villages 
in the Tonle Sap. The reason of doing this is because of unequal distribution of resources, 
particularly those with protection fish more freely while those did not have protection fish 
limitedly. According to James Scott (1976): “For inequalities in society means, above all, 
unequal control over the scarce resources  of community, and it is this difference  alone that 
provides one party with bargaining or coercive strength to impose an equal exchange, an 
exchange that violate a widely shared  sense of fair value” (Scott, 1976:170). Because of 
these, fishers shift their relationship toward officials as a mean of seeking protection in 
fishing. Inequality continues to rise in fishing communities and that inequality as socio-
political as well as economic dimensions. Wealth and power intersect; people with power and 
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influence use it to build wealth and gain opportunities, while economic resources are used to 
buy power and influence. Poor households are locked out of the patronage networks and 
connection that would allow them to gain opportunities and lack the resources to buy in the 
patronage system (CDRI, 2007a; Field Notes, 2007 & 2008).  
 
Moreover, government officials are corrupted. According to CDRI (2007a), 
corruption occurs at all levels including in fishing communities and are endemic and 
structural. High officials and powerful people private interests instigate corruption  out of 
greed and desire to maximize their profits, while lower officials such fisheries officials, 
police, military police and commune administrators are pushed into corrupted practices by 
low salaries and rising cost of living. Corruption is part of the string that connects individuals 
of lower and higher status: corruption costs are imposed by those with higher status on those 
below in part so they can pay those above them. By doing this they could stay in a good 
position with protection (CDRI, 2007a). Thus, officials at fishing village take the bribe from 
fishers as part of sharing their poverty.  
 
Fishers pay officials, particularly fisheries officials for fishing for protection in 
fishing business. As a result, fisher up-grades and up-scales fishing activity and they may try 
to bribe the local officials to enable fishing in good fishing grounds. Thus, Tonle Sap fishers 
are not concerned with the official notion of ‘small-scale fishing’ because it is their survival 
that is a primary focus.  
 
My study of different fishing villages indicates that fishing operations by many 
fishing households in Kampong La, Kampong Phluk, Peam Bang and Kampong Loung is not 
either a ‘small-scale fisheries’ or ‘medium-scale fisheries’. My research indicates that most 
fishing households in the stand-stilt and floating villages practice fishing regardless of the 
official ‘scales’ and as a consequence, it is hard to determine what ‘fishing scale’ people in 
Kampong Phluk, in Peam Bang and Kampong Loung do nowadays as actual practices do not 
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fit criteria defined in the Fisheries Law, but are in official terms, technically ‘illegal’ (in terms 
of gears and other criteria).  
“We know that it is illegal fishing, but we have no other choices or alternative 
as we catch less fish for everyday life. At the same time, there are fishermen 
from other places coming to fish as well in our areas. These people are 
fishing illegally and no one stops them, as they pay the officials for fishing 
here. Therefore, we do illegal fishing also. If we don't do it, they do” (Group 
discussion with fishermen in Peam Bang, 10 September, 2006). 
 
“We live in fear of officials accusing us of doing illegal fishing. Therefore, 
we have to pay everyday to Sangkat (lowest fisheries officials), OP (police) 
and Tiger 5 (military police) about 150,000-300,000 Riels and some time 
500,000 Riels per fishing season. It is difficult for us because sometimes we 
pay Sangkat, but OP demand different payments and so do the Tiger 5. If we 
do not pay up, they destroy our fishing gears or arrest us” (Group discussion 
with fishermen in Kamping Phluk, Sept. 11, 2007). 
 
This account illustrates a corrupt aspect of the kinds of payments and patronage that 
affects fishing at the level of individual communities and households. Each fishing household 
has to deal with different agencies, such as ‘sangkat nesat’ (lowest branch of official fisheries 
administration), OP (economic police for the Tonle Sap) and Tiger 5 (the Tonle Sap Military 
Police). People living in floating and stand-stilt communities are very much concerned about 
how to sustain their living and survive in the situation of a decline in fisheries. Given fishers’ 
concerns about their survival in fishing, they do whatever they can to fish as much as they can 
to ensure their ‘daily survival’ and I call this the ‘survival scale’ (Field Notes, 2007). 
 
To practice this fishing, they collude with officials in order to fish for subsistence and 
sale. Low paid officials find it hard to make a decent living on their low salaries, and thus, 
bribes from fishers enables them to top up their meager incomes. To claim this pay from 
fishers, officials must demonstrate their ability in ensuring that fishers could fish in a 
productive fishing area using a fishing gear larger than the officially designated ‘small-scale’ 
gear, so that they may increase their catch.  
 
Lower level officials are supported and protected by higher level ones in a sort of 
‘power webs’ of connections. To secure their survival, fishers must attach themselves to this 
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‘power web’; but being attached to this ‘power web’ means being subject to petty corruption, 
exploitation and indebtedness. Furthermore, ‘survival scale’ fishing often means using bor 
fishing, fine fishing mesh size nets, enlarging technologies, poaching, seine nets, and other 
practices, which if only loosely regulated mean that the fishery is subject to over-exploitation 
from all fishers, and not just those operating at a commercial scale in the fishing lots.  
 
In a meeting with a Commune Chief of Kampong Phluk, he indicated to me that he 
knew about illegal fishing bors in the commune area, but if he stopped people from using this 
method, “people in Kampong Phluk will have no food” (pers.comm. with Mr. Neung Ny, 
Commune Chief, Kampong Phluk, 10 Sept., 2007). Therefore, he did not take any action to 
stop it unless there is an alterative provided. Similarly, in a discussion with a Chief of the 
Sangkat Nesat (local fishery office) in Kampong Phluk indicates that “we know ‘bor’ is 
‘illegal fishing’, but we close our eyes and fishermen do it quietly. If we crackdown on them, 
they would face food shortages” (pers.comm. with Tan Hong, Kampong Phluk, Sept. 11, 
2007).    
 
From the fishermen’s side, ‘illegal fishing’ like bor and other gears is viewed as 
technically ‘illegal’ but locally ‘licit’ as it is for ‘surivival’ only, and they see the practice as 
something they pay to do (pers.comm., Sangkat fishery official, Sept. 11, 2007). If they do 
not pay, then they are pushed out as ‘illegal fishers’, often with arrests or gear confiscated. 
So, they decide to pay local officials rather than stick to so-called ‘legal fishing’ (small-scale 
fishing) which is not enough to feed their families (pers.comm. with Mr. Loung Pha, 
fisherman from Kouk Kdol, Mr. Ouk Bunna fisherman from Thnaot Kampot, Kampong 
Phluk, Sept. 11, 2007).  
 
This story is common in many areas of the Tonle Sap. ‘Illegal fishing’ is an official 
language, but ‘survival-scale’ relates to local practice and is common in Kampong Phluk as 
well as in Peam Bang. It is widely known, and all people (officials and communities) know 
 313 
that it is destructive to the fisheries and livelihoods of people in the longer term, but they can 
not get rid of it because it affects their immediate livelihoods (the living of fishing households 
and officials) and instead, they maintain it as a way of ‘sharing poverty’ among fishermen and 
government officials. Some fishing households pay the OP or Tiger 5 to ‘protect’ them from 
fisheries officials, so that fisheries officials do not confiscate gears, make arrests or expel 
them. In any case, fishery officials do not have enough resources from the state to prevent 
illegal fishing on their own. Thus, the ‘power web’ of patron-client relations is complex, with 
many ordinary people attached to the ‘power web’ primarily out of necessity, and it is 
important to understand the local dynamics to appreciate why and how people are caught in 
short-term practices that are in the long-run likely to damage fishery sustainability.  
 
8.6 Moy as a Patron-Client System of Fishing Community in the Tonle Sap 
 
 As indicated above, a critical distinction lies between ‘land-based’, ‘land- and water-
based’ and ‘water-based’ communities. Understanding the complexity of local geographies 
around the Tonle Sap enables us to develop a more nuanced picture of the political 
geographies of resource access, utilization and control. Since floating communities are 
permanently living on water, fishing is practically their only form of livelihood, and they are 
without formal attachments and entitlements to land. Thus, fishers fish to maintain what 
James Scott (1976) termed a ‘minimum subsistence,’ which is challenging in an environment 
characterized by growing competition and speculation over resources, and when many fishers 
complain of declining yields per unit of effort.  
 
In the struggle for a ‘minimum subsistence’, fishers in water-based, and land-and 
water-based communities exchange their fish for rice with land-based communities known as 
an ‘equal exchange’. As indicated above, the ‘equal exchange’ is substituted by free market 
economy in which middleman is at the forefront of ‘minimum subsistence’ of fishers. The 
struggle for a ‘minimum subsistence in the free market economy requires fisher to fish and 
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sell fish to middlemen. Two things happens in fishing and selling fish; first, to undertake 
fishing, fishers borrow money from moneylenders as fishing does not provide enough food 
for many fishing households; and second, to sell fish, fishers have to sell it to those who lend 
them money. The moneylender acts as both moneylender and fish trader. Thus, fishers borrow 
money from the moneylender and sell fish to moneylenders or fish traders lower than the 
‘real’ market price (Field Notes, 2007). I refer the whole system of fishing and fish trading to 
as a ‘moy system’ (See Figure 8.4).  
Figure 8. 4: The Moy system of fish trading in the Tonle Sap 
 
To understand the ‘moy system’ in fishing villages in the Tonle Sap, I examine 
fishing businesses of two floating communities—Kampong Loung and Peam Bang– 
to see how they deal with fishing and fish trading in a situation of fisheries decline. 
 
8.6.1 Fishing and Fish Selling in the Tonle Sap 
 
Fishers in the Tonle Sap catch fish and sell fish. To understand this, I chose to 
examine fishing and fish selling in Peam Bang how fisher conduct their fishing and fish 
selling. Fishing is the main occupation of people in Peam Bang. About 90 percent of 
population in Peam Bang is engaged in fishing as a primary occupation. Fishing is the main 
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source of household incomes for the majority of villagers (Field Notes, 2007). Access to 
fishing grounds is a key factor affecting household fish production and incomes.  
 
As indicated above, most of the fishing grounds are under the fishing lots owning by 
few people while majority of villagers in Peam Bang could only access to a small fishing 
areas. Fishermen in Peam Bang report that fishing lot areas surround their villages and thus, 
the actual fishing areas for local fishers are small in size, but fished by many fishers. Hence, 
they face difficulty in fishing for their livelihoods. In this case, some fishermen do whatever 
they can to strengthen their relationship with the fishing lot owners or the commune councils, 
and they become ‘patron’ to small-fishers. Those fishers, who could not identify a suitable 
patron in fishing, continue fishing in their small fishing areas, but those who effectively 
become a ‘client’ to their ‘patron’ are more able to maximize their fish catch, although they 
are literally caught in a ‘power web’ of relations. About 3 percent of households interviewed 
engage in the sub-leasing of fishing lot areas, whilst about 24 percent of households in Peam 
Bang report engaging in fishing inside the commercial fishing lots areas. The rest fishes in 
other designated fishing areas as shown in Table 8.2. 
 
Table 8. 2: Fishing areas for fishermen by season 
Type of fishing area No. of interviewed household (N=136) Percentage 
All fishing area 27 19.85 
Around the village 29 21.32 
Inside the fishing lot 33 24.26 
Inside the flooded forest 18 13.24 
Inside the Tonle Sap Lake 35 25.74 
Public fishing area 16 11.76 
Sub-leasing the fishing lot 4 2.94 
Stream/river 30 22.06 
Source: Field Notes, 2007   
 
Fishers fish everyday. In Peam Bang, the household fish catch varies between 5 and 
50kg a day and small quantity of the catch is consumed daily and large quantity is sold to fish 
traders. Based on the survey, fishing households with catches of 1-5kg per day consume 0.3-
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2kg a day whilst those fishing households with catches of 10-20kg/day consume around 1-
3kg/day. These figures suggest that although they catch a lot of fish, they tend to keep most of 
the catch for sale and they consume relatively small amounts of the catch.  
 
Most of the catch is sold to middlemen-traders. To obtain a ‘good price’, it is usual 
that the best quality of the catch is sold and the lowest quality of the catch is kept for 
household consumption. Based on interviews, fishing households with an estimated catch of 
about 1-5kg/day consume the fish catch proportionately more than the other fishers, 
accounting for around 30-40 percent of their catches and they sell the rest. However, the 
fishing households with a daily catch of 5-10kg/day, accounting for about 40 percent of the 
fishing households in Peam Bang, sell between 80-90 percent of the catches.  
 
Fish catch data relates closely to household socio-economic status in communities 
such as Peam Bang. The rich and the better-off fishing households equipped with larger 
fishing gears catch more fish a day estimated at 20-50kg/day (rich) and 10-20kg/day (better-
off) respectively, but they tend to consume less as they have other foods to supplement their 
fish catches.  However, the poorest fishing household catches 1-5kg/day, some or even all of 
which are consumed daily (See Table 8.3). The poor and the poorest households consume fish 
catches more than the rich and better-off households as they have no other food sources for 
their households. This also relates to the vicious poverty cycle which keeps many of these 
people in debt.  
 
Table 8. 3: Daily fish catch of fishing household level in different fishing village in 
Peam Bang 
Consumption Fish Sale 
Fish catch (kg) Fish consumption % Fish sale (kg) % 
1_5 0.3-2 30-40 0.7-3 60-70 
5_10 0.5-2 10-20 4.5_8 80-90 
10_20 1_3 10-15 9-17 85-90 
20-50 0.5-1.2 2-3 19.5-49.8 97 
Source: Field Notes, 2007 
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Two main types of ‘middlemen’ may be identified in the fishing villages of Peam 
Bang — the ‘village middleman’ or fish collector and the ‘external middleman’ or ‘mobile 
fish buyers’ from outside the village. The mobile fish buyer moves around the fishing villages 
to buy fish from local fish collectors. Based on field surveys with 136 fishing households in 
Peam Bang commune, about 57 percent of the fishers indicate that they sell fish catches to a 
‘village middleman,’ who supplies fishers with cash advances and fishing equipment, but 
make an agreement that the fishers must sell all their fish catches to them. Moreover, about 32 
percent of the fishing households indicate that they sell their fish catches to a ‘mobile fish 
buyers’ from outside their area (See Table 8.4). The fishing households that catch between 
20-50kg/day sell their fish to the middlemen outside the village. Thus, the village trader-
buyers-moneylenders are most directly involved in tying the small-scale fishers into a system 
of lending-buying-selling. Whereas, the richer and larger-scale local fishers deal directly with 
‘mobile fish buyers,’ who are often also engaged in buying fish from the ‘village middlemen.’ 
I refer the whole system of fishing and fish selling by fishers, and the ‘goods’ and ‘services’ 
provided by fish buyers as a ‘moy system’ in the Tonle Sap.  
 
Table 8. 4: The fish sale by fishers in Peam Bang 
Fish catch sale to middleman No. of households interviewed Percentage 
Selling to Village Middlemen  70 57.38 
Selling to External Middlemen  39 31.97 
Not selling 13 10.66 
Total 122 100 
Source: Field Notes, 2007 
 
‘Mobile fish buyer’ and ‘village middlemen’ provide ‘goods’ such as cash and 
‘services’ to buy fish from fishers. Fishers in Tonle Sap need this ‘goods’ and ‘services’ in 
order for them to do fishing for their livelihoods. According to James Scott (1976), in the 
moral principles of peasant society, “a gift or service received creates, for the recipient, a 
obligation to return a gift or service of at least comparable value at some future date” (Scott, 
1976:167). In return, fishers in Tonle Sap sell the fish catch to village middlemen or mobile 
fish buyer as their moral obligation. According James Scott (1976), I describe the relationship 
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between middlemen and fishers as a form of patron-client system in the Tonle Sap. However, 
in this system, those who are in the position to provide ‘goods’ and ‘services’ to those need its 
impose terms and conditions that possess monopoly in nature (Scott, 1976; Popkin, 1979).  
 
8.6.2 The Moy System of Fish Trading in the Tonle Sap 
 
 
The ‘moy system’ requires careful explanation as it relates to so many relations across 
fishery scales, between different actors within and beyond villages, and is another aspect of 
patron-client relations, discussed earlier in this chapter. Figure 8.4 reveals the fundamental 
connections in the Tonle Sap ‘moy system’. ‘Moy’ in Khmer basically means to have a 
regular client. Thus, in the fisheries trade, a large fish merchant involved in exporting fish 
overseas will have regular fish trader – merchants they buy fish from. These merchants 
(exporters and suppliers, who are big moy) are usually based in Phnom Penh or large towns, 
and they have their own networks of collective buyers (middle-scale moy) operating at 
provincial and district levels with numerous fishing villages. The collective fish buyers are 
called ‘thovke’, who operate as both merchants and also patrons, for they supply loans to 
smaller suppliers (lower-level moy) or their ‘little fingures’ (kaundai) in the villages. The 
‘kaundai’ are mobile fish buyers operating between villages, who in turn, have their own 
village representatives in each village, called in Khmer ‘kaun kagnchreng’, literally ‘smaller 
basket’.  Thus, to understand the ‘moy system’ requires knowledge of the three main 
categories—the middleman or the mobile fish buyers, the collective fish buyers and fish 
merchants who operate at large market and export levels. The ‘moy’ are regular clients within 
a network, and thus, for this system to operate requires degrees of dependency and reciprocity 
between larger moy-patrons and other moy-clients (Field Notes, 2007).  
 
Fishers catch fish and with the help of kaun kagnchreng they eventually sell to the 
kaundai. In turn, the kaundai mobile fish buyers who sell to the thovke or ‘collective fish 
buyers’. Several collective buyers then will sell to the large fish merchants who export fish to 
 319 
Phnom Penh or overseas, such as to Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore (pers.comm. with 
house S53, Thangchen, Agust, 2007). 
 
 One large merchant will usually network with 5-6 collective fish buyers and 
merchants also provide financial support to these buyers in return for agreements to sell their 
fish supply to the merchant. However, a collective fish buyer does not only supply fish to 
merchants, but they also buy fish from a network of kaundai, their extensions operating at 
local level as mobile buyers with links in various fishing villages. One thovke work with 5-6 
‘mobile fish buyers’, and the ‘collective fish buyer’ often provides ‘loans’ to the kaundai 
provided they agree to be ‘moy’ (reliable sellers of their fish to the collective buyers). The 
mobility of the kaundai means that they operate in different fishing districts and communities, 
which in turn means they require their ‘moy’ connections in those localities.  To ensure this, 
the mobile fish buyers often supply fishers with food, gear, and fuel loans. Thus, they are also 
patrons in the system, and many fishers are in some form of client relation with these lower-
level fish traders. Middlemen traders derive profits from their sale of fish to the collective 
buyers. This is clearly demonstrated in Kampong Loung and Peam Bang, in which fish 
traders from Kampong Loung network with fishers in Peam Bang to organize them into the 
moy system (Field Notes, 2007 and 2008). Thus, there is a spatial pattern to the moy system, 
with land-and-water based villages becoming the bases of both collective and mobile fish 
buyers whereas the floating communities are mostly the source of fish.  
 
Table 8. 5: Fish trader by fishing communities 
Type of fish trader No. of fish trader 
Collective fish buyer (CF) in  
Kampong Loung 14 
Mobile fish buyer (MFB) 
Raing Til 5 
Peam Bang 5 
Moat Khla 1 
Kampong Loung 11 
Sub-total 22 
Total                                                                                                                                      36
Source: Field Notes, 2007 
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For instance, in Kampong Loung, there are approximately 14 thovke (collective fish 
buyers) and 11 kaundai (mobile fish buyers) stationed in the town to buy fish from fishing 
villages in the Tonle Sap and export to different places. Some other mobile fish buyers come 
from three main fishing communities—Raing Til in Pursat Province, Peam Bang in Kampong 
Thom Province, and Moat Khla in Siem Reap Province—but they all mostly operate through 
Kampong Loung (Field Notes, 2007).  
 
In Kampong Loung, each of the 14 collective buyers network with 5-6  mobile fish 
buyers. Each kaundai network has approximately 40-50 fishers from 4-5 fishing villages in 
the Tonle Sap Lake (See Table 8.5). In each fishing village, kaundai organizes a network of 
fishers to sell fish catch through their village representatives. Their village representatives or 
kaun kagnchreng collect fish from fishers in the village and transfer them to kaundai on a 
daily basis, but they charge extra fees on top of the fish price per kilogram. For instance, 
‘House 53’ is a ‘store’ of a collective fish buyer. He has operated this business since 1996 and 
in doing this business he receives a “license” from Fisheries Administration. He has 5-6 
mobile buyers. As a collective fish buyer, he provides financial resources as a loan to the 
kaundai, and also fishing equipment such as frozen containers. The ‘moy’ arrangement means 
that the kaundai are obligated to sell fish back to him at agreeable prices. He transports fish to 
Poypet—a Cambodia-Thai border town, and from there, most of the fish are taken to 
Thailand. Apart from given loans to mobile fish buyers, he also provides loans to the fishing 
lot owner no.7 and no.2 in Pursat Province, and the fishing lot owners sell fish to him (pers. 
comm.. with Mr. Sor Sovan, owner of House 53 in March 2007). This is very significant 
locally because fishing lot owners have considerable commercial size catches compared to 
many of the village fishers in public areas.  
 
 Mr. Thangcheng is a mobile fish buyer based in Raing Til, and he operates his fish 
buying activities in Phum Prek village in Raing Til commune, Pursat Province. In Phum Prek 
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Village, he has 50 fishers as his ‘moy’ (clients), selling fish to him on a daily basis. In 
maintaining his ‘moy’ to sell fish to him, he provides loans to individual fishers. Over time, 
the fishers become indebted to him to as much as about 60-70 million Riel (or US$15,000-
17,000). The indebted fishers have to sell fish to him, and if they are found out to be selling 
fish to other fish buyers, then the fishers are liable to repay their debts. Thus, the moy system 
is a ‘power web’ of client-patron connections. If a fisher is removed from the moy system, he 
is not easily accepted by other fish buyers to be a ‘moy’ (client). This can be a very serious 
issue undermining the fisher ability to sell their catches on a regular basis. Therefore, fishers 
are careful in their relations with kaundai and thovke (buyers and merchant-patrons) 
(Pers.comm. with Mr. Socheat, March 2007).  
 
 Phoung Hing is another kaundai operating in Charos village in Raing Til commune. 
Similar to Mr. Thangcheng, Phoung Hing organizes 35-40 fishers in Charos as moy (clients) 
to sell fish to him. He also provides financial support to fishers in Charos in exchange for fish. 
Fishers in Charos are indebted to the amount of 100 million Riel (in mid-2007) since he 
started his fish trade in 1999. He actually buys fish from his ‘moy’ cheaper than in other 
villages as he is the only mobile fish buyer in Charos and this village is remote from other 
villages (pers comm. with Mr. Phoung Phin, Charos village, May 2007).  
 
 Sophon (Sadesh) is another mobile buyer in Raing Til commune and he has his moy 
to sell their fish to him in Phum Prek, Raing Til and Koh Kev villages. The total ‘moy’ of 
Sophon is estimated at more than 200 fishers. Given his large number of moy, Sophon is 
taking money from the local thovke or collective fish buyer and distributes to fishers as his 
moy in order for him to main his personal ‘moy system’ (pers.comm. with Mr. Sophon in 





Table 8. 6: The mobile fish buyer and their target fishing village 
Mobile Fish buyer Fishing village 
Hang Sovann 
Buy fish from Pechkrey in Peam Bang, Moat Khla and Stung Chrov  
In Siem Reap Province 
Yoeun Buy fish from Balot village, Peam Bang Commune 
Heng Buy fish from Peam Bang, Pov Voeu, Duansdeung--House in Peam Bang 
Hai Buy fish from Pechkrey in Peam Bang commune—House in Peckrey 
Khla Buy fish from Peam Bang commune, 
Khla Sor Buy fish from Raing Til, Kok Kaek, Phat sandong 
Khla meas Buy fish from fishing lot in Boeung Chmar in Peam Bang 
Theoung Buy fish from AnlongRaing, Koh Kaek--buy a trey Andeng 
Chom 
Buy fish Chroy Sdey, Thkol in Krakor District, Pursat Province and 
Peam Bang commune.  
Source: Field Notes, 2007 
  
About seven kaundai from Kampong Loung operate in Peam Bang. Among the 
mobile buyers in Peam Bang, five of them live in Kampong Loung, but make frequent travel 
on a daily basis to Peam Bang, and two of them live in Peam Bang, but take fish to sell to 
thovke in Kampong Loung. One mobile fish buyer occupies one fishing village, at least, and 
usually buys from three or more fishing villages. To buy fish, the fish traders need to organize 
fishers into a ‘moy system’. It can be seen that the resulting networks between thovke, 
kaundai, kaun kagnchreng, and numerous fishers in different villages is more like a ‘power 
web’ of patrons and clients caught together by supply-demand, hierarchical ‘moy’ relations, 
with various obligations and reciprocal ties (Field Notes, 2007).  
 
8.6.3 Money lending as Vital Part in the “Moy System” 
 
From the detailed discussion of the intricacies of the moy system, we begin to 
appreciate that these sets of social relations become even more intensified during a period of 
increasing commercialization, growing urban and regional demand for fish, growing 
competition amongst fishers on the Lake and in the Mekong region as a whole. There is more 
and more pressure on fishers not only to take out loans but to increase the size of loans. 
However, the loan-borrowing system extends higher up the chain than the small-scale fishers. 
Collective buyers frequently take out loans from the big merchants and then distribute these 
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loans to kaundai or ‘middlemen’ operating in districts. In turn, the middlemen give loans to 
fishers who agree to sell all their catch to the kaundai at prices that are to be set below the 
market price. After the middlemen receive their fish they then sell (as agreed) to the thovke or 
collective buyers.  It is clear from my own field observations and from conversations with 
numerous fishermen that many of the small-scale operators in the Tonle Sap simply could not 
fish without taking out loans. Thus, the loans are part of a complex system of monetary and 
resource obligations in the ‘moy of power web’ of merchants – collective buyers – smaller 
fish traders and the fishers of myriad communities around the Tonle Sap. This is a vital aspect 
of socio-economic patron-client relations that is common throughout the whole Lake area 
(Field Notes, 2007).  
 
There are several aspects of the money lending system that are important to 
appreciate. As in many other rural areas, access to “formal” credit through banks and credit 
agencies is lacking in many parts of the Tonle Sap. Villages are largely remote from the 
formal banking sector that now thrives in Phnom Penh and other urban centres. Thus, money-
lending is mostly “informal” and based on mutual recognition, on trust and personal ties. Two 
other aspects of money-lending are critical in this context. The first is that the money-lenders 
(Neak Chongkar Prak in Khmer) are actually not money-lenders first and foremost, but they 
are the same fish traders as discussed in the moy system. Indeed, money-lending is 
fundamentally an aspect of that system. Fish are the collateral in the sense that traders do not 
require money back payments, but rather payments in the form of fish catches. These fish are 
sold at lower than market price and some portion of the catch is also repayment for the money 
loan (Field Notes, 2007).  
 
There are essentially three different forms of informal money-lending that apply in 
the village context. Based on fieldwork, I would like to highlight three forms of lending, 
which I characterize as “fishing loans”, “food loans” and “hunger loans”. Obviously, 
repayments of loans are entirely tied to the fish catches of the individual fishers who have 
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taken on loans. Indebtedness may often increase cumulatively over the course of fishing 
seasons, particularly in the context of declining individual catches and growing competition 
over available resources. Practically all small-scale fishers take out “fishing loans” at one 
time or another, for this enables them to buy essential equipment (boats, nets, gears, make 
repairs, purchase fuel). A few fishers may also prefer to take out “food” or “rice” loans, rather 
than money or as part of the loan arrangement. The Tonle Sap communities do not all have 
easy access to paddy and some floating communities rely totally on their ability to buy, barter 
fish, or trade with rice-farmers (see above) in order to get enough supplies for their families. 
Thus, “food loans” may be simply a convenient way for fishers to access supplies. Finally, in 
times of crisis some families are dragged into deep poverty and they may not be able to feed 
their families. Fish traders may arrange “hunger loans” or “survival loans” to tide over these 
families in return for fish catches. Fishers do not have a pawn anything and can get access to 
some credit. The fact is that these sorts of loans often mean fish traders obtain a broad base of 
ready suppliers are below market prices, and for many fishers, debts may never be fully 
repaid due to the ups and downs of fishing life (Field Notes, 2007).  
 
During my research in 2007, some 120 village households were interviewed, of whom 
63 percent express that they have taken a loan from a ‘moy’ (trader or kaundai) (see Table 
8.7). The villagers reported that they sell their catches to the ‘moy’ at below market prices, 
and that the fish price is adjusted by the ‘moy’ and not the clients. Some fishers were indebted 
for between 3 – 5 million Riel for a long period of time. Cumulative indebtedness is a 
common problem. It is hard to break the cycle of indebtedness because without money the 
fishers find it hard to keep fishing, pay for other foodstuffs, buy essential items for their 
families, send children to school, and buy necessary medicines when they are sick. Stopping 
taking loans is often more immediately risky for fishers and their households than taking out 
further loans. The incentive for traders to continue making loans available, even though they 
probably realize that quick and full repayments are unlikely, is that they have a network of 
fishers supplying them every fishing season.  
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Table 8. 7: The percentage of fishers taking loan for fishing by categories  
in Peam Bang 
Type of Household Interview Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Fishers taking loan 76 63.3 63.3 63.3 
Fishers do not taking loan 41 34.2 34.2 97.5 
Too poor to take a loan 1 0.8 0.8 98.3 
Fishers and loan giver 2 1.7 1.7 100 
Total 120 100 100   
Source: Field Notes, 2007 
 
As can be seen from Table 8.7, about 34 percent of the fishing households in Peam 
Bang do not take loans from the middlemen traders as they have enough resources and they 
could manage by themselves. But indebtedness affects the majority of fishers. Among the 
interviewed households, one household head expressed that he is ‘too poor’ to take a loan and 
therefore, no one could dare to give him a loan. Two household owners said that they did not 
take loans but operated as small-scale money-lenders. Thus, my fieldwork strongly indicates 
the pervasiveness of the moy system and its special patron-client relations, as well as 




This chapter has examined the changes in patron-client relations, rice-fish economy 
and “power webs” of the “moy system” in the Tonle Sap. Increasingly, the commercialization 
of fisheries, agriculture and resource sectors generates fundamental transformations in socio-
economic relations of many communities in the lake area. Indeed, the traditional rice-fish 
barter system and relations are now mostly broken, with all sorts of ‘moy’ relations involving 
middlemen traders and money-lenders between the predominantly farm-based and fish-based 
communities of the system. Purely monetary transactions have replaced the bartering of rice 
for fish and vice versa. As cumulative indebtedness is a problem of the poor, but without 
alternative sources of credit, money-lending at different levels has become an integral part of 
the moy system. which The rice-fishing economy has been substituted by a market economy, 
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but one which still relies on complex “power webs” of relations spreading from big merchants 
in Cambodia’s capital to every district and community of the lake area. Understanding the 
dynamics of the Tonle Sap requires more than an understanding of the territorial and political 
spaces, it necessitates a focus on vertical social relations that make up the moy system.  
 
 One of the consequences of the intensified nature of market relations in the Tonle Sap 
has been the growing competition for resources between and within communities, particularly 
between fishers in the floating and stand-stilt villages and farmers of the land-based villages. 
The traditional “moral universe” of peasant societies studied by Scott (1976) is now less 
subsistence-oriented and sharing, and is much more internally and externally competitive, 
with growing disparities based on abilities to avoid debt, access to capital, and cumulative 
indebtedness. Within this system there are important roles for middlemen traders and money-
lenders who are integral to both patron-client and moy system relations.  
 
Thus, the Tonle Sap is not only territorially and politically contested as a lake-space 
(previous chapters), socio-political-economic relations are simultaneously mediated and 
influenced by a complex verticality of patron-client and moy relationships. Consideration of 
the political geographic, political economic and cultural dimensions of the Lake are essential 
if we are to understand how to introduce governance measures that include socio-economic 
and environmental justice principles as well as resource security and sustainability ones in 





Conclusion: Space, Resources and People 
 
This thesis takes a political geographical perspective, using spatial-political analysis, 
territoriality, and politics of scale, in addition to examining some non-territorial dimensions of 
social-power relations. To understand the problems of different villages, the thesis examines 
the common types of fishing communities found in the Tonle Sap, and studies how the spaces 
of these communities are incorporated into state-imposed processes of territoriality and space 
differentiation. This chapter is organized according to the following topics: (1) the current 
crisis in fisheries governance, (2) key findings; (3) competing representations of space; (4) 
contested boundaries and everyday territorialities; (5) scales of fishing; (6) non-territorial and 
territorial ‘Power Webs’; (7) stressing ‘localized’ forms of management; and (8) policy 
implications for improving resource governance.  
 
9.1 Current Crisis in Fisheries Governance 
 
The study identifies that resources management in the Tonle Sap involves different 
spatial imaginaries of resource governing institutions, competing representations of space, 
overlapping and clashing territorializations of natural resources, inappropriate official uses of 
fishery scales, and the deeply entrenched social relations that relate to the ‘moy system’. The 
space in the Tonle Sap is transformed by different agents and actors (re)constructing 
territories, leading to overlapping claims and often leading to conflicts at various ‘local’ 
levels. Territorialization of the Lake has been integral to the commercialization and 
privatization of fishing resources, often at the expense of ‘small-scale’ fishers. Commercial 
fishing lots have tended towards over-exploitation of resources and increase fishing conflicts 
between ‘small’ and ‘large scale’ fishers whilst at the same time increasing state control and 
management of these resources. As this research has shown the officially designated ‘scales’ 
(large, middle and small) for fishing activity have failed in their objectives to protect fisheries 
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and habitats for fishes, and failed to ensure adequate income and food for people whose 
livelihoods are largely dependent on the fisheries of the Tonle Sap. As observed by this 
researcher, fishers actually are engaged in creating their own ‘survival scales’ for fishing, 
often resorting to local level corruption to ‘buy’ access into richer fishing areas, or paying the 
price to fish within commercial zones, as well as up-scaling fishing gears, poaching, and 
using illegal gears. The result is that there is over-fishing and always a potential for conflict. 
 
The noncompliance of fishers to the current fisheries law and management is not due 
to fishers being disobedient. Local fishers of the Tonle Sap are engaged in their own struggles 
for survival and they can not, at present, rely on the legal framework and existing institutional 
arrangements to help them. It is the author’s view that the entire fisheries management system 
has failed to address the needs of and current survival struggles of the majority of poor fishers 
in the Tonle Sap. Fishery law implementation is weak but has tended to add to conflicts 
between different stakeholders within the fishery at numerous localized scales. Furthermore, 
there is a pervasive ‘hidden’ corrupt system that benefits the elites, certain officials, and 
privileged stakeholders but does not protect the biodiversity, fishes, fishers (who live in the 
villages of the Tonle Sap, as opposed to absentee big operators), or the sustainability of the 
Lake for future generations of Cambodians.  
 
This thesis has tried to highlight the political geographies of resource governance in 
the Lake. Hitherto, the spatial nature of freshwater resource politics, and links between space 
and power have largely been ignored by both academics and practitioners. The main purpose 






9.2 Summary of key findings  
 
The study has found the following key findings: 
• Key Finding 1: “Space” in the Tonle Sap is constructed and reconstructed by global, 
regional and national actors. Thus, there are competing geographical imaginaries and 
representations of space, sometimes producing real overlapping territories, conflicts 
of interest, and complicated resource management.  
 
• Key finding 2: Territoriality in the Tonle Sap is complex; on the one hand, it is a 
state strategy to control and promote the commercialization (and partial privatization) 
of fishery resources in the Tonle Sap, as well as to generate state revenues; and on the 
other hand, local level territorialities relates to a ‘way of life’ in which fishing 
communities adapt and organize themselves in response to ecological functions, as 
well as to state and privatized control over access to vital resources within their ‘lived 
space’. The stakeholders compete over natural resources to maximize their profits on 
the one hand, or to survive on the other.  
 
• Key finding 3: ‘Scale’ has been used for fisheries management in the Tonle Sap. It is 
a form of control over the fishing population through: (a) Classifying fishing 
population into ‘small-scale’, ‘medium-scale’ and ‘large-scale’ fishers; (b) 
Classifying fishing areas into commercial fishing area, public fishing areas and 
conservation areas, and assigning fishing populations to specific fishing areas; (c) 
Assigning fishing gears to specific fishing groups operating within designated fishing 
areas; and (d) Assigning specific timeframes (seasonally based) for specific fishing 
groups to fish in designated fishing areas.  
 
• Key finding 4: The spatial organization of the Tonle Sap, including the 
territorialization of the Lake resources and ‘scales’ used in fisheries management 
serve the State interests, big organizations and private commercial users, but exclude 
myriad communities. Communities around the Lake have struggled against this 
exclusion. Hitherto this has led to three main forms of localized actions and 
arrangements in the Lake: (1) ‘To fish to survive’ fishers adopt numerous strategies 
including up-scaling of equipment, using destructive fishing gears, poaching, 
encroaching into areas designated for other uses, paying off local officials to turn a 
blind eye, and other means; (2) Fishers build up patron-client relationships with 
fishing lot owners as a matter of necessity and basic survival as fishing has become 
hotly competitive and community areas are zone-locked by other uses; and (3) 
Fishers are tapped in the “power web of the fish traders” or the “moy system” of the 
Tonle Sap. 
 






9.3 Competing Representations of Space 
 
The Tonle Sap is rich in fisheries, biodiversity and natural resources, which is an 
important one for thousands of fishing communities. The Lake is their ‘lived space’ although 
it can be conceptualized as containing multiple localized ‘spaces of dependence’ (Cox, 1998). 
As I have illustrated, different types of village community may have dissimilar ‘spaces of 
dependence’ due to certain attributes, such as access to water, to land, to the flooded forests, 
which vary from place to place. The Tonle Sap as a political space is further divided up into 
designated or ‘specialized areas’ and into areas that are prohibited to one group or another 
(Lefebvre, 1991: 319-320). In particular, the state territorializes the fishing areas into the 
commercial fishing space, the conservation zones and the public fishing space. Each of these 
territorial designations contains other sub-divisions. Over and above these territorializations 
there are differing geographical imaginaries of the Lake space producing distinctive 
representations of space, constructed beyond the state boundary by state and non-state actors. 
Each space is constructed based on: (1) power, politics and policy on one hand, and politico-
economy, science or technology and resources on the other hand; and (2) the 
commercialization, privatization and the capital accumulation on one hand; and the 
specialization, rationalization and significant issues on the other hand.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Tonle Sap is conceptualized as a ‘global space’ based 
on three key global trends; first, identification of biodiversity protection ‘hot-spots’ and the 
choice of the Tonle Sap as one such area in need of ‘global’ action; second, Cambodia signing 
the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and the September 2000 
Millennium Declaration; and third, the role of international aid, donors, and international; 




Initially, Cambodia’s state was reluctant to promote the Tonle Sap as a ‘conservation 
space’ due to the fact that the Lake is a major source of economic value and national 
revenues. However, over time the state realized that there is much value in being seen to be 
active in conservation, for it brings valuable investments through aid and donor organizations, 
and helps to promote the country in various global forums. At the same time, the promotion 
of the Tonle Sap as a key space for biodiversity protection and Biosphere Reserves means that 
there exist tensions between the political economy aspects of policy, fisheries goals, localized 
community needs and the overall aims of scientific conservation. The creation of Biosphere 
Reserves and smaller conservation zones are not necessarily serving the goals of either fishery 
or biodiversity management, in part this is due to the relative lack of ground-up participatory 
engagement and relatively weak governance institutions. As this thesis illustrates, the 
Reserves and smaller conservation zones merely add to the territorial complexity of the Lake, 
and since they operate in a context rife with corruption, poaching, and illegal encroachments, 
the conservation efforts are undermined.  
 
At grander scales, the Tonle Sap is conceptualized as a ‘regional space’ of the 
Mekong based upon three key ideas. First, the Tonle Sap is variously considered by many 
water specialists, fishery managers, and scientific experts as the ‘bladder’ (containing and 
releasing water), ‘liver’ (cleaning and managing water) or ‘heart’ (pulsing and maintaining 
life) of the Mekong Basin. This researcher views the whole Mekong Basin as what I call “a 
natural ‘geo-body’” (as distinct from national geo-bodies, see Winichakul, 1994) in which 
the Mekong River and other tributaries act as blood vessels and the water its ‘blood’. Thus, 
the Tonle Sap has bigger scale ‘geo-ecological functions’ relating to hydrology and the ‘flood 
pulse’ of the Mekong. If the ‘heart’ stops, the system dies (Poulsen, cited in Jussi Nikkula, 
2005). The notion of the Tonle Sap as an integral and vital element within a region-scale 
“natural geo-body” has enormous implications for the way we analyze the implications of 
mega-projects up and down the Basin, particularly contentious hydropower schemes proposed 
for the lower mainstream, for it is imperative to consider trans-border ecosystem functions 
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and ecosystem services, which have natural, social and economic values (Lansing, Lansing 
and Erazo, 1998).  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Tonle Sap is institutionally connected to other parts of 
the Lower Mekong through the Mekong 1995 Agreement in which the four lower Mekong 
countries are signatories, part of which is the need to maintain the flow in the mainstream to 
acceptable minimum monthly natural flows during each month of the dry season and to 
enable acceptable the natural reverse flow of the Tonle Sap to take place during the wet 
season (MRC Agreement, 1995). Other important organizations, such as the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) have also been influential in regionalizing the Tonle Sap within 
the ‘Greater Mekong Sub-Region’ geographical and policy-related imaginary. Any 
examination of Mekong Basin resource governance, integrated water resources management, 
and trans-border legal frameworks are of direct relevance to the Tonle Sap (Hirsch, 2006; 
2010). 
 
As this thesis illustrates, the Tonle Sap conjures up many different spatial imaginaries 
and scales. Within the national scale, there are distinct ways we may examine the spatial 
organization and politics of the Lake. 
 
As a ‘technical or sectoral space’: Here state planners and policy-makers have 
tended to develop such ideas since the French Protectorate period, creating an ‘abstract’ 
functional and commercial view of space. These representations have prioritized the value of 
the private fishing operators over other fishers and been used to justify managing the fishery 
space as revenue-generating lots (commercial fishery space, Tana and Todd, 2002), or in 
relation to the ‘global imaginaries’ as Biosphere Reserves (conservation space, Bunhoeur and 
Lane, 2001). Even ‘community areas’ are imagined as functionally specific and homogenized 
zones through the 2001 Fishery Reforms that seek to extend community resource 
management areas by some 540,000 ha (Ratner, 2006). These ‘representations of space’ 
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(Lefebvre, 1991) are mostly based upon an ‘abstract space’ created by key agents, elites, and 
institutions. Such hegemonic representations are primarily focused on commercial fisheries 
and conservation, although alternative geographies can emerge through the development of 
‘terrains of resistance’ (Routledge, 1996) or ‘spaces of engagement’ through collective action 
and social networks (Cox, 1998). It is within the creative everyday realm of ‘lived space’ that 
coordinated community-based actions are needed and where there is great potential to 
challenge dominant paradigms and representations of Lake-space. However, it is likely that 
collective responses will only emerge as internal and external stresses on livelihoods and 
everyday ‘spaces of dependence’ intensify over time.  
 
As a ‘scientific space’: These representations are created by the scientific studies of 
ichthyologists, fishery managers, ecologists, hydrologists, modeling experts, wetlands 
specialists, and other groups. For instance, ecologists and biologists see no definite borders 
for flora and fauna between different ecological systems (Campbell et al., 2006; Torrell et al., 
2004). In spite of the inherent contradictions that rigid administrative boundaries can create, 
the value of having sanctuaries and protection zones has been promoted by several scientific 
researchers and concerned environmental organizations, such as the WWF, World Fish 
Center, UNESCO, and IUCN . Numerous scientific studies of fish migrations in the lower 
Mekong, commissioned by the MRC and World Fish Center, have revealed the many bio-
ecological linkages that connect the Tonle Sap intimately with other parts of the Basin. Thus, 
specific scientific research reinforces the notion of regional connectivity and challenges the 
nation-centric thinking of many decision-makers. In addition, some scientific studies have 
helped raise awareness of ecological and livelihood security threats that relate to hydropower 
development that disrupt wild capture fisheries (Friend, 2007).  
 
As a ‘non-government space’: There exist a broad range of NGOs and international 
donor organizations lobbying for communities to be given enhanced rights, roles and 
responsibilities in the Tonle Sap area (including groups such as the Fisheries Action Coalition 
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Team (FACT); Oxfam’s Mekong projects; and the Asian Forestry Network (AFN) and others. 
All forms of ‘community-based property resource management’ necessarily implicate space 
and involve tenure, property, access to resources issues, as well as territorial claims, 
identities, representation and practices (Ostrom, 1990; Peluso, 2005a & 2005b; Vandergeest 
and Peluso, 1995). As Nancy Lee Peluso (2005a:8) argues, the defense of commons is of 
necessity increasingly a territorial politics in today’s world. Territorial strategies are integral 
to many battles over and for communal spaces, although not all organizations perceive 
‘commons’ or ‘common spaces’ the same way and there are often different perspectives even 
between organizations with shared common interests.  
 
As a Commercial Fishing Space: In the Tonle Sap, the fishing lot is commercially 
auctioned for ‘private control’.  Those winning the auctions or receiving the offer for the 
exclusive control of the fishing lot then become the lot owner, although the controlling agents 
should really be regarded as ‘concessionaires’ or ‘lessees’, not as  ‘owners’ (Tana and Todd, 
2002). This thesis has focused on how this particular national representation of the Tonle Sap 
fisheries has generated numerous political geographic problems at local levels.  
 
As a Public Fishing Space: The public fishing space is located outside the fishing lot 
and conservation areas (Thouk and Sina, 1997; Tana and Todd, 2002).  However, this is not 
really a ‘public space’ whereby different collective and community-based groups can 
negotiate alternative forms of common property ownership relatively free from top-level 
interference (Blomley, Delaney and Ford, 2001). Rather, it is perceived to be a space of 
control in which people must fish using small-scale fishing gears and fish for subsistence 
only. This relates two competing ideas; on one hand, it constitutes the ‘public space’  as the 
site of control; for instance, the state confines the small fishers to fish only in ‘public fishing 
areas’ and for subsistence only, not for sale. Authoritarian state practices are used to maintain 
order and stability, which involve territorial exclusions and inclusions. On the other hand, 
there is an alternative perspective of ‘public space’ as sites where the relatively silent majority 
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can make demands; a space in which identity may be alternatively (re)constructed, reified, 
and contested; and a space where the relatively weak (in terms of socio-economic and 
political power) and the poor may create their own ‘spaces of engagement’ (Cox, 1998; 
Springer, 2009a; Lefebvre, 1991).  
 
In the freshwater lake, the fact is that the state regulates much of the access to 
resources. Thus, the Tonle Sap ‘public space’ in fishing is conceptualized first, as a state 
property; second, as regulated access areas; and third, as an ‘open space’ (Thomson and 
Somony, 2003; Thouk and Sina, 1997; Tana and Todd, 2002). The public /state properties are 
inalienable. Consequently, no water body or land belonging to the inland or marine fishery 
domain can be disposed of by the State. Furthermore, these areas cannot be privately owned 
by any legal private person or entity (Thomson & Somony, 2003; Thouk & Sina, 1997; Tana 
& Todd, 2002).   
 
The Conservation Space: Effectively, this idea was established in 1997 by the Royal 
Government of Cambodia, supported by UNESCO, declaring the Tonle Sap as a ‘Biosphere 
Reserve’. After a Royal Decree on Protected Areas in 1993, followed by a decision in 
October 1997 by UNESCO to designate some 70,837 ha in three areas, which were finally 
confirmed in 2001 (Prek Toal, Boeung Tonle Chmar and Stun Sen) as Biosphere Reserve 
Areas. These areas are  also divided into sub-zones of ‘core areas’ surrounded by ‘buffer 
zones’ and beyond that  ‘transitional zones’ (Bunhoeur and Lane, 2002; Campbell et al., 
2006).  Several state agencies are involved in management. The Fisheries Administration 
under the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and the supposedly inter-
ministerial Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve Secretariat which includes representatives from the 
Ministry of Environment (MoE), MAFF, and Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology 
(Campbell et al., 2006). However, the latter does not seem to prevent confusion over 
functional uses, conflicts between stakeholders, and poor coordination over planning 
priorities.  
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9.4 Contested Boundaries and Everyday Territorialities  
 
As this thesis illustrates, the Tonle Sap Lake is territorialized into commercial, 
conservation and the public fishing spaces. The commercial fishing space is further classified 
into many small commercial fishing areas known as a ‘commercial fishing lot’, the 
conservation space is further classified into the ‘transition zone’, the ‘buffer zone’ and the 
‘core zone’, and the public fishing space is classified into the open access area and the 
community fisheries areas. In the freshwater lake this is similar to Vandergeest and Peluso’s 
(1995) perspective of the state’s key role in determining territoriality within all kinds of land 
designated as ‘forest’ in Thailand for direct control and exploitation of resources for state 
revenues. The demarcation of boundaries and mapping of the forest areas in Thailand is 
similar to the case of fishery resources management in Cambodia in which the state, with the 
purpose of generating national revenue, demarcates the good fishing grounds and allocates 
them into commercial fishing lots, the conservation areas and public fishing areas. Many 
fisheries whose lives are dependent on this resource long before the coming into existence of 
state law are almost outright excluded.  
 
The commercial fishing lot and conservation area boundaries of the freshwater lake 
serve similar functions to boundaries on terrestrial and maritime spaces (Newman, 2003; 
Grundy-Warr and Schofield, 2010). Boundaries are drawn delimiting the commercial fishing 
areas, conservation areas and the public fishing areas, cutting across the indigenous fishing 
grounds and ‘lived space’, ignoring the social, cultural and historical context of the Tonle 
Sap. Another critical distinction to ‘freshwater territoriality’ is that, in the Tonle Sap, 
boundaries are marked on the fluctuating water levels, varying between 1.5m and 9m above 
sea levels, between the dry season and the wet season (Kummu et al., 2008).  
 
One unique form of territorialization is what this researcher calls ‘floating 
boundaries.’ The ‘floating boundary’ is a ‘boundary line’ of the fishing lot which is marked 
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on the fluctuating water levels between wet and dry seasons. This boundary ‘floats’ in two 
ways; first, one side of the fishing lot, the side facing towards land is an open-ended boundary 
line and the fishing lot owner claims that ‘where there is water, that is the boundary of the 
fishing lot’ (Van Acker, 2005; Sithirith, 2000). This literally opens the way to extended 
seasonal claims, oftentimes without justification, and usually to the detriment of resource 
access by fishers from nearby communities. Second, the side of the lot’s boundary facing the 
Lake is affected by the fluctuating water level.  When the water level is high, then the 
boundary line is high and deep. Extending fishing lot boundaries clearly benefits the lot 
owners (Vuthy et al., 2000), causing occasional conflict with local communities.  
 
In the open fishing season, fishing lot owners literally erect fences around the fishing 
lot areas, with bamboo fences to demarcate boundary lines. These ‘bamboo boundaries’ are 
found all over the Tonle Sap and are distinguishable from Google Earth images of the Lake. 
These physical boundaries extend to the Lake bottom, and so, they not only control people’s 
access but also fish movements (Degen and Thouk, 2000; Van Zalinge et al., 2000). 
However, in the closed fishing season, the fishing lot owners are supposed to remove the 
bamboo fences (Degen et al., 2000; Van Zalinge et al., 2000; Vuthy et al., 2000). However, 
the reinstalling of the fishing lot bamboo fences may be in slightly different positions 
depending on the water-levels, and this gives rise to the contestation of the fishing lot 
boundaries. Water-levels do fluctuate from year to year as well as seasonally, which means 
that physical boundaries are rarely positioned in the same places as they were previously. The 
fishing lot owners also deliberately extend the boundaries of their fishing lots through the 
removal and re-installing process. Almost every single boundary produces localized 
contestations of one sort or another, and these are precisely the reasons why political 
geographic approaches are highly relevant to understanding resource governance and resource 
spaces. Clearly, there is a need for much tighter controls over the placement and positions of 
boundaries in the Lake, as well as peaceful conflict management mechanisms to fairly 
arbitrate boundary disputes and prevent future conflicts. Better management of formal 
 338 
boundaries is necessary, just as there is a need for better appreciation of the varied forms of 
human territoriality that exist within the lived spaces of the Lake. 
 
Indigenous forms of territoriality are rarely discussed in policy-circles or by 
academics. This researcher views territoriality as both a political strategy related to defending 
livelihoods and resource access (Sack, 1986), and as something that may be considered in 
relation to indigenous forms of ecological knowledge (Berkes, 1999), particularly in relation 
to people’s knowledge and adjustments to the annual flood pulse. For instance, many floating 
villages in the Tonle Sap float and move between locations, while some only float, and 
remain more or less stationary. Actually even fixed villages move vertically from the lowest 
area position of about 1.5 m above sea level (asl) in the dry season to the highest area position 
of about 9.50 m asl in the wet season in the lake (Kummu et al., 2008). Thus, there are two 
types of floating territoriality; mobile and vertical territorialities. Mobile territoriality is 
illustrated by the floating village of Kampong Loung, in which it floats and moves upward 
from the lowest area position of about 1.5m asl to the highest area position of about 9.50 m 
asl in the lake over a distance of 5-6km within a period of six months in the wet season; and 
then, it floats and moves downward from the highest areas position to the lowest area position 
in the lake over the same distance in the dry season. Vertical territoriality implies seasonal up 
and down movement, but not changes in location. Indeed, many floating villages, such as 
Peam Bang, are literally zone-locked by formal territorial boundaries of nearby fishing lots, 
conservation zones, and landed settlements with some lake access.  
 
Another unique spatiality of the Tonle Sap relates to the ‘pulsing territoriality’ of 
stand-stilt communities. For instance, Kampong Phluk is influenced by the ‘pulsing 
ecosystem’ of the Tonle Sap, as it is located six months on land and six months within water 
(AFN, 2004); and the community organize their livelihoods system in response to seasonal 
transformations in the environment and in response to the state-imposed territorial system. 
Under the influence of the ‘pulsing ecosystem,’ each stand-stilt community such as Kampong 
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Phluk has both terrestrial and aquatic phases (Kummu et al., 2008). First, in the terrestrial 
phase about six months of the year, people in stand-stilt communities adapt their living 
strategy according to land system and they engage in fishing and farming as a primary 
occupation—this is a ‘terrestrial territoriality,’ with access to parcels of land and forest. 
Second, in the aquatic phase about six months of the year, people adapt their living based on a 
water system and they use boats as a mean of their living, and I call this ‘aquatic 
territoriality.’  
 
Farming-fishing territoriality relates to livelihoods of people in these communities 
whereby primary occupations are farming and secondary ones are fishing. Thus, they 
organize their livelihood system based on organizing the land areas into Sreleu and Srekrom, 
and the fishing into high season and off-fishing season.  
 
All these indigenous territorialities are social-ecological adaptations to seasonal 
changes in water-level, as well as the way in which the political waterscape of the Tonle Sap 
has changed over time. Historically, the indigenous forms also relate to the Lake as a 
‘common pool resource.’ But as stressed in this thesis, human territoriality in the last century 
is most affected by state territoriality and commercial fisheries. Boundaries are delimited, and 
often demarcated (with nets, bamboo fences, other structures, and look-out towers in the 
Lake) to exclude and limit the access of local communities to fishing areas they used to fish 
long before the emergence of the state territoriality. In other words, the story of the Lake is 
similar in this regard to the numerous enclosures, dislocations and dispossessions occurring in 
forest zones of Southeast Asia (Vandergeest, 1996; Laungaramsri, 2002; Lohmann, 1999).  
 
There is a need for informed understanding of how human territoriality relates to 
questions of resource access, utilization and control. There is also a need for a deeper 
appreciation of the human ecologies that relate to spatiality in the Tonle Sap, and why and 
how people try to adjust territorial behaviour in relation to ecological and political 
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transformations of Lake-space. Finally, it seems that improved resource governance will 
require better knowledge of territoriality in relation to people’s and community notions of 
‘spaces of dependence’, that is the areas where they fish, access to other important aquatic 
resources, non-timber forest products, and other means of livelihood. This researcher believes 
that policy-makers are often too remote from village life and have little appreciation of the 
connections between resource management and the spatial practices of literally hundreds of 
thousands of people who utilize the Tonle Sap every day. The gap between everyday life and 
policy making is a big one in the Cambodian context, but as this study indicates, it is 
necessary to bridge such gaps if policies are to develop into sustainable resource management 
based on the majority of people who utilize resources for their living. 
 
9.5 Scales of Fishing 
 
Scale is used for fisheries management in the Tonle Sap, but it is strictly a 
categorization of fishing activity, not the same as geographical scale or the politics of scale 
discussions used by geographers (Howitt, 2003).  More critical applications of ‘scale’, defined 
as a size, time, level, and relational actions (Charles, 2001) in fisheries management theory 
and by Neumann (2009) in theorizing scale. However, ‘scale’ is somewhat rigidly applied in 
the Tonle Sap for fisheries management, in which the fishing population is grouped into 
‘small-scale’, ‘medium-scale’ and ‘large-scale’ fishing. This has spatial fishery access 
implications for the small-scale and medium-scale fishing is allowed within the public fishing 
areas whilst the large-scale fishing is allowed only in the commercial fishing areas. A 
‘temporal-scale’ applies to commercial fishing areas in the open fishing season, whilst the 
public fishing area may be utilized by small-scale fishers in both the open and closed fishing 




This thesis highlights the problems created by official designations of fishery scales, 
particularly in generating conflicts and over-fishing. First, ‘small-scale’ is based on a general 
assumption that fishermen are homogenous, without taking into account the wide 
differentiation that actually exists within and between floating communities, stand-stilt 
communities and farming-cum-fishing communities. In fact, this study identifies diversified 
fishing communities and multiple different practices of so-called small-scale fishing. 
 
Second, the ‘scale’ of actual fishing practices in the Tonle Sap involves complex 
social and political relations and ‘power webs’ of interaction between fishers of different 
status, money-lenders, and fish traders and so on. For instance, large-Scale fishing refers to 
commercial fishing operators who are big private investors in the Tonle Sap. The key owners 
gain commercial access of prime fishery areas through a public bidding system every 2-4 
years, but actually most fishing lot owners are able to run their fishing lots for more than 10 
years, and to do so requires maintaining special relations with higher officials as well as 
relations with small-scale fishers who look up to them as patrons (Vuthy et al., 2000). Whilst 
many fishers claim to be small-scale fishers, few of them fish using small-scale fishing gear, 
and most have up-scaled their technology beyond that of subsistence fishing gear. Such 
practices are common throughout the Tonle Sap because of the intense competition over 
fishery space, and in order to up-scale or have access to better fishing areas, they often have 
to build relationships with officials (fisheries department, police, armed forces) and fishing lot 
owners. This is an aspect of the ‘power webs’ discussed below.  
 
Third, the researcher has observed that ‘up-scaling’ is a typical livelihood strategy and 
to understand its dynamics is to better appreciate what is happening within fisheries, 
including the issue of over-fishing. The researcher believes that it is better to say that fishers 
develop their own ‘survival scales’, which have little to do with the archaic categories of the 
Fisheries Department. Declining fish yields or less return per unit of effort have enormous 
implications for the ‘everyday life’ of fishers and their families, and therefore, they are often 
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anxious about how to catch enough fish to eat, to sell, and to repay debts. To catch enough for 
today, individual fishers worry little about official fishery designations of what they should 
(in theory) be doing (small-scale fishing for subsistence), rather they focus on how to improve 
fishing gears or how to get access to good fishing areas where they may catch more fish, 
which necessitates protection from powerful people. At present, the researcher can testify that 
no single fisher in the Tonle Sap practices small-scale fishing as it is defined officially. Thus, 
there is a tendency towards a ‘tragedy’ (Hardin, 1968), but not a ‘tragedy of the commons’, 
for as this thesis has also argued, there is practically no commons as such. Every space is 
territorialized in one way or another and even public fishing areas are not under the control of 
ordinary fishers. Commercialization, territories, boundaries, and non-territorial ‘power webs’ 
literally mean that ordinary, smaller fishing operators have little choice but to try to ‘up-scale’ 
their operations and bribe or pay their way into prime fishing zones. This is not a ‘tragedy of 
the commons’ but a tragedy of poor governance.  
 
9.6 Non-Territorial and Territorial “Power Webs” 
 
As noted above, individual fishers have to articulate everyday social relations with 
other fishers, with ‘moy’ fish traders, and with other influential figures or fishing lot owners, 
or combinations of all of these. Whilst developing these kinds of social relations may help, to 
some extent, improve access to fishery resources, they tend to have a cumulative downward 
effect in the sense that many fishers become literally entrapped in various power webs of 
patronage, obligation and indebtedness. This research has found that only a talented or lucky 
few fishers actually benefit in the longer term, whilst the majority of fishers remain 
disadvantaged. This system is so deeply embedded that it could only be challenged effectively 
by collective action and collaboration amongst fishers and their communities to campaign for 




The fishing lot system, which was considered as a tool to combat illegal fishing, has 
in fact fuelled illegal fishing, including that done by fishing lot owners as well as petty 
poaching, encroachments, and localized conflicts between the lot owners and small-and 
medium-scale fishers. The enclosure of the fishing lot and the lot system creates conflict and 
violence. The conflicts have occurred as both parties compete for their respective interests, 
ranging from profits from lots to basic survival needs for poorer fishers. Facing such 
exclusions, fishers have to adopt different strategies which are found to be consistent with 
those examined by Scott (1985, 1998), wherein ‘resistance’ can be seen in different forms, 
such as, encroachment by the local people onto state properties, poaching in exclusive zones, 
‘illegal’ forms of fishing which are exercised as openly expressed forms of resentment of 
particular rules, regulations, and restrictions.  
 
Hitherto, strategies of resistance are constrained by the presence of a strong patronage 
system in the fisheries, which means that the ‘officials’, lot owners and larger-scale fishers 
are rarely punished for violations, but the ‘victims’ of encroachment (when for instance 
borders of lots are extended into public fishing zones) may end up being officially blamed for 
damaging the fisheries. In order to cope with various forms of exclusion, people primarily use 
‘individual’ tactics to look for alternative ways for survival in order to avoid outright conflict, 
similar to those described by Popkin (1979). Fishers may choose a strategy to cooperate with 
a variety of officials, traders and or lot owners. I conceptualize these strategies of fishers in 
the Tonle Sap into three main ‘power webs’: (1) fishers trapped in the ‘power webs’ of 
officials’; (2) fishers ‘in the power webs of fishing lot owners’; and (3) fishers ‘in the power 
webs of fish traders’ or ‘moy system’. These are overlapping power webs in practice, and it is 
quite common for individual fishers to be trapped in all three ‘power webs’ simultaneously.  
 
This situation is exacerbated by the existing Fisheries Law which permits a fisher to 
fish for subsistence only, but not to trade from fish caught with ‘small-scale’ fishing gear. As 
discussed earlier, such gears do not guarantee survival in the Tonle Sap Lake fisheries of 
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today. Thus, to make a living, fishers end up using ‘illegal’ larger gear as a mean of ensuring 
their survival. To do this, they pay corrupted officials for allowing this in practice. Without 
the payments they would most likely face arrest or fines for transgressing the Fisheries Law. 
Acceptance of bribes has become a common way of supplementing meager government 
salaries for many officials. Indeed, there is little secrecy about such behavior, which is 
translated into locally licit forms of protection. In this way, many fishers and officials are 













Figure 9. 1: Fishers Trapped in the ‘power web’ of corrupted officials 
 
 
Second, the commercial fishing space is territorialized into many fishing lots and the 
fishing lot is auctioned and effectively given to private control. There are 38 fishing lots in the 
Tonle Sap, each of which is sub-divided into sub-lots and lease them out to leaseholders 
(Vuthy et al., 2000; ADB, FOA & DoF, 2003). The leaseholder sub-divides the sub-lots into 
the sub-sub-lots and leases them out to the sub-leaseholds (Degen et al., 2000; Thouk and 
Sina, 1997; Vuthy et al., 2000). This is the ‘power web of fishing lot system’. The leaseholder 
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and sub-leaseholder fish until they realize that no fish left inside the sub-lot and sub-sub-lot 
areas respectively, and then, they sub-contract to other fishers who pay for entry inside the 
sub-lot or sub-sub-lot areas (Vuthy et al., 2000; Gum, 1998; Swift, 1997). To enter the fishing 
lots, the sub-lots and the sub-sub-lot areas fishers must agree to two conditions; first, they 
must share their ‘fish catch’ with the owners, usually 40 percent of the catch will go to the 
owners of the fishing lost, the sub-lots and the sub-sub-lots and 60 percent will go to the 
fishers themselves.  Second, they must agree to sell the remaining fish catches to the owners 
of the fishing lots, the sub-lots and the sub-sub-lots (Gum, 1998; Vuthy et al., 2000; Van 
Acker, 2005)(See Figure 9.2).  
 
Figure 9. 2: Fishers in the ‘power web’ in the fishing lot system 
 
The fishers, leaseholders, and sub-leaseholders fish in the fishing lot area using 
commercial fishing gear. They must do this to ensure that the income generated from fishing 

















Second, they need to secure ‘protection’ from the fishing lot owners when they fish in these 
areas.  Third, with that protection from fishing lot owners, the fishers are allowed to use 
fishing gears that ensure the highest catches, but proportions of their catches are ‘payments’  
in kind for fishing in commercial zones. 
 
Fishing lot owners effectively have ‘ownership’ over the fishing lots due to their 
relationship with higher level government officials and their ability to make ‘under table 
deals’. This involves both social capital, in terms of the social connections of fishing lot 
owners with high level government officials, and financial capital to pay the officials for the 
‘protection’ they extend over the fishing lot business. Hence, the fishing lot owners pay large 
sums of money in order to gain a long term control over the fishing lots. Furthermore, the 
fishing lot owners find it most practical to divide the fishing lots into ‘sub-lots’ and lease 
these out to leaseholders as a means of generating more income. Thus a combination of non-
territorial power relations feed into the territorial system of the Lake. This also implies that 
the fishing lot owners need the ‘leaseholders’ in order to make their business successful. In 
the same way, the leaseholder needs to have their ‘sub-leaseholders’. These form the basic 
characteristics of what I have termed the ‘power web’ of the fishing lot system. 
 
Two reasons tie fishers to this ‘power webs’. First, they gain access to good fishing 
areas enabling them to ‘up-scale’ activities. Second, by adding many ordinary fishers to this 
‘power web’, the fishing lot owners, the leaseholders and the sub-leaseholders are able to 
raise more revenues by making more demands for ‘(re)payment’.   
 
The Tonle Sap has four locations that act as key fish trading centers, including Ek 
Phnom in Battambang Province along the Stung Sangke River, Chong Kneas in Siem Reap, 
Kampong Loung in Pursat Province and Chnoc Tru in Kampong Chhnang Province. This 
trading system has its own ‘power webs’ of patrons and clients. 
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Figure 9. 3: The ‘moy’ system in the Tonle Sap 
 
To sell their catches, fishers must form relations to particular fish buyers and become 
part of the ‘moy system’, which is a fish trading system based on organizing buyers into 
collective and the mobile buyers.  The ‘fish trader’ extends the ‘moy system’ beyond the 
‘collective and mobile fish buyer’ to all fishing villages in the Tonle Sap. It means that ‘fish 
traders’ become the ‘moy’ or ‘trading partner’ to the ‘collective fish buyer’, the ‘collective 
fish buyer’ is a ‘moy’ to the ‘mobile fish buyer’, the ‘mobile fish buyer’ is a ‘moy’ to the 
‘fisherman’, and vice versa. As discussed in Chapter 8, the system also includes fish trading 
and money-lending and borrowing relations between different categories of fish traders (see 
Figure 9.3).  
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Figure 9. 4: Fishers trapped in the ‘power webs’ of fish traders in the Tonle Sap 
 
A ‘fish trader’ usually works with 2-3 collective fish buyers as a moy, then collective 
fish buyers work with 5-6 mobile fish buyers. One mobile fish buyer buys fish from 4-5 
fishing villages in the Tonle Sap and each mobile fish buyer buys from 50-60 fishers. The fish 
trader buys fish and trade fish to oversea, to Phnom Penh and to other urban areas. These 
form a ‘power web of fish trading’ in the Tonle Sap and fishers are attached to the ‘power 
web of fish trading’ for fishing and fish trading. Fishers must forge links with the ‘mobile fish 
buyers’ and fishermen take on ‘loans’ from these ‘mobile fish buyers’ but agree to sell fish 
catches back to them. The loans are used to buy food, fishing gear, fuel and other necessities. 
This loans are given without interest, but fishermen must sell fish catches to the ‘mobile fish 
buyers’ at cheaper than the market price, and the price of the fish catches is set by the 
‘collective fish buyers’, not by a fishermen. The loan given by the ‘fish buyers’ becomes part 










Thus, in the Tonle Sap, there exists a disproportionate degree of influence, and 
political and economic power with a relatively small fishery elite, including senior politicians, 
fishing lot ‘owners’, local government, police/navy, wealthy and well capitalized fishers, 
fisher traders, and officials with connections within relevant state agencies. The expansion of 
commercial fish production has undoubtedly expanded the complex ‘power web’ of patron-
client relations in the freshwater fisheries sector. As a result, many smaller-scale fishers are 
trapped in cycles of debt and relational dependency, with vulnerable livelihood security, and 
prospects of diminishing returns if fish stocks are over-exploited in the future (See Figure 
9.5).  
  
Figure 9. 5: Fishers trapped in the Complex ‘Power Webs’ of Patrons in Fisheries 
 
The ‘power webs’ described here are different from the traditional patron-client 
relations in which the patrons extracted resources and labor from clients by virtue of their 





















a degree of stability for rural communities, helping to guarantee the social and spiritual fabric 
of village life, and sometime acting to ameliorate the consequences of unequal distributions of 
land ownership among members of a community. However, the new forms of patron-client 
system or the ‘power web’ relations today serve communities less than they did in previous 
times, and this may be because they tend to serve certain personalized sets of relations and 
personal agendas, as opposed to broader societal objectives. Furthermore, the ‘power web’ 
relations or the new forms of patron-client system can be viewed as a sort of ‘shadow’ 
institutional arrangement that to an extent relies on broader political patronage networks with 
senior officials and government ministers, whilst managing to remain relatively independent 
of the state. The ‘power webs’ allow for material inducements in exchange for political 
allegiance, and it is still strong in the rural fishing communities partly due to the weakness of 
the government system in supporting myriad local communities, and partly due to the way in 
which the Cambodian state has encouraged the resurrection of patron-client relations so long 
as it yields political support for the ruling party and does not challenge state authority.  
 
9.7 Stressing ‘Localized’ Forms of Management 
  
 In a recent article, Carl Middleton and Prom Tola (2008) argue that there has been 
much scholarly, scientific and practitioner interest in various issues relating to the Tonle Sap, 
such as hydrodynamics, biodiversity, fisheries management institutions, and Integrated Water 
Resources Management (Milner et al., 2005; Kummu et al., 2006). However, very little 
attention has been given to more localized forms of water management. As I have suggested, 
to understand what is happening at various micro scales in the Tonle Sap must include 
examination of territoriality, the issue of legitimizing claims, local-level patron-client 
relations, the “moy system”, and conflicts over resource spaces. In addition, indigenous 
ecological knowledge (Berkes, 1999) requires ethnographic and socio-ecological 
understanding, which is often lacking in policy papers and institutional reports about the 
fisheries and resources of the Lake. Thus, I argue that micro-scale research is essential to the 
 351 
business of improving community-based resources management, and at the same time, to 
linking the ‘local’ with ‘trans-local’ and basin-wide policy agendas. This also calls for various 
kinds of “knowledge partnerships” (Middleton and Prom Tola, 2008; Zanetell and Knuth, 
2002) helping to combine vested specialist and indigenous knowledge in the creation of 
“spaces of engagement” (Cox, 1998). 
 
 It is also important not to be unrealistic or to reify ‘local’, ‘indigenous’ and 
‘community’ (Agrawal, 1996) for they are also ‘political’ and socially constructed, and within 
every place and every community there are socio-economic and power inequities and 
disparities. However, as Poulsen et al., (2003) have put it: “Fishers usually constitute de facto 
managers … and unless they are enlisted to take an active part in management, including 
implementation, prospects for success are poor.” In other words, ‘community-based’ 
management institutions should be given more time, resources and competency within the 
Tonle Sap. These bodies are appropriate ones to help formulate the structure and rules for 
both local-level resource governance, and to be involved collectively within bigger structures 
of Tonle Sap Basin governance. Within that broader governance, policy-making agencies, 
scientists, relevant non-governmental organizations, and community leaders should be 
engaged cooperatively whilst seriously addressing urgent multiple localized and place-based 
problems. This is unlikely to happen unless there are powerful networked spaces of 
engagement and movements that prioritize the defense of spaces of dependence. Furthermore, 
I agree with Middleton and Prom Tola (2008: 157) that the development of basin-wide 
organization with strong local institutions, provided adequate resources from the state and 
non-state bodies, should be part of an “organic process with less predictable outcomes 
originating from the bottom upwards.” That would indeed be quite a radical departure from 




9.8 Policy Implications  
9.8.1 Implication of Spatial Arrangements  
 
Space in the Tonle Sap is perceived differently by different actors and scales. One of 
the challenges is that global and regional actors have tended to emphasize the conservation of 
the Tonle Sap’s unique ecosystem, whilst national actors are quite focusing more on the 
commercial exploitation of its fisheries and other resources (Bonheur and Lane 2002; Sithirith 
and Grundy-Warr, forthcoming). There are a great many overlaps between differing 
objectives and with many overlapping spaces (conservation, commercial, public) generating 
tensions between stakeholders and institutions, especially in areas where fishing and 
agricultural activities overlap with conservational areas (Keskenen and Sithirith, 2010; 
Sithirith, 2007).  
 
The overlaps between the Biosphere Reserve space and commercial fishing lots 
produce conflicts of interests among state agencies in both the floodplain and the Lake proper 
(Bonheur and Lane 2002; Sithirith and Grundy-Warr, forthcoming). Although the Tonle Sap 
Biosphere Reserve is basically applicable throughout the lake-floodplain area, in practice the 
Ministry of Environment has full authority only over the so-called conservational Core 
Areas30. The Core Areas are partially overlapping with fishing lots that are under control of 
the Fisheries Administration. Thus, the two most dominant spaces in the Tonle Sap –fisheries 
space and conservation space– are both spatially and institutionally contested. This 
controversy over control of certain areas and spaces explains partly the current confusion and 
poor governance of the Tonle Sap (Keskinen and Sithirith, 2010).  
 
In this context, the recent establishment of the Tonle Sap Basin Authority (TSBA) 
adds further complexity to the existing multi-dimensional characteristics of Lake Governance. 
                                               
30
 The Royal Decree divided the TSBR into three zones, namely the Core Areas, a Buffer Zone and a flexible 
Transition Zone (Royal Government of Cambodia 2001) 
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These raise questions as to whether such a system can in any reasonable way be managed 
comprehensively, at least by a single institution known as TSBA. At the same time, the 
establishment of the TSBA tends to promote the centralization of the management of the 
Tonle Sap that in return could possibly intensify resource exploitation (Keskenen and 
Sithirith, 2010; Sithirith, 2007). As discussed below, there are simultaneously efforts to 
decentralize resources governance through community based management. The danger is that 
such processes will be subject to attempts to centrally control the nature and scope of 
community based management, or to perceive decentralization primarily in terms of co-opting 
community leaders within a system of tighter state control.  
 
Overcoming some of the problems of overlapping responsibilities and boundaries 
requires re-examination of the spatial arrangements by looking into the problems of 
overlapping functional space and to study the real implications that have resulted from the 
dominant overlapping official representations of space that have influenced institutional 
arrangements. At the same time, this study calls for a reform of spatial arrangements in the 
Tonle Sap in which there is a much clearer distinction between conservation zones and 
commercial fishing areas. Furthermore, the study calls for decentralized spatial arrangements 
in which local community institutions are nurtured and granted specific responsibilities for 
resource management. However, given the large number of overlapping and conflicting 
interests, there is also a need for independent conflict resolution mechanisms to handle these 
issues in a fair and unbiased manner. Finally, the acknowledgement of community fishery 
organizations alone is insufficient without strong capacity building measures and funding to 






9.8.2 Fisheries Law  
 
The management of fisheries resources in Cambodia is guided by a Fisheries Law 
promulgated in 1987 and revised in 2006. According to the Fisheries Law, the commercial 
fishing lot is auctioned or granted for private control. The Law is good for fisheries 
management and it works to promote development, uses and conservation and if the Fishery 
Law is fully implemented, fisheries resources are well protected. However, two aspects affect 
fisheries management in Cambodia. On the one hand, according to the Fisheries Law, it is 
stated that the auctioned fishing lot is auctioned every 2 years while the research fishing lot is 
re-granted every four years. In practice it is observed that the same fishing lot owner often 
controls the same fishing lot for more than 10 years, for instance, the fishing lot no.6 in 
Kampong Thom and the fishing lot no.2 in Battambang Provinces. This suggests that the 
Fisheries Law implementation is weak on issues relating to fishing lots, and allows specific 
persons-of-influence to have ownership over the fishing lots for long periods. As a 
consequence, the fishing lot owners have developed over time into a powerful fishing ‘class’ 
and the Fisheries Law has become something that looks nice in print but is mostly ineffective 
in practice.   
 
Three aspects of fisheries governance require urgent attention — fisheries policy,   
resources, and the livelihoods of fishers. It seems that the Fishery Law is developed on the 
assumption of a relative abundance of fisheries resources, but in fact scientific studies and 
evidence from fishers themselves reveals that Tonle Sap fisheries resources are under 
pressure. At the same time, fishers cannot make their living if they fish according to the 
categories and rules contained in the Fisheries Law, particularly the unrealistic notion that 
‘small-scale fishers’ fish for subsistence only, not for sale or trade.  As this thesis has strongly 
argued, there is a need to re-examine the fishery scales issue and to revise the current Fishery 
Law.   
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9.8.3 Social-ecological Relations and Livelihood Security 
 
This thesis has highlighted some important distinctions between and practices of 
floating, stand-stilt and farming-fishing communities. There has been too strong a tendency 
for policy-makers to view all villages in and around the Tonle Sap as if they have the same 
relation to the Lake and its natural resources. This thesis indicates otherwise.  
 
The study found out that the floating practices (and mobility) of floating villages are 
unrecognized by state laws, and also poorly understood by state agents. Given this official 
ignorance, the floating villages are poorly incorporated into existing legal and management 
frameworks. Furthermore, some floating villages are not necessarily officially registered by as 
legitimate villages or may only receive partial recognition as such. And very few people in 
these floating villages own any land at all, and property ownership on water is less well 
defined than on land. This means that floating villages fall between gaps in legal recognition 
and property rights. In this case, many of these villages are vulnerable to being designated as 
“illegal”, particularly perhaps if they have conflicts with fishing lot owners. The situation is 
difficult for those villages located inside fishing lots. At the same time, floating villages do 
not receive adequate social services such as health care, education, and welfare services from 
the Government unlike many of the fixed farming-fishing settlements on land. 
 
Similarly, stand-stilt communities experience similar difficulties to the floating 
villages in terms of land ownership around their villages, although they are better off for they 
do seasonally have access to land. Most of the land areas around their villages are controlled 
by the state as conservation areas for flooded forest. Another issue that sets these villages 
apart is the life style of living six months on land and six months on water, particularly during 
the rainy season whereby each house becomes an ‘individual island’ (AFN, 2004). Thus, 
access to the stand-stilt villages is often difficult and therefore, social services and other 
development programs are less prominent in these villages. It is necessary for there to be 
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greater recognition of the unique fishing cultures that are critical dimension of the lived space 
of the Tonle Sap. The floating and stand-stilt villages add character and vitality to the Lake, 
but the needs of these people and their unique relation to the flood pulse and water-levels are 
little appreciated at planning and policy-formation levels of resource governance. Thus, the 
rights to community zones, social services and resource access have not been well-protected 
or encouraged. Greater legal recognition and understanding of unique social-ecological 
relations and livelihood security needs should help to garner more supportive programs, NGO 
assistance, and fairer treatment in future.   
 
9.8.4 Community Organizing and Sustaining Resource Stewardship  
 
This thesis has illustrated that many ordinary fishers are trapped in at least three 
“power webs” – there are the “power webs” of corrupted officials (see Figure 9.1), the “power 
webs” of fishing lot owners (webs of elites) (see Figure 9.2) and the “power webs” of “moy” 
(traders) (see Figure 9.4). As a consequence, fishers are sucked and exploited by the ‘power 
webs’ of patrons, but in return, they exploit resources not simply to make their living but to 
pay numerous power webs of patrons, creating a vicious cycle tending towards over-
exploitation and natural resource degradation.  
 
If these “power webs” continue to dominate the lives of fishers in the Lake, then it is 
likely the natural resources will be over-exploited by all fishers. Pumping in millions of  
dollars into projects in the Tonle Sap by Government or multilateral donors (such as the 
ADB) will not necessarily help improve the situation of poor fishers and poor resources 
governance unless the ‘power webs’ are simultaneously challenged. Rather, increased 
investment may further strengthen existing structures and relational power of the patrons, 
whilst the majority of fishers remain impoverished.  
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One of the most important challenges in the early part of the 21st century regarding 
Tonle Sap governance is to develop strong, resilient and capable community-based 
management, with properly funded and supported institutions at local level. Following the 
Fishery Reforms of 2000, the Government of Cambodia and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) signed agreements which have transformed aspects of Tonle Sap governance, and at 
least allowed a certain degree of decentralization to take place. In 2003, there was the 
establishment of the Tonle Sap Basin Management Organization (TSBMO) (ADB, 2005b) 
that aims ‘to sustainably develop the Tonle Sap Basin’s economy and infrastructure’ partly 
through ideas of integrated water resources management (IWRM) (Milner et al., 2005) 
involving coordination from national to provincial and district levels (Middleton and Tola, 
2008). Additionally, the ADB supported a loan agreement worth around US $19 million to 
support the organization of Community Fishery Organizations (CFOs) as part of the Tonle 
Sap Environmental Management Project (TSEMP) with the expressed aim of establishing 
‘over 175’ CFOs around the Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve (TSBR, 2007). As noted in 
Chapter 6, community based resource management (CBRM) has become something of a 
mantra for policy-makers seeking to decentralize natural resource management (Vandergeest 
and Peluso, 2010). This researcher believes that a greater emphasis on community-level 
institutions and organization is vital to improved governance, although there are some critical 
issues that need to be addressed for CFOs to play a more effective part in resources 
management. 
 
Examples of relatively successful CFOs can be found. For instance, where there is 
good financial support from competent agencies, such as OXFAM or the small grant schemes 
of the UNDP, with capacity-building inputs from existing community-based groups and/or 
local non-governmental organizations, then CFOs can develop (Bonheur, 2007). All CFOs 
and other forms of CBRM require meeting relevant by-law agreements, with formal mapping 
delimitation of CFO boundaries for conservation areas to be approved initially at provincial, 
then at national level by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). CFO 
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Area Agreements with accurate maps at 1:50,000 scale with coordinates of boundaries, plus 
details of CFO organizational structure, members, objectives, and management plans must be 
submitted to MAFF for official registration and approval (Bonheur, 2007). Thus, some of the 
intractable localized political geography problems that affect relations between different 
stakeholders, be they particular villages and fishing lots, or between floating villages and 
fixed settlements, or community zones and designated fishery conservation areas, remain 
impediments to the establishment of CFOs in some parts of the Tonle Sap. Not all community 
fishery areas will receive official government blessing, and not all community groups have 
the capacity to prepare the necessary documentation required by the Sub-Decree on the 
Management of Community Fishery Organizations adopted in June 2005. Thus, better 
understanding of the politics of space and the connections between fishery zoning and 
livelihood politics is required. Furthermore, the rising and falling of lake waters with the 
annual flood pulse, and social-ecological adaptations (which are fundamental adjustments 
within everyday livelihood strategies), mean that fixed all-year-round boundaries are not 
always sufficient markers of complex spaces of resource dependence for local people.  
 
The bigger scale impediments to grounded (Lake-level) community resource 
management are the concentric ‘power webs’ discussed in some detail earlier. This researcher 
argues that in order to lessen the stranglehold of the ‘power web’ of patrons have on ordinary 
fishers, their families and fellow villagers, it is necessary to develop community-level savings 
groups (as distinct from micro-credit institutions), self-help groups (based on community 
personnel and volunteers with NGO support), and advocacy groups (that means local people 
advocating particular strategies or policy measures), helped by local non-governmental 
organizations, including women’s organizations, environmental bodies, and agencies such as 
the Fisheries Action Coalition Team (FACT).  
 
Getting community groups involved in localized savings schemes or ‘community 
banks’ will potentially help to reduce some of the chronic dependency on the webs of the 
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‘moy’, fish traders and moneylenders. But this can only be built up over a few years with help 
from competent non-governmental bodies with government agency and Fisheries Department 
support. Fishers are already indebted to varying degrees, and without additional external 
supports from small grants (such as those provided by UNDP) and other sources, they are 
unlikely to be able to commit themselves to developing community fisheries and local 
conservation schemes. Additionally, some CFOs are being encouraged to auction fishery 
areas and to earn some income from allowing non-member fishers to fish within community 
zones, which may in the long run provide ways of lessening the ‘power webs’ of the fishing 
lot owners. 
 
External support requires “knowledge partnerships” (Zonetell and Knuth, 2002) at 
various scales and levels, including improved relations between relevant state officials and 
community representatives (Middleton and Tola, 2008: 157). Whilst there are some CFO 
successes, there are still many parts of the Tonle Sap where community management is more 
on paper than it is in actual practice, with high levels of mistrust between local people and 
government officials and numerous unresolved conflicts of the kind discussed in parts of this 
thesis. As Neou Bonheur, Project Director of the TSEMP states: “It may take some years 
before CFOs can stand on their own feet” (Bonheur, 2007: 4). However, this researcher would 
also agree that CBRM, with cultivation of local institutions, capacities, and resources, and 
with better NGO-CBO coordination, does offer prospects of improving resource stewardship, 
fisheries protection and more sustainable livelihoods.  
 
For the CFOs and other CBRM mechanisms to have any real teeth in environmental 
resource governance there is also a need for collective (inter-and intra-CFO and CBO) action. 
This is the kind of politics is discussed by political geographer Kevin Cox (1998) as a means 
to create appropriate “spaces of engagement” through collaboration, regular meetings, 
networking with relevant organizations, and the development of associational power. This is 
precisely the type of work I am both intellectually and socially committed to. Hitherto, such 
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inter- community fishery organization and inter-CBO connections within the Tonle Sap are 
barely discernible, but it is clear to this researcher that more cohesive socio-political 
associations, lobbying and actions will be required to challenge the worse aspects of poor 
governance at macro-levels and the embedded power relations associated with patron-client 
networks, indebtedness and over-reliance on the existing socio-economic “power webs.” 
Having worked within an NGO working with fishing communities in the Tonle Sap, I am 
aware of the immense effort and dedication this will require over the next few years, 
particularly from concerned NGOs working alongside various community institutions around 
the Lake. This is a juncture between an academic thesis that has allowed me to study the 
politics and political geographies of the Tonle Sap and important advocacy work that lies 
ahead.  
 
9.9 Future Research Suggestions 
 
My thesis stems from a deep personal engagement within the ‘politics’ of the Tonle 
Sap as a director of a small but active NGO concerned about the future of the majority of 
people who live there, the future of the environment and the long-term sustainability of the 
fisheries. I have focused as a ‘scholar’ undertaking a PhD on a political geographical 
perspective, in part in prior recognition of the Tonle Sap having a very complex political 
landscape. It is my intention and desire to continue to undertake such research because there 
are urgent needs for the political geographic and other ‘political’ realities to be incorporated 
into policy agendas which includes social justice for the ‘place-based’ interests of people who 
are dependent on a rich ecosystem and freshwater resources for their livelihoods. 
 
However, there are many other areas of research to consider given increased resource 
degradation. These include the implications of regional and global spaces on the resources 
and people in the Tonle Sap. The issue of climate change is vitally important and it is 
necessary to understand huge numbers of local-level
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devise better forms of resource governance at higher levels. The Tonle Sap is one of the most 
important ‘barometers’ for measuring and analyzing such transformations to the physical and 
human landscape, as well as the political of policy in times of great economic and 
environmental change.  These multi-scale challenges are already affecting the viability of the 
Lake as a vital source of social and natural capital for ordinary people for years to come. 
 
Perhaps even more immediate and no less challenging are the politics of competing 
land-uses and resource-uses in the Mekong Basin as a whole, particularly water for irrigation, 
flood control, and hydropower. There is an immediate danger of a new cascade of dams being 
constructed along the mainstream of the Lower Mekong River, which would potentially bring 
many changes to the hydrological, ecological and cyclical patterns that are so vital to the 
reverse flow, fish migrations, and annual flood pulse. This thesis has focused intensively on 
trying to understand the politics of space within a freshwater lake, but an equally urgent task 
is that of ‘connecting’ the intra-Basin politics to the broader challenges confronting the 
Mekong region as a whole. As probably the only Cambodian activist-scholar who reads 
Political Geography I hope to play a full part in both further research and policy-related 
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Appendix One: Questionnaire for Interviewing the Officials 
 




4. Education: _________________________________________ 
5. Position: ______________________________________________ 
6. Work station: Province:_________________________District:_____________________ 
7. How long have you been in this position?________________________ 
 
II. Territoriality of the Tonle Sap 
 
1. Why the Tonle Sap is territorialized into commercial fishing lot, public fishing areas, and 
conservation area? 
2. When it was territorialized and by whom? 
3. How each zone is managed?  
a) Fishing lot area:_________________________ 
b) Public fishing areas:________________________ 
c) Community fishery area:___________________ 
d) Conservation area:___________________ 
 
III. Fishing Lot 
1. How long fishing lot owners have controlled that fishing lots?  
2. How could he become the owners of those fishing lots? 
a) Through public bidding:________________ 
b) Through a government offer: 
3. Why he could control that fishing lot that long? 
a) He wins the bidding all times: ___________________________________ 
b) He pay the officials:______________________ 
c) He got political from high government level:_________________________________ 
d) He is powerful: ____________________________ 
4. Whom he employs for the fishing lot: 
a) Villagers from neighboring villages:_______________________________ 
b) People from outside the village:___________________________ 
5. Does he sell fishing rights to a leasee and sub-leasee of he fish himself? 
6. How many shareholders? Who are they? 
7. Any politician or government officials is part of the share? 
Yes: __________________ 
No:___________________ 
8. How he manages his fishing lot? 
a) Fence around the fishing lot areas and fished by himself:______________________ 
b) Sell divided areas to sub-leasee:________________ 
c) He fish first and sell afterward:__________________ 
 
IV. Boundary of commercial fishing lot 
1. Is boundary of commercial fishing lot fixed or changed over time?  
2. How fishing lot boundary is enforced under the changing water level in the Lake?  
a) Through map:____________________________ 
b) Through using GPS:_______________________ 
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c) Through consensus between commercial fishing lot and 
community:_________________ 
d) Through placing boundary mark:______________________ 
e) Through regular intensive patrol:_____________________ 
f) Trough extending the boundary pole:____________________ 
 
3. Does often fishing lot owner enlarge the fishing lot boundary? Yes:_________; 
No:________ 
4. If yes, how they do that? 
a) With supports from high ranking government officials:_________________ 
b) Bribing the local officers to ignore its but remove it when officials check and 
control:________ 
c) Use armed group to enforce the extended boundary with support from local 
officials:_________ 
d) Making up the map:______________________________ 
5. Is boundary on map and boundary on changing water level realistic?  
a) Boundary is unrealistic between map and on ground:________________________ 
b) Boundary is up and down due to changing water level:____________________ 
c) Boundary is up to mouth of powerful officials: ____________________ 
d) Boundary is up to the commercial fishing lot:____________________ 
6. How fishing lot boundary is enforced when the commercial fishing lot extends the 
boundary? 
a) Often enforced by the fisheries officials when people 
complain:____________________ 
b) Often not enforced by the fisheries officials despite people complain: 
________________ 
c) No enforced at all, although people complain:________________________ 
 
V. Fishing Season 
1. When the fishing lot owner starts fishing season and stop fishing?  
Open fishing season:________________ 
Close fishing seasons:_______________ 
2. Does the fishing lot owner own the fishing lot areas both in open and closed fishing 
season? 
3. What did the fishing lot owner do in the close fishing season? In practice, does the fishing 
lot fish in the close fishing season?  
4. Can the small fishermen fish in the fishing lot areas? 
a) Open fishing season:______________________________ 
b) Closed fishing season:___________________________ 
5. Has fishing season and closed fishing season been effectively enforced? Who enforces it?  
 
VI. Fishing gear 
1. What fishing gears do fishing lot owner use to fish in the fishing lot?  
2. Does the fishing lot owners fence around the fishing lot areas by bamboo fence? 
Yes:______; No:____________ 
3. Does the fishing lot owner need to get approval from fisheries officials over the use of the 
fishing gears for his fishing lot area?  
Yes:____________; No:_________________ 
4. How does the DoF ensure that fishing lot owners do not use the destructive fishing gear to 
fish in their fishing lot areas?  
a) Regular monitor:________________________ 
b) Periodical monitor:____________________ 
c) Annual monitor:___________________ 
d) Monitor based on a complain:_____________________ 
5. Where these fishing gears come from? Who provide them with these gears? 
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6. How fishing gears used by the fishing lot owners evolved over time: 
a) Increase both the size and quantity to catch more fish:____________________ 
b) Remain as it was:_________________________ 
7. Why the fishing lot owners increase the size and number of fishing gears? 
8. Does the fishing lot owner increase the fishing gears to catch a selected fish species? 
 
VII. Fishing lot exploitation 
1. How do you rate the fishing exploitation by the fishing lot owner? 
a) Over-exploitation: _________________________ 
b) Optimal exploitation:_____________________ 
2. Does the fishing lot owner increase catch or reduce? 
a) Increase catch:____________________ 
b) Maintain the same level of catch:_____________________ 
c) Reduce the catch:_______________________ 
3. Where does the fish catch from the fishing lot go? 
a) Local market:________________ 
b) International export:__________________ 
c) Both local and international market:____________ 
 
VIII. Fishing lot management 
1. Does the fishing lot management is the only tool for fisheries management in the Tonle 
Sap? Yes:________________; No:_________________________________ 
2. If yes, Why_____________________________________________ 
3. If no, why_____________________________________________ 
4. Do you think the fishing lot management is appropriate for Tonle Sap? 
5. Do you fishing lot should be existed in the future in the Tonle Sap? Why 
6. Does the fishing lot protect the resources and environment? 
7. Does fishing lot protect the people?  
8. Does the fishing lot owner respect the roles of local authority? How local authority plays a 
role in fishing lot management? 
9. How local authorities resolve the conflict between the fishing lot owner and community? 
10. What local authority does when community report about illegal fishing activities by 
fishing lot owner?  
11. Can local authority stop illegal fishing lot in the fishing lot area?  
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for Interviewing Villager 
 
Village:................................; Commune: ......................................; 
District:..................................; Province:......................................................... 
 
I. Household data 
1. Name: ......................................; 2. Sex: male/female:..................................; 
3.Age:........................; 4. Education: 
...............................................................................................      
a) Elementary: 
b) Primary : 
c) Secondary:  
d) High school:  
e) Others:  
5.Employment:..............................................................................................................................
...... 
a) MAIN EMPLOYMENT: What is your main 
job?........................................................................... 
b) SECONDARY EMPLOYMENT: What are your secondary 
jobs?.................................................................................... 
c) TERTIARY EMPLOYMENT: What are your other 
jobs?................................................................................................. 





1 Fish on own without 
motor 
11 Fishing  net/fish trap 
repair 
21 Housekeeping 
2 Fish on own with motor 12 Crocodile rearing 22 Home gardening 
3 Fish with a small group 
without motor 
13 Pig rearing 23 Carpentry 
4 Fish on a small group 
with motor 
14 Petty trading and shop 
keeping (non-fish) 
24  
5 Fishing labourer 15 Farming 25  
6 Fish processing 16 Daily Labour 26  
7 Smoking fish 17 Forest products (say 
what) 
27  
8 Fish trading/selling 18 Chicken/duck rearing 28  
9 Fish (cage) culture 19 Motor and boat driving 29  
10 Fishing net/gear making 20 Government service 30  
 










II. Population and migration 
 
1. How long have you been living in this 
village?________________________________________ 
2. How old this village is? _____________________________ 
3. How long this village has been existed?________________________  
4. How many family living in this village (now and past 5 years)? 
5. How many people in this village are newly settled? __________________________ 
6. How long they have settled? 
a) They settle there periodically  for fishing:________________________________ 
b) They settle there for more than 2-3 fishing season?________________________ 
c) They go and come back:___________________________________________ 
 
7. Why they settle there? 
a) They settle there for fishing as they migrate from 
upland:_________________________ 
b) They settle there for fishing as they have relative in this 
village:____________________ 
c) They settle there because they used to fish there for many 
generation:________________ 
d) They settle there because of 
marriage:_________________________________________ 
e) They settle there because they have farmland in their own 
village:___________________ 
f) Working as a fisherman of other people:____________________________________ 
 
8. Are they legally settled there? Who recognize them? 
9. Are they a member of the village yet?  
10. What problem they make for you and your village? 
a) Did illegal fishing:_________________________ 
b) Bribe officials:____________________________ 
c) Introducing destructive fishing gears:____________________________ 
 
11. Do people in this village migrate out? __________What type of out-migration they did? 
a) Seasonal migration:_____________________________ 
b) Labor migration:________________________________ 
c) Migration for fishing activity:________________________ 
12. How long they migrate? 
a) Temporal migration:_________________________ 
b) Short time migration:____________________ 
c) Long time migration:_______________________ 
 
13. Where they migrate to? 
a) Migrate to find work in Thailand:___________________________________ 
b) Migrate to seek work in Phnom Penh:___________________________________ 
c) Migrate to seek work in Provincial Town and district center:_________________ 
 
14. What benefits and non-benefit they bring for the village? 
a) Bringing in money for family:________________________ 
b) Bringing in new lifestyle:_________________________ 
c) Bringing in new ideas of fishing and other type of work: ______________________ 
d) Bringing in a drug and 
prostitution:__________________________________________ 
e) Bringing in a disease:___________________________________________ 
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III. Fishing Activity 
 
1. Where do you fish?  
a) Community fishing area:_______________________ 
b) Public fishing ground:_______________________ 
c) Fishing in conservation area:_____________________________ 
2. How far it is from you house?  2km_____________; 5km:_________________ 
3. How long have you been fishing there?_________________________________ 
 
A) Community fishery 
 
1. How community fishery is established?  
2. Who set up this community fishery?  
3.When it was established?  
4. Who have participated in this community fishery establishment?  
5. What is the size of community fishery area?  
6. Is this community fishery was part of the public fishing area or commercial fishing lot? Has 
community fishery area been demarcated? Is it boundary clear?  
7. Are you a member of community fishery? yes:________; No:______________ 
8. Are all villagers a member of this community fishery? Yes:_______; No:________ 
9. What role you do you play in CF?  
Committee or member:____________ 
10. Are you fishing in community fishery area?  
11. What contribution do you make as a member of CF? 
12. What benefits do you get from CF? 
 
13. How community enforces the community fishery area?  
14. Is there fisherman from outside your community areas fished in you community fishery 
area?  
15. Can community enforce illegal fishing activity in its community areas by themselves? 
Can they arrest the illegal fishers? yes:____________; No:_____________ 
a) If yes, why it is?-_________________________ 
b) If no, why not? ____________________________ 
 
16. If you could not enforce the community fishery area, what could you do to protect the 
community areas from illegal fishing? 
a) Reporting to fishery officials to and seek for help:________________________ 
b) Arresting the illegal poachers and fine them by 
themselves:________________________ 
c) Arresting and sending them to fisheries 
officials:______________________________ 
 
16. What problems do you face as a community fishery in enforcing the community areas?  
a) Fishery officials are far distance from 
community:_______________________________ 
b) Some cases, fishery officials come but not enforce, but get 
bribe:____________________ 
c) When officials arrive, poachers run 
away:______________________________________ 
d) Poacher revenges the community members who report the 
case:____________________ 
e) Poachers are equipped with high-tech fishing gears: 
______________________________ 
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f) Poacher is powerful and supported by high government 
officials:____________________ 
 
17. Is community fishery member equally accessed to the community fishery area? Is there a 
powerful person in the community influencing the community fishery?   
Has community been able to protect the community fishery areas from illegal fishing?  
Is the community is the effective agent to protect the fisheries resources? 
 
B) Public Fishing areas 
 
1. Why do you fish in public fishing?  
a) My community has not organized the community fishery 
yet:______________________ 
b) Restricted to small scale fishing gear only if fishing in community 
fishery:____________ 
c) Not a member of Community fishery:_______________________________ 
d) No money to pay the community fishery:________________________________ 
e) Controlled by a few people:___________________________________________ 
2. Are there many or few fishermen fishing there? 
a) Few only:_______________________ 
b) Many fishermen:__________________ 
 
3. Do you get a permission to fish there? What fishing scale are you? 
a) Medium scale___________________ 
b) small scale:_________________________ 
 
4. If medium scale, why you choose to fish with medium scale:___________________,  
5. With medium scale, when do you start to fish and when do you stop?________________ 
 
6. If you fish with small scale, why you choose to fish with small scale: 
a) Lack of money to buy larger gear:_________________________ 
b) Have no money to pay the officials:________________________ 
c) To avoid conflict with medium scale fishermen:_________________ 
d) Too complicate to fish with medium scale:______________________________ 
e) Too restrictive to fish with medium scale: ________________________________ 
 
7. Are you fishing in one specific location all the times, or you move around to fish?  
a) Moving around:__________________________ 
b) Fish in a fixed location:_________________________________________ 
 
8. In case you move around to fish; why you move around to fish? 
a) Due to less fish:_______________ 
b) Fishing area is too large I can fish any where I want:___________________ 
c) No boundary to hold me to one place:_____________________________ 
d) I try to avoid competing with others:________________________ 
e) Many community fishery is established and less fishing ground for me, everywhere I 
fish, there is always community fishery areas:____________________________ 
 
9. If you are fishing in a fixed location, why it is? 
a) I buy the fishing areas:___________________ 
b) Not enough labor to move:____________________ 
c) Not enough fishing area to move to:______________________ 
d) Everywhere the fishing ground is occupied by people:____________________ 
 
10. How do fishermen share the public fishing areas? 
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a) By consensus:___________________________ 
b) By grouping medium scale in one area and small scale in 
another:__________________ 
c) By power they have:__________________________________ 
d) By competition:_____________________________________ 
 
 
12. Who fish there with you? a) Fishermen from the same village?_________________; b) 
fishermen from neighboring village?________________________; c) fisherman from other 
places___________________ 
 
13. Do you fish as a group or as an individual? How many days you are staying per fishing 
trip?  
 
14. What problem do you face? 
a) Conflict between small scale and medium scale 
fishermen:________________________ 
b) Medium scale fishes and damage the fishing of small scale 
fishermen:_______________ 
c) Small scale fishermen upgrade their fishing gears to deal with medium 
scale:_________ 
 
C) Fishing in conservation and fishing lot areas 
 
1. Have you ever been fishing in conservation or fishing lot areas? yes:________; No:____. 
 
2. If yes, why? 
a) Unclear boundary: I don't know that is the conservation or fishing lot 
areas:____________________ 
b) Fishing lot owners allow me to fish inside the fishing lot and share the 
fish:___________ 
c) I pay the officials who protect the conservation areas:_________________________ 
d) I encroach the conservation and fishing lot areas as there is rich in 
fish:_______________ 
 
IV. Fishing gear: 
 
1What type of fishing gear do you use? 
a) Fishing net: How many meter?____________________ 
b) Gillnet: How many meter?_________________________ 
c) Fishing line: How many______________________ 
d) Fishing trap: How many________________________ 
 
2. How do you classify your fishing gear? Subsistence:____________________; medium 
scale: ____________; Commercial scale:___________________________________ 
 
3. Do you make your own fishing gears or you buy it?  
a) Make it 
b) rent it; if you rent it, how much it is? whom do you rent from? how long you rent it? 
How do you pay the rent? Cash: ___________; Kinds:________; Pay in 
fish:__________ 
c) Buy it 
If you buy it, where did you buy?--within a village; from outside the village; people come 
to sell it occasionally? How much it is? How did you pay it?--pay full price; pay an 
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installment; take the credit from money lender to pay the bill; agree to sell fish to the 
money lender when got fish. 
5. Have you been increasing your fishing gears compared to 5-10 years ago? 
Yes:__________; No:__________ 
6. If yes; what make you change it?  
7. Do you need to get approval from DoF for this increased gear and did they approve it? 8. If 
they do not approve it--what do you do?  
9. Since you have increased your fishing gears, your catch is increased also? yes:__; No:__ 
10. How is each fishing gear used? How many months each is used? What type of fishing 
ground each is used?  
a) Fishing net:____________________ 
b) Gillnet: _________________________ 
c) Fishing line: ______________________ 
d) Fishing trap: _ 
 
V. Fish Catch 
 
1. How many kg of fish you could fish a day? Present catch:____________; 5-10 years ago 
catch:_________ 
2. What type of fish species you catch everyday? 5-10 years ago:__________; at 
present:____________ 
3. What is composition of the fish catch? 5-10 years ago:__________________; At 
present:_________ 
4. Who go to fish in your family? Husband/wife and child:5-10 years ago:___________; At 
present:__________ 
 
5. How many days you fish a week, a month, and a year at present:____________; at 5-10 
years ago?  
6. Is there a peak fishing season, how many kg of fish you could catch a day during the peak 
fishing season at present and 5-10 years ago? If yes, how long the peak fishing season is?  
7. When is a low fishing season, how many kg of fish you fish to day and 5-10 years ago 
during the low fishing season?  
8. When there is no fishing activities and what do people do and how they support their food? 
 
9. How many kg of fish you could catch a day during peak fishing season and low fishing 
season? How was 5-10 years ago?  
10. how many people in your family involve in catching that fish? Does your wife and 
children involve in fishing?  
11. What fishing gears do you use to catch that fish? how long do you fish a day now? How 
long do you fish a day in 5-10 years ago?  
12. How many kg of fish catch/day was in 5-10 years ago? Does fish catch increase or 
decline? 
13. If decline, what causes fish catch decline?  
a) due to poor governance?  
b) due to illegal fishing?  
c) due to increased fishing population? 
  
14. Have your catching efforts been increased nowadays compared to last 5-10 years? What 
make your catching effort increased?  
15. How do you use the catch? How much you eat and how much you sell? What is the 
quality of fish you eat compared with fish you sell? How many kg of catch you have 
processed for your food? 
 
VI. Fish trade/Fish Sale 
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1. How do you trade your fish?  
a) Exchange fish with rice:_____________;  
b) sell to fish trader:__________________;  
c) sell to money lender:______________________ 
 
2. Do you process fish first and sell it later or you sell fresh fish? Why? 
a) No fish processing facility:________________________________ 
b) Lack of fish processing technology:___________________________ 
c) Cost more to process than to sell it freshly:_____________________ 
d) Do not have experiences in processing:__________________________ 
 
3. How much the price of fish/kg in 5-10 years ago and at present?  
Where you sell your fish? 
a) At the market:_______________________; 
b) In the village:_________________ 
 
4. Who buy your fish? fish trader:_____________; money lender: _________________ 
 
5. How the price of fish is determined?  
a) Negotiable between fisherman and buyer:______________________;  
b) The price of fish is there in the market:_________________________ 
c) The price of fish is influenced by the fish trader:________________;  
d) The Prince of fish is determined by the money lender as a 
precondition:______________ 
 
6. If you sell fish to money lender or fish trader, why is that? Why don't sell it directly to 
market?  
a) Due to taking advance from money lender:________________________;  
b) Lack of transportation to market:_____________________________________;  
c) the cost for transportation to the market is 
high:_______________________________; agreement with money lender or fish 
trader:__________________________________;  
d) Lack of frozen equipment:________________________________________ 
 
7. How stable the price of fish is compared 5 years ago? 
a) The price of fish sell to money lender:_____________________ 
b) The price of the same fish sell to fish trader:___________________ 
c) The price of the same fish sell in the public market:_______________ 
d) The price of the same fish sell in the village 
 
8. How do you spend your income from fishing? 
a) Buying rice and food:_$____________________________ 
b) Buying fishing gears:$________________________ 
c) Buying fishing fuel: $___________________________ 
d) Social activity:$_________________________________ 
e) Health care:$____________________________________ 
f) Child education:$________________________________________ 
 
VII. Payment for Fishing 
 
1. Do you pay to fish?  
2. Whom do you pay?  
3. Is it official paid? yes or no;  
4. If not official paid, who is he?  
5. Do you pay per access, daily, monthly or weekly?  
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6. Do you pay in cash or kind? How much did you pay?  
7. Did you pay to community to fish in community fisheries areas? How much service do you 
receive from paying him?  
8. Why did you pay? 
a) Due to doing illegal fishing:____________________ 
b) Due to fishing in different fishing areas not assigned for him:__________________ 
c) Due to corrupted officials:___________________________ 
d) due to fishing in closed fishing season:___________________ 
e) Due to low fish catch and not enough food if fishing with legal fishing 
gears:__________ 
f) Official based in the field has low salary:_______________________ 
g) The officials request to you to pay:__________________________ 
9. How long have you been paying for fishing in this area?_________________ 












Appendix 3: Focus Group Discussion 
Date:   
Time:   
Place:   
Village Name:   
Commune:   
District:   
Province:   
Group type:   
No. of participants:   
 
Reminders: 
1. Greet and welcome participants and thank them for coming. 
2. Let them sit or arrange them in a way enough for everybody to take part and interact, 
so maybe a semi-circle. Be seated at eye level. 
3. Introduce the team and explain the purpose of the gathering. 
4. Get to know the participants. Let them briefly say who they are, what do they do, etc. 
5. Explain the FGD exercise. Emphasize that what you want to find out and discuss with 
them are issues as a community (or village) and not individually.  
6. Ask if they have questions before formally starting the discussion. 
7. To end the gathering, do not forget to summarize the outcomes or results of the 
discussion, tell them what’s next and most of all thank them for their valuable 








Ask villagers to describe the situation of their villages in relation to 
fishery and its evolution overtime.  
Brainstorming by just listing 
them down,  
 
Where are the fishing grounds for them? Where is the fishing areas for 
community fisheries? Where is the fishing lot areas 
Mapping these areas and 
analyze the fishing areas belong 
to community in this areas 
What are the pressing problems or issues related to fishing areas, access 
to fisheries?  
• Boundary of the fishing lot, and community areas 
• Territory of the fishing lot and community areas--total areas 
• Any conflict over these areas 
Brainstorming by just listing 
them down, then score them 
 
How have these problems changed over time?  
 
Historical analysis 
What are the causes or reasons behind these problems? 
 
Problem tree 
What are the effects of these problems especially to your livelihood? 
(health, time, income, expenses etc) 
Discussion, diagram 
How do people address or cope with these problems? 
 
Discussion 
What do you think are alternative solutions to these problems?  Why do 
these not happen? 
Discussion, ranking and scoring 
What would be required to make these solutions happen? 
 
Discussion 
Who are the important and influential persons, groups or organizations 
who could help or contribute in addressing the problems or carrying out 
programs for improvement of the village? 
Venn/Chapatti diagram  
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Appendix 4: Fishing Lot Numbers and Area 
Table D-1: Changes in area of fishing lots in Tonle Sap 
Province Fishing lot area 
in 1919 (ha)a) 
Fishing lot 
area in 1940b)  
(ha) 
Fishing lot area 
from 1998 to 
2000(ha)c)  
Fishing area in 
2001 (ha)c) 
Kampong Chhnang 67,667 63,037 62,256 45,084 
Kampong Thom 248,272 192,571 127,126 69353 
Siem Reap   83941 22725 
Pursat 105  55,120 24,848 
Bantey Meanchey 182,352 189,362 332,756 6,411 
Battambang   146,532 102,718 
Total Tonle Sap Lake 603,880 (42.09%) 444,970 
(46.7%) 
507,731 (53.23%) 271,139 (64.21%) 
Total Cambodia 1,434,710 952,039 953,740 422,216 
Source: a) Degen et al., 2000, citing  1919 Maps from National Archives 
            b) Degen et al., 2000, citing Cheyvy and Le Poulain 1940 
             c) Sub-decrees DoF, January 2001. 
 



























1980-88 307 143 96 - 13 - 55 11 
1989-90 302 141 76 7 13 31 34 13 
1991-92 301 141 76 8 13 31 32 15 
1993-94 298 141 74 8 13 31 31 15 
1995-96 279 141 63 8 13 31 23 15 
1997 277 141 63 8 13 31 23 15 
1999 270 153 63 8 13 31 20 13 
2000-
2002 
164 82 60 8 13 0 1 13 









Appendix 5: Fishing Occupation 
Table E-1: Primary Occupation of villages in Zone 2, Zone 3 and Zone 4 
       Zone 1 
     Zone 
2 
     Zone 3      Zone 4 
     Zone 
5 
    All zones 
Primary 
Occupation No % 
N
o % No % No % 
N
o % No % 





0 3 3.60 18 3.80 44 6.40 4 6.30 251 15.50 
Fish Selling 4 1.30     3 0.60 6 0.90 1 1.60 14 0.90 
Fish Culture 2 0.70     1 0.20         3 0.20 
Fish Processing 5 1.70             1 1.60 6 0.40 
Fishing Net / Gear 
 / Trap Making 1 0.30                 1 0.10 





0 3 3.60 22 4.60 50 7.30 6 9.50 275 17.10 
Bamboo and  
Cane Works             2 
0.30


















Daily Labor 7 2.30 4 4.80 6 1.30 19 2.70 11 
17.5
0 47 2.90 
Housekeeping 2 0.70     1 0.20 3 0.40     6 0.40 
Petty Trading / 
 Shopkeeping 15 5.00 1 1.20 11 2.30 28 4.00 12 
19.0
0 67 4.10 
Business 9 3.00     1 0.20 3 0.40 6 9.50 19 1.20 
Govt Service 4 1.30 3 3.60 11 2.30 49 7.10 4 6.30 71 4.40 
Motor Taxi /  
Boat Driving 6 2.00     5 1.00 1 0.10 3 4.80 15 0.90 
Other1 11 3.70     7 1.50 6 0.90     24 1.50 
Total 
29




0 99.6 62 98.3 
161
4 99.80 
Source: Household survey 1998 (MRC/DoF) 
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Table E-2: The secondary occupation of villages in Zone 2, Zone 3 and Zone 4 
     Zone 1      Zone 2      Zone 3      Zone 4      Zone 5     All zones   
Secondary  
Occupation No % 
N
o % No % No % 
N
o % No % 
                          










0 1 1.60 324 
20.0
0 
Fish Selling 31 
10.4
0 1 1.20 9 1.90 12 1.70     53 3.30 
Fish Culture 54 
18.1
0         3 0.40 2 3.20 59 3.60 
Fish 
Processing 20 6.70 1 1.20 1 0.20 3 0.40     25 1.50 
Fishing Net /  
Gear / Trap  
Making             1 0.10     1 0.10 















0 3 4.80 462 
28.5
0 
                          
Bamboo and  
Cane Works 4 1.30 1 1.20 3 0.60 12 1.70     20 1.20 
Farming 7 2.30 3 3.60 30 6.30 48 6.90 6 9.50 94 5.80 













0 5 6.00 96 
20.0
0 50 7.20 2 3.20 193 
11.9
0 
Petty Trading /  
Shopkeeping 23 7.70 7 8.30 46 9.60 95 
13.7
0 4 6.30 175 
10.8
0 
Business 3 1.00     7 1.50 6 0.90 3 4.80 19 1.20 
Govt Service 5 1.70 3 3.60 11 2.30 29 4.20 2 3.20 50 3.10 
Motor Taxi /  
Boat Driving     1 1.20 6 1.30 13 1.90 3 4.80 23 1.40 
Other1 25 8.40 6 7.10 21 4.40 48 6.90 3 4.80 103 6.40 


























Source: Household survey 1998 (MRC/DoF) 
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Appendix 6: Picture of Fishing Villages 
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